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Abstract
How are companies responsible for helping to ensure orderly financial markets? In economic theory,
the question is redundant, because orderly markets result from normal business activity, with
support from regulators. Within the last few years, however, several episodes have suggested
differently. Citigroup investment bank was fined for destabilising bond markets, despite being
absolved of criminal conduct. Sovereign wealth funds were compelled to sign a code-of-conduct, to
safeguard "free and open markets", despite having brought economic benefits globally. The USand
UK governments described the most profitable financial decade in generations as an "age of
irresponsibility", after it led to a crisis. These three episodes are the empirical focus of this thesis.
The thesis develops a grounded theory of corporate market responsibility (CMR)- an expectation by
regulators and other actors that firms will help to regulate systemic risk in financial markets through
discretionary activities that supplement regulatory requirements. This expectation explains the
controversies, and may help us to anticipate and understand similar episodes in future. Further, it is
argued that observing CMR conduct - which relates to risk management, investment policy, and
proactive improvement - decreases regulatory risk for financial firms, while not observing it
increases regulatory risk. The primary reason for this is that CMR conduct is perceived to reduce
systemic risk, and state actors regard market governance as a shared responsibility with firms.
In addition to framing these controversies, CMR theory contributes to our understanding of several
concepts in decentralised governance and regulatory capitalism. It illustrates a substantive model of
meta-regulation - that is, the regulation of corporate self-regulation. As such, it illustrates
substantive limits for private authority and its legitimacy. The observation of CMR also reveals new
dimensions of sociological processes in financial governance, particularly markets' social
embedded ness, and actors' reliance on performative market models. Finally, CMR illustrates a
governance model combining incentives with ethics, as regulators seek to de-legitimise regulatory
arbitrage by firms. The analysis concludes by arguing that CMR is increasingly relevant for other
substantive contexts such as the hedge funds industry and private markets like 'dark pools'.
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"What I'm saying to you is, yes, I've found a
flaw. , don't know how significant or permanent
it is. But I've been very distressed by that fact.
"Waxman: Youfound a flaw in the reality --
"Greenspan: Flaw in the model that I perceived as the critical
functioning structure that defines how the world works, so to speak."
Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
(1987-2006), testifying to the US Congress in 2008
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1.1. Research question
Since the 1980s, we have frequently heard the message "greed is good", with the rationale that
greed drives efficient markets, which drive economic growth.' This particular message has, in recent
years, lost its ironic charm. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, it has become more
common to hear that greed is "irresponsible". The British Prime Minister told the United Nations in
September 2008 that the world had lived through an "age of irresponsibility" in financial markets
(Brown 2008), and five months later, the American President heralded a "new era of responsibility",
writing:
"This crisis is neither the result of a normal turn of the business cycle nor an accident of history. We
arrived at this point as a result of an era of profound irresponsibility that engulfed both private and
public institutions from some of our largest companies' executive suites to the seats of power in
Washington, D.C. For decades, too many on Wall Street threw caution to the wind, chased profits
with blind optimism and little regard for serious risks-and with even less regard for the public good.
[...]
The time has come to usher in a new era - a new era of responsibility in which we act not only to
save and create new jobs, but also to lay a new foundation of growth upon which we can renew the
promise of America" (Obama 2009, p. 1).
This thesis engages with the latter messages. It builds a theory about companies' responsibilities in
the governance of financial market stability. It is the product of research begun before the crisis,
analysing the reaction to a Citigroup bond trade that resulted in the bank being fined for improper
conduct, despite not having broken the law. The case suggested that operating efficiently and within
the boundaries of compliance had not sufficed to satisfy other market actors and regulators. It
suggested that additional behaviours were tacitly expected of the bank.
Similar messages emerged in other contexts, to the effect that certain principles of good market
conduct were widely expected. Following a significant political controversy, codes of conduct were
drafted for sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in 2007-08, under threat of regulatory sanctions,
alongside concerns that, even if the funds obeyed the law, they could compromise the effectiveness
1Celebratedquotation from the characterGordonGekkoin the film Wall Street (1987), see:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JaKkuJVy2YA.
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of markets due to their large size and opaque corporate governance. Then, in 2008, as the global
financial crisis unravelled, market expectations became characterised by uncertainty.' Trust in
market signals broke down, major banks were nationalised or collapsed, regulation tightened,
government policies sent mixed signals, and, for the first time outside of this doctorate, banks'
responsibilities to markets became a topic of widespread discussion.
This thesis develops a substantive, integrative theory of financial firms' responsibility for regulating
systemic risk - 'corporate market responsibility' - a contribution to this wider debate. The CMR
concept, and the propositions that comprise a CMR theory, provide an explanation for these three
controversies, whose analysis forms the bulk of the thesis: Citigroup's Eurobond trade, sovereign
wealth funds' rise to prominence, and the post-Credit Crunch regulatory debate. In each episode,
regulators and other actors showed significant concern about firms' impact on financial stability,
despite the firms ostensibly behaving as they should, profitably and legally. These actors sought to
influence firms to adopt certain internal management systems that they perceived would reduce
risks to the wider financial system.
Conceptually, this dynamic cuts across several forms of financial market governance. On one hand, it
illustrates 'simple' regulator-led inducements for firms to carry out business in certain ways. It also
illustrates how other non-market actors participate in financial governance, by bringing reputational
and political pressure to bear on the target companies. Concerns over poor market conduct were
also voiced by market participants themselves. These various actors sought to influence firms'
management decisions, while simultaneously reinforcing their discretion to take those decisions. In
this respect, firms were compelled to adopt certain self-regulatory internal controls - self-regulation
was itself increasingly regulated. The firms were held responsible for meeting regulators' objectives
of systemic stability. Markets were not assumed to self-correct. This represented a shift in normative
responsibility for market governance. Firms were held accountable for more than their traditional
economic mandate - which is to be profitable and compliant (Friedman 1970).
My research question related to the normative underpinnings of this dynamic. The first episode,
Citigroup's trade, which I read about shortly after the event, jarred with my understanding of
2 Foradetailednarrativeaccountof this process,centringon lehman Brothers'bankruptcy,seeSorkin(2009).
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economic behaviour and perceptions. On 2 August 2004, Citigroup traders sold a large amount of
bonds, watched the price fall as a result of their sale, and bought back the same bonds minutes later
at a lower price, making a substantial profit. For an economics graduate, the operation did not fit
how profit-making theoretically happens. It did not seem to be about clever arbitrage, spotting
mispriced assets and trading them for a profit, but rather about manipulating the signals of supply
and demand that define those prices.' Although Citigroup was absolved of market manipulation, or
any other criminal conduct, the market was unable to accommodate the operation. Other banks on
the Milan-based MTSEurobond exchange suspended their trading. MTSadministrators convened to
assess whether to condone or condemn Citigroup, despite stating that it had not breached
regulations. Regulators such as the UK's Financial ServicesAuthority (FSA)launched investigations.
Citigroup's clients protested. The bank was eventually fined by the FSA,on the grounds that it had
not helped to ensure lithe efficient and orderly functioning of the market" (FSA2005).
If the original event had jarred with my theoretical understanding of profit-making, the FSA's
judgement raised a bigger question. It implied that financial markets were not even perceived to be
self-correcting, but to require special commercial conduct from firms. If this was the case, then the
question was worth pursuing: how are companies responsible for ensuring orderly financial
markets?
This research question resonates with problematic issues in several disciplines. I sought to answer it,
first, by building propositions from data; to account for the three controversies as well as the wider
theme they all share. Only then would I integrate these propositions with existing theoretical
explanations. This grounded theory approach (Glaser 1978, Straussand Corbin 1998, Charmaz 2006)
would help me to stay sensitive to the empirical data, and not preclude certain types of information
or theoretical insights that might fall outside a pre-determined hypothetical framework. The theory
was built by comparing empirical data, deriving concepts and propositions that explain those data,
and sampling for new empirical contexts that demonstrate variations in the emerging concepts. As a
result, in this thesis, knowledge accrues cumulatively. Eachof the three controversies - Citigroup's
transaction, sovereign funds' rise to prominence, and the post-Credit Crunch debate - has a
3 It emergedin the FSA's(2005)rulingthat Citigrouphadsoughtto arbitragetwo different markets.Fora
sociologicalaccount,seeBeunza,Hardie,andMacKenzie(2006).
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dedicated chapter, and each chapter contributes, first, an explanation for the specific controversy
and, second, concepts that build up to a wider answer to the research question. The objective of the
thesis is to build a theory that explains each of the controversies and is tentatively generalisable to
new situations in financial governance.
The research began by exploring sensitising concepts (Strauss 1987) and theoretical questions that I
could use as heuristics during the data analysis. It looked initially to theories of corporate social
responsibility (CSR),economics, and political economy. Although these analyses suggested that the
question was relevant, it was also important, given my epistemological and methodological position,
to stay open to what the data itself revealed, and not force it unduly into the extant concepts. As the
research progressed, the theorisation departed from these sensitising concepts. The final
substantive theory resonates with slightly different themes. I present the following analysis to
sensitise the reader to the concepts that first motivated this work. Then, I explain the structure of
the thesis and its argument.
1.2. Sensitising concepts
For an economist interested in corporate responsibility, the question of companies' responsibilities
towards their markets is problematic. In liberal economics, the question is redundant. Economics
regards the market as self-regulating, through endogenous incentives. External planning, sanction or
distribution are considered to reduce its efficiency. Orderly markets, with few exceptions, are
considered simply a by-product of legal profit maximisation - normal business activity. In corporate
social responsibility (CSR)literature, the key focus is the role of firms in social governance, rather
than market governance. Firms' responsibilities to the market environment are not neglected, but
they are understudied. Corporations are said in the CSRliterature to be 'economically responsible'
whenever they produce goods or services efficiently and legally (Carroll 1979, 1991; Mitchell 1998;
Schwartz and Carroll 2003; Wartich and Cochran 1985; Wood 1991). The implicit dichotomy in the
CSR discourse is that corporations have social responsibilities to society, or the "non-market
environment" (Baron 2001), and economic responsibilities to themselves (i.e., shareholders,
managers, etc). CSRtheory does not develop the concept of 'economic responsibilities' because it
devolves them to self-regulating market forces, as conventional economic theory would have it.
Political economy theory hasaddressed some of these issues,exploring the role of private regulatory
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regimes (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999), informal industry norms (Haufler 2000, Porter 1993),
corporate political activity (Baron 2003, Vogel 1996), and other features of private authority, which
often lacks legitimacy and normative underpinnings (Underhill and Zhang 2003b, 2008).
1.2.1. CSR:modes and purpose of corporate responsibility
Several CSRresearchers have defined what they call "corporate economic responsibility" (CER)as
economists would have it - a responsibility to maximise shareholder value efficiently and legally (e.g.
Carroll 1991). The traditional concept of CERhas important limitations: it is incompatible with key
definitional features of corporate social responsibility, and incompatible with CSR'sapproach to
market failure.
The definitional inconsistency between corporate economic, and corporate social responsibility is
found in the two necessaryconditions for CER:efficiency and legality. Both fall short of standards of
CSR.Prioritising efficiency precludes managerial discretion to increase costs and decline business
opportunities that management perceive might destabilise other market stakeholders. Yet these
expectations exist. For example, the FSA(2005) argued that Citigroup should have invested more
into risk management resources and abstained from their transaction in order to safeguard market
stability. Citigroup itself apologised for failing lito fully consider [the transaction's] impact on our
clients, other market participants, and our regulators" (Financial Times 2004). Similarly, many
innovative products and business strategies were condemned after the Credit Crunch, like structured
derivatives and short-selling, due to their effect on market stability (FSA2009b). The firms were
expected to incur risk management costs and opportunity costs on behalf of the market, even if this
was not the most efficient management scheme. Efficiency's status asa threshold of CERimplies that
managers do not need discretion to depart from the most efficient scheme in order to be
responsible. Yet such discretion is a pre-requisite of CSR,which is predicated on adapting managerial
choices, and increasing costs if necessary, to meet pre-defined social objectives outside the firm
(Frederick 1998, Ackerman 1973; c.f., Schwartz and Carroll 2003).
The second element of CER,not to break the law, is, again, not what corporate responsibility is
strictly about. From the earliest conceptions of CSR(Bowen 1953, McGuire 1963) to present-day
instrumental (Wood 1991) or ethical approaches (Crane and Matten 2003), it is clear that socially
responsible companies exceed legal requirements. They engage with social problems even in the
absence of legal compulsion to do so. There is little reason a priori why corporate responsibility
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theorists should not say the same of the market environment: it does not take inefficient or illegal
practices to create significant market problems, as witnessed in the 1997-8 global financial crisis
(Radelet and Sachs1998), and in the Credit Crunch, the topic of this thesis's fifth chapter.
The inconsistency between CERand CSRis widened when we consider the different approaches to
responsibility itself. Consider Dubbink's (2003) two models of responsibility: indirect and direct. The
indirect responsibility model "holds that the responsibility of actors in the market ends with their
republican duty, abiding laws and the rules of common decency" (op cit: 3). Proponents of liberalised
markets champion this view because they do not consider actors in the market responsible for public
problems in society, and prefer to limit markets with system-wide rules such as taxation. Pro-market
theorists have also derided the concept of CSRon the grounds that controlling the market is the
(democratic) state's responsibility, rather than firms' (ibid). On the other hand, there is a direct
responsibility model, favoured by CSRtheorists, whereby "actors are called upon to personally
acknowledge their responsibility, [to assume] some public responsibility at actor level, [and] to use at
least some of their freedom (discretionary space) to solve public problems" (op cit: 2-3). CSRmodels
that rely on CERto postulate a complete understanding of corporate responsibilities conflate the
direct and indirect responsibility models. CSRclaims that firms operate within a broader society, and
have direct responsibilities to public problems in the nonmarket domain, but only indirect
responsibilities to public problems in the market domain.
The incompatibility between CSRand CERis further evident in light of what proponents of CSRand
economists expect of governance in the economy. Take the concept of market failure, which has
been central to the development and implementation of CSR,particularly with practitioners who
subscribe to the triple-bottom-line approach (financial, social, and environmental; Mitchell 1998).
Accepting the existence of market failure presents us with two options to prevent and correct those
failures: either advocate state intervention in the economy, or advocate pro-active industry self-
regulation. Both options appear incompatible with how CERhas been defined. If markets' broader
impact should be governed by political and legal entities, then the concept of corporate
responsibility loses resonance because governments will look after society. If, on the other hand,
companies are encouraged to regulate their activities voluntarily and redistribute utility, then their
economic responsibilities must go beyond legal competition because they must correct market
failures, some of which are market-bounded, as I argue below. Market failures are prima facie
conceptual evidence that the traditional definition of CERis incomplete.
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There are a number of factors that may explain why the gap in our understanding of CERand CSRis
still open. Accepting that the main audience for CSRtheorisation are practitioners (Edlund 1996), it is
possible that CSRtheorists have chosen not to challenge the foundations of basic competitive
operations, with a view to persuading more business practitioners to address social issues. It may
also be because political economy is not the main research interest or specialisation of CSRtheorists.
Jones (1996) cites a survey of business ethics, CSR,and corporate social performance studies which
found that "only 9% (6 out of 67) of projects were in any way related to issuesof political economy,
whereas 36% (24 out of 67) of projects were ethics oriented" (Jones1996: 32). It is also possible that
the gap exists becausethe concept of CERproblematises the corporate social responsibility construct
in its entirety.
1.2.2. Economic theory: Market failure and self-correction
Market failure is the main indicator or test in economics of whether the market requires political
intervention. It is central to the question of how corporate conduct may relate to the well-
functioning of markets. Welfare economics postulates four major causes for market failure:
imperfect information; abuse of market position through monopoly; external, unaccounted benefits
or costs of market activity (externalities); and underprovided public goods with societal benefits.
This concept is being challenged with growing momentum by eminent economists such as Rogoff
(2002) and Wolf (2002) among others, who argue that the concept is unhelpful because government
failure - the analogy made with respect to inefficient government planning - is worse. In this
argument, theorists often conflate the problem with the proposed solution. That is, they downplay
the problem of market failure because they appear to dislike the solution of government
intervention. Often, the debate on market failure is reduced to the relative desirability of market
versus socialist economics (see Sirico 1998). More sophisticated arguments against market failure
have emerged (Zerby Jr and McCurdy 2000), but they do not resolve the following problem.
Considerable disagreement remains over how market failures may be resolved if government is too
inefficient or lacks capacity to correct it. Many have argued that incentives are unavailable for
corporations to address market failures, especially due to transaction costs (Zerby Jr and McCurdy
2000). Instrumentalist theories in CSRhave provided partial exceptions to this rule, by arguing that
corporations may improve financial performance and maintain economic sustainability if they
correct or prevent negative social externalities. This analytical gap is important because the
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responsibility of corporations in the face of market failures is higher if governments are unable to
correct them. CSR is a partial but incomplete response to this problem. It concentrates
predominantly on market failures with nonmarket (social) impacts. However, some classesof market
failure impact strongly on market actors and only tangentially on nonmarket actors. This is
particularly true in wholesale financial markets, where a large share of trading bears little relation to
the real economy - market activity that Adair Turner, FSAChairman, called socially useless (FSA
2009b). In other words, some market failures are market-bounded.
Another type of market failure, 'positive' barriers to entry (Hindmoor 1999), occurs when able
entrepreneurs are prevented from accessingcredit and contributing to markets because they do not
have enough financial resources. This constitutes an opportunity cost for the market. Such barriers
to entry are exacerbated when the number of firms in a market decreases rapidly through mergers
and acquisitions. If a market is tending towards monopoly, economic theory suggests the incentives
are in place for the market's efficiency eventually to fall (fail). In each of these situations,
governments have policy options to intervene in markets, but politically diverse research suggests
that in a globalising environment they are increasingly difficult, and unfashionable, as I outline
below. A gap remains. What should firms do to ensure that markets function effectively when
governments are unable to intervene, and where current CSRprescriptions do not capture the
problem because the failure is bounded within the market?
1.2.3. Political economy: Private regulatory regimes
Political economists have addressed this problem more specifically. Much of this literature, writes
Walter (2000: 51), argues that capital markets, like other factors, have "eroded the ability of
governments to make policies that constrain the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs)
within their jurisdictions. This view is widespread amongst both critics and supporters of
globalisation ...". The threat to regulatory capacity is often caused by an inability of government
institutions to develop technologies (hardware, knowledge and approaches; Nessand Brechin 1998)
to monitor fast-paced innovation and fluid corporate assets effectively (Strange 1996). In addition,
government-led stabilisation of the economy has been "unfashionable" (The Economist 2005),
despite a recent revival of more interventionist, Keynesian ideas (Skidelski 2009). A decrease in state
regulatory capacity, or willingness, would strengthen the proposition that de facto corporate
responsibility for the market governance is emerging (in a descriptive sense). Corporations are
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acquiring autonomy over markets without interstate institutions assuming an effective governance
role.
Literature in the political economy of private sector regulatory regimes (e.g. Cutler, Haufler and
Porter 1999) has pursued that theme. Haufler (2000: 122) writes that in response to "a mismatch
between markets and politics in terms of governance, [private regimes arise within industries, to
coordinate] self-regulation or rule-setting in the absence of an overarching global political regime."
Other theorists also emphasise, like Kroszner (1999: 335), that companies have adopted private
regulation, "spurred by the avoidance of traditional government regulation" (see Maitland 1985,
Getz 1997, Haufler 2000). In reference to the financial sector, which contains the most globalised
and complex set of markets, Porter (1993) writes that this "suggests the absence of a strong
hierarchical regulatory body for finance does not mean there are no significant institutions for
regulating global finance. It means rather that we must take informal arrangements into account in
searching for such institutions" (ibid). Further, Haufler writes, "These private sector regimes address
the problems of international efficiency, the security or stability of markets, the power and
autonomy of firms, and the social embedded nessof economic actors" (op cit).
The Citigroup episode resonates with Haufler's, Porters, and krcszner's arguments. Citigroup's
competitors claimed that the bank had broken a gentlemen's agreement between traders on the
MTS market, implying that the market relied on implicit norms in order to secure its stability." In
addition, sovereign wealth funds were compelled to adopt a self-regulatory code-of-conduct in order
to ensure the efficiency of international markets and avoid traditional protectionist regulation.
However, non-private dimensions were also significant. The FSAand other regulators investigation
did not cite norms in their censures of Citigroup, for example. In the post-Credit Crunch episode, the
narrative of the "age of irresponsibility" cut across all financial markets, beyond the reach of discrete
regimes and institutions. Perhaps this narrative reflected generalised expectations about market
conduct to stabilise financial markets. This thesis suggests that such expectations exist. As political
economy literature searches for normative underpinnings of private authority (Underhill and Zhang
2003b, 2008), the thesis advancesa tentative response.
41 find that the evidenceof agentlemen'sagreementistenuous,asI discussin Chapter2, but that the social
embeddednessof the actorswassignificant.
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1.3. Thesis structure and argument
The argument in the thesis accumulates in the three empirical analyses - on Citigroup, sovereign
funds, and the Credit Crunch. The first contribution of these chapters is to present empirical data
and a theoretical explanation of the episode itself. The second is to develop, simultaneously,
concepts with broader relevance for the other episodes. Take the concept of proactive improvement
by firms. When this concept first emerged in the data, it had few processes associated with it, one of
which was cooperating with regulators. Both Citigroup and SWFs had faced a lower regulatory risk
on the grounds that they had begun cooperating with regulators even when they were not obliged
to do so. The Credit Crunch episode added a new process to this theme, which evolved into
responsible compliance - not only cooperating with regulators but also interpreting regulation as it
was intended. So by incorporating various processes from the different episodes, the concept of
responsible compliance came to represent processes observed in all of the episodes. This theory-
building method is explained in detail in the following chapter. Figure 1-1, below, illustrates how
each chapter contributed to the accumulation of knowledge in the thesis.
Figure 1-1. Chapter contributions and accumulation of knowledge
Chapter Empirical contribution Theoretical contribution (broader thesis)
2. Postpositivist grounded theory
(Details the selection of each empirical
episode and data sources)
3. Citigroup's Eurobond controversy
Presents empirical data and develops a
theoretical account of the Citigroup
controversy
Presents empirical data and develops a
4. Sovereign funds' rise to prominence
theoretical account of the SWF controversy
S.The post-Credit Crunch regulatory
debate
Presents empirical data and develops a
theoretical account of the regulatory
debate
6. Theorising Corporate Market
Responsibility
Interprets empirical data as new variations
of existing concepts in the literature, like
meta-regulation and market
embeddedness
Specifies research objectives, theory's
generalisability, and criteria for assessment
Presents initial concepts (such as judging
market conduct) and tentative conceptual
relationships for further sampling
Develops concepts' properties and
dimensions; advances first CMR
propositions explaining both episodes;
defines CMR
Theoretically saturates concepts; presents
new concepts with broader scope (such as
systemic risk)
Integrates propositions and concepts into a
theory of CMR; presents its implications for
political economy and economic sociology
literature
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Chapter 2, which follows this introduction, explains the epistemological objectives of the research
and its methodology. It proposes combining standards of rigour commonly associated with
positivists, like objectivity and deductive transparency, with the benefits (and inevitability) of
subjective experience and interpretation, associated with constructivists. This postpositivist
approach (Morcol 2002) is shown to be very closely associated with Strauss and Corbin's (1998)
grounded theory methodology, which I outline in detail. The objective of the thesis is to build a
substantive theory that explains the empirical episodes in full and is tentatively generalisable to new
situations. Quality criteria for assessingthis claim are set out in Chapter 2, and the claim is finally
assessed in Chapter 6, where I present the theory. The methodological discussion also explains why
the empirical episodes were selected, and which data sources were most suitable for the
investigation. The thesis is based on documentary evidence from news reports and regulatory and
policy papers.
Chapter 3 presents and conceptualises Citigroup's Eurobond controversy. The problematique in this
episode is that Citigroup was penalised for its transaction despite having been absolved of criminal
conduct. Numerous market actors were cited in the press saying that Citigroup had broken a
gentlemen's agreement, and news reports focused extensively on this. However, no one clearly
articulated what the agreement had been, and some evidence suggests that it did not exist. The
conceptual argument, based on citations in the press and regulatory documents, is that the bank
had been expected to promote market stability by adopting, among other things, a risk management
system that anticipated the trade's impact on market risk. A gentlemen's agreement seems to have
been invoked to justify the notion that even in such a "cut-throat" market, as the Financial Times put
it (FT28), norms of good market conduct were nevertheless expected.
Chapter 4 extends this analysis to the controversy surrounding sovereign wealth funds' rise to
prominence. The problematique in this chapter is a similar one: that SWFswere held accountable for
ensuring that they would not threaten efficient and orderly markets. Whereas the Citigroup episode
was a reaction to perceived misconduct, this controversy anticipated misconduct. The tunds were
compelled, under threat of regulatory sanctions, to develop a voluntary global code-ot-conduct to
mitigate systemic risk. It is notable that the first blueprint for the global code provides a fair
summary of the principles that Citigroup was said to have violated. This supports the notion that
similar principles applied across the substantive contexts. The provisions of the IMF, US, and
European codes-of-conduct for sovereign funds are coded to reveal which generic processes the
funds were expected to adopt. It is argued that the SWFsand Citigroup controversies were owed to
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the expectation that the firms would implement management systems (responsible market
conduct), in the areas of risk management, investment policy, and proactive improvement
specifically. Chapter 4 thus presents tentative propositions defining CMR.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis to the post-Credit Crunch regulatory debate, where it was argued
that firms had behaved "irresponsibly" in the lead-up to the crisis (Brown 2008, Obama 2009). The
problematique in this episode is, similarly, that financial firms were judged to have neglected their
"responsibilities" to the financial system, despite having been profit-maximising and compliant.
However, this is a much broader episode that raised questions of the very foundations of capitalism,
as Greenspan's quote in the opening of this thesis suggested. Analysis of the regulatory debate and
its reporting in the press held that, among other issues, responsible compliance was a central
concept in the debate. For example, the Securities and ExchangeCommission, which describes itself
as a "law enforcement agency", said in a statement that "We need to encourage a tone and culture
... that mere compliance with the law, narrowly viewed, is not the highest goal to which we aspire,
but the base from which we start" (SEC2009b). Significant questions were also raised about moral
hazard in key investment banks, and 'bad' innovations. The findings from this chapter are integrated
with the propositions from Chapters 3 and 4.
The episodes in Chapters 3-5 are of progressively broader scope. Chapter 3 focuses on a controversy
surrounding a single actor in a well-defined Eurobond market with specific rules. Chapter 4 focuses
on a set of actors that operate across several markets, including bonds, equities, real estate, etc,
globally. Chapter 5 covers a broader range of "banks and other financial institutions" (UK Treasury
2009), and other "systemically important" firms (Financial Times 2009b). This means that as
concepts develop throughout the chapters, they become more abstract and represent a broader set
of empirical phenomena, while, simultaneously becoming "theoretically saturated" - that is new
data does not show new variations in the concept (Glaser 1978, Strauss and Corbin 1998, Charmaz
2006). Thus, concepts gain, both, more breadth and density in the data underpinning them. As a
result, the theory becomes more credible because it fits a broader set of data, and becomes more
relevant because it addresses issuesthat are problematic for more actors. These are two of the four
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criteria of a good grounded theory, as the methodological discussion in Chapter 2 explains." Figure 1-
2 illustrates.
Figure 1-2. Theory gaining credibility and relevance
cumulatively throughout the thesis
~ c
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CMR credibility
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Chapter 4
(SWFs)
Chapter 5
{Credit Crunch)
• Chapter 3
(Citigroup)
Empirical scope
Chapter 6 integrates the findings from the empirical chapters and sets out a theory of corporate
market responsibility (CMR). The term 'CMR' refers both to a theoretical concept and to a corporate
practice. As a concept, CMR is an expectation by regulators and other actors that firms help to
regulate systemic risk by adopting certain discretionary management protocols. This expectation
exists because CMR protocols are perceived to improve firms' impact on the financial system. As a
corporate practice, CMR refers to the management protocols themselves.
The theory of CMR is presented in three sets of propositions (summarised in the figure below). The
first set is a single proposition affirming the existence of corporate market responsibility, the
regulatory expectation. It defines what CMR is, how it is implemented, by whom, when, and with
what consequences. The second set of propositions looks specifically inside the firm. These
propositions hold that CMR conduct comprises three management protocols: operating a risk
management system that anticipates the firm's systemic impact; operating a transparent investment
policy; and proactive improvement in respect of CMR. Each of these protocols in turn entails specific
corporate processes (like stress-testing, or responsible compliance).
5 The other two criteria are that the theory should be useful and original. Chapter 2 details the technical
aspects of the four criteria and Chapter 6 assessesmy findings in light of them.
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Finally, the third set of propositions looks outside the firm. It relates CMR conduct to two other
dynamics in wider market governance, both of which emerged from the empirical analysis:
regulatory risk and systemic risk. Firms are argued to face a higher risk of regulatory changes or
punishment (regulatory risk) when they lack CMR protocols, because in that state they are perceived
to increase systemic risk. Conversely, when firms adopt CMR protocols, they face less regulatory risk,
partly because they are taking on some ofthe regulators' responsibilities for systemic risk regulation.
The CMR protocols relate to internal controls, and in this way, CMR is a regulation of discretionary
conduct.
Figure 1-3. Summary of CMR propositions
Propositions on Corporate Market Responsiblity
CMR Financial companies are expected to help regulate systemic risk in financial markets, through ...
Operating a sound risk management system that anticipates the systemic impact of business operations
CMR protocols
(conduct) Operating a transparent investment policy that defines parameters for commercial transactions
Correcting shortcomings proactively even if they are not in literal breach of regulation.
Less CMR conduct leads to more regulatory risk.
CMR and market
governance
More CMR conduct leads to less regulatory risk.
LessCMR conduct leads to more systemic risk.
These are substantive propositions, and several empirical boundaries de-limit their explanatory
power, as I will discuss. Nevertheless, it is argued that they are also useful frames of reference to
interpret and explain emerging issues. I note that the increasing regulatory scrutiny of private
markets like dark pools, and of market conduct like high-frequency trading, may find useful
interpretations in this CMR theory because they fulfil similar conditions. The extent to which these
propositions are generalisable is explored in Chapters 2 (method) and 6 (theory).
Chapter 6 also positions CMR within a broader theoretical context, drawing on the literature about
decentralised governance and private regulation (e.g. Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Braithwaite
and Drahos 2000). The dynamics of CMR are consistent with Levy-Faur's (2005: 15) notion of
"regulatory capitalism", where states adopt a supervisory role and compel firms to adopt self-
regulatory management systems "in the shadow of the state". A central regulatory mechanism of
regulatory capitalism is meta-regulation (Grabosky 1995, Parker 2002, Braithwaite 2003). Meta-
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regulation focuses on firms' internal protocols (rather than their incorporation or specific types of
transactions, for example) (Chiu 2009), and aims to ensure that firms' self-regulation is such that it
meets regulators' own strategic objectives (Black 2006), often defined "through the prism of risk"
(Gray and Hamilton 2006: 227). CMR, regulators' expectation that firms adopt management
protocols to help reduce systemic risk, appears to be a substantive form of meta-regulation. Under
meta-regulation, like under CMR, the required protocols cannot be excessively prescriptive, "as
regulators are not in a position to micro-manage firms, and hence, these represent a meta-
regulatory approach where regulators expect certain internal measures to be in place in firms, and
the regulators' role is to monitor the performance of such measures," writes Chiu (2009: 29). CMR
also shares characteristics with models of enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), and
ethical self-regulation (Shamir 2008).
These comparisons help CMR, an empirically developed concept, to find resonance with established
concepts and thus gain further definition. Inversely, CMR's empirical weight enhances our
understanding of these models. For example, the generic meta-regulation model has been criticised
for lacking insight into its broader impact, including systemic risk (Chiu 2009). The CMR form of
meta-regulation attends specifically to that risk and therefore contributes to our understanding of
meta-regulation in practice.
Having thus positioned CMR within a broader theoretical tradition, Chapter 6 explores CMR's
implications for other current theoretical problems, in political economy and economic sociology.
One problem is the search for normative underpinnings for global financial governance, particularly
to increase its legitimacy, and therefore effectiveness (Underhill and Zhang 2008). CMR is a
substantive normative ethic and a partial response to this search. It enhances the three phases of
Underhill and Zhang's (2008) model of legitimacy: providing input for regulatory agendas (CMR
protocols) that aims for an outcome in the public interest (systemic stability), along with an ethic of
accountability (regulatory risk). The empirical observation of CMR further suggeststhat the transfer
of authority to private interests may slow when it leads to systemic risk. The thesis is argued to
contribute both theoretical and empirical knowledge to this debate.
CMR is also argued to enhance our understanding of key concepts in the sociology of financial
markets, which addresses the problems of social norms and networks that are also problematic in
political economy. Each of the empirical episodes shows new dimensions of markets' social
embedded ness (e.g. Granovetter 1985) and the performativity of economic theory and models (e.g.
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MacKenzie 2006). Citigroup's transaction occurred in a highly embedded market that showed the
state-market condominium (Underhill 2000) as a profitable businessmodel for states and firms. One
social norm in the market, the putative gentlemen's agreement between banks, appeared to be a
post hoc construction that allowed market actors to rationalise the failure of economic theory to
explain why a legal and profitable transaction should be controversial. The sovereign funds episode
illustrated what I call performativity-plus. The funds were given "users' manuals" for capitalism
(disembedding them from traditional and historical forms of decision-making) to help them perform
economic theory, but in addition, to perform it responsibly (re-embedding them in the CMRethic). In
the Credit Crunch episode, some CMR protocols were used to de-legitimise the practice of
regulatory arbitrage - firms' search for minimum regulatory requirements - both through incentives
like regulatory risk (seeGoodhart et a11998) and through ethical compulsion (seeShamir 2008).
Thus it is also argued that CMR is an integrative concept that helps to explain problematic patterns
of interaction both in political economy and economic sociology. The theory proposed in this thesis
does not attempt to resolve extant theoretical debates, but rather is an integrative concept that may
be used to enhance understandings of a range of current governance problems. A multidisciplinary
discussion supports this claim.
The theory's limitations and other contributions are captured in the concluding chapter.
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It is not until researchers are able to let go and put
trust in their abilities to generate knowledge that
they finally are able to make discoveries of their own.
Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin'
2.1. Introduction
A self-aware social scientist seeksto abide by conventional benchmarks of rigour, like objectivity, but
also acknowledges that his results are not necessarily the whole truth. He takes the middle ground in
a polarised epistemological landscape, where positivists stand to one side advocating 'rigour', to
uncover objective reality, and constructivists stand to the other advocating 'authenticity',
interpreting the necessarily subjective context of their research. Positivist scientists argue that they
are aware of their subjectivity, and that is why they design research controls and double-blind
experiments. Constructivists hold that the very choice of research design is influenced by the
broader environment, and that claims to objectivity undermine scientists' own understanding and
subjugate others'.
In arguing that both objective rigour and subjective authenticity are required in social science, a
post positivist - which I call a self-aware social scientist - may carry the highest burden of persuasion,
disputed by either polar camp. Either side may argue that the postpositivist deploys shortcuts to
avoid the hard work of justifying a conventional approach in full. To me, it is the conventional polar
positions that feel incomplete. Constructivists often aim to understand the broader context in which
phenomena are embedded, such as social classes, in order to induce social change (Denzin and
Lincoln 2005: 195). However, by their own measure they speak a different language from those that
hold power (positivists, predominantly), and remain epistemologically incommensurate with those
whom they seek to influence. I would respond to them by paraphrasing the political economist
SusanStrange (1997b): those who depart too far from the underlying language of power ceaseto be
taken seriously by those who possesssuch power.' Positivism's so-called 'disinterested scientists', by
contrast, claim an untenable scholarly objectivity. At the extreme, this leads to the kind of situation
where a Harvard economist, having accepted an invitation to speak at an IMF conference on poverty
reduction, refused to derive any practical policy implications from his research, on the grounds that
1StraussandCorbin(1998:49).
2 Strangewasreferringto the distributionof structuralpower ratherthan the 'languageof power'.
27
doing so is not part of academic work.' This, to my mind, is also an incomplete epistemological
position.
In this chapter, I argue for a middle-ground, postpositivist position, which recognises the merits of
replicable analytical techniques and the inevitability of subjective judgement. To do so, I draw
primarily on Denzin and Lincoln's (2000, 2005) comparisons of research paradigms, and while they
argue that postpositivism is similar to positivism, I argue that it is also similar to constructivism. This
epistemological positioning foreshadows my choice of methodology and the claims I make for the
generalisability of my research. The methodology is grounded theory, which seeks to build abstract
theory from data, rather than use data to verify pre-conceived hypotheses. This methodology
deploys formal concepts and techniques (Glaser and Holton 2004, Strauss and Corbin 1998) that
tend towards objectivism. However, it acknowledges and harnesses researches' subjective
knowledge - their "theoretical sensitivity" (Glaser 1978) - because it helps researchers better
identify problematic issues in a substantive area and adjust the research design in order better to
explain and interpret them. As the product of, both, good technique and good temperament, a
postpositivist grounded theory advances "limited, tentative generalisations, not universal
statements" (Charmaz and Bryant 2007: 52). It is on this basis that a grounded theory achieves
credibility, relevance, usefulness, and originality, its four key quality criteria.
2.1.1. Purpose and contribution of this chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to explain my postpositivist position, and the methodological,
analytical, and sampling decisions that I made while researching the thesis. It details the objective of
the thesis - to build a substantive grounded theory about how firms are expected to contribute to
orderly financial markets - and the methodological criteria with which I assess my findings at the
end of the work. It also establishes my claims for the resulting substantive theory: that it should
account for the central problematiques in each of the empirical episodes and, in addition, be
tentatively generalisable to new situations in financial markets.
3 Michael Kremer, presenting the paper Odious Debt, declined on these grounds to answer my question
regarding practical implications, at the IMF Conference on Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty Reduction in
Washington, 14-15 March 2002.
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2.1.2. Chapter outline
The argument begins in Section 2.2 with epistemological positioning, showing a natural conceptual
overlap between positivism and constructivism, and a corresponding research tradition. Extending
this argument to the methodological domain in Section 2.3, I argue that the most fitting
methodology for a postpositivist approach is grounded theory, because it combines specific
analytical techniques, in a nod to positivism, with guidelines for subjective interpretation. The
section details those techniques and goes on to argue that tentative generalisability is desirable in
social science. I state my objective of building a representative, tentatively generalisable theory
based on three empirical settings: Citigroup's Eurobond controversy, the rise to prominence of
sovereign wealth funds, and the regulatory debate after the Credit Crunch. In Section 2.4 I explain
how these episodes and the data behind them - news reporting and regulatory documents - were
selected. Section 2.5 outlines epistemological implications from this research design and its
empirical boundaries. I conclude by reiterating my epistemological claim: to present limited,
tentative generalisations that account for the analysed empirical episodes in full and can be used as
interpretive frames to research other phenomena.
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2.2. Epistemology: Postpositivism as self-aware social science
Corresponding to a critical realist ontology, my analysis is positioned in an epistemological space
that Guba and Lincoln (1998, 2000, 2005), Denzin and Lincoln (2000, 2005), Charmaz (2000, 2006),
and Mor~ol (2002) describe as postpositivist. The table below reproduces a comparison of research
paradigms that appeared in Guba and Lincoln (1998, 2000, 2005), and in it I have highlighted the
core features of the postpositivist approach. This approach has its roots in positivism, and it is often
used by researchers who collaborate with constructivists and are motivated by inducing practical
change (on this tradition, see especially Epilogue in Denzin and Lincoln 2005), thus bridging the gap
between the two epistemologies. Postpositivism is at the centre of epistemological pluralism (Guba
and lincoln 1998, Mor~oI2002).
Morcol (2002: 94-5), citing Giddens (1995) and Fischer (1995), traces the roots of postpositivism to
Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, who, respectively, demonstrated that "it was not possible to
maintain the fact-value dichotomy and the principle of ethical neutrality in science", and "proposed
another concept for the goal of science: 'verisimilitude' (getting closer to or approximating the truth
rather than obtaining the full truth)". This was a first criticism of realist ontology and its pursuit of
absolute objective truth. The argument evolved when, according to Mor~ol, "in the 1980s, the
critique shifted toward epistemological and methodological issues and it was then that critics [of
realist ontology and positivism] began using the term postpositivism" (2002: 104). As such,
postpositivist research corresponds to a critical realist ontology: a neutral reality exists but attempts
to apprehend it are mediated by analysts' inevitable subjectivity and context.
Mor~ol states that the philosophical umbrella for all postpositivist theories is the following
dichotomy between methodology and epistemology: "the theory and practice of [...] analysis are
predominantly positivistic [whereas ...] analytic knowledge is presupposed (Le. it is mediated by
analysts' preconceived notions, pre-acquired beliefs, and values) and formed in historical, cultural,
and political contexts" (po lOS). In other words, postpositivists are aware of their subjective
rendering of knowledge and, in contrast to positivists, do not take their research to represent an
objective reality. However, postpositivists also seek to approximate reality through well
substantiated statements, rather than dismiss objectivism outright. Charmaz and Bryant (2007)
describe a postpositivist grounded theory as offering "limited, tentative generalisations" (p. 52). This
is a reconciliation of the traditional positivist/constructivist dichotomy, which I also adopt.
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Campbell (1982, 1984) defended the postpositivist ontology of critical realism against constructivist's
relativism, calling such relativism, "ontological nihilism". In this critique of constructivists, Campbell
argued that "conceptualizing truth entirely as a social construction [...] undermines our effective
motivation for criticising and changing the existing global order" (Mor~ol 2002: 111). Contrary to
popular depictions of postpositivism (e.g. Guba and Lincoln 1998, 2000, 2005; Denzin and Lincoln
2000, 2005), Campbell thus suggests that postpositivists are also motivated by inducing social
change. I identify entirely with these articulations of postpositivism by Mor~ol and Campbell, and
this explains why, in the figure below, I have highlighted some features of both positivism and of
constructivism as reflecting my own position. Next, I elaborate my position.
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2.2.1. (Re)defining postpositivism: reconciling positivism and constructivism
As is evident in the table above, Guba and Lincoln (2005) characterise postpositivism as being much
closer to positivism than constructivism - more about "explanation", than a "catalyst for change".
When describing analysts' voice and goodness or quality criteria, Guba and Lincoln go so far as to
draw no distinction between positivism and postpositivism. I contend that postpositivists' voice and
goodness or quality criteria needn't be characterised so differently from constructivists'. This kind of
methodological reconciliation is inherent in the postpositivist approach, as noted by Morcol (2002),
Campbell (1982, 1984), and Guba and Lincoln themselves in an earlier work (1998). In that study,
Guba and Lincoln write that postpositivists "take the position that all paradigms can be
accommodated - that is, that there exists, or will be found to exist some common rational structure
to which all questions of difference can be referred for resolution" (p. 216-7). Indeed some theorists
(e.g. Jurgen Habermas) have been closely aligned with critical theory despite being postpositivists
(Mor~ol 2002), an affiliation that Guba and Lincoln (2000, 2005; cf. 1998) would appear not to
recognise in their later work.
Revisiting Guba and Lincoln's (2005) representation, I would argue that the postpositivist and
constructivist renderings of voice and goodness or quality criteria are not, on close examination, so
different. According to Guba and Lincoln, the postpositivist argueswith the voice of a "'disinterested
scientist', as informer of decision makers, policy makers, and change agents", using goodness or
quality criteria that require "conventional benchmarks of rigour: internal and external validity,
reliability, and objectivity" (op cit: 193). The constructivist, in turn, speaks with the voice of a
"passionate participant, as facilitator of multivoice reconstruction", and holds as goodness or quality
criteria "trustworthiness and authenticity" (ibid). The constructivist uses this voice and criteria to
engage in "Advocacy and activism [which] are also key concepts in this [constructivist] view" (Guba
and Lincoln 1998: 211).
And yet, the constructivists' advocacy and activism target a similar audience as the postpositivists'
"decision makers, policy makers, and change agents" (ibid). Why does the postpositivist adopt a
"disinterested" voice, if not to build "trustworthiness" (the goodness or quality criteria of the
constructivist) among those "decision makers, policy makers, and change agents"?" The
4 Charmaz(2006) makesa similarpoint: " ... [positivist]theoriespresentargumentsabout the world and
relationshipswithin it, despitesometimesbeingcleansedof contextand reducedto seeminglyneutral
statements.Forthosewho espousepositivenotionsof objectivity,suchcleansingandneutrality only addsto
their persuasiveness"(p. 128).
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postpositivist and the constructivist arguably set out (1) to be trusted by (2) the same audience, but
using different voices and criteria as routes. The implication is that voice and goodness or quality
criteria are options that researchers have in order to build what postpositivists would call Ita
strategically crafted argument" (Mor~oI2002: lOS).
Guba and Lincoln's (1998) earlier work, in contrast with their later work, specifies the parallels
between different voices and criteria quite explicitly:
"Constructivism. Two setsof criteria have been proposed:the trustworthiness criteria of credibility
(paralleling internal validity), transferability (parallelingexternal validity), dependability (paralleling
reliability), and confirmability (parallelingobjectivity) (Guba 1981; Lincoln& Guba 1985); and the
authenticity criteria [...]" (p. 213).
What is important therefore is to adopt a methodological scheme that is consistent with the
researcher's epistemological position. A researcher is free to mix voice and quality criteria from the
positivist and constructivist camps provided that the analysis methodology is consistent with, and
disciplines, this pluralism.
On the paramount issue of goodness or quality criteria, Guba and Lincoln (2005) again draw no
distinction between positivist and postpositivist approaches, arguing that both seek "conventional
benchmarks of 'rigour': internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity", whereas as
constructivists aim for "trustworthiness and authenticity, including catalyst for action" (p. 193).
Grounded theory methodology, which I detail in the next section, has both positivist and
constructivist variants (Charmaz 2006), as well as a postpositivist variant that incorporates elements
of both camps, so-called "repositioned grounded theory" (Charmaz and Bryant 2007, ch 1). I outline
those quality criteria at the end of the next section.
Ultimately the postpositivist reconciliation is based both on personal beliefs and on epistemological
objectives. Researchers have their own views about the existence of an objective, apprehendable
reality and these are embedded in their contributions to knowledge. By acknowledging their own
contextual environment and aiming, nonetheless, to be methodologically rigorous, postpositivists'
work is stricter than qualitative research, it is self-aware social science.
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2.3. Methodology: Grounded theory, its temperament and techniques
Postpositivist grounded theory "produces limited, tentative
generalisations, not universal statements". It is objectivist
to an extent and interpretivist to an extent.
Charmaz and Bryant 200i
In this thesis I operationalise the postpositivist approach through grounded theory methodology
(GTM), a formal "family of methods" for qualitative analysis (Bryant and Charmaz 2007: 11). GTM
holds that theoretical discovery should emerge from, be grounded in, data. This approach differs
from the dominant model of research, where data is collected and analysed based on pre-
determined theoretical frameworks. In GTM, data collection and analysis precedes and accompanies
the building of hypotheses or propositions. This is, as I will argue, a fundamentally postpositivist
methodology that includes, both, specific techniques, in a nod to objectivism, and guidelines for
good subjective interpretation. It is this unique mix that makes it a best-fit for the epistemological
perspective that I have outlined. In giving primacy to data, GTM also provides good leverage for
developing new theoretical constructs that might otherwise fit awkwardly with extant hypotheses,
particularly if the extant hypotheses would span across disciplines. As such, it is especially well-
suited for research on original or less established concepts. This section outlines the methodology's
roots, temperament, techniques, and finally its epistemological claims and criteria.
GTM began as a positivist research programme with Glaser and Strauss's (1967) Discovery of
Grounded Theory, its first manual. It was originally conceived to "emancipate" qualitative analysis by
challenging:
• "Beliefs that qualitative methods were impressionistic and unsystematic
• "Separation of the data collection and analysis phasesof research
• "Prevailing views of qualitative research as a precursor to more 'rigorous' quantitative
methods
• "The arbitrary division between theory and research"
• "Assumptions that qualitative research could not generate theory" because it was
necessarily situational and interpretivist (Charmaz2006: 6).
5 CharmazandBryant(2007: 52).
6Glaser(1978) clarifiesthe divisionthus: "traditional methodsof theorydevelopmentrelyon standard
methodsof socialresearchthat are not directlyformulated,controlledby or relatedto howthe theorywill be
developed"(p. 2).That is,methodologicalschemesarenot developedto fit specificempiricalcontexts.
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Since its inception, GTM's objective has been lito generate a theory that accounts for a pattern of
behaviour which is relevant and problematic for those involved[; t]he goal is not voluminous
description, nor clever verification" (Glaser 1978: 93). Yet, approaches to grounded theory have
developed formalist (Glaser), postpositivist (Strauss and Corbin) and constructivist (Charmaz)
variants. In the formalist camp, Glaser sharply criticises what he calls "erosion", "Iacing" and
"remodelling" of grounded theory by other qualitative data analysis, which he groups into a single,
interpretivist family. Glaser and Holton (2004) argue at length against:
"the mixing of QDA [qualitative data analysis] and grounded theory methodologies [because this] has
the effect of downgrading and eroding the grounded theory goal of conceptual theory ... Grounded
theory becomes considered, wrongly, as an interpretative method, a symbolic interaction method, a
constructionist method, a qualitative method, a describing method, a producer of worrisome facts, a
memoing method, a method of field interview and so forth".
Crystallising this distinction between grounded theory and other qualitative analysis, he writes
positivistically that "the goal of grounded theory is conceptual theory abstract of time, place, and
people. The goal of grounded theory is NOT the QDA quest for accurate description" (ibid, original
emphasis). Finally, confirming his formalism, Glaser argues that "grounded theory requires following
its rigorous procedures to generate a theory that fits, works, is relevant and readily modifiable."
When it is adopted, co-opted, and corrupted by QDA research, a close look at the work often shows
that the QDA researcher is tinkering with the grounded theory method" (ibid, underlining added).
Glaser's formalism stands in sharp contrast with the approach pursued by Anselm Strauss, the co-
originator of grounded theory. This excerpt from Strauss and Corbin's (1998) seminal Basics of
Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory is representative
of the broader post positivist tradition in grounded theory:
"We emphasise strongly that techniques and procedures, however necessary, are only a means to an
end. They are not meant to be used rigidly in a step-by-step fashion. Rather, their intent is to provide
researchers with a set of tools that enable them to approach analysiswith confidence and to enhance
[their] creativity [...J. It is the vision of new understandings and the building of useful grounded theory
that is the driving force behind this methodology" (p. 14).
Charmaz (2006) and Charmaz and Bryant (2007) have argued that the line between formalism and
interpretivism is increasingly blurred among grounded theorists. "Grounded theory as theory
contains both positivist and interpretivist inclinations", writes Charmaz (2006):
"Strauss and Corbin's (1998) view of theory has some positivist leanings but emphasises relationships
among concepts. For them, theory means a 'set of well-developed concepts related through
7 I describe these quality criteria below.
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statements of relationship, which together constitute an integrated framework that can be used to
explain or predict phenomena' (p. 15). Their stance towards constructing theories, however, also
acknowledges interpretivist views. Corbin (1998) recognises that analysis means that researchers
interpret data but implies that such interpretation in an unavoidable limltation." (p. 127).
In practice, the distinction between positivist and grounded theory is predominantly one of nuance,
as the following table shows.
Figure 2-2. Epistemologies of grounded theory (Adapted from Charmaz 2006: 130-1)
1.0bjectivist grounded theory 2. Constructivist grounded theory 3. Judgement and boundaries
"Objectivist grounded theory
resides in the positivist tradition
and thus attends to data as real in
and of themselves and does not
attend to the processes of their
production."
itA constructivist approach places
priority on the phenomena of
study and seesboth data and
analysis ascreated from shared
experiences and relationships with
participants."
"I juxtapose constructivist and
objectivist forms of grounded
theory here for clarity; however,
whether you judge a specific study
to be constructivist or objectivist
depends on the extent to which its
key characteristics conform to one
of the other."
Postpositivist grounded theory as self-aware social science
"Any research method makes epistemological claims," write Bryant and Charmaz (2007: 23). I
understand that Strauss (1987), Strauss and Corbin (1998), Charmaz (2006) and Charmaz and Bryant
(2007, ch. 1) increasingly identify grounded theory with postpositivist epistemology. Departing from
formalist underpinnings, Strauss and Corbin's call for critical flexibility and openness to
methodological innovation mirrors the postpositivist tradition of Habermas's multi-method research
and Campbell's positivistic activism, but also the idea that "in order to break out of normal science,
researchers must constantly strive for innovative insights and fresh conceptualisations" (Charmaz
and Bryant 2007: 51), a principle grounded in Kuhn's (1962) Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In
their exposition of GTM's history, Charmaz and Bryant call this postpositivist approach a
'repositioned GTM':
"It is realist to the extent that the researcher strives to represent the studied phenomena as faithfully
as possible, representing the 'realities' of those in the studied situation in all their diversity and
complexity. A repositioned GTM assumes that any rendering is just that: a representation of
experience, not a replication of it. It is interpretivist in acknowledging that to have a view at all means
conceptualising it. [...] It produces limited, tentative generalisations, not universal statements" (p. 51-
2).
The principle of striving both for (hard) objectivity and (soft) faithfulness is at the core of grounded
theory through what grounded theorists call theoretical sensitivity. To understand this, one much go
back to the key tenet in the methodology: that theory should be grounded in data. In GTM, data
gathering and analysis lead to theoretical propositions, whereas in traditional 'scientific' research
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methods researchers often do the opposite: deduce hypotheses from extant theories, and then
collect data to verify, refute, or extend them." The grounded theorist begins the research, writes
Glaser:
"with as few predetermined ideas as possible - especially logically deducted. a priori hypotheses. In
this posture, the analyst is able to remain sensitive to the data by being able to record events and
detect happenings without first having them filtered through and squared with pre-existing
hypotheses and biases. His mandate is to remain open to what is actually happening" (Glaser 1978: 2-
3, underlining added).
Without a priori theoretical positioning, the choice of research topic and the theory-building rely
heavily on a researchers theoretical sensitivity (Glaser 1978: ch. 1). Entering the field with as few
pre-conceived arguments as possible does not of course mean entering it with an empty head.
Sensitivity means "having insight into, and give meaning to, the events and happenings in the data,"
write Strauss and Corbin (1998: 46-7), adding, "that enables us to recognise incidents as being
conceptually similar or dissimilar and to give them conceptual names". While sensitivity accrues
from earlier knowledge and experience, it is also, writes Glaser (1978) "necessarily increased by
being steeped in the literature that deals with both the kinds of variables and their associated
general ideas that will be used .... This theoretical grasp of problems and processes within data is - in
our perspective - a very useful way to understand what is going on in a substantive area and how to
explain and interpret it" (p. 3). I have outlined how, observing my first piece of data in a newspaper, I
was drawn to how the reported event challenged my notions of economic theory. In that respect,
this thesis was conceived as a result of theoretical sensitivity.
Glaser turns the issue of theoretical predispositions and biases on its head with an interesting
argument. Can the use of theoretical sensitivity discipline a researchers "proclivities and premises",
rather than encourage them?
"Most generally," he writes, "the background experiences of one's education and training is used to
sensitise the researcher to address certain kinds of broad questions. Thus, one's methodological
orientation is broadly, rather than narrowly, based in one's scholarly discipline. Its sensitising nature
lacks specification of attributes, but forms guidelines and reference points which the researcher uses
to deductively formulate questions which may then elicit data that leads to inductive concepts being
formulated later. But. most importantly. the sensitising concept is not simply verified through the
research process. Instead it is used to uncover data that otherwise might be overlooked" (op cit: 39).
8 Many doctoral research programmes are structured to accommodate this traditional model, with the first
year dedicated to a theoretical literature review and development of hypotheses. This constraint helps to
explain why grounded theory remains unconventional. Grounded theory has also been severely
mischaracterised as an inductive method (Glaser and Holton 2004). That view neglects the processesof
constant comparison, theoretical sampling, and theoretical saturation, which are all essential for deduction
and verification in the method.
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In this way, theoretical sensitivity helps direct the analyst to useful new data for sampling that he
might have overlooked." By contrast, the traditional research model, argues Glaser, can close off
valuable research trajectories:
"[Traditionally,] hypotheses are created before the researcher has initiated the investigation. The
investigator may then feel compelled to find the information that is presupposed by the hypotheses
that were logically derived. [...] Commitment to pre-conceived hypotheses may limit the kinds of
observations, information and insights that the researcher makes [...J. He finds himself subject to a
non-strategic, fixed and immovable research design. His theoretical sensitivity is thwarted" (op cit:
38).
Theoretical sensitivity is harnessed by a number of specific guidelines, which I now turn to.
2.3.1. Temperament
To make grounded theory a "careful method of idea manufacturing" (Glaser 1978: 7) several
guidelines exist, with an associated technical toolkit. They rely first and foremost on the following
personal characteristics of grounded theorists:
• "The ability to step back and critically analyse situations
• "The ability to recognise the tendency towards bias
• "The ability to think abstractly
• "The ability to be flexible and open to helpful criticism
• "Sensitivity to the words and actions [in the data]
• "A sense of absorption and devotion to the work process" (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 7).
With this mindset, the following guidelines are recommended: abduction through constant
comparison, memoing, deriving a core concept, sampling theoretically, and achieving theoretical
saturation.
Guideline 1:Abduction through constant comparison
"Conceptual specification is at the focus of grounded theory", and the method for it has three
functions: induction, deduction, and verification (Strauss 1987: 11). The method is based on Ita
concept-indicator model," which holds that empirical indicators can be abstracted to represent a
concept (op cit: 25). These indicators are found in data: events, processes, hierarchies, stated
perceptions, etc. Observed phenomena are constantly compared until the researcher "constructs
concepts that account for relationships defined in the empirical data, and each concept rests on
9 If an analyst has positivistic training, this sensitivity may mitigate biases- it led me to choose grounded
theory over a purely interpretivist approach, for example.
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empirical data," writes Charmaz (2006: 187): "Thus, the concept is 'grounded' in data". The diagram
below illustrates.
Figure 2-3. The concept-indicator model (adapted from Strauss and Corbin 1998: 25)
CONCEPT (a~a category;
///\\\
Comparing empiric al indie ator s to arrive at a conc ept
In comparing empirical indicators, researchers are asking questions. The ubiquitous, persistent
question is "What is this data a study of?" (Charmaz 2006: 138; Glaser 1978). The answers may be
temporal (e.g. frequency, duration, rate, and timing of phenomena), spatial (location, size,
bounded ness, visibility), technological (requisite equipments, ease of use, sourcing), and
informational (who knows which information, where and how is it sourced), and include values,
rules and standards (Straussand Corbin 1998: 91-2). The analyst draws on several heuristics to keep
bias in check; using 'counterfactuals', which turn concepts upside-down to assess alternative
outcomes (paralleling a falsification test), and looking out for words such as 'always', 'never',
'fortunately', and 'obviously' in their reasoning. These heuristics identify when personal experiences
may be obscuring the data or "intruding into the analysis" (op cit: 97).
Detailed conceptualisation should integrate all of the data into the emerging concepts. Contradictory
phenomena may signal higher-order processes. The analyst specifies the contingent nature of the
concept its constituent properties, and their dimensions (see table of definitions below). Thus,
conceptualisation as a process can also be referred to asconceptual ordering, or the "organisation of
data into discrete categories (and sometimes ratings) according to their properties and dimensions
and then using description to elucidate those categories" (Straussand Corbin 1998: 19).
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Figure 2-4. Conceptual ordering (adapted from Strauss and
Corbin 1998: 101, 124)
Terms Definitions Examples
Properties
Concepts that represent phenomena such as events,
problems, or processes
Characteristics of a category
'Market behaviour'Categories
'Competition' (or 'Investing')
Dimensions Rangesalong which properties vary
Labelsattached to words in the data, which represent
conceptual categories, properties, and dimensions.
'Monopoly', 'Oligopoly'
Codes All of the above
Guideline 2:Memoing (analytic momentum)
The purpose of developing theory is to find an explanatory or unifying theme for the ordered
concepts and their relationships. As Strauss and Corbin (1998) define it, "theory denotes a set of
well-developed categories (eg, themes, concepts) that are systematically inter-related through
statements of relationship to form a theoretical framework that explains some relevant social,
psychological, educational, f...J or other phenomenon. The statements of relationship explain who,
what, when, where, why, how, and with what consequences an event occurs" (p. 22, original italics).
As the analyst codes and conceptualises data, ideas about their relationships emerge. "When the
analyst generates a good idea in thought, he must decontain himself immediately by writing a memo
on it," writes Glaser (1978: 8).
Memos include records of codes, questions, propositions, and other forms of conceptual
development, discussing conceptual relationships and processes (Charmaz 2000: 517). They
constitute the "pivotal intermediate step between data collection and writing drafts of papers '" a
crucial method in grounded theory [prompting] you to analyse your data and codes early in the
research process" (Charmaz 2006: 73). Writing memos frequently and throughout the research
ensures analytic momentum and thus helps to "extend theoretical reach further" than a sequence
that simply "identif[ies] a process, outline[s] its phases, and then describers] them" (op cit: 137).
"One hazard of grounded theory approaches is constructing a list of connected but under-analysed
processes," writes Charmaz, and analytic momentum reduces this risk (ibid). Refined memos are
ultimately sorted and integrated to form the core of the grounded theory (op cit: 94).
Guideline 3: Core category
A grounded theory revolves around a core category that "accounts for most of the variation in a
pattern of behaviour" (Glaser 1978: 93). This central concept is related to all the other categories
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logically and consistently; it is sufficiently abstract to allow its study in new substantive areas; it
appears frequently in the data, explains variation in the main pattern studied, and its central idea is
also related to alternative cases (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 147; Glaser 1978: 95-6). The diagram
below shows that the core category has a similar relationship structure to other categories as the
other categories have to their empirical indicators (cf. diagram above; c signifies a category, i
signifies an empirical indicator).
Figure 2-5. Core category accounts for the conceptual variation
in the data (author developing Strauss and Corbin 1998)
(ore <ategory
II 1\\ \
-----( ( ( (
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-----...-...-...-...- ...-
111i\\
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Ensuring that the core category accounts for as many of the concepts as possible "has the prime
function of integrating the theory and rendering the theory dense and saturated as the relationships
increase" (Glaser 1978: 93). Thus, the analyst achieves "theoretical completeness - accounting for as
much variation in a pattern of behaviour with as few concepts as possible thereby maximising
parsimony and scope," writes Glaser (ibid): "Clearly integrating a theory around a core variable
delimits it and thereby research project". "Another delimiting function of the core category occurs in
its necessary relation to resolving the problematic nature of the pattern of behaviour to be
accounted for," he adds (ibid), "Without a focus on how the core resolves, solves or processes the
problem, the analysis can drift to accounting for irrelevancies in the pattern, instead of being forced
to integrate around the problematic".
Guideline 4: Theoretical sampling
Sampling in grounded theory is fundamentally different from traditional sampling, and this
difference is at the core of the methodology. Traditionally, the function of sampling is to capture a
representative sample of a population 'out there' that will verify or refute pre-determined
hypotheses. In grounded theory, the purpose of sampling is "to go to places, people, or events that
will maximise opportunities to discover variations among concepts and to density categories in
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terms of their properties and dimensions", write Strauss and Corbin 1998 (p. 201). Charmaz (2000)
specifies:
"I ...WJechooseto samplespecificissuesonly; we look for preciseinformation to shed light on the
emerging theory[, ...J to developour emergingcategoriesand to make them more definitive and
useful[; ...Jto refine ideas,not to increasethe sizeof the original sample.Theoreticalsamplinghelps
us to identify conceptualboundariesand pinpoint the fit and relevanceof our categories"(Charmaz
2000: 519, addeditalics).
The researcher samples to better understand ideas that are repeatedly present; act as conditions or
variations of a major category; or appear inconsistent or unexplained. For example, if a researcher is
studying the concept of "work flow in a doctoral project", he or she might sample data from
doctorates in various disciplines, or across countries, or at different stages in the student's
experience, etc, depending on which settings would best help explain and interpret the problem
under investigation (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 202). New empirical settings can be determined with
questions like, "What would happen if...? When? How? Where? The answers to these questions
serve as the basis for sampling and then making comparisons across those various conditions" (op
cit: 203-4). The chosen destinations are those that add density and the conceptual properties and
dimensions of the emerging theory, and therefore help identify how the theory varies across
relevant contexts.
Guideline 5: Theoretical saturation
Data sampling and analysis continue until the concepts appear to be theoretically saturated; that is,
when "more data about a theoretical category reveals no new properties nor yields any further
theoretical insights about the emerging grounded theory" (Charmaz 2006: 189). At this point, lithe
events/behavioural actions [in the data] may vary in detail or in fact just be repetitious - but anyhow
the indicators seem to 'add up to the same thing' analytically .... Nothing new happens as he or she
reviews the data. The category and its properties exhaust the data," writes Strauss (1987: 26). An
example of a category that became quickly saturated in my research was Citigroup executing an
extraordinary financial transaction. The properties of this concept - its size, speed, surprise, etc -
were indicated in many documents, but it quickly became well-delineated. Saturation not only
delimits the sample size, but it is also a central element of verification and authenticity in a
grounded theory, becausethe concepts and their context-specific variations are confirmed by data.
Abiding by these five guidelines thoughtfully would, on its own, set a researcher well on his or her
way to being a grounded theorist. However, grounded theory also provides tools that help
operationalise these guidelines, which I favour.
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2.3.2. Techniques
Grounded theory appears to me to be the only qualitative methodology that outlines transparent
and auditable analytical techniques (see Dey 2007, Holton 2007, Morse 2007). By analytical
techniques, I mean the means of rendering conclusions from data; or the procedures of
interpretation. By and large, other qualitative methodologies provide careful advice on harnessing
good experiential data, and advert against context-free or skewed interpretations. Handbooks of
qualitative research, such as Denzin and Lincoln (2000, 2005) and Huberman and Miles (2002), begin
with ontological and epistemological philosophies and illustrate those philosophical camps as
applied to specific contexts. These are excellent guides for discovering one's academic voice and
world view, and they changed my epistemological positioning and research objectives significantly,
by exposing me to a much wider set of issues than I had been aware of. However, these seminal
works can hardly be said to outline analytical techniques, not least because such techniques are
often seen as positivistic and detached, contrary to qualitative, interpretivist practice (Charmaz
2006: 132). The techniques mentioned in standard qualitative research literature - such as coding,
comparing categories, and theoretical sampling, among others - are borrowed from grounded
theory."
I find these techniques valuable because they supplement epistemological objectives and
methodological strategy by operationalising the analysis process. So doing, they make the analysis
auditable. That is, "once an analyst explains in detail how he or she arrived at a conceptualisation
other researchers, regardless of their perspective, should be able to follow the analyst's path of logic
and agree that it is one plausible explanation for what is going on," write Strauss and Corbin (1998:
146). As a postpositivist, I find that this auditability makes the analysis more persuasive across
specialisations, and therefore more useful across substantive contexts. The following is an overview
of the techniques employed in this research, and how they relate to the temperamental guidelines
outlined above.
Technique 1: Open coding
10 This appropriation of GTM techniques by other qualitative research traditions might explain the somewhat
surprising claim in the back cover of the Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory (Charmaz and Bryant 2007) that
"Grounded Theory is by far the most widely used research method across a wide range of disciplines and
subject areas, including social sciences, nursing and healthcare, medical sociology, information systems,
psychology, and anthropology".
44
Coding is the basic analytical operation, and it means attaching a conceptual label to a segment of
data, such as a word or sentence. Codes may be generic processes that describe an action or
interaction at a conceptual level, like 'managing risk'. Coding begins as a word-by-word or line-by-
line analysis of a text. In the coding process, "Data are broken down into discrete parts, closely
examined, and compared for similarities and differences [using the comparative method.] Events,
happenings, objects, and actions/interactions that are found to be conceptually similar in nature or
related in meaning are grouped under more abstract" conceptual codes, write Strauss and Corbin
(op cit: l02). Once a specific, evolving code is found to describe a wider set of data, it is a 'category'.
Conceptualisation through questioning and comparison reveals categories' properties ("generic or
specific attributes of a category") and their dimensions ("the location of a property along a
continuum or range") (op cit: 117). For example, the category 'managing risk', may have properties
described with codes like 'collecting information' and 'hedging an investment'. The property
'collecting information' may in turn have several dimensions like 'consulting colleagues', and
'consulting documents'. Codingwithout any preconceived categories is known as 'open' coding.
Technique 2: Axial coding
Axial coding is used once open coding has led to the emergence of several conceptual categories,
and its purpose it to establish the categories' internal relationships, to give them more explanatory
power. Concretely, the process is to "code intensely and concertedly around single categories,"
writes Strauss (1987: 64): "The analyst hypothesises about and increasingly can specify varieties of
conditions and consequences [associated with the category.] By doing this, the analyst begins to
build up a dense texture of relationships around the 'axis' of the category being focused upon"
(ibid). For example, axial coding for the category 'managing risk' would involve conceptualising the
relationships between various properties like 'collecting information' and 'hedging an investment'
and their dimensions. Some of the questions explored would be, 'How is information collected for
the purposes of hedging an investment?', 'Who mediates this process?', 'When does the process
fail?'. In answering these questions, the analyst re-orders and re-words the various properties and
dimensions to ensure they closely represent the data, at a conceptual level. It is key to stay focused
on the specific category and data set, "not allowing diversionary coding temptations to interfere
with this specific and highly directed coding" (Strauss 1987: 65). Ultimately, the operational purpose
is to "reassemble data [and concepts] that were fractured [or, segmented] during open coding," in
order to "explain, in a general sense,what is going on" (Straussand Corbin 1998: 124, 145).
Technique 3: Selective coding
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The analytical process leads the analyst to identify a core category, or unifying theme, for what he is
researching (Guideline 3). This category represents the main pattern of behaviour that is
problematic in the research. Once a core category is decided upon, the analyst is likely to begin
theoretical sampling; looking for data that shows variations of the core category in new places, or
time-periods, with new people, etc (Guideline 4). This i~ where selective coding comes in. It is the
process of coding the relationships between the core and other categories. It is like axial coding, but
between the core category and others, rather than between categories and their properties and
dimensions. This process is central to developing theoretical propositions. For example, in Chapter 3,
I identify the expectation that Citigroup would heJp to ensure market confidence as a central
category. At the end of that chapter (Section 3.4), I integrate other categories with this central
concept, by arguing that ensuring market confidence entails foreseeing and treating risk, for
example. The latter category is presented as a necessary condition for the core category, based on
selective coding. The reader will also notice that the category foreseeing and treating risk is a re-
formulation of 'managing risk'. This re-formulation was done through axial coding, to be more
representative of the different dimensions (foreseeing, treating) observed in the data. Selective
coding is, in sum, "the process of integrating and refining the theory" (Straussand Corbin 1998: 143).
Other established coding techniques and rules-of-thumb may be deployed for specific problems and
interests, should they arise (Strauss and Corbin 1998, chs. 7, 11, 12; Strauss 1987, ch. 8; Charmaz
2006, ch. 5). Among those that I found useful were counterfactual analysis, noted earlier. It involves
trying to falsify one's hypothesis by asking, 'what would it take to prove me wrong?' and then
looking for that data. I use this explicitly in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2), where I conclude that the
political resistance to sovereign wealth funds was better explained by politicians' desire that the
funds observe certain norms of market conduct, than it was by protectionist instincts in government.
As I have noted, Strauss, Corbin and Charmaz advocate strongly that techniques should be tailored
to the specific problem at hand. Indeed, as Barney Glaser (1978: 2) wrote, grounded theory
methodology is valuable because it ensures that methods are "directly formulated, controlled by or
related to how the theory will be developed", provided that the central 'temperament' guidelines
that I described are observed. Researchers may also develop their own procedural operations
(Strauss and Corbin 1998: 273).
Technique 5: CodeJogging
I developed a code logging process to help me administrate my thinking between the coding and
memo-writing stages. Grounded theorists write memos to capture new thinking during the coding
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processes, and many memos evolve into the final written product. However, maintaining analytical
momentum (Guideline 2) is difficult when the analyst is administrating many codes and eager to
remain faithful to the data - good ideas may leave one's mind as quickly as they emerged. To resolve
this problem, and to give me a sound basis to go back and review my propositions, I found it helpful
to maintain a log of where I found each code. I illustrate the log's component parts contextually in
Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3. On a spreadsheet, I listed the emerging categories, properties and
dimensions vertically. Then I created a matrix, listing all the data sources horizontally. When each
code appeared in a data source, I noted its prominence in it. A 1signalled the code appeared in the
source, a 2 signalled it was analysed in some depth, and a 3 signalled that it was the main focus of
the source. Alongside, I also noted where two codes where strongly associated with each other. For
example, if the data described process A as causing process B, then I cross-referenced each process
in the log. The log was a 'live' tool. It changed significantly, both in format and density, as I re-
ordered concepts through axial and selective coding. For some time, I had supporting tools, like a
code definitions spreadsheet, where I ordered the emerging concepts. As concepts became
theoretically saturated, I stopped logging where they appeared. As a result of the code logging
process, I had a reference guide indicating where to find information on each concept whenever I
turned my attention to a particular memo. Thus, code logging facilitated both the "ideas
manufacturing" process, and the quality control.
2.3.3. Quality: A grounded theory's claims, and criteria for evaluation
The balanced emphasis on temperament and technique lends grounded theory methodology a
postpositivist epistemology. The process of abstraction is, ultimately, an interpretive one (Charmaz
2006). However, it is an interpretation that seeks to approximate truth. As Lomborg and Kirkevold
(2003: 194) put it, "Neither the recognition that the truth is never fully established nor that theories
are historically embedded [contradicts] the existence of a reality that is - at least partly -
independent of human consciousness". On this premise, I now clarify how generalisable my CMR
propositions aim to be across substantive contexts. First, I discuss the problem of generalisability by
arguing that a theory is only useful and relevant if it is somewhat generalisable, and that
generalisation is increasingly accepted in qualitative research. Then, I draw out a distinction between
grounded theory and case study analysis: grounded theory seeks to conceptualise empirical settings
comprehensively, not to outline an "accurate" or "thick" description of events. Finally, I set out the
quality criteria for a good grounded theory.
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2.3.3.1. Why generalise: Making qualitative research useful
The usefulness of qualitative research is an unclear notion. Usefulness often entails applying
analytical insights outside the contexts from which they were derived; useful analytical insights are
effectively tools. Yet, qualitative research tends to be interpretivist in nature (Schofield 2002), and
interpretivists are sceptical of applying analytical insights across contexts. Denzin (1983), for
example, writes that, "for the interpretivist every instance of social interaction, if thickly described
(Geertz 1973), [...] must be seen ascarrying its own logic, senseof order, structure, and meaning" (p.
133-4). This means, add Guba and lincoln (1981), that "it is virtually impossible to imagine any
human behaviour that is not heavily mediated by the context in which it occurs [and therefore] One
can easily conclude that generalisations that are intended to be context-free will have little that is
useful to say about human behaviour" (p. 61, italics added).
I would argue that research findings that cannot be generalised to new contexts will also have little
that is useful to say about human behaviour. Building knowledge solely for the sake of
understanding social phenomena may be worthwhile, but it is hardly useful. To be useful, social
science research should, at a minimum, be generalisable within substantive environments and
across similar ones.
Indeed, over time, compromise positions on generalisations have emerged from within the
interpretivist tradition. For example, lincoln and Guba, by 2002, write that case studies "serve as
metaphors useful to the reader to stretch and test his or her own knowledge; they provide the
vicarious experience from which the reader may learn (as we do from a" experience)" (p. 206,
underlining added). To live vicarious experiences is to transfer knowledge into a new setting; e.g.
new research or interventions. According to this view, even interpretivist casestudies do not provide
merely transitory knowledge that is irrelevant outside its specific context; they have utility. If we
agree that it is desirable for research to be useful, and that to be useful, research results must be at
least tentatively generalisable, then we must determine how to achieve that generalisation.
2.3.3.2. Generalisation through comparisons
Grounded theory methodology differs from other qualitative research traditions because it aims for
conceptual theory with generalisable properties, and has different criteria from case studies (Glaser
2007: 99). In traditional qualitative research, the objective is to provide "accurate" or "thick"
descriptions of events or actors through case studies (Schofield 2002: 179; Geertz 1973). These
descriptions are usually not generalisable in a strict sense, even if they provide vicarious insight for
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new applications. They focus on obtaining and presenting in Denzin's words (2002), "personal
experience stories and self-stories that embody, in full detail, the essential features of the
phenomenon ..." (p, 360). Grounded theory's objective, by contrast, is to derive theoretical concepts
that render faithful abstractions of the researched experiences.
These two objectives, thick description versus conceptual theory, have significant parallels. The
grounded theory ethos that "data is king", and the criterion that collection and analysis should
continue until a category is theoretically saturated, demonstrate grounded theorists' focus on
accurate renderings of theory. Indeed the exhaustive coding of data might be characterised as
creating a "thick theory", rather than a "thick description". In addressing this distinction, Dey (2007),
a grounded theorist, strikes a conciliatory tone:
"Thenature of a caseis problematicin groundedtheory, especiallyasGlaserandStraussdeliberately
rejected a case-basedapproachto samplingin favour of analysingsocial processescomparatively
acrossdifferent settings.However,even settings can be treated as casesand used for systematic
comparison..." (p. 180).
This thesis analyses and compares three empirical settings of varying scope - Citigroup's Eurobond
controversy, the rise to prominence of sovereign wealth funds, and the regulatory debate during the
credit crunch. Rather than approaching them as casestudies, I treat them as settings where through
careful comparisons I can identify generic processes to build theoretical propositions. Whereas case
study analysis would dig into the data in a search for an interpretive meaning, the propositions I
develop rise from the data through comparison and abstraction. This helps make the resulting
theory tentatively generalisable, and therefore useful. This conviction is evident even in
constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz2006: 133).
2.3.3.3. Substantive grounded theory: Claims and criteria
Varying levels of generalisability are evident in grounded theory methodology, in the lexicon of
substantive theory versusformal theory. Substantive theory is a theoretical rendering of specific sets
of actors or events, not yet extended beyond one or a few similar contexts. It is tentatively
generalisable within its empirical settings whilst acknowledging situational idiosyncrasies, and offers
an interpretive frame for researching and shaping emerging situations in other contexts. A
substantive theory becomes more generalisable when the researcher samples for variations of the
core category acrossmore empirical contexts. The new settings are selected on the basisof whether
similar social processes are evident there (theoretical sampling). With enough investigation, a
substantive theory may eventually become a formal theory. Glaser (2007) writes that the level of
abstraction is not the defining feature of a formal theory: "let the level of abstraction fall where it
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may," he writes, lias the generation of formal theory pursues the general implications of the core
variable" (p. 102). In other words, however abstract a core concept, it only substantiates formal
theory if it is generalisable.
This thesis presents a substantive theory which has predictive power that is, on one hand, limited by
the recognition that reality is historically and culturally embedded and never fully apprehendable,
and, on the other hand, supported by comparisons and conceptualisations of similar social processes
across empirical settings. From this broad characteristic, two specific claims follow. First, the
propositions from this thesis should improve the understanding of these episodes such that another
analyst with a similar theoretical background and following the same procedures would arrive at
similar conclusions. Put differently, the theory should be valid and reliable within the studied
empirical contexts. Secondly, the theoretical propositions should be usable by other researchers as
potential explanations for new emerging phenomena. For example, in Chapter 6, I note that the
debate that recently emerged about private capital markets known as 'dark pools', might be
understood as an attempt to define a 'corporate market responsibility' for the market actors
involved. The sporadic bursts of scrutiny affecting hedge funds may also have a similar
interpretation. If I have done my job well, then the propositions around 'corporate market
responsibility' should help researchers and practitioners to learn from, adapt to, and shape some
emerging situations in financial market governance.
These objectives are consistent with the quality criteria for grounded theory advanced in the
literature, of which there are two strands: classical and new. After outlining both sets of criteria, I
specify which I set out to meet.
Figure 2-6. Criteria for evaluating a grounded theory I (adapted from Glaser 1978: 4-5)
Classical criteria
Fit
Categories fit the data; data not selected to fit an extant theory; most of the
categories are generated directly from the data; categories are refit to new
data, and there is emergent fit between data and pre-existing categories
Theory explains what happened, predicts what will happen and interprets what
is happening.
Theory allows core problems and processes to emerge; theorist does not have
to spend time to convince others of the relevance of his work.
Categories allow for ready, quick modification to help explain surprising or new
variations in an ever changing world, as new data emerges; and can be
extended to new substantive contexts; maintains tractability and hence
relevance.
Work
Relevance
Modifiability
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As Lomborg and Kirkevold (2003) note, these classical criteria are "internally related":
lilt seems reasonable to believe that, all being equal, a relevant theory should work in practice, and
that a theory generated from empirical data should be relevant. If one recognises that social reality is
dynamic and therefore continuously goes through slight changes, then the fitness of a theory must be
understood as being situated in a context with possibilities for modification as the theory is brought
into new contexts where new data is available" (p. 191).
Newer criteria demonstrate grounded theory's move into a more constructivist domain.
Figure 2-7. Criteria for evaluating a grounded theory II (adapted from Charmaz 2006: 182-3)
New criteria
Resonance
Achieving intimate familiarity with the topic; sufficient data to merit the claims;
systematic comparisons between the categories
Categories are fresh and offer new insights; new conceptual rendering of the
data; challenge, extend, or refine current ideas
Categories portray the fullness of the studied experience; reveal unstable
'taken-far-granted' meanings; analysis offers insights to people in the analysed
environment
Interpretations that people can use practically; generic processes; analysis
sparks further research in other areas; contributions to knowledge and making a
better world
Credibility
Originality
Usefulness
Two sets of criteria overlap, as the criteria of fit and credibility both call for an accurate theoretical
rendering of data. Relevance and resonance are also closely related: the theory is readily
apprehendable by those familiar with the studied phenomena. However, some divergence is evident
as new grounded theory has moved away from positivism. The new criterion of resonance,
"portraying the fullness of the studied experience", invokes thick, descriptive renderings, more
commonly associated with constructivist research. The classical criterion of "work" is phrased as a
very positivist and realist criterion, invoking a seemingly immutable external reality.
Whereas a researcher might ordinarily pick one set of criteria, a postpositivist researcher who
recognises both positivist and non-positivist insights may well need to meet both. To do so, I should
caveat the two more extreme criteria of resonance and work. The "fullness of the studied
experience" should be captured by good fit and credibility. The theory should wark well, but
inevitable historical and social idiosyncrasies should be recognised. In Chapter 6, I present the
propositions and assess how they meet these quality criteria.
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2.4. Researching three empirical settings
A journey begins before the travellers depart.
Kathy Charmaz (2006: 1)
For a postpositivist, a research problem "exists when there is a [perceived] discrepancy between
what ought to be and what is" (Mor~ol 2002: 109, citing McKenna 1980). To perceive this
discrepancy, researchers rely on their theoretical sensitivity, derived from their research background
and experience. My curiosity was initially piqued by an article about a Eurobond trade by Citigroup,
which is reproduced on the next page.The transaction became known as the 'Dr Evil' trade, after the
nickname that Citigroup traders gave to their software programme. Recalling my undergraduate
study of economics, I thought 'this is not how the economy ismeant to work'.
In this event, the discrepancy between what seemed to be (making money from having large
amounts of it to begin with) and what ought to be (making money from selling better products,
asking lower prices, or making efficiency gains) was curious. Sixdays after this article, I read that the
UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA)would be investigating Citigroup for violating principles of
conduct, despite Citigroup not having broken the law. According to the press, the bank had broken a
"gentlemen's agreement" in the market (e.g. The Times 2004), but it was unclear what that
gentlemen's agreement had been. When the FSA(2005) fined Citigroup for having demonstrated
"undue regard for the efficient and orderly operation" of the market, it seemed to suggest that even
highly transparent and efficient markets like the MTS do not self-correct. The FSA'sjudgement
prompted the question 'how are firms responsible for ensuring orderly financial markets?' This is
where the research began.
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Figure 2-8. First report that inspired the thesis
Citigroup's brazen bond bet pays off
But sooner or later there will be a casualty
The Guardian, Wednesday 11 August 2004
How do you make E8m in half an hour? The answer, it seems, in the caseof Citigroup, is to sell a container-load of
bonds issued by eurozone countries, creating a market panic in the process, before then buying back a chunk of the
same bonds at lower prices.
This, or something like it, seems to have happened on a quiet day last week. Citigroup, the world's largest financial
institution, refuses to talk in detail about the saga, but it is nevertheless clear that it sold an astonishing €l1bn
(E7.3bn) worth of eurozone government bonds via the Italy-based MTSelectronic trading system.
Across a wide range of debt instruments, this had the predictable effect of pushing down prices - by about 40 ticks,
or 0.4% of a percentage point.
It may not sound much but, when you are dealing in billions, small margins can still translate to substantial profits.
When Citigrou p bought back €4bn of the same bonds half an hour later it will have benefited by about €12m,
assuming a more conservative profit (or spread) of about 30 ticks.
Eurozone bonds will seem pretty esoteric stuff to many readers, but many dealers who found themselves on the
losing side of these transactions reckon Citigroup is guiltv of something akin to market manipulation.
MTS,which is owned by a group of banks, is sufficiently concerned to have placed a temporary restriction of €1bn
on the amount that any bank can trade within two minutes.
Of course, Citigroup did nothing illegal here. It legitimately filled orders that had been placed by willing
counterparties, all of whom were grown-up financial institutions used to dealing in large numbers.
The novel aspect was to trade in such size across a range of debt at such speed. It looks to have been a clever, if
controversial, piece of market trading.
Even so, two thoughts occur. One is that eurozone governments will not like the idea that a USinvestment bank is
using its huge balance sheet to play silly buggers with their debt, particularly if the effect is to reduce liquidity;
Citigroup, which likes to act for governments directly, will have received some black marks in certain European
capitals.
Second, the tale illustrates the truly huge sums now involved in what the investment banks call proprietary trading,
and outsiders think of as gambling with the bank's capital.
The buccaneering Citigroup trade was clearly well-designed and executed - but, sooner or later, there will be a major
casualty in this game.
As theoretical underpinnings for the Citigroup episode emerged, it became necessaryto analyse how
well they applied to new settings, and I sought other episodes that appeared to display similar
characteristics as the Citigroup case, thus giving the emerging concepts more fit, relevance, and
modifiability over time. I was not seeking to confirm or refute the sensttlsing concepts (Strauss and
Corbin 1998), or a priori constructs (Eisenhardt 2002), that emerged from the Citigroup episode.
Rather, I sought out how they appeared to vary in a new context. I identified two other episodes, as
well as data sources that were consistent both with the concepts I was researching, and across the
episodes. In the following paragraphs, I explain how these decisions were made.
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2.4.1. Selecting empirical contexts
In 2007 I became aware, through news reports, that politicians and analysts were expressing
concerns about the market conduct of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). The funds, which are
government-owned, were very large and growing quickly and it was feared that they might
destabilise markets (IMF 2007) or invest in order to further political objectives. Sovereign funds
became highly controversial in 2007, sparking reviews of national investment policy in many
Western countries, which in Germany's case let to a new regulatory institution. The controversy had
an interesting parallel to the Citigroup case.Much like it was unclear what "gentlemen's agreement"
Citigroup had broken, no one accused sovereign funds of actual misconduct. Their very expansion
was based on chasing financial returns, and none of their investments had been viewed as
untoward. Yet, political pressure soon emerged for SWFsto sign codes-of-conduct that would ensure
that they adopted practices that would safeguard efficient and orderly financial markets.l! Good
market conduct, adopted to mitigate regulatory risk, would supplement legal and competitive
behaviour. In this case therefore, and as with Citigroup, regulatory authorities appeared to be
holding sovereign wealth funds responsible for their impact on markets.
In the Citigroup episode, the main pattern of behaviour that needed to be investigated was why the
trade had been controversial, given that it was legal and followed basic economic tenets. The
explanation I advance is that there was a requirement that banks would help ensure market
confidence and stability on the MTSbond exchange, even if that entailed higher administrative costs
(e.g. risk management) and opportunity costs (abstaining from certain transactions). I wanted to
understand to what extent, and how, there was a similar expectation of sovereign wealth funds.
Despite the controversy surrounding them, there were no empirical grounds that would justify it.
Based on press and regulatory data, I argue that the controversy represented an attempt to define
good market conduct for the funds, which were newly significant actors in international financial
markets. The codes-of-conduct, which ended the controversy, were characterised as capitalism
"user-manuals" for SWFs. They could be regarded as guidelines for responsible financial market
participants, and they were predicated on many of the same behaviours that regulators had invoked
for Citigroup. Therefore, the SWFs episode helped to substantiate and add variation to the
propositions I was developing.
11 Therewere salientconcernsthat SWFinvestment(1) signalleda reversalof decadesof privationsandmight
leadto inefficient industriesor (2) wascarriedon sucha largescalethat it would destabilisemarkets(Chapter
4, Section4.2.3).
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My discovery of the sovereign wealth funds episode was what Strauss and Corbin (1998) call a
"fortuitous" variant of theoretical sampling:
"The researcher happens on theoretically significant events quite unexpectedly during field
observation, interviewing or reading documents. It is important to recognise the analytic importance
of such an event or incident and to pick up on it. This comes with having an open and questioning
mind and with being alert" (p. 209).
Although the selection of the episodes was sequential, the analysis was cyclical. Comparing generic
processes across episodes helped me to ask new questions of my preliminary substantive
conclusions, and to review them. I demonstrate my preliminary conclusions in each episode's
chapter (3, 4, 5), and then integrate them in a single theoretical chapter (6).
My initial intention was to use the two episodes - one micro and one macro - to conduct the kind of
comparative analysis that Moses and Knutsen (2007) discussed: "comparing particular events and
general norms helps us to understand the event as more than just particular, or local [... and] to
uncover meanings by juxtaposition of the particular against the general" (pp. 238, 240). However,
the financial crisis that erupted during this research gave rise to a third phenomenon that appeared
to reinforce the contemporaneous relevance of my research. Many started to blame the crisis on an
"age of irresponsibility", a new concept in the public domain (Brown 2008, Obama 2009). By then,
my analysis of Citigroup and SWFssuggested that they had been held accountable for protecting
market confidence and stability. Against this background, "irresponsible banking" seemed an
essential issue to account for in the emerging propositions.
A significant international regulatory debate emerged as to what had gone wrong in the lead-up to
the crisis, and how to resolve it. Blame for the crisis was attributed to a wide range of actors, from
regulators who did not prevent excessive risk in the system, to financial institutions who lent and
traded imprudently, and consumers who borrowed beyond their means. As in previous episodes, I
focused on financial firms' behaviours. The regulatory debate held that banks had somehow acted
irresponsibly even where they had complied with the applicable regulations, and (especially) where
they had maximised returns - ostensibly the two sole responsibilities of business (Friedman 1970). In
this way, the central problematique of the debate on corporate conduct was similar to those of the
Citigroup and SWF cases. Using the techniques of theoretical sampling and theoretical coding, I
analysed what the regulatory debate and the ensuing coverage in the news had to say about the
specific themes identified in the earlier episodes: risk management, investment policy, and firms'
proactive improvement of their shortcomings. The Credit Crunch episode contributed new concepts
as well as variations on existing themes. Like the SWFsepisode, this episode was another case of
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"fortuitous" theoretical sampling, where I happened on significant new events in the course of my
research. It is a tribute to grounded theory methodology that it allowed me to extract new
theoretical insights from the emerging episode. The case enabled me to broaden the scope of
analysis to the full systemic level. Thus, I completed a trajectory from analysing a single actor in a
well-defined market, to a set of similar actors across several markets, to a wide range of banks and
bank-like institutions across all (Western) financial markets.
To clarify the similarities and differences in each of these episodes, the following table draws some
distinctions.
Figure 2-9. The episodes' conceptual features
Citigroup controversy SWF prominence Post-Credit Crunch debate
Problematique Controversy around a legal, Controversy around rise of New debate on "irresponsibleprofitable trade new market actors banking"
Conceptual account Firms' responsibility to ensure Efforts to establish 'good Responsibility for firms to help
(expla nation) market confidence market conduct' for SWFs regulators pursue objectives
Financial actors Large investment banks Large investment funds Large banks and funds
Market domain Bond markets Bond and equity markets Credit markets and others
All news reports on 'Citigroup' All news reports on 'SWFs'
Selected news reports and
Data sampling
and 'MTS'; related regulation and 'controversy'; related
policy documents on financial
policy documents regulatory reform
Contribution I Theoretical account ofthe
Theoretica I account of the Theoretical account of the
Citigroup episode SWFepisode Credit Crunch episode
Contribution II Sensitising concepts, theory
Conceptual variation, Theoretical saturation, leading
'building blocks' tentative propositions to final propositions
2.4.2. Selecting data
Insofar as the question of how firms are responsible for ensuring orderly markets is a general
question about broad-based expectations of corporate conduct, I sought data that would convey a
broad basis for answering it. The first data type was news reports of the episodes. It is well known
that news reporting influences societal responses to markets (Islam 2002, Herman 2002, Shiller
2002, Oyck and Zingales 2002, Stiglitz 2002), and sometimes alert researchers to new research
problems. In her study of "Social construction of a perfect market", Garcia-Parpet (2007) was
persuaded to return to a specific market because "Media coverage ... made me aware of the fact
that this market form was threatened" (p. 46). In not dissimilar fashion, the media alerted me to the
Citigroup case. However, I took my use of the media a step further than Garcia-Parpet, and used it as
a data source in itself. News articles are rich in insight because, as Shiller (2002) puts it, "Significant
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market events generally occur only if there is similar thinking about large groups of people, and the
news media are essential vehicles for the spread of ideas" (p. 84). The media's contribution to public
debate occurs both through reports and a word-of-mouth effect, particularly when journalists,
market actors, government officials and academics form de facto epistemic communities. Like Shiller
and other political economists and sociologists, I take it as given that the media provide valuable
data about market expectations (see also Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005). The challenge was to use
that data consistently with my epistemological positioning, attending to skewed or biased reporting.
The next subsection below discusseshow I dealt with this problem.
As news reports emphasised the centrality of regulatory and political reactions to the controversies,
it became necessary to analyse those reactions in more depth, and therefore regulatory and policy
papers were also sampled. The reports indicated that non-market actors were the main catalysts for
deciding how the episodes would evolve. In the Citigroup episode, the reporting focused primarily
on the regulatory implications of the bank's conduct. Citigroup's apologies, for example, were
interpreted as attempts to manage regulatory risk. When other banks discussed how to retaliate,
they focused on the possibility of lobbying the regulators against Citigroup. Ultimately they decided
they could not, because Citigroup had not broken the law; they expressly decided to wait for the
regulators' decisions. In the sovereign funds controversy, the main drivers were once again political.
The 'grand debate', and the impending resolution, was whether Western governments would block
SWF investments. It was not, for example, how joint ventures between SWFsand other financial
actors would evolve within the market environment. The resolution came through codes-of-conduct
for SWFs (brokered by the IMF and the US government), which thus acquired central analytical
value. Finally, in terms of the fall-out from the credit crunch, the loudest invocations of the "age of
irresponsibility" came from government, through the UK Prime Minister and USPresident. On this
basis, all three episodes have regulatory and political documents that earned their way into the
theory. That is, comparing this data to the concepts identified in the news reports would help to
increase the concepts' density and variation, without having to draw on extant theoretical
justifications for data selection and without compromising the theory's parsimony.
While official documents are very commonly used as data in grounded theory, news reports are not.
In their helpful correspondence with me, Barney Glaser and Kathy Charmaz could not point me to
other examples. Strauss and Corbin 1998 (p. 52) list newspapers as useful primary data, but do not
discuss how to treat it. Therefore, I have devoted particular attention to that in the following
explanation of my sampling decisions.
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2.4.2.1. News reports as data
Asserting that the media facilitate the spread of ideas and capture debates about financial markets
is, of course, not the same as assuming that the media are neutral. Shiller (2002) argues that,
"Although the media ... present themselves as detached observers of market events, they are
themselves an integral part of these events" (p. 84). Indeed, news reports may elevate their subjects
to undue importance. That is, a reader may conclude that a reported event is more significant, either
epistemologically or in application, than subsequent events justify. This is why Taleb (2004: 50)
writes, tongue-in-cheek, that "To be competent, a journalist should ... play down the value of the
information he is providing ...". Even if the. reported event or debate finds traction and becomes
relevant, it may serve the specific agendas of the news corporation (Herman 2002), and therefore
not faithfully represent the substantive debate in society. These limitations could be problematic for
theory-building insofar as they would yield a skewed or incomplete understanding of the empirical
content. However, I argue below that neither the possibility of hype nor skew are limitations in this
study. If it was hype it found traction, and some skew in the reporting could be beneficial, provided
that the selection of sources iswell carried out.
Hype is the first problem. Shiller (2002) cautions the following: "One can argue that [the media)
ought to focus on a variety of topics of interest to general audiences so that the public can refine
their views. Yet, in doing so, the media seem often to disseminate and reinforce ideas that are not
supported by real evidence" (p. 86). LikeTaleb (2004, ch. 11) and Veldkamp (2004), Shiller concludes
that news reports may ascribe high significance to ultimately irrelevant news, or "noise", as Taleb
calls it. Financial markets are "naturally attractive" to the media, Shiller writes:
"because, at the very least, [financial markets) provide constant news in the form of daily price
changes ... Nothing beats the stock market for sheer frequency of potentially interesting news items.
The stock market also has star quality .... Financial news may have great human interest potential to
the extent that it deals with the making or breaking of fortunes" (2002: 85).
From a different - constructivist - tradition Gabriel Garcia Marquez (2002) argues that the demands
of technology, which have narrowed the time and scope for research and reflection, are to account
for many of the inaccuracies and banalities in the news: "Reporting is, in reality, a meticulous and
accurate reconstruction of facts. In other words, it is the news in its entirety, as events actually
occurred, presented in a way to make the reader feel as though he actually witnessed them ... In my
view, it is the haste and restriction of space that have reduced the stature of reporting ..." (p. 251).
These critiques beg the question: do the reports in my data point to a legitimate, relevant
phenomenon, or were issuesamplified in order to increase newspaper circulation? There is both the
58
possibility that journalists needed new material to report in order to meet deadlines, and the
possibility that they sustained the controversy in order to push an agenda. I would argue that
neither possibility compromises my analysis.
The dataset is partly shielded from the first risk because the episodes are not related to frequent
price moves and span a relatively long period of time covering relatively few major events. The
Citigroup and SWF episodes did not comprise a large number of pivotal events, meaning that there
were few logistical pressures incentivising reporters to exaggerate the event. In the Citigroup case,
there were only five or six turning points through the course of the year that actors reacted to
markedly." In relation to sovereign funds, there were roughly three." The high intensity of
reporting, in light of infrequent events, may reflect beneficial "research and reflection" (cf. Garcia
Marquez 2002: 251); "an effort to make sense" of events (cf. Shiller 2002: 88). Nevertheless, some
could argue that persistent reporting in the absence of new events was evidence that the
newspapers were pushing an agenda. I would contest that, as I now argue.
The media's economic and political agendas - their skew - are explored from liberal and critical
perspectives by Stiglitz (2002) and Herman (2002), respectively. Stiglitz (also citing Sen 1980) argues
that "independent" media influence governments to act more in the public interest. Islam (2002)
corroborates this in a literature review which concludes that "independent" media with good
information and broad reach are often associated with positive economic performance. From this
perspective, it is possible to increase the level of transparency and faithfulness in journalists'
accounting of debates in society by choosing "independent" sources, with good quality information
and broad reach." Herman (2002), also citing Herman and Chomsky (2002, ch. 1) is critical of this
view. "As part of the market," he argues, "the media are unlikely to be hostile to the market and
oppose polities that dominant members of the market support" (p. 78). Yet my analysis shows that
the "hostile to market / favourable to market" distinction is not clear-cut. The media introduced
issues and reported controversies that, over time, challenged several dominant ideas in free-market
thinking, in particular the idea that markets are self-correcting. Indeed, these challenges are what
12 They were the bank's trade, the MTSexchange's judgment, Citigroup's apology, a leaked confidential memo,
the FSA'sregulatory judgment, and perhaps Germany's initial investigation.
13The publication of reports on SWFsby Morgan Stanley and the IMF, the USand ECprinciples for SWFs,and
the final international code of conduct.
14 Stiglitz (2002) defines this "reach" as reducing natural information asymmetries in the substantive
environment.
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made the present research worth pursuing. As a result, I find Stiglitz's, Sen's and Islam's arguments
(that it is possible to find faithful media sources) a good theoretical basisfor using these sources.
The question of whether the newspapers hyped up the controversy does not strike me as a
limitation in this study because,either way, the controversies found traction. If everyone agrees that
a topic is controversial, then it becomes controversial (Lomborg and Kirkevold 2003). The
controversies led to regulatory and political responses and, in addition, some of the debates in the
dataset, regarding what constitutes good conduct in financial markets (beyond compliance),
continue to resonate with current debates (Chapter 5) about the efficiency of financial markets in
light of the financial crisis. If the debates exist, my objective is to make sense of them within a
setting where they are carried out, namely independent press.
Undoubtedly, it is interesting to research how the media select issuesto report, and how that affects
market expectations. However, the present research concerns the content of those expectations
about the market, not their provenance. In economic sociology, this angle may be seen as a valuable
contribution. Smith-Doerr and Powell (2005), argue that there is a "tendency [in market networks
research] to focus on the structure of relationships, and neglect the content of their ties" (p. 394). I
contend that the content of market expectations discernible in news reports is, in itself, rich and
critical enough to merit researching. To increase the credibility of my analysis, I also compare my
preliminary conclusions to regulatory documents, and across substantive contexts.
It should be noted that there are many precedents for taking news reports of controversy 'as they
are' in order to develop new theory. One might expect this practice to be restricted to positivistic
economists who thrive on observer-independent data, but it is not. Richard Swedberg's (2005)
article, "Conflicts of interests in the USbrokerage industry" is an example; the eminent sociologist
frequently references specific media reports as evidence of broader social sentiment. For example,
he uses a New York Times article as evidence that "it was apparent to many observers that business
analysts were getting careless and irresponsible in their analyses" (p. 190). Similarly, in their article
itA price is a social thing: Towards a material sociology of arbitrage", Beunza, Hardie and MacKenzie
(2006) cite some of the same reports that appear in my Citigroup dataset as a basis for their
interpretation. Notwithstanding precedent, and in keeping with a postpositivist approach, I seek to
maximise the positive aspects of bias (Le. being embedded in market and regulatory networks), and
minimise the negative aspects (hype and skew). I do this by selecting newspapers using criteria that
fulfil Islam's (2002) and Stiglitz's (2002) notions of independence, good quality information and
broad reach within the substantive environment.
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The newspapers that met the criteria are the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the
Washington Post - from the US - and the Financial Times, the Daily Telegraph, The Times, the
Guardian, and the Economist, from the UK.These newspapers are all Western, in order to exploit a
direct relevance to the studied phenomena. Direct relevance means the propensity to influence and
operate within the same domain as major financial market and regulatory actors - to capture the
word-of-mouth effect. A source with direct relevance is useful because it has access to more
information and because it adapts its messagesmore quickly in response to evolving expectations.
The newspapers are American and British becauseWestern financial markets operate predominantly
from there, and those countries have long served as models of market-based economies. Indeed, in
these countries the structure of corporate governance is underpinned by an assumption of
transparency (Moon 2004). As a sub-criterion, these newspapers are known, by common knowledge,
to be read by decision-makers in market and policy circles.
The sample excludes tabloids, which are often sensationalist. There is value in sensationalism insofar
as it magnifies certain expectations, but it can also obscure our view of core messagesin the market,
since, by assumption, tabloids are not widely used by financial market actors and regulators to
inform financial and regulatory decisions. Consequently, I am not looking for popular attitudes in
these episodes, but rather for specialised attitudes. The newspapers in the data set have a strong
focus on business issues,and thus a higher propensity to report nuance.
These criteria naturally create some limitations. Non-Western media might espouse 'freer'
perspectives, unencumbered by peer pressure and Western liberal frames of reference.
Sensationalist media might pinpoint where wider popular attitudes differ from expectations in the
market. However, these media sources have not, as grounded theorists put it, "earned their way"
into the theory. That is, the data does not present questions or inconsistencies that could be helped
with these other types of sources (see Glaser 1978: 34-44). I research the 'view from within' in
liberal, capitalist society. This means using, as Strauss and Corbin (1998) put it, for "data [which]
have the greatest potential to capture the types of information desired" (p. 204).
The choice of newspapers, rather than other sources, is also intentional. Newspapers offer a
valuable contrast between reports (where journalists 'try to be objective'), columns (where
individuals are required to present an interpretation), and editorials (where the newspaper stakes its
position institutionally). The fact that newspapers register the passing of events, actions, themes,
contradictions, and reactions in detail allow the researcher to wade through valuable 'unresolved'
uncertainties that gripped the episode on a daily basis. The analyst is then able to conceptualise
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them independently from - and then compare them with - the 'resolved' interpretations ex post,
including those in columns. Thus newspapers are unique because they offer a comprehensive
registry of events alongside an archive of interpretations, both of them widely accessed by diverse
actors in the market and non-market environments, such as bankers, consultants, regulators,
politicians, and academics. This makes them deeply substantive, multi-dimensional, and influential
data sources.
2.4.2.2. Regulatory and policy documents
As I explained earlier, the media reports suggested that the substantive regulatory and policy
documents should be consulted. These documents would help discover conceptual properties and
dimensions of the reported data. Another justification for drawing on these documents accrues from
political economy theory. If one accepts a distinction between the market and non-market domain
(Baron 2003), then regulatory and political documents (which I will refer to here simply as
'regulation') may been seen as attempts to maintain efficient and orderly markets. That is, in
Western capitalist society regulation looks to compensate for market failures, including where the
market does not self-correct adequately. Thus if the central research question is 'how are firms
responsible for ensuring orderly financial markets', there is a predetermined rationale for consulting
how that function is carried out by firms' regulatory counterparts. This general proposition is
compounded by a more specific rationale in the controversial episodes I am analysing. The
regulation delineates what the market actors are perceived to do on their own, can be allowed to
do, must be proscribed from doing, and should be encouraged to do. In this respect, they provide a
sound data-driven basis for theorising how orderly markets are maintained.
Notwithstanding, regulatory data faces a similar, if milder, problem as media data. Like media,
regulators are not neutral. They may face pressures to act idiosyncratically; for example, they may
come under pressure to arrive at a quick decision over a contentious transaction (Mayhew 2006).
Regulation in specific episodes may therefore not provide generalisable insights about broader
trends in markets. However, it is in the nature of regulation to establish precedents and directly
influence future expectations both in the market and non-market environments. Whereas individual
news reports may be unread or ignored, regulation, strictly speaking, is not. All financial firms
employ compliance personnel whose purpose is to examine regulation - circumvent it perhaps, but
examine it nonetheless. Therefore, regulation is always material to the substantive environment.
Once the key processes outlined in them are conceptualised and compared with other data and
other substantive settings, they acquire theoretical significance and provide interpretive frames that
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can be used to assessnew situations. Regulation's traction is evident in the episode data itself. For
example, several sovereign wealth funds argued against the political pressure on them by pointing
out that hedge funds had received relatively lower scrutiny. Private equity firms signed a code-of-
conduct under regulatory pressure and urged sovereign funds to do the same. These different
industries used regulatory decisions in different domains to justify their own expectations. The
regulatory data in the three episodes therefore provides insights with some basic theoretical
resonance beyond the substantive contexts.
For this reason, and to maintain epistemological consistency with the media reports analysis, the
regulatory documents are analysed primarily for their content 'as is', rather than for how it was
internally constructed. Insights into the social context of their construction emerge naturally
elsewhere. First, the media data reports the broader social context of the regulatory decisions, and
the conditions under which they occurred. Becausemy analysis compares how generic processesare
manifest in the two datasets, my conclusions incorporate the more salient aspects of the social,
contextual contingencies of the regulatory decisions. In addition, much of the regulatory data itself
notes the rationale for its own construction endogenously. Regulatory documents pertaining to
Citigroup explain the FSA'sprinciples-based approach to regulation; the FSA'sexpress 'mindset'. The
codes-of-conduct for SWFsoutline which public and private sector parties were involved in their
design, yielding a fundamental lesson for my analysis: that firms 'signed up' to ensuring orderly
markets, under the pressures reported in the news. Similar insights emerge in the credit crunch
episode, where the emergence of a political debate on "irresponsible banking" carries its historical
relevance endogenously. Ultimately, this matters for my claims on generalisability and resonance.
Because the broader embedded ness of the regulation appears in the content of the datasets
themselves, and because the episodes are contemporaneous, I maintain that the documents provide
basic theoretical resonance and support tentative generalisations.
To select which regulatory documents to analyse, I followed the same methodologically grounded
principle of direct relevance used to select news sources. While I guided the news sources selection
with extant criteria of objectivity, reach and quality (Stiglitz 2002, Islam 2002), to mitigate concerns
about the nature of reporting, I guided the regulation selection with theoretical sampling. First, I
identified the most relevant documents to the controversies, which were cited in the news
reporting. This included the regulatory investigations into Citigroup, the policy documents issued on
SWFs,and the regulatory and political statements on irresponsible banking. Then, conceptualisation
of that data threw up additional questions whenever phenomena were inconsistent or unexplained.
This led me to sample other regulation. For example, the FSA's(200Sa) Final Notice to Citigroup was
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based on the regulator's Principles for Business,but did not invoke Principle 5, on market conduct.
Becausethe news data and other regulators had investigated potential market abuse, I sampled the
regulation on market abuse nonetheless, in order to help delineate which aspects of market conduct
were and weren't material to the episode. Where comparisons between the data did not yield
inconsistencies or unexplained phenomena, including based on my own theoretical knowledge, I did
not sample further.
Eachdataset is described in detail in the first section of each empirical analysis chapter.
2.4.2.3. Focus on documentary analysis
A priori, my epistemological and methodological approach would not justify introducing new data
sources, and here I explain why interviews or questionnaires of market participants were not
pursued. Becausethe research question is about firms' responsibilities, one might have intuited that
individuals in firms would provide valuable insights. Moreover, such data is common in doctoral
work. It is worth, however, distinguishing between capturing perspectives from a population of
market participants within substantive contexts, versus capturing idiosyncratic perspectives from
individuals outside the problematiques being analysed. The former is part of my analysis insofar as
each of the empirical chapters draws on a range of direct quotations from market participants,
harvested from media data, in the context of a societal debate. Idiosyncratic individual perspectives,
however, drawn from interviews or questionnaires would be unnecessary (undermining parsimony)
and skewed (undermining credibility), as I now explain.
To be consistent with my overall approach, sampling should be driven by conceptual problems and
empirical gaps identified during the analysis. The data does not suggest that any idiosyncratic
perspectives remained unexplained. Indeed the financial institutions in each episode adapted to the
expectations held of them: Citigroup apologised, sovereign funds signed a code of conduct, and
although the Credit Crunch episode continues, banks have begun addressing concerns over
remuneration, for example, by adopting new compensation structures (AFP 2009). The market
perspectives that led to these resolutions are analysed extensively from the news data, particularly
in Chapter 3, in light of a putative 'gentlemen's agreement' within the bond market. The central
concern of the market participants and other commentators in the data was what governments
would do next (which justified the regulatory sampling), and the regulatory data accounted for how
firms were being held responsible for systemic impact. 'Corporate responsibility' is, in any case, a
construct advanced primarily from the non-market domain (Baron 2003, Jones 1996). Finally, the
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reports and regulation data captured broad, system-level expectations and events. Purposefully
sampling idiosyncratic market perspectives could introduce skew and reduce parsimony because the
data had not earned its way into the theory.
Several cognitive and practical challenges contributed to this rationale. The question of firms being
responsible for orderly markets is interesting because it problematises dominant thinking about
markets, but this creates cognitive obstacles. Even if the conceptualisation of certain behaviours as
CMR makes sense based on sampling of documentary data, it was likely to seem 'academic' to
market participants (in the colloquial sense, meaning peripheral), particularly as much of this
research took place while markets were booming, before the Credit Crunch. Moreover, incentives
existed to downplay the concept of CMRbecauseaccepting it could implicate changes to established
working practices for respondents, higher costs and foregone opportunities. It might also
characterise some of respondents' past conduct as irresponsible. As we now know from the post-
Credit Crunch debate, financial incentives and risk management practices leading to irresponsible
finance are strongly entrenched. Respondents also face legal, ethical, and professional constraints in
discussing controversies related to their employers. On these grounds (the value of) idiosyncratic
contributions would be limited.
Finally, the value and quality of idiosyncratic perspectives is particularly questionable in lieu of my
conclusions. It would be entirely possible, given the cognitive and practical challenges above, that
idiosyncratic responses from firms would state that CMR does not exist - that firms are only
responsible for compliance and profit-maximisation. This would not detract from the proposition
that firms are held responsible for the practices that I have conceptualised asCMR. In other words, it
is sufficiently valid to argue that CMRconduct mitigates regulatory risk, if that argument is based on
regulatory data. In recognition that regulators do not operate in isolation from firms - on the
contrary, that expectations spread through numerous information channels and epistemic
communities - I look for insights from market participants in the media data. The reader will find
many contrarian, and often contradictory, testimonies from market participants in the empirical
analysis.
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2.S. Implications of research design: The epistemological boundaries of CMR
Depending on how data is selected and rendered, all theories acquire epistemological de-limitations.
In this thesis, the research strategy implies five such boundaries, which I discuss in more length in
later chapters.
Firstly, the research design gives the theory a systemic perspective. The reports and regulation apply
to broad sets of actors involved in the episodes. While specific people, processes and events are
discussed, my conceptualisation of what they have to say and their implications is rendered from a
broad systemic perspective because those events are compared with, and conceptualised from,
other data in the episode. Therefore, this is a thesis about financial markets broadly, and addresses
internal corporate processes (e.g. corporate governance) primarily for their impact on the financial
system (e.g. mitigating market risk). This provides a theoretical framework that other researchers
may use to analyse specific corporate conditions, such the management constraints that a particular
actor faces in implementing corporate market responsibility.
Secondly, and by extension, the primary dynamic is between expectations of CMR behaviours on
one hand and regulatory risk on the other. The controversies of the three episodes were embedded
in this dynamic: i.e. the regulatory and political reactions to (possibly) irresponsible conduct.
Researchers may alternatively be interested in the dynamics between CMR and, for example, asset
prices or contractual relationships. To that end, the thesis contributes a number of categories,
properties and dimensions (like forms of corporate governance) and, with its systemic perspective,
provides a basis for new research into how CMR processes interact with other processes in and
outside the firm.
Third, the systemic perspective is further bounded to financial, rather than industrial, markets. The
three episodes vary in nature and scope: a single bond market (Citigroup); bond and equity markets
(SWFs); and retail/investment credit markets (credit crunch). By conceptualising generic social
processes across these environments, I claim resonance and tentative generalisability to other
segments of financial markets; such as dark pools and hedge funds (Chapter 6, Section 6.4).
Researchers focusing on those settings should find the propositions of CMR to be valid and useful
interpretive frames. However, I have not advanced propositions regarding other economic sectors,
such as manufacturing, construction, etc. Future research could make that excursion in two ways.
First, some individuals, like Adair Turner, Chairman of the FSA,have suggested that banks have a
special obligation to help non-financial industries (FSA 200Sb). The US and UK government's
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pressure on 'bailed out' banks to increase lending might be interpreted to resonate with Turner's
sentiment. Exploring financial actors' responsibility to industrial markets might therefore lead to a
broader construct of 'corporate economic responsibilltv'. Similarly, researchers may seek to
understand how CMR is manifest inside altogether different industries like manufacturing, in the
West and beyond.
The research takes a Western (particularly, Anglo-American) view by design. It draws on Western
media and regulation because it was based on a perceived inconsistency between mainstream
economic theory, which is predominantly Western, and empirical controversies occurring in Western
countries. This perspective is, of course, fertile at this time in history when financial markets and
conventional economic theory are undergoing extensive review. (The 'corporate responsibility'
construct is itself primarily Western; Roche 2002.) By the same reasoning, however, analysing these
propositions in non-Western environments would also be valuable. For example, economic
sociologists argue that market actions are embedded in social norms (Granovetter 1985). Examining
CMR propositions in non-Western societies, where different social norms exist, could extend the
theory, and potentially yield new insights into management practice and market governance there.
Finally, the sampling methods and data types that I used imply that this research is embedded in a
contemporaneous historical context. I did not make historical embedded ness (which is a primary
concern for constructivist theories) a primary focus of the central propositions because the data did
not invoke it as a significant enough factor. However, this is largely a matter of salience because
explicitly historical processes conditioned the analysis. For example, the political resistance to
sovereign funds was often contextualised as a protectionist reaction to the historic shift in financial
power away from Western companies and into non-Western governments ('state capitalism'). I
argued that an alternative explanation, based on the requirement of good conduct by SWFs,
explained the resistance more adequately becauseeven recalcitrant Western countries courted SWF
investment (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3). Not having embedded historical context at the centre of the
theory means neither that historical context is absent, nor that theory is context-free.
The temptation is to claim that CMR is becoming increasingly apparent and relevant historically. The
catalysts for the episodes were large financial institutions, operating under voluntary governance
arrangements, and increasingly across borders. These conditions, which are embedded in the CMR
propositions, appear to be increasingly evident. This might therefore suggest that CMR is
increasingly relevant historically. Pursuing this claim would be a worthwhile direction for future
research, sampling across historical time periods. For example, one might comparatively analyse
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expectations of financial firms during the mercantilist era, or debates in the post-WWII period when
powerful new international financial institutions emerged. For now, my claim to historical context is
contemporaneous, as follows: CMR propositions are valid and useful (1) to interpret things that are
happening 'out there' in financial markets, and (2) to fuel fruitful new research into emerging
phenomena in financial market governance.
2.6. Conclusion
With this review of my philosophical inclinations and research method, I have set the objective of
building a substantive theory that explains the empirical data and provides an interpretive frame to
help understand other situations. Likeother postpositivists, I believe one can try to understand what
is really happening 'out there' by drawing on systematic and transparent analytical techniques. Still,
one must recognise that these tools are mediated by personal, often unconscious, knowledge and
norms, and by broader structural and historical trends. In conveying theoretical explanations, we
must therefore note which underlying conditions and contingencies are material, to make our
theories genuinely useful and tentatively generalisable.
My propositions on corporate market responsibility are built cumulatively in the following chapters.
The first concepts emerge in the analysis of Citigroup's Eurobond controversy, which suggested that
banks in that market were implicitly expected to help maintain market stability, primarily by
stabilising their liquidity provision and by foreseeing and treating market risks. These concepts are
then compared in another setting, the rise to prominence of sovereign wealth funds. There, codes-
of-conduct for the funds help us understand which behaviours large financial institutions that are
relatively new to international financial markets are accountable for, under the threat of political
sanctions. Analytical scope broadens again in the third empirical setting, where the debate on
irresponsible banking that began during the current financial crisis generates concepts that add
further empirical density and variation to the properties of 'corporate market responsibility'. Finally,
a theoretical chapter compares and integrates the conceptual accounts of the episodes into a
substantive set of propositions, and discusses its contributions to existing theory and future
research.
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"there are five words that never fail to excite and
motivate us: 'It's never been done before'."
Citigroup brochure 1
3.1. Introduction
At 10:28am on Monday, 2 August 2004, four traders in Citigroup's European government bond
trading desk activated a proprietary software programme to sell a large amount of bonds very
quickly. Twenty seconds later, unsure whether the trades had succeeded, they submitted another
sell order. By 10.29, Citigroup had sold (13 billion worth of 119 different European government
bonds across 11 platforms of the Rome-based MTS bond exchange (Mercato dei Titolo di Stati). This
was roughly the same value of bonds as the entire market would typically trade over one day. After
reconfiguring their spreadsheet, the traders bought back (4 billion in bonds, realising a profit of (15
million at 11.ZSam.
Although Citigroup was not charged with market abuse, which is illegal, the operation was highly
controversial and led to a fine against the bank. At the time, it provoked "bankers' wrath" (OTl), and
"launched a wave of ill will in the bond markets", according to the Daily Telegraph (OT2).2 The MTS
exchange imposed emergency trading limits on the entire market (FTl). Citigroup's rivals, primarily
investment banks, "panicked" during the trade, overwhelmed by its size and speed, and some
withdrew from the market for three days. The financial press reported a near consensus that
Citigroup had broken "a gentlemen's agreement". Yet, no one articulated clearly what that
agreement had been or what it was for. When the UK's Financial Services Authority ruled on the
transaction, in June 2005, it levied a fine of £14 million, corresponding to the profit from the
transaction plus £4 million, its biggest fine to date. The bank had not contravened any applicable
rules, but the FSA held that it "executed a trading strategy without due regard to the risks and likely
consequences of its action for the efficient and orderly operation of the MTS platform" (FSAZ). Both
1Cited in Bloomberg (2006).
2 Given the large number of documents in the data sample, the referencing format has been simplified in each
empirical chapter (3,4,5). For news reports, a set of initials denote the newspaper title, and a number denotes
the article's place in the data sample chronologically. For example, 'FT4S' denotes the as" article by the
Financial Times in the sample. The full sample can be viewed in Part 1of the bibliography. The other initials are
WSJ(Wall Street Journal), NYT(New York Times), WP (Washington Post), DT(Daily Telegraph), IT (The Times),
and GU (The Guardian). For regulatory documents, a similar format applies: FSA(Financial ServicesAuthority),
UKP(UK Parliament), EC(European Commission), and CMVM (Portugal's financial regulator). Documents that
are not part of the data sample have been cited conventionally in Part 2 of the bibliography.
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the ineffable gentlemen's agreement and FSA'sexpectation that Citigroup would help ensure an
orderly market are intriguing, and the subject of this chapter.
The notion that a firm ought to help ensure an orderly market is unusual from the point of view of
conventional economic theory. Economics holds that markets are self-correcting, provided that
actors are rational and, as was the case on the MTS, information is freely available. In Milton
Friedman's (1970) words, "The social responsibility of business is to maximise profits". Friedman's
statement was a response to the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR),which holds that it
behoves a firm to have a positive impact on society. But CSRtheorists agree with economists
regarding the market, as I discussed in Chapter 1. The CSRliterature distinguishes between a firm's
social responsibilities (to the non-market domain) and their economic responsibility. In CSRtheory,
"economic responsibility" is to produce goods efficiently and legally, as economists would have it
(Carroll 1979, 1991; Mitchell 1998; Schwartz and Carroll 2003; Wartich and Cochran 1985; Wood
1991). Against this theoretical background, the expectation that Citigroup go beyond legal,
competitive profit maximisation in order to ensure orderly markets is unusual.
To answer the question of how Citigroup was expected to ensure an orderly market, I derived a
theoretical account of the episode, by looking in detail at the public debate held in the financial
press, and at the regulators' concerns for the transaction. In this data, I found that market
participants, observers, and regulators expected that Citigroup (and other participants on the MTS)
would sustain help to sustain market confidence by stabilising liquidity and implementing corporate
governance mechanisms that would foresee the bank's impact, particularly on market risk. Citigroup
was responsible for helping to ensure market confidence. even if that meant foregoing a profitable
business opportunity.
3.1.1. Purpose and contributions of this chapter
As told in the introductory chapter, it was an early report of Citigroup's trade inspired this thesis,
and the FSA's ruling that crystallised its research question: how are firms responsible for ensuring
orderly financial markets? This chapter begins to answer the question by building a substantive,
grounded theory to account for two problems: that the FSAwould sanction Citigroup for disrupting a
market, even legally, and that the public controversy that played out in the financial press was based
on a "gentlemen's agreement" that no one articulated.
The chapter's contributions come in three sizes.The broadest contribution is to set the foundation
for a substantive theory about firms' responsibilities to markets which has resonance and usefulness
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across substantive contexts. The propositions from this chapter are the basis for sampling data
across other contexts, in later chapters. Secondly, the chapter contributes the first grounded theory
of the Citigroup episode. It should help interested researchers to identify new underlying processes
in their studies of Citigroup or financial markets more broadly, and to debate extant theories. Finally,
the diminutive contribution is at the level of words and concepts: the chapter develops a number of
data-driven constructs that are interesting heuristically in their own right. For example, the data
helps to identify the necessary conditions for a controversy in financial markets, such as what
constitutes an extraordinary financial transaction, and the dimensions of judging conduct. These
heuristics are potentially useful for analysing similar episodes.
3.1.2. Chapter outline
After describing the data sample and providing insight into my experiences coding it, the analytical
presentation begins in Section 3.2 with a study of the controversy, based on reports in the financial
press. The objective is to explain the controversy by drawing on other processes that are described
in the data. These include how Citigroup executed an extraordinary transaction, how others judged
its conduct, and what this meant for market confidence.
Section 3.3 applies the same approach to analyse financial regulators' reactions to the transaction,
based on regulatory documents from the UK's Financial Services Authority primarily, the lead
investigator. The regulatory documents highlight new dimensions of the episode, which media
reports had largely neglected; for example, the degree to which the transaction had been approved
at senior levels of the bank, and what controls were in place to manage the risks involved.
Finally, the emerging concepts and theoretical propositions are integrated to account for the full
episode, and I derive directions for the next chapter.
3.1.3. Sampling and analytical approach
As detailed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), the sampling and analysis in this thesis is based on grounded
theory principles and techniques.
The first dataset comprised media reports of the Citigroup trade and its aftermath. Sampling was
carried out across eight Western newspapers judged to have direct relevance to the episode - that
is, influencing and operating among major financial market actors and regulators, and hailing from
market-based economies. The publications were the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and
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the Washington Post - from the US - and the Financial Times, the Daily Telegraph, The Times, the
Guardian, and the Economist, from the UK. To compile the reports, I searched for all articles
containing the words "Citigroup" and "MTS" on the Google News Archive search engine, and then on
each publication's website for a cross-check. As mandates grounded theory methodology, sampling
continued until the emerging concepts were theoretically saturated; that is, when new information
did not add any new theoretical inslghts.' This dataset comprises 167 articles. The reports range
from August 2004 through July 2005, and further theoretical sampling looked at data for the three
months preceeding this period. A timeline of the episode is provided at the start of the next section.
The chart below shows how the articles were distributed across publications. The Financial Times
(FT) published the first article on the case, one day before the others, and published by far the most
reports (87). This was a valuable find in terms of building theory that would resonate in the market:
the FT has been the most widely read newspaper in financial circles annually since 2004, according
to the Global Capital Markets survey (Financial Times 2009). The Wall Street Journal published the
second-highest number of articles (25), also testifying to the episode's resonance in the industry.
The Economist was an outlier insofar as it mentioned Citigroup in many articles but never in relation
to this episode, so it does not figure in the sample (it is a weekly publication, but describes itself as a
newspaper).
3 For example, it did not take long for the concept of executing an extraordinary transaction to become
theoretically saturated. The key properties were trade's size, speed, and surprise. After a short time, new
reports did not add any new information to help develop that concept further, which meant that it was
theoretically saturated. After the FSA imposed its fine on Citigroup, roughly one year after the trade, new
reports on the episode did not add conceptual variation to the analysis already carried out, and therefore
sampling stopped.
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Figure 3-1. Distribution of news reports by publication
NYT Wash Post Economist
0%
The second dataset, which is analysed in Section 3, is made up of regulatory documents related
specifically to the Citigroup trade, and background guidance documents that guided the regulators'
decisions. Although seven European regulators investigated Citigroup, only the UK's FSA and
Portugal's CMVM reprimanded the bank and published the results of their investigations. In the
FSA's judgement, it gave grounds to sample other regulatory documents, namely the FSA's
Handbook outlining its regulatory approach and provisions, and UK law. The sampling decisions had
to be well calibrated in order to provide a representative account of the regulatory issuesthat really
mattered in the episode. The decisions were guided by the principle of theoretical sampling,
described in the earlier chapter. Theoretical sampling means looking for information that adds
variation and density to the key concepts being developed. For example, in order better to
understand the issue of market conduct, I sampled the relevant sections from the FSA'sHandbook,
to add density to the FSA'sinterpretation, as well as the European Union's Market Abuse Directive
(EU2003), to understand how the concept could vary. This kind of sampling underpins the processof
comparing different data on the same emerging concepts, thus ensuring that the emergent concept
fits the data, is modifiable, and works.
Analytical approach
Once the initial data sets are established, the process of coding data is meticulous, cyclical and
quickly rewarding as one delves deeper into the documentation. Coding at its most basic means
attaching an abstract label to a segment of data (like a word or sentence in an article) that explains,
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as a generic action or process, 'what is going on here' (Charmaz 2006: 69, Strauss & Corbin 1998). I
began by coding the data word-far-word or phrase-by-phrase, in order to capture as much nuance as
possible, keeping an extensive log of emerging categories, their possible relationships, and
methodological notes. Figure 3-2 (below) shows three of the first reports on Citigroup, and my initial
coding on the margins of each document. Each letter code corresponds to a concept. The centre
picture shows some concepts (e.g. banks being unsettled) acquiring different dimensions (e.g.
boycotting Citigroup, withdrawing from the MTS, lodging protests). Connections between concepts
also quickly became evident. They are represented by a line connecting different codes.
Figure 3-2. Codes quickly becoming denser and more complex (Left
to right: FTl, FT2, TT2)
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I soon found the operating question 'what is going on here' difficult to apply to newspaper reports
because the answer could refer either to the subject matter or to the reporting style. I changed the
operating question to 'what is being reported here'. This helped me to focus on reported events,
processes, and attitudes, when segments of data had become confusing or too many ideas emerged
simultaneously. More importantly, analytically, the change helped me ensure I was analysing the
episodes through media data, my stated intention, rather than analysing the media itself."
Two working tools were indispensable in this process. First, a code definitions spreadsheet was built
as each code emerged, providing a comprehensive view of all the concepts, and facilitating their
ordering into categories, properties and dimensions. This document began as a simple list of codes
and corresponding concepts. For every phrase where I noted a new conceptual property or
4 Abolafia (2005) applies a similar but more interpretative coding technique to analyse transcripts of meetings
of the USFederal Open Market Committee (see p. 210).
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dimension, I created a reference number, noted it in the margin of the article, and again in the
definitions spreadsheet. When the list became unwieldy, because codes were overlapping, I
consolidated the document into with a new list of bundled codes, and new reference numbers. This
consolidation is known as conceptual ordering (see Strauss and Corbin 1998: 19-21), re-organising
the data codes into a scheme that delineated their relationships, properties, and dimensions. An
example is shown in Figure 3-3 below.
Figure 3-3. Excerpt from code definitions tool: properties and
dimensions of the emerging concept '8: signalling controversy'
j g
~ ~ Property
I 15
~
~
~
~f
~ ~
~
~ Sub-property
~
~ Dimensions
~ ~
~
:!;> z 15z 0 z
B1.1 A Panicking B1.1.1 V Hedging
B1.1.2 Withdrawing
81.2 A Feeling emotional 81.2.1 Jealous
Bl.3 Expressinll uncertainty about the future
Bl.4 Z lodeing protests 81,4.1 Against Citigroup
81.4.2 GG Against MTS
Bl.S Z Takine relatiatory action (gateway to new catelory) B1.S.1 BB Collective
Bl.S.2 0 Individual (pricing, boycotting)
B1.5.3 Not expecting F5A sanctions for Citi
Bl.S.4 Not expecting end to electronic
B2.1 K Shutting down trading
B2.2 T Imposing trading limits B2.2.1 2-month suspension for violating it
B2.2.2 Unprecedented or emergency
82.3 T Assessing new rules 82.3.1 leaving it to the market
B2.3.2 Impose new rules
B2.4 Taking action (tbc) B2.4.1 Consulting with dealers
B3 L Oedining to comment (weak signal)
B3.1 Briefing the regulator
B4.1 Market conduct guidelines B4.1.1 W Regulator declining to comment
B4.1.2 Unsure how to react
B4.2 Market abuse rules
B4.3 launching formal investigation
Bl A Banks being unsettled
B2 T Operator curbing market
B3 L Citiaroup explaining the deal
B4 HH Relulators beginning investigation
85 Savers, pension funds being shocked
86 Rival exchanges criticising ownership structure
87 Damaging one's reputation
88 Damaglne relationship with customers
The second working document was a code log that set out articles contained which concepts, and
the major relationships between concepts (see below). Both of these tools, the code definitions and
code log, were indispensable for the theorising process." It was based on these documents, that I
was able to write more extensive memos to flesh out the concepts and set the basis for this chapter.
The reader will note in the following sections that I build a theory of the episode by establishing
relationships between these various coded concepts.
5 The two documents were merged into one for the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Figure 3-4. Excerpt from code log, showing each coded concept
(left-hand columns) referenced against each article (right hand
columns), and relationships between the concepts (shaded
columns)
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3.2. Controversy and Expectation: News reports of the episode
The catalyst for the entire Citigroup episode can be summarised thus: on 2 August 2004, Citigroup
executed a very large operation, selling over 200 debt-based securities (range), worth approximately
€13 billion (value), in under two minutes (speed) to counterparties who were obligated to buy them.
One hour later, it bought back €4 billion of the same bonds, increasing its profit. A regulatory
investigation concluded that the trade's "effect on the MTS was a temporary disruption to the
volume of bonds quoted and traded on the platform, sharp falls in bond prices and in some cases
the temporary withdrawal of some participants from quoting on that platform" (FSA 2005).6
Conceptually, the trades constituted an extraordinary financial operation. (Throughout the thesis,
the phrases in italics refer to conceptual categories, properties, and dimensions that have emerged
from the data. They are usually phrased as actions or generic processes, in keeping with grounded
theory practice, to help infer relationships between them. To emphasise a phrase conventionally, an
underlined font is used instead.)
It was an extraordinary event because it involved a wide range of transactions; a high monetary
value traded; an unprecedented speed; a clear responsibility for the event (a strategy, not an
accident); and because it was, on the whole, unprecedented; induced losses; and took others by
surprise. The operation's very large size was reported as a reason for all that happened next; it is
emphasised in every article and always associated with controversy. It is also related to other
important questions, such as the operation's ambiguous legality, the conditions its competitors were
operating under, and the timing chosen (the first Monday of August, typically a quiet trading day).
Controversy as the central feature of the episode
And yet, whilst catalytic, executing an extraordinary transaction it is arguably not the central feature
of the episode. The reporting focused much more on the ensuing controversy than on the details of
the operation itself. Reports of ensuing events, such as rival banks plotting sanctions against
Citigroup, the MTS operator deliberating on new trading rules for the exchange, Citigroup's
regulatory problems in Japan, the debates on alternative bond trading business models, investors'
6 It wasalsorevealedthat, prior to the bondtrades,Citigrouphadboughta largenumberof futures contracts,
becauseit hadexpectedcompetitorsto turn to the futuresmarketto hedgethe riskfrom fallingpricesin the
cashmarket.Thiswasnot knownuntil severalmonthslater.
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bids to acquire the MTS, etc, are always associated, in the analytical codes, with signalling
controversy. If the reports had instead focused on the operation itself, one would expect to find
more details, including the specific debt instruments traded, the dynamic price effects, the sequence
of trades over time, the software utilised, the individuals and personalities involved, the
competitors' losses, or any precedents. Even if these details had not been immediately available,
one would expect to find speculation about them, though questioning of people familiar with the
event, for example. Instead, the reporting focused overwhelmingly on the signalling of controversy,
and nearly every article on the operation can be understood as a report on the controversy.
The controversy is all the more a central problernatique because although disapproval of Citigroup's
conduct is nearly universal, the reasons why observers disapproved are not clear-cut. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines controversy as, "debate or disagreement about a matter which arouses
strongly contrasting opinions", and the Random House Dictionary as, Ita prolonged public dispute,
debate, or contention; disputation concerning a matter of opinion". While there are several signals
that Citigroup broke a gentlemen's agreement, thus destabilising the market, the data does not
elaborate a standard of conduct, rule, or law, precedent, or explicit expectation that Citigroup broke
or failed to meet. This purported "gentlemen's agreement" itself is not well articulated. In other
words, the "contrasting opinions" leading to controversy are not explicit, making this an interesting,
multilayered episode.
By analysing the data most closely related to the controversy, an explanation for it emerges that
centres on three factors: (1) the extraordinary nature of the transaction in itself, (2) the mix of
judgments that observers had of Citigroup's conduct, and (3) the transaction's effect on market
confidence and stability. Taken together, these factors point to an emerging expectation that
Citigroup would help ensure market confidence and stability, even at the expense of a potentially
profitable transaction. I argue that this expectation explains the extent of the controversy.
Moreover, by analysing these three factors and their relation to the other concepts that emerged
from the data, such as providing liquidity, I derive a set of theoretical building blocks that account for
the entire episode.
Before outlining the signals of controversy, I set out below a timeline of the entire episode and a
graphic showing the intensity of reporting around key events. In the graph, the vertical axis
numerates the number of reports and the horizontal represents the time period. Each cross
represents the number of reports on a given day. Four distinct periods contain higher intensity
reporting over several days. The first, on the far left, contains initial reports of the operation, largely
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centred on the MTS operator's imposition of trading curbs. The second is immediately to its right,
and reports the lifting of trading curbs, the beginning of regulatory investigations, and Citigroup's
apology for the trade. In early February 2005, in the middle of the graph, a large number of articles
reported the discovery of a secret Citigroup memo that set out the objectives of the operation.
Finally, on the far right, articles reported the FSA'sfine on Citigroup. This demonstrates some of the
reporting emphasis, but my analysis is not grouped around these periods; it is ordered around
conceptual categories from the data throughout.
Figure 3-S. Reporting frequency and time line
l:11'
_
~ 10 • • • • •t.Ut • • • • • • . ::- .i 5 ----f~·· · ..,·-'-'-· :· ,_,_·.,..· .-:;----------fic--:'t.+tt-.,-:-------------:.-{. ':="\
§ ....+r-++ !~ .;.t++++ t+tt + ;+++~ \1+'*\++1:':"'+++-++ ++ *+ +-".# +:
z .• .........
126.04
Sampfing period
( \
... .:
...............
.........
( )
r> .
................l
1.8.04 20.9.04
02 August 2004
09August 2004
11August 2004
12August 2004
19August 2004
08 September 2004
14September 2004
05 October 2004
04 November 2004
08 November 2004
31 December 2004
24January 2005
31 January 2005
03 February 2005
08 February 2005
28 February 2005
22 March 2005
27June 2005
3.2.1. Signalling controversy
9.11.04 29.12.04 28.5.05 5.9.0517.7.0517.2.05 8.4.05
:>
Citigroup operation; MTSimposes trading limits
First reports of operation emerge
FSAbegins consultations
Citigroup rivals meet to discuss sanctions
FSAannounces investigation
MTSlifts trading limits
Citigroup apologises for the trade
European regulators announce investigations
MTSreported to have lost business after the trade
MTSimplements opt-out system to protect banks on the exchange
Citigroup's Eurobond business reported to "dwindle"
Germany announces a criminal investigation against Citigroup traders
Secret memo reveals Citigroup's plan for the operation
Citigroup apologises for the trade, condemns the traders
EUparliament calls for Europe-wide regulation
Italian regulator launches criminal investigation
Germany drops criminal charges and changes its law
FSAfines Citigroup £14m
The descriptor "controversial" features in the opening sentence of the vast majority of reports in the
sample, sometimes among other adjectives including "astonishing", "audacious", "brazen",
"buccaneering", "clever", and "daring". The reporting of banks being unsettled, both during and
after the operation, was especially extensive in the early data. First, traders panicked during the
operation itself. The panic dimension was manifest through large-scale hedging in the futures
market (FT8) and by some banks temporarily withdrawing from the market (FT12). The emotional
feelings generated by the operation - "unsettled", "angered", "annoyed", "concerned", "jealous",
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"privately seething" - also signalled controversy. The data frequently links these emotions to
uncertainty about the future of the market. In one article titled "How Citigroup launched a wave of
ill will in the bond markets", one trader said, "lf it happens again we will pull out" (DT3). Dealers also
began lodging protests, both directly to reporters and to the UK's Financial ServicesAuthority (TIl,
FTl2), and taking retaliatory action, collectively and individually. Two reports covered a meeting of
10 of lithe City's leading investment banks ... [convened) to formulate sanctions against Citigroup"
(DTl). The banks decided to publicise the operation to their clients in order to damage Citigroup's
reputation (DT2). Retaliatory options are also manifest an individual bank level, such as widening
bid-offer spreads (but losing competitiveness) (FTl) or boycotting the offender (DT2) or the market
(FT27).
The MTS exchange itself also signalled controversy by temporarily limiting transactions in the
market. As a result of the operation, the MTS exchange adopted a set of "extraordinary" (FT2),
"emergency" (WSH) measures limiting the amount any bank could trade over 120 seconds to €1
billion, with the ultimate penalty being suspension
from the market. The Citigroup operation had
totalled (11 billion. The stated intention of these
temporary measures was to restore market
confidence (WSJ1,FT8).
Controversy was also signalled by regulators
beginning investigations. Citigroup submitted
details of the trade to the UK's FSA"after rivals
complained that the Wall Street firm had breached
a 'gentleman's agreement' barring firms from
Figure 3-6. The category Signalling controversy:
properties and (dimensions)
Banks being unsettled
('Panicking', Strong Hedging)
(Feeling emotional; 'concerned', 'ieotous', ...)
(Lodging protests; boycotts; negative messaging)
Operator limiting the market
(Imposing trading limits)
(Assessingnew future rules)
(Reigning in liquidity)
Regulators beginning investigations
(Market conduct guidelines)
(Market abuse rules)
(Formal investigation)
swamping the market with a barrage of sell
orders" (TIl). One week later, the regulator
launched an official investigation into Citigroup's
"unusual trading activity", stating, "The FSA'skey
aims include maintaining efficient, orderly and clean financial markets. In the view of the FSA,
Rival exchanges criticising MTS ownership
Hurting one's reputation
(With customers, with savers/pension funds)
achievement of that aim requires large players in financial markets to have regard to the likely
consequences of their trading strategies" (FT12). Regulators from Germany, France and Italy began
informal investigations at around the same time, and a meeting of "debt issuers representing the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's 30 countries" was convened to "discuss
the implications of Citigroup's raid on the European bond market" (TI6).
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Report also conveyed the operation hurting Citigroup's reputation among stakeholders. According to
the Times, "Citigroup's standing in several closely watched league tables slumped amid signs that
some borrowers are refusing to hand the bank lucrative bond mandates following the controversy"
(TI6). A trader cited in the Telegraph had stated, "European governments want their bonds to be
tradeable and bond issuerswill not like this because it threatens the trading system" (DT2). In a Wall
Street Journal article titled "Citigroup image takes a buffeting", the operation was reported as one in
a string of damaging events for the bank: "Japanese regulators sought penalties against a local unit
for allegedly taking advantage of clients, while in Europe the company conceded that a huge and
controversial bond trade it conducted last month was likely problematic. The developments come as
Citigroup is seeking to rehabilitate its image after a series of scandals in the US in recent years
involving troubled clients and alleged conflicts over research policies". The Financial Times reiterated
this view, saying that "The reputation of the bank has been under pressure", as Tom Maheras,
Citigroup's head of global capital markets, wrote in an internal memo that "Unfortunately, we failed
to fully consider [the transaction's] impact on our clients, other market participants, and our
regulators" (FT29).
3.2.2. Drivers of controversy: Executing an extraordinary operation, judging conduct, and
hurting market confidence
Executing an extraordinary financial operation
"The attack, when it came, was not from 01-
Qaeda but from the world's biggest bank."
James Moore, Daily Telegraph'
The controversy would not have occurred, according to the media's reporting, had it not been for
the operation's size. Size, however, is not sufficient to account for the operation's extraordinary
nature, however. It was also extraordinary because it induced major losses, to a (large) number of
competitors, 26 banks, most of the other dealers on the MTS. The size of the losses was not
reported, but often qualified. The operation took others by surprise, with traders expressing shock
and disbelief: '''What the hell are they up to? This is weird,' said one trader watching his screen go
red," reported The Times (TI4). This surprise is related to who was responsible for the transaction.
71n DB.
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One report highlighted, for example, the possibility
of error: ''The first guess was that a Citigroup
trader had committed a lucky 'fat finger' error with
the trades. Such mistakes happen every few months.
Citi is not known for taking big market risks, so its
involvement in the trade came as a surprise to its
rivals" (DT3). Another cited a trader saying: "'Everyone
was calling one another trying to guess what had
happened and what would happen next. It was easy to
see who was responsible, but nobody could believe
the audacity'" (TI4). The issue of being responsible for
the transaction has dimensions including the
institution (the report above said Citigroup was not known for taking major risks, for example -
Figure 3-7. The category Executing an extraordinary
financial operation: properties and dimensions
Range
(Instruments, Settings)
({Unjavailability of precedents)
Value
(Relative to overall trading, Absolute)
([Un]availability of precedents)
Speed
([Un]availability of precedents)
Being responsible
(Purposeful, Mistake)
(Institution, Individua/)
Inducing losses
([Large] Number of competitors)
Taking others by surprise
(Specu/ation, Disbelief, Shock)
contrary to other reports, c.f. FTlO), and individual responsibility can also be traced, in this case to
Spiros Skordos, who led the operation. Skordos was name-checked by The Times on three occasions
(TIl, TI2, TI3), and a Financial Times column (FTlO) called for his sacking.
Very large and fast transactions routinely result in major losses across many platforms without
provoking a strong reaction from stakeholders in the media, or claims of wrongdoing. Indeed, data
showing traders and influential columnists believing that Citigroup's transaction had been
acceptable despite being "astonishing" or "astounding" is evidence that extraordinary properties are
not necessarily controversial (see FT4).For this reason, the extraordinary nature of the transaction is
not enough to explain the controversy. Citigroup's conduct was judged in other ways.
Judging Citigroup's conduct
"Citigroup made money on the trades which means other
people lost money. It cannot be allowed to get away with
this. "
Rival trader"
The controversy stemmed from an extraordinary event, but also from a degree of uncertainty.
Uncertainty sustains controversy; when it abates, debates reach closure, questions are answered.
8 Cited in DTlO.
83
Citigroup's operation was not illegal (e.g. NYT1)and, according to the market operators themselves,
did not violate the MTS platform's specific trading rules (FT2).But Citigroup did appear, perhaps, to
push the rules to the limit, or to violate a gentlemen's agreement, and there was uncertainty
regarding whether or not it had been right to do so. Thus the controversy arose also because
observers were uncertain or ambiguous in their judgement of Citigroup's conduct.
Judging conduct was a resolute process among banks, who almost unanimously disapproved of the
transaction. Collectively, senior managers from 10 of Citigroup's competitors met for dinner in Soho
on 10 August, to "formulate sanctions against Citigroup" (DTl). "The options discussed," according
to the Daily Telegraph's source, "included restricting Citigroup's accessto the [MTS] system" (ibid).
However, the bankers concluded that there was little they could do on a political level, such as
lobbying for Citigroup's expulsion from the MTS. One trader said, "We don't think that they did
anything illegal so there is nothing we can do. We will wait to seewhat the FSAdoes and how bond
issuers react" (DT2). The banks did decide, however, to seek to damage Citigroup's reputation by
speaking about the transaction in their pitches to European bond issuers. The second news report
regarding the dinner carried the headline, "Coup could lose Citigroup work, say rivals" (OT2).
If Citigroup's reputation deserved a concerted effort to damage it - indeed if that effort was worth
the cost and had a chance of success- then it stands to reason that Citigroup was judged to have
done something wrong. However, all parties agreed it was not breaking the law. Illustrating the
ambiguity of judgment succinctly, one trader said: "Really what they did was smart. They didn't do
anything wrong, they just cornered the market. I'll tell you this though, $25m doesn't seem like a lot
of profit to make when you've for the whole world lining up against you" (DT3).Thus the transaction
was controversial as the judgements of its propriety were mixed. Questions were raised about
whether the ultimate judgement pushed the rules to the limit, broke a gentlemen's agreement, or,
indeed, did nothing wrong or illegal.
Articulating a gentlemen's agreement
To be clear, many observers noted that the reason for controversy had been Citigroup breaking a
gentlemen's agreement. This notion emerged in the second day of reporting, with the Financial
Times's Lex column asking, "Has Citigroup, with its audacious selling of €l1bn [sic] of eurozone
government bonds within two minutes, been very clever or has it overstepped the boundaries of fair
trading?" (FT4). The column largely sides with Citigroup, saying "gentlemen's agreements are not a
sensible way to manage risks" (ibid), but sheds no light in any context as to what the gentlemen's
agreement or the "boundaries of fair trading" are. The Wall Street Journal cites traders calling the
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operation "saWV, if not slightly untoward", and refers to MTS having introduced measures to stop
"this kind of behaviour" (WSJ1),without articulating the "kind". The Daily Telegraph reports that
rival traders had "felt themselves protected by a 'gentlemen's agreement"', but does not elaborate
what it was (DT3). The Guardian's Notebook column judged that, "Of course, Citigroup did nothing
illegal here. It legitimately filled orders that had been placed by willing counterparties, all of whom
were grown-up financial institutions used to dealing in large numbers. The novel aspect was to trade
in such size across a range of debt at such speed. It looks to have been a clever, if controversial,
piece of market trading" (GU1). In all bar one of the references to Citigroup having behaved in an
untoward manner somehow, there was no clear articulation of what standard of conduct had been
broken (see also TT4, FTS9).
The one exception was a Times report which cited a gentlemen's agreement "barring firms from
swamping the market with a barrage of sell orders" (TTl). The Financial Times also intimated that
Citigroup broke an agreement by "splitting its bond sales into as many as 200 separate deals, ...
[ensuring] each was within the trading limits of the counterparties" (FT59). This corroborates the
many codes in the data that link the size of the transaction to the controversy. However, if violating
the agreement was a basis for controversy, one might reasonably expect to see more than one or
two articulations of what the understanding had been in a sample of 167 reports. No individuals
were cited to support the statements. A leaked Citigroup memo setting out the rationale for the
trade stated that Citigroup expected other banks to engage in "copycat trades". (It was part of
Citigroup's broader objectives; next subsection below.) If copycat trades were plausible, then either
there was no agreement barring them, or traders at Citigroup - the world's largest bank - did not
know about it, or Citigroup believed that the rest of the market would be willing to shelve the
agreement. The fact that Citigroup did not acknowledge any possible controversy arising from the
trades in its plan challenges the notion of a clear gentlemen's agreement existing.
What is a gentlemen's agreement? I set out three definitions below; first, from a language
dictionary; then from Wikipedia, to indicate common or colloquial usage; and finally from a legal
dictionary, to indicate usage in the context of contractual obligations. In combination, they
illuminate possible reasonswhy the gentlemen's agreement was so difficult to articulate.
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Figure 3-8. Definitions of 'gentlemen's agreement'
Source Definitions
1. "An agreement that, although unenforceable at law, is binding asa
matterofpe~onalhonou~
2. "An unwritten agreement by socially prominent clique, private club,
etc., to discriminate against or refuse to accept members of certain
religious, racial, national, or other groups."
1. "An informal agreement between two or more parties. It may be
written, oral, or simply understood as part of an unspoken
agreement by convention or through mutually beneficial etiquette."
1. "...parties may honour them because moral obligations compel
observance or because future relations will be more difficult if the
present arrangement is broken:._." _
Random House Dictionary (2008)
Wikipedia (2008)
West's Encyclopaedia of
American Law (2008)
The Wikipedia definition notes that gentlemen's agreements may be unspoken - that is, implicit - a
matter of etiquette. This resonates with the media descriptions of the operation as "untoward"
without articulating the reason. The West's legal definition holds that such agreements are observed
to maintain good relations, while the dictionary alludes to arrangements made by a substantive
elite. Perhaps the banks all recognised implicitly that certain trades could destabilise a market and
sour relations among them. In addition, there is
evidence to suggest that this understanding
existed only at the highest levels of the
organisation. For example, the regulatory
sanction, which I analyse in the next section,
emphasised strongly that one Citigroup's biggest
failings was not to vet the operation at high
management levels. traders andSome
commentators outside of that management elite
had felt that the operation was legitimate
because bond markets are "hypercompetitive",
"cut-throat", "testosterone-fuelled" environments
Figure 3-9. The category Judging Citigroup's conduct:
properties and (dimensions)
Expressing disapproval
(formulating sanctions)
(discussing boycott)
(planning PRcampaign)
Assessing degree of wrong-doing
(breaking the law, breaking rules, being
untoward)
(expecting regulatory reaction)
Articulating a gentlemen's agreement
(implicit rules, explicit unwritten rules)
Reacting Citigroup memos
('acting in stakeholders' best interest')
({not] being 'investment-driven', being a 'US
bank')
(soliciting Citigroup documents)
(FT28), and hence a gentlemen's agreement would be difficult to enforce. One of Citigroup's
competitors said, "Citigroup spotted a way to make a quick buck. I guess we just have to say well
done to them" (FT24). The fact that the gentlemen's agreement was not articulated in the media
reports, despite being noted so frequently as a reason for the controversy, suggests that some
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members of banking circles understood implicitly that some commercial behaviours complicate
relationships and are seen as untoward, even if they are legal and competitive. I develop this
argument in more detail below, after analysing a set Citigroup's memos. The memos suggest that
Citigroup's management was also aware of this perspective.
Citigroup's memos: acting in stakeholders' best interest
The media picked up five direct 'testaments' from Citigroup during the episode; two of which were
memos that highlighted which behaviours were perceived as "untoward"."
Before the first memo was leaked, Citigroup issued a brief statement during the second day of
reporting, saying only that "The growth of European government bond electronic trading platforms
has promoted significantly increased capacity in the European cash markets, and Citigroup continues
to be a major provider of liquidity on these platforms" (OTl). Chuck Prince, Citigroup's chief
executive officer, was later reported to have called the trades "knuckle-headed" (FTS1), signalling a
hardening stance within the bank against the traders.
Roughly five weeks after the operation, after the MTS lifted the temporary curbs on trading,
newspapers picked up on a leaked Citigroup memo from Tom Maheras, head of global capital
markets, stating that:
• The operation was an "innovative transaction that sought to access liquidity in the European
bond markets", involving a "willingness to commit capital" and "thinking creatively"
• "Citigroup is committed to holding itself to the highest standards in its business practices. We did
not meet our standards in this instance and, as a result, we regret having executed this
transaction. Unfortunately. we failed to fully consider its impact on our clients. other market
participants. and our regulators."
• "We need to be sure that in whatever we do, we fully consider the impact of our actions on our
clients and the markets. We must exercise sound judgement. know our markets and our clients
well and act in their best interests" (compiled from FT28, FT29,TI6, OT7,NYTl, TI7, underlining
added).
This memo - in particular the reference to act in markets' best interest - was explicitly interpreted
as an attempt to placate regulators and Citigroup's government clients. In other words, it was
recognised as 'the right thing to say'. Statements in the media described the memo, which was sent
to all of Citigroup's 40,000 banking employees, but not to its clients, as an "astonishing" (FT28),
"humiliating" (OT7), and "unprecedented apology" (IT6). The New York Times called it "an indication
9 The bank also declined to comment on several occasions.
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that the bank is taking the investigation and the complaints seriously", and drew a parallel between
Marehas's language and that used by the FSA: "When the inquiry was announced, the regulator said
that market participants should have 'regard to the likely consequences of their trading strategies in
the market concerned'" (NYT1). The Daily Telegraph cited Citigroup's "rival traders" as saying that
the bank would have counted on the memo being made public, and calling it a form of "birch
beating in public but [also] a high risk strategy". The Financial Times wrote: "A public statement of
contrition may go some way to placating the regulators, although it could backfire if the widespread
circulation of an ostensibly internal memo is seen as manipulative" (FT28). Whether the bank had
indeed intended to pre-empt the tone of potential regulatory sanctions, it is noteworthy that "acting
in markets' and clients' best interests" was isolated as an objective independent of profit-making,
and as a means to mitigate regulatory risk.
A second memo, leaked in late January 2005, revealed that the bank had set out to destabilise
markets and therefore damaged Citigroup's standing significantly. The document set out the original
rationale for the trade, the method, and its objectives. The trade's objectives had included imposing
costs on competitors, decreasing the attractiveness of German bond futures, spurring copycat
trades, "killing off smaller dealers", and "turning the European government bond market into one
that more closely resembles the US government bond market" (memo reproduced in FTS3).
Described as "hideously embarrassing" by Financial Times's Lex column (FTS4), which originally
supported Citigroup, the memo undid Maheras's PR effort. In response:
• Citigroup issued a statement saying "Unfortunately the traders involved made inappropriate,
unrealistic and in certain instances juvenile remarks about the trading strategy before it was
executed. We regret these comments, which do not represent the views of the supervisors who
approved the trade, or of the management" (0T11);
• The MTSsolicited a copy of the document, citing their "astonishment";
• The German regulator specified that their criminal investigation into market manipulation
centred on six individuals, including the head of Citigroup's European government bond trading
desk;
• The president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, called for a "thorough and
deep" investigation into the operation, saying he felt "'very, very strongly' that fairness was
essential to financial markets. 'We have an enormous stake in markets functioning fairly and
correctly" (FT66).
It was at this time that the Wall Street Journal revealed that Citigroup's strategy had been dubbed
'''Dr. Evil', taking its name from the 'Austin Powers' spy-spoof movies, according to a report by a
German financial regulator" (WSJ18).
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While Maheras's apologetic memo had noted that the bank had other objectives than profit-making
- namely to "act in markets' and clients' best interest" - this strategy memo was seen to display
other ulterior motives for the trade. According to the Wall Street Journal, a "German regulator's
report criticised the strategy outlined in the [transaction strategy memo] as 'not investment driven'
but instead aimed at harming Eurex's reputation" (ibid, underlining added)." In an editorial entitled
"Citi takes on Europe", the Financial Times took a similar view:
"When US banks venture overseas, they often do so under the banner of spreading American
capitalism. But where they actually make a lot of money is by exploiting undeveloped markets that
are in a transitional phase, such as European private equity dealing or Japanese distressed debt. It
looks like this is what Citigroup had in mind with its controversial government bond trades in the
eurozone last summer. [...]
The unwritten rule of UScapitalism - that if something is not explicitly banned, it can be done - is one
way of creating innovation and achieving market change. In fact, Citi's trades have prompted MTS to
look at reforming its rules [...l" (FT61).
The reactions to both Citigroup memos - the Maheras apology and the transaction strategy memo-
both centred on Citigroup's role in supporting the market. The Maheras memo apologises for
Citigroup not having acted in the market's, market participants', and clients' best interests. This was
seen as a way to placate regulators and clients, as if the commentators believed this is what the
regulators would like to hear. The second memo proved controversial because it revealed that the
bank had intended to alter market operations and increase costs for smaller competitors. This data
suggests that a prime explanation for the controversy was that the bank had been expected to
support the market, even at the expense of profitability.
Hurting market confidence and stability
"Anyone expecting ethical behaviour in an inter-
bank dealing environment is having a laugh."
Anonymous 'senior source' 11
European regulators and politicians, the MTS operator, and the most outraged competitors did not
invoke a gentlemen's agreement as a reason for their displeasure, but rather the operation having
damaged market stability and confidence. Whilst market confidence and market stability are
ostensibly distinct concepts in a theoretical sense, they are used interchangeably in the data to
describe similar phenomena. They are often conflated because the stability of the MTS market
10 Accusations that Citigroup's operation had not been "investment driven" are particularly interesting in the
following chapter, which looks at the expectations and fears held for state-owned investment funds.
11 Cited in TI4.
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during the operation is said to have threatened confidence in the MTSbusiness model in the longer
run (see FT8, and FTl, rn, H1S, FTlG, H17, FTl8). (We return to this theme when discussing the
MTSmodel of rule-making, in light of MTS'scompetitors' reaction to the controversy.)
The FSAsignalled that the operation would be controversial when it launched a formal inquiry on 2
August (first reported on 18 August). Its stated purpose was to look into "unusual trading activity"
on the grounds that its "key aims include maintaining efficient, orderly and clean financial markets.
In the view of the FSA,achievement of that aim requires large players in financial markets to have
regard to the likely consequences of their trading strategies," it stated (cited in FTl2). Concluding
the investigation, the regulator based its fine
Figure 3-10. The category Ensuring market confidence
and stability: properties and (dimensions)on the judgement that "Citigroup Global
Markets Limited planned, authorised and
executed a trading strategy without having
due regard to the risks and likely
consequences of its action for the efficient
and orderly operation of the MTS platform"
(TT12). There is no data to suggest that the
regulator focused either on the size of the trades per se, nor on established norms in the market.
Dosing the liquidity available in market
(Operator, Dealers, Government)
(Quote-driven system, order-driven system)
Assessing risk
Restricting accessto the system
Investing on commercial grounds
Political ownership of the MTS
(False liquidity)
Rather it directed its attention to "the efficient and orderly operation" of the market, which is to say,
the market's stability. Although the sizeof the trades is a necessarycondition for the investigation, it
would be remiss to ignore that the higher-order principle of orderly markets was the regulators'
primary focus.
In the immediate aftermath of the transaction, the MTSoperators imposed emergency limits on the
amount of trading allowed on the exchange in order to "restore market confidence" (H2, WSJ1,
FT12, FT27, WSJ4).This was one of the earliest and strongest signals of controversy, as the main
topic that first brought the incident to light. Roughly five weeks later, on 13 September, the MTS
lifted the curbs: "MTS Chief Executive Gianluca Garbi said the platform operators board never
discussed making any changes to its trading system, which some had anticipated, and views risk as
inherent in any market-making activity. 'Now everyone knows the risk; knowing it now, they can put
safeguards in place', Mr Garbi said" (WSJ4).Thus MTS emphasised their expectation of sound risk
management, rather than an understanding that banks would not execute large trades. (In the next
section, regulatory papers indicate that sound risk management practices and due process were key
expectations for regulators aswelL)
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Among rival banks, the operation was controversial primarily because of its extraordinary nature
(even inspiring a "hefty dose of jealousy" for its sophistication and profitability, FT1),and because of
its dubious relation to market norms, but the impact on market confidence also features
significantly. One trader said, "Citigroup made money on the trades which means other people lost
money. It cannot be allowed to get away with this. If we allow this to happen the system will break
down, and we do not what that to happen because the system is good for everyone" (OTl). The
head of European bonds at JP Morgan, Nicolas Galmiche said, ''The most important thing is for
markets to stay liquid and transparent. The trade itself was unimportant; what we are watching
carefully is its consequences" (FT28).
3.2.3. Unifying theme: The expectation of ensuring market confidence
I would content that the expectations which Citigroup violated, leading to controversy, were broader
than the narrow issue of large trades or a specific gentlemen's agreement. Rather, the data suggests
that the higher-order principle of ensuring market confidence was fundamental. The single
proposition that accounts for this data is: controversy arises because there was an expectation that
traders should help ensure market confidence and stability. A report of the FSA'sfinal judgement
provides similar phrasing: "The FSAsaid the trades temporarily disrupted the MTS system and
caused a sharp fall in bond prices. Consequently, the bank behaved without 'due regard to the risks
and likely consequences of its actions for the efficient and orderly operation of the MTS platform',
the regulator said, pointing out that this contravened the principles of responsible market conduct"
(FT99).This report conveys a sensethat Citigroup broke a specific rule, albeit an implicit one.
All of the categories and properties in the data that relate to signalling controversy are accounted
for in this proposition. Put differently, in the language of grounded theory, this expectation is the
core category in this episode. It is the concept that "accounts for most of the variation in [the]
pattern of behaviour," (Strauss 1987: 34). It is also "related to as many other categories and their
properties as is possible, and more than other candidates for the position of core category," the
criterion advanced by Strauss (op cit: 36). By relating this central proposition to the other categories
that emerge in the data, we will arrive at other propositions that explain the episode more fully, and
provide higher density and theoretical saturation to this proposition.
Core category as process: Observing the rules, providing liquidity
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Citigroup's operation succeeded by exploiting the market-making system on the MTSexchange. The
rules of this system require dealers to publish the prices at which they will trade European
government bonds. Market-making, also known as a quote-driven system, increases liquidity
because all bonds must have a price (be liquid), and increases market confidence and stability
because it "tends to smooth price movements, making investment safer and ultimately cutting the
cost of borrowing for governments" (TT2).The less liquid alternative, popular in the US,is the order-
driven model, where securities are priced ad hoc by the parties to individual transactions (WSJ1,
FTS9).The MTS's visible, given pricing enabled Citigroup to execute simultaneous trades on a scale
that would otherwise have been difficult through order-driven negotiations (WSJ1). In addition, it
meant that Citigroup's competitors were committed to buying the bonds, having previously
published their prices. Thus the market-making context was necessary condition for the controversy
in this episode.
The MTS rules were seen as controversial in themselves because of European governments'
influence over the MTS.This view was held primarily by MTS's competitors, and Wall Street Journal
and Financial Times editorial writers. The rules were introduced when the Euro was established, in
order to minimise the risk that smaller Eurozone governments, which had acquired the same
currency as larger governments, would not find buyers for their debt (with currency risks eliminated,
traders might opt to buy only debt with the lowest default risks, like German bonds). The rules
ensured liquidity for smaller debt instruments. In return, there is an explicit but unwritten (FT8)
understanding that governments reward the banks who participate in these secondary markets
(trading bonds) with very lucrative primary market deals (issuing new bonds) (TT4,WSJ1,FT8,FT12,
FT13, FT17). Critics argue that the MTS exchange enables European governments to reduce
borrowing costs by creating "virtual liquidity" that may not otherwise have been there (TT4), and
disadvantages other exchanges (m). Citigroup's operation helped bring this dimension of
controversy, the MTS's political ownership to the fore.
By comparing the category, observing MTS rules, to the signalling of controversy, and judging
conduct, we can draw an immediate conclusion: under this system. explicit rules need to be
moderated by dealers in order to ensure market confidence and stability. Consider that observing
MTS rules aims to guarantee liquidity; that is their objective. However, it is also the case that
injecting too much liquidity, asCitigroup did, threatens market confidence by creating price volatility
and inducing losses. Indeed, the MTS operator restricted liquidity in the market in response to the
operation, by limiting the size of trades. Thus while banks have a firm obligation to provide liquidity
through transparent pricing, they also have an implicit responsibility not to create excess liquidity.
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Put differently, the explicit rules require implicit rules in order to meet their objective. From this
analysis one can also conclude that stable liquidity promotes market confidence and stability.
Unstable liquidity leads to controversy if an extraordinary transaction is involved in creating the
instability.
In the data, providing liquidity is invariably associated with the objective of market confidence and
stability, not only through the MTS rules above, but also the underlying conditions in global markets
when the operation took place. The general market conditions at the time of the trade were a
consolidating market (FTI), with the number of exchangesdecreasing. In addition, "profit-margins in
the inter-dealer, or wholesale trading, of eurozone government bonds [had] dwindled as pricing in
the maturing market has become more efficient. This [had] been driven by a move to electronic and
internet-based trading, which cuts costs and increases pricing transparency", according to a
Financial Times report (FT3).The report concludes that, "unwelcome though they may be to rivals,
larges trades of this sort are probably here to stay. Citigroup's market coup reflects the growing
power of a handful of leading banks in the capital market arena" (ibid). The growth in large trades,
due to technical innovation and the multitude of debt instruments, many of which are not liquid, is a
contextual factor highlighted in several reports (e.g. FTG). These contextual conditions may help
explain the extent of controversy. One dealer said he would leave the market if he saw another
similar operation to Citigroup's because the bond market was becoming less profitable (OTl). By
definition, it is large institutions that have the liquidity available to execute large transactions. Given
that the FSAhighlighted large institutions as having a particular duty to assessthe impact of their
transactions on the market (OT4), we can also deduce that this contextual data leads to the core
category through this proposition: large. liquid dealers are particularly responsible for market
confidence and stability.
3.2.4. Preliminary propositions
Basedon the analysis thus far, the following propositions account for the media data in the Citigroup
episode:
Pi There is an emergent expectation that traders should help to ensure market confidence and
stability. (core proposition, which accounts for the central pattern, controversy, and to which
other propositions and categories are related)
P2 Controversy occurs even when specific standards are not breached, provided that there is an
extraordinary financial transaction and that observers are driven to judge an actor's conduct.
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P3 In a market-making system, explicit rules need to be moderated by dealers in order to ensure
market confidence and stability. It is not sufficient to observe explicit trading rules.
P4 Stable liquidity promotes market confidence and stability. Unstable liquidity leads to controversy
if an extraordinary transaction is involved in creating the instability.
PS Large, liquid dealers are particularly responsible for ensuring market confidence and stability.
PG Ensuring market confidence reduces regulatory risk.
These propositions emerge from the express views of actors that were directly involved in the
incident, such as Citigroup's competitors, as well as more distant observers, such as editorial writers.
As I noted in Chapter 2, Section 5, on the use of media reports as data, these propositions represent
the spread of ideas and expectations in societal circles that are particularly concerned about
financial markets and market conduct; such as banking practitioners, academics, corporate
executives, politicians, and other groups in the newspapers' readership demographic. In the
following section, I pursue more specifically the regulatory interpretation of the trade, and its
implications. Whereas in media reports the central pattern of behaviour was the controversy that
followed the trades, the regulatory documents focus on the trade itself. Regulators are the enforcers
of market guidelines and rules, and de-limit which behaviours are sanctioned or proscribed. They are
therefore central to the question of how firms are expected to contribute to orderly markets.
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3.3. The Visible Hand: Regulatory accounts
"Repeated violations of the duty of defence
of the market ..."
CMVM, Portugal's regulator,
ruling on Citigroup"
The UK financial regulator's decision against Citigroup helped to crystallise the key question
confronting us. The FSAruled that Citigroup's trade was improper because it had been conducted
without due regard for "the efficient and orderly operation ofthe MTSplatform", the market (FSA2).
Yet Citigroup had not broken any market rules and its operation did not constitute market abuse; it
had acted to maximise its profitability; and the market had extreme transparency (the market-
making rules). Therefore, from an economic perspective, it was surprising that the 'invisible hand'
had not sufficed to ensure an orderly allocation of resources, which economic theory suggests it
would have under those conditions. The FSA'sruling begged the question, how are firms responsible
for orderly markets?
The analysis of media reports provided part of the answer to this question. From them we deduced
that Citigroup had been expected to help ensure market confidence, and that this required it to
stabilise liquidity in the market, even if that was not its own calculus of self-interest. Thus the public
controversy was explained. Those reports represented a debate on Citigroup's conduct, among a
broad set of actors. In this section I turn to a more specialised group, regulators, in order to add
variation and densltv" to the propositions identified until now. Undoubtedly, the debates reported
in the media and the expectations of regulators overlap, but regulators provide a distinct dataset
because they are explicitly responsible for market supervision. Regulators' specific insight into what
role firms play in market governance is highly material, and I use it to refine the analysis. Moreover,
the regulatory repercussions of the trade were a significant focus of the reporting, and Citigroup's
own apologies widely interpreted as an attempt to placate the regulators.
As a starting point, a factual timeline of the operation was outlined by the FSA(FSA1).
12 CMVMl.
13 Theobjectiveis to identify newproperties,dimensions,and relationsbetweenconcepts.
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Figure 3-11. Official time line of the Citigroup transaction (Adapted
from FSA1:3-7)
Date / Time Occurrences
Early July 2004 European government bond trading desk is urged to increase profits "by taking
more proprietary market risk and developing new trading strategies".
A trader develops a strategy based on capturing market liquidity on the MTS,
and emails the basic strategy to colleagues: 1) create a 'basis position' long in
cash bonds and short in bond futures": 2) on a chosen day, close short futures
position by buying futures, leaving a long cash bond position; 3) rapidly sell the
long cashposition on MTS,capturing all available liquidity. (Citigroup's futures
position would benefit because competitors would likely buy futures to hedge
against the falling price of cash bonds.)
Traders design a software application using a spreadsheet to carry out the
operation and nickname it 'Dr Evil'.
Traders attempt the operation and begin to buy futures, but then decide to
unwind that position because the price of futures is rising quickly.
Traders discussthe operation with management in the morning and conclude
that the market is sufficiently stable to proceed.
Traders purchase 66,214 futures contracts, mostly German Bunds. Futures' and
cash bonds' prices rise.
Traders begin to sell approximately €10.6 billion is in cash bonds.
16-29 July 2004
Friday 30 July
Monday 2 August
9.12am-10.29am
10.28am
20 seconds later Traders are unsure whether the salesare confirmed and resubmit a sell order.
10.29am A total sale of €12.9 billion in cash bonds is concluded.
Realising that they had build an unexpected short position on cash bonds,
traders reconfigure the spreadsheet to work in reverse, i.e. to buy bonds.
Traders purchase 0.8 billion of cash bonds, neutralising their risk position and
realising a profit of $18.2 million.
10.30am-ll.2Sam
11.2Sam
The FSA's Final Notice concluded that Citigroup's management had failed to control trading
operations appropriately and had not acted with "due skill, care and diligence" (ibid). I analyse this
judgement in detail below, after accounting for the other European investigations.
Regulatory interventions outside the UK
Of the seven European financial regulators who opened investigations into Citigroup's trade, only
Portugal's CMVM (Cornrnlssao do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarlos] joined the FSA in fining Citigroup.
CMVM imposed a penalty of (950,000 and published its judgement in a single phrase: "Repeated
violation of the duty of defence of the market relative to eight treasury bonds issued by the
Portuguese State and admitted to negotiation in the Special Market for Public Debt [MTS]" (CMVM1,
14 A long position is taken when traders expect the price of the security to increase over time; a short position
is when they expect the price to fall.
15Author's estimate, based on the FSAaccount (FSA1):traders needed to sell between (8 and (9 billion, and
estimated the spreadsheet's failure rate at 20%to 30%,which they compensated for by overselling.
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author's translation). CMVM designated the infraction category as "Integrity, Transparency and
Fairness in the Market" (ibid). The linguistic flourish in CMVM's statement - Citigroup's "duty to
defend the market" - is notable for its 'hardness'. Not only does the market require "defending", but
it is a firm's "duty", not prerogative, to protect it. This hardness may be attributable to linguistic
differences, but the inference is clear: markets do not defend themselves.
The German regulator, BaFin (Bundesanstalt Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), and the Italian
regulator, Consob (Commissione Nazionale per Ie Societa e la Borsa), launched a criminal
investigation against the Citigroup traders, on the charge of market manipulation, which is illegal."
The events that led to this charge were not extensively reported in the media. Before carrying out
the large sale of bonds, the bank had built up a position in the Eurex Eurobond futures market,
expecting that its panicked competitors would buy futures in order to hedge their cash position on
MTS. If it could be established that Citigroup's intention had been to make a profit on the
subsequent sale of futures by sending a misleading signal through its sale of cash bonds, then the
trades might have constituted a case of market manipulation. Moreover, it was revealed in a leaked
Citigroup memo that Citigroup had aimed in its operation to decrease the attractiveness of German
bonds in the long-term. However, for reasons that have not been reported and I have not been able
to determine, both cases were dropped, and Citigroup did not suffer any regulatory penalty in either
country (Mayhew 2006). German law was changed after the trade (DT14), but it is unclear what the
change was.
Other regulators considered launching a charge of market manipulation but did not. In the UK,
"market abuse" (which includes manipulation, insider dealing, or improper disclosure) was an initial
focus of the FSA investigation, but subsequently dropped because, according to Gans (2006), "no UK
securities [had been] traded" (p. 44)17. Interestingly, according to an advocacy paper published by
the British Banking Association and Clifford Chance (respectively, a lobby group and a law firm), the
Belgian regulator CBFA "initially sought to take action against Citigroup on the grounds of market
abuse, but subsequently classed the alleged abuse as identical to that previously 'prosecuted' by
FSA, and as such, chose not to commence disciplinary proceedings under the principle of [double
16 Market manipulation occurs when a transaction deliberately sendsmisleading signals about the demand for,
supply of, or fair value of a particular asset. Several commentators in the media (e.g. WSJ24)described the
FSA'sactions asmarket manipulation. The FSAHandbook groups market manipulation alongside insider
dealing and improper disclosure of information as different forms of market abuse.
17 Other explanations exist for the FSA'sdecision and Iaddress them more fully below.
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jeopardy]1811(BBAand Clifford Chance [undated]: 4, underlining added). These accounts of the British
and Belgian regulators' motives are slightly incongruous, given that the FSA had in fact not
prosecuted the market manipulation charge and therefore the Belgians may have been able to do
so. (Carlos Conceicao, the ex-FSAofficial who headed the Citigroup investigation, is now a partner at
Clifford Chanceand co-authored the report cited.)
In the end, no charges of market manipulation were brought against Citigroup by any regulator and
Citigroup was not judged to have broken the law. Instead, it was punished by the FSAfor not having
had the right internal systems and controls in place to ensure that the trade did not proceed.
Focuson the FSA
The FSA's documentation is perhaps the most comprehensive data on this episode of any
supervisory agency. This is primarily because it played "a leadership role in agreeing the scope and
content of the investigation [...]", coordinated information gathering and exchange between the
other European regulators (Gans 2006: 44; BBA and Clifford Chance [undated]), and "carried out
supplementary interviews and documentation reviews" pertaining to Citigroup's submission to the
investigation (Gans,op cit). It was the only regulator to interview the key individuals involved in the
trade (ibid). Its regulatory judgement was trusted by "all of the other interested regulators [who]
appeared to be comfortable in relying upon the FSAto complete the investigatory phase" (ibid). In
some respects, one could therefore argue that the FSA'sview reflected the main thrust of regulatory
concerns in Europe.
In some respects, focusing on the FSAhas an additional advantage - apart from it setting out all
available facts on the trade - this regulator is very close to industry bodies. All of its policy
documents incorporate references to external stakeholder consultations, and whilst not wishing to
assesstheir consultative process, my view is that this proximity lends some weight to the idea that
the FSA'sexpectations are well known, sometimes shared, by market actors. Indeed the FSAhad
been reputed as a so-called "light-touch" regulator (Reuters 2007), relative to its European and
American counterparts, deploying methods that resonate with preferences of financial sector firms.
For a regulator, it is as close to a market actor as one can be. Its judgement may well be
representative of broad sections of market sentiment. (I also note that the FSAis a private company
18 Theprincipleof doublejeopardy"is intendedto preventmultiple prosecutionsin different jurisdictionsfor
the sameallegedcriminaloffense" (BBA andCliffordChance,undated:1).
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mandated by the government to supervise the industry, and its board is made up of former
financiers.)
I turn now to a conceptualisation of the regulatory account of the MTStrade. The analytical scheme
draws on the same grounded theory approach and methods as the rest of the thesis. I begin by
theorising key the concepts in the FSA'sdocuments regarding Citigroup, and establishing how they
relate to the propositions already deduced from media reports. Then, I sample and analyse other
documents by the FSAthat are related to the key concepts and propositions. This is the practice of
theoretical sampling, which means looking for new data that can illuminate new properties and
dimensions of the key concepts (such as market abuse), until those concepts are theoretically
saturated - that is, when new data tells us nothing new about them. Thus the early detailed coding
of the Citigroup judgement becomes progressively more abstract as I seek to conceptualise, rather
than describe, the episode. The objective, throughout, is to build theoretical propositions that
account for how firms may be responsible for orderly markets, in the perspective of state regulators.
3.3.1. The FSA's judgement: Foreseeing and treating risk
"In a quickly changing marketplace,
principles are far more durable" than rules.
FSA (2009a)
The FSAissued its Final Notice to Citigroup on 28 June 2005, roughly nine months after the trade,
following consultations with other European regulators, Citigroup employees, and market
participants (FSA1). It provided a detailed technical account of the planning, execution, and price
and liquidity effects of the trade. Its conclusion stated: "the FSAnotes that the main issue of
regulatory concern was the failure by CGML [Citigroup Global Markets Limited! to consider the
impact the trade would be likely to have (and indeed did have) on MTS" (FSA1: 14, underlining
added). The regulator imposed its largest financial penalty to date, £13.9 million, which comprised
£9.9 million in relinquished profits and a further £4 million in punitive damages (FSA1:1). Fitigroup
was found to have contravened two of the FSA'sPrinciples for Business:
• Principle2 (Skill, care and diligence): itA firm must conduct its business with due skill, care
and diligence." Citigroup:
o "did not have due regard to the inherent risks including the likely consequences the
execution of the trading strategy could have for the efficient and orderly operation
of the MTSplatform."
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o "did not ensure that clear parameters for the size of the trade were understood,
communicated and reviewed."
• Principle 3 (Management and control): "A firm must take reasonable care to organise and
control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems."
o "There was a failure within CGMl to escalate the detailed trading strategy on 2
August 2004 adequately and in advance to senior management, and a failure to
consult with applicable control functions."
o "There were inadequate systems for supervision of traders." (FSA1:2)
Before setting out my analysis of the FSA'sjudgement, I outline the FSA'sapproach to principles-
based regulation, and its Principles for Business.
Principles-based regulation
The FSAsupervises markets through what is called principles-based regulation, broad guidelines for
conduct. This contrasts, for example, with the American approach of rules-based regulation, which
employs detailed prescriptions. The FSA's reasoning for using principles-based regulation provides
some insight into what lay behind the Citigroup sanction.
Principles-based regulation, which has been in place since 2001, is a way to operationalise risk-based
regulation, which means addressing issues that pose a risk to the institution's statutory objectives
(FSA4). In the FSA's words, "Risk-based regulation will remain central to determining how we
prioritise our resources, as principles-based regulation steers our expectations of firms and the way
we deal with them" (op cit: 4). It continues, "Principles-based regulation means, where possible,
moving away from dictating through detailed, prescriptive rules and supervisory actions how firms
should operate their business.We want to give firms the responsibility to decide how best to align
their business objectives and processes with the regulatory outcomes we have specified" (ibid,
underlining added). In justifying its transition to this approach, the FSAemphasises strongly its view
that principles are a more effective means to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes, because
detailed rules may stifle innovation or open loopholes that companies may exploit (op cit: 6-7). "In a
quickly changing marketplace," it states (ibid), "principles are far more durable".
The FSA's11 overarching Principles for Businessare as follows.
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Figure 3-12. FSA's "Principles for Business" (FSA3)
Principles Description
1. Integrity
2. Skill, care and diligence
3. Management and
control
4. Financial prudence
5. Market conduct
6. Customers' interests
7. Communications with
clients
8. Conflicts of interest
9. Customers:
relationships of trust
10. Clients' assets
11. Relations with
regulators
A firm must conduct its businesswith integrity.
A firm must conduct its businesswith due skill, care and diligence.
A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly
and effectively, with adequate risk management systems.
A firm must maintain adequate financial resources.
A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct.
A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them
fairly.
A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its client, and
communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not
misleading.
A firm must manage conflicts of interests fairly, both between itself and its
customers and between a customer and another client.
A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and
discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its
judgement.
A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients' assetswhen it is
responsible for them.
A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must
disclose to the FSAappropriately anything relating to the firm of which the FSA
would reasonably expect notice.
In addition to analysing the FSA's take on the specific principles contravened (Principles 2 and 3), I
also seek to identify other principles on the list that appear embedded in the ruling (Principle 5, on
market conduct), and principles that do not feature on the list above. I analyse Principle 3 first, and
only then Principle 2, consistent with the FSA's Final Notice to Citigroup.
Controlling affairs with adequate risk management
Citigroup contravened Principle 3 (management and control) in two respects: it failed to escalate the
trading strategy to senior management adequately, which could have prevented the trade from
going ahead, and it failed to operate adequate systems to supervise traders. These are properties of
controlling affairs with adequate risk management. In order to flesh out these properties'
dimensions - or manifestations -I analyse the codes found in the regulator's Final Notice.
The interactions between the trading desk, which executed the operation, and senior management
were central to the FSA's judgment. Escalating the strategy to senior management means ensuring
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that management is aware of the strategy and, ultimately, approves it. In the escalation process,
some parts of the management were aware of the basic strategy, but not its size:
"The Traders discussed the strategy with the head of the Desk. Following this discussion the Head of
Desk on 28 or 29 July 2004 sought approval from the European Head of Interest RateTrading [...]. The
European Head of Interest Rate Trading authorised the trade [...]. However, there was not a common
understanding between the Traders, the Head of Desk, and the European Head of Interest Rate
Trading as to the parameters of the size of the trade. CGMLdid not therefore ensure parameters for
the size of the trade were clear, understood and communicated" (FSA1:5, italics added).
The traders' risk position after the first set of trades also appeared excessively high, being "more
than four times the level at which the Desk was authorised to hold a position overnight, although
there are no intra-day limits and trades frequently exceed end of day limits during the day" (ibid).
Despite traders not having breached formal limits, the FSA cited this as further evidence that
parameters for the size of the trade were not clearly set out by management (FSA1: 6). The traders
had also estimated that 20%-30% of their trades would fail (because they would be executed very
quickly using partly untested technology) and programmed their spreadsheet to oversell by 20%-
30%. According to the FSA, "These estimations for the failure rate were not considered by
management as part of the authorisation process" (ibid).
Ultimately, although the traders escalated the strategy two levels up, Citigroup's failure to operate
adequate control systems and policies meant that the escalation was not steered correctly to control
functions; that is, "not considered by Compliance, Legal or independent Risk Management [ ...]" (op
cit: 10). "Accordingly", writes the FSA, "insufficient weight and attention was given to:
"the franchise risk [also known as reputational risk] to which the trading gave rise;
"the execution risk arising from, amongst other things, the use of a spreadsheet that was not fully
testable;
"the market impact risk, i.e. that the trade might have an adverse effect on price and on quotation
levels on MTSand the effect this might have on market confidence; and
"legal and regulatory risk resulting from the above" (ibid, underlining added).
The regulator also judged that systems for supervising traders an the Desk were inadequate, which
enabled traders to exceed the size of trade previously considered by management (ibid). The traders
had built a special spreadsheet, Dr Evil, to interface with the MTS system and execute the trades. Dr
Evil was so effective that "Within about the first 20 seconds of the spreadsheet being deployed, the
Traders were unaware that CGML had received sale confirmations of the trades [... They] became
concerned that the spreadsheet had not worked and that CGML continued to retain a significant risk
position [totalling €3.8 billion]. Accordingly, the spreadsheet was activated again with sell orders
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being re-submitted [...]" (op cit: 7_8).19 This incident raises a number of questions about the
intentionality of the trade and the mooted market manipulation charge. I review these implications
in more detail later.
Citigroup was not charged with market misconduct, but the FSA highlighted providing market
canduct training as a desirable feature of management control systems. It found that traders had
been "inadequately trained in respect of observing proper standards of market conduct", specifically
because:
"market abuse training was only provided to CGMl employees on the introduction of the market
abuse regime on 1 December 2001, a date known as 'N2' and not thereafter;
"the Traders employed at the time did not attend the market abuse training provided on 'N2';
"[the email setting out the basic strategy for the trade] contained language which suggested that the
author had been inadequately trained on market conduct issues [...]" (op cit: 10).
Coding the data cited above, in respect of Citigroup's violation of Principle 3, Controlling affairs with
adequate risk management, we can deduce a set of properties and dimensions for this concept,
which I have summarised in Figure 3-13. The first property is to escalate the strategy to senior
management, with particular emphasis on escalating in advance of the trade and on consulting with
control functions, such as the compliance
and risk management departments. Then,
operating supervisory systems for traders,
such that execution can be monitored,
Figure 3-13. The category Controlling affairs with
adequate riskmanagement: properties and (dimensions)
Escalating the strategy to senior management
(Before/after the trade)
(Consulting with the control functions, e.g. risk teams)
Operating control/supervisory systems for traders
(Observing clear parameters for size of trades)
(Being aware a/trading positions and risk exposure)
Assessing potential impact of trades
(Reputationa/ risk, aka 'franchise risk')
(Execution risk)
(Market impact risk)
(Legal & regulatory risk)
Training in respect of market conduct
(Frequency of training)
(Attendance at training)
particularly when it comes to observing
clear parameters for the size of trades and
being aware of trading positions and risk
exposure as the trade progresses. Thirdly,
adequate risk management requires
assessing the potential impact of trades on
risks across the corporation. This is distinct
from managing financial risk during the operation itself (for example through hedging). Rather, it
relates to contextual factors, such as reputation risk, execution risk (technological or human failure),
market impact risk (adverse effect on market confidence), and regulatory risk (potential sanctions).
Finally, the data also associates market conduct training with adequate controls; particularly its
19 Note that this human faltering was partly responsible for the size of the trade.
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frequency and distribution. Together, these properties and dimensions account for the FSA's reading
of how Citigroup failed to control its affairs adequately (Principle 3).
It is a critical insight that Citigroup was expected to use its discretion to decide how to apply the
relevant principles. The processes I have just described, which the FSAjudged were inconsistent with
Principle 3 (management and controls), are not detailed prescriptions in the FSA's Handbook. The
document "Senior Management Arrangements, Systems, and Controls" (FSAS), which the FSA refers
to in the Final Notice against Citigroup, elaborates the principle. In respect of escalation and risk
assessment, the document states:
"Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to
have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessingthe risks that the firm faces and
advising the governing body and senior managers on them [and/or) delegate much of the task of
monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit
function [...]" (op cit: 3).
It was Citigroup's responsibility to identify the need to refer the trading strategy to the legal,
compliance, or risk management departments. The regulation does not specify detailed parameters
for the decision. Similarly, the regulatory document has no reference to market conduct training
being a part of adequate management and control, even though the FSAjudged the lack of training
to represent a failure of that management. Again, from the regulator's perspective, it was beholden
on Citigroup to define the right processes to meet the FSA's guidelines in respect of management
and control.
Exercising due skill, core and diligence
The FSA's Principle 2 (skill, care and diligence) is notable as a regulatory principle because one might
have expected it to be endogenous to the market. That is, any firm that operates without due skill
should theoretically be cleared out by the invisible hand of the market if its competitors better it;
theoretically, there is no more need for a "due skill" principle than there is for a "make profits"
principle. However, from a regulatory perspective, the point is that a lack of skill. care and diligence
in a financial market threatens the financial system and its stakeholders as the whole - the invisible
hand may be too slow to deal with it.
Citigroup breached the principle of due skill because, according to the FSA, it:
"did not have due regard to the inherent risks including the likely consequences the execution of the
trading strategy could have for the efficient and orderly operation of the MTSplatform;"
"did not ensure that clear parameters for the size of the trade were understood, communicated and
reviewed" (FSA1: 2).
104
In justifying this judgment, the FSAbegins: "From its inception, the trading strategy was clearly
careless in view of the ordinary levels of trading volume on MTSand the amount of visible quotes on
that platform. It was foreseeable that the execution of the trading strategy ran the significant risk of
disrupting visible quotes and therefore the efficient and orderly operation of the MTS platform"
(ibid). In this reading, the trade's size was central to the ensuring and foreseeable market risk. The
MTS's rule that all market actors had to display their price quotes, meant that Citigroup could rapidly
capture all of the liquidity on the market, thus hurting market confidence. This conclusion is
consistent with the primary concerns expressed in media reports, which emphasised the effects of
the trade's size on market confidence.
The property assessing the potential impact of trades, which was also raised in the context of the
earlier principle, management and controls, has a negative dimension here. The FSAstated that "to
the extent that the risks inherent in the trading strategy were considered [...] the exercise was
carried out with insufficient skill, care and diligence" (op cit: 11). That is, to the extent that Citigroup
correctly assessed the risks, they were careless
Figure 3-14. The category Exercising due skill, care
and diligence: properties and (dimensions)to pursue the trade.
Further, the traders were unable to create "a
reasonable or statistically meaningful basis for
assessing what would happen" once they
deployed Dr. Evil, and therefore acted "without
any scientific basis" (ibid, italics added).
Overestimating the spreadsheet's failure rate, they sold bonds in excessof what they "needed to sell
Assessing the potential impact of trades
(Assessing market risk)
(Assessing execution risk)
(Using well-structured analysis)
Operating control/supervisory systems for traders
(Implementing the risk assessment)
Escalating the strategy to senior management
in order to return to a flat [risk-neutral] position" (ibid). It is notable that the FSAdid not rely on a
specific parameter of 'reasonableness' or statistical significance. In the text, it related this lack of
what I call structured analysis both to market risk and execution risk (ibid).
The lack of appropriate escalation was also cited as a lack of due skill (ibid).
Basedon this analysis, Figure 3-14 summarises the properties and dimensions of exercising due skill.
The FSAdid not reference any other parts of its regulatory framework in ruling on Principle 2.
However, its "Code of Practice for Approved Persons: Specific", part of its Handbook dealing with
Principle 2, prohibits "Undertaking transactions without a reasonable understanding of the risk
exposure of the transaction to the firm" (FSA3:3). Citigroup's failure to escalate appropriately may
also be covered by the Handbook's provision against "providing inaccurate or inadequate
lOS
trader's] firm" (op cit: 2).
information to a firm, its auditors or an actuary [specialist risk manager] appointed by his [the
Using corporate governance to foresee and treat risks posed by the trade
On close examination, even though Citigroup was judged to have contravened two separate
principles, the FSA's justifications under each principle overlap markedly. The figure below shows
how the conceptual properties are distributed between the two principles. (C represents principle 3
controlling affairs and E represents principle 2 exercising due skill.) In both cases, there is a strong
emphasis on the failure of corporate governance mechanisms to foresee and manage risks posed bv
the trade. Indeed, the properties abstract to create a new combined category: foreseeing and
treating risks posed by the trade, which accounts for the failures under both principles." Later, we
will use this category, and its relationship to others, to derive theoretical propositions that account
for the regulatory concerns.
Figure 3-15. The combined category Using corporate
governance systems to foresee and guard against risks
Assessing the potential impact of trades [C,E]
(Assessingmarket risk) [C,E)
(Assessingexecution risk) [C,E)
(Using well-structured analysis) [E)
(Reputational risk, aka 1ranchise risk') [C)
(Legal & regulatory risk) [C)
Escalating the strategy to senior management [C,E]
(Before/after the trade) [C)
(Consulting with the control functions, e.g. risk) [C,E)
Operating control/supervisory systems for traders [C,E]
(Observing clear parameters for size of trades) [C,E)
(Being aware of trading positions and risk exposure) [C)
(Implementing the risk assessment) [E)
Training in respect of market conduct [C)
(Frequency a/training) [C)
(Attendance at training) [C)
20 The process of comparing conceptual properties and dimensions is known in grounded theory methodology
as conceptual ordering, detailed in Chapter 2, Section 3. Becausethe two categories controlling affairs and
exercising due skill account for much of the same phenomena, they abstract to a higher category, following the
concept-indicator model.
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Being responsible at corporate level
The FSA held Citigroup responsible at corporate level, even though senior management were
unaware of the transaction, and even though the email setting out the basic strategy for the trade
"was not seen by all of the Traders and not all of the Traders agreed with the author's assessmentof
the possible side effects and benefits and the strategy evolved in the days leading up to 2 August
2004" (FSA1: 5). Despite the operation involving a handful of individuals, the FSA ultimately
concluded: "The matter of regulatory concern is the serious corporate failings of CGMl. The FSAis
not taking action against any of the individuals concerned" (op cit: 14). The corporation was
ultimately punished for allowing the trade to proceed. rather than for the trade itself, a point I
develop in the next section (the trade did not constitute market abuse but was deemed
inappropriate). It is key that the UK's Financial Servicesand Markets Act (UK1),which underpins the
FSA'sregulatory regime, specifies that a IIIbehaviour' includes action or inaction" (Section 118[10)).
Senior management's inaction to prevent the operation was punishable. They were responsible for
preventing it.
Citigroup's size was a key dimension of corporate-level responsibility, according to the regulator.
Under the heading, "Seriousness", the FSAstated:
"CGMl is part of the largestfinancial institution in the world. CGMl hasthe financialresourcesat its
disposal to ensure [compliance, and to] take significant risks. The FSA therefore expects high
standardsof a firm of CGMl's size. It behovesa firm such as CGMl to take particular care [...] to
consider all the risks associatedwith its trading for the efficient and orderly operation of the
platform" (FSA1:14).
This factor is significant when we consider the conditions under which these expectations apply.
3.3.2. The requirement of good market conduct .
While the FSA(FSA1)concluded that "the main issue of regulatory concern" was Citigroup's failure
"to consider the impact the trade would be likely to have" on the market (p. 14), it did not cite its
Principle 5 on market conduct in the Final Notice. Principle 5 states that "firms must observe proper
standards of market conduct" (FSA3).As I noted, Gans (2006) states that even though the FSA's
"initial focus was on controls and market conduct (Principles 3 and 5), [or. t]here was no action as no
UK securities were traded" (p. 44). This explanation is puzzling because the UK's Financial Services
and Markets Act, which is the basis for all financial regulation, holds that market abuse penalties
apply if the behaviour in question occurs either in the United Kingdom or in a market "which is
accessible electronically in the United Kingdom" (UK1, Section 118, Subsection 5). Citigroup's
107
operation fulfilled both of the conditions cited there and, in addition, the Act does not mention a
requirement that UK securities be traded. The FSA itself justifies the absolution solely on the
grounds that the trading strategy "did not deliberately set out to disrupt [the market, and] did not
depend on price positioning or other distortive behaviour" (FSA1: 14). "It might be said", posits
Mayhew (2006) in European Company Law, "that the FSA's findings were influenced by the prospect
of achieving an early result which could be announced to the market [...J Regulators with power to
settle cases have imperatives other than the jurisprudential purity of the outcome" {p. 218}.
Whatever the most fitting account, it remains that regulators across Europe did not find Citigroup
guilty of market abuse - and this episode is more interesting for it. It would not have been very
interesting to explore why the bank was punished for breaking the law. What is interesting that it
was punished for authorising a legal but "careless" trade (FSA1: 11). To paraphrase the FSA's
judgement, Citigroup management should have known better than to authorise the operation." But
should have known what? Below I outline what constitutes market abuse under the FSA's and
European regulatory regimes, and specify in what respects Citigroup's trade appeared to constitute
misconduct.
The FSA's Code of Market Conduct regards the following behaviours as market abuse.
Figure 3-16. Types of market abuse (adapted from FSA3)
Type Variations
Insider dealing (MARl.3)22
Improper disclosure
(MAR1.4)
Misuse of information
(MARl.S)
Manipulating transactions
(MARl.6)
Manipulating devices
(MARl.7)
Dissemination (MARl.8)
Misleading behaviour and
distortion (MARl.9)
Dealsmade on the basisof inside/non-trading information; or of the anticipated
impact of another impending deal, such as buying a company's shares before it
is bid for.
One's disclosure of inside information other than in the exercise of professional
duties.
Behaviour based on information that is "generally unavailable" but which does
not qualify as inside information.
Transactions that give a misleading impression about the supply, demand, or
price of particular securities; or "secure the price of [a security] at an abnormal
or artificial level" .
Transactions which "employ any form of deception or contrivance", such as
praising a particular stock without disclosing one's interest in it, in order to drive
up the price.
Disseminating false or misleading information.
Behaviours which do not qualify asmanipulating transactions or devices, but
have a similar effect; e.g. moving an empty cargo ship to mislead about
commodity supply.
21Cf. lithe FSAnotes that the main issue of regulatory concern was the failure by CGMLto take due care to
consider the impact the trade would be likely to have (and indeed did have) on the MTS" (FSA1:14).
22"MARl.x" is a reference to the relevant section of the "Code of Market Conduct" (FSA3).
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Of the behaviours designated above, those associated with "manipulating transactions" (MARl.G)
seem to resonate with Citigroup's operation, as the following table demonstrates.
Figure 3-17. Market abuse and resonance with the MTS trade
Manipulating transactions: Examples" Resonance with MTS trade
Parties trading securities in order to force price to
an artificial level and subsequently profiting from
that price level. (MAR1.6.4[5])
Trading on one market with a view to improperly
influencing the price of a related investment on a
different market. (MAR1.6.4[7))
The trader "has another, illegitimate, reason
behind the trade" (MAR1.6.5[2])
Mitigating factor: If the trade creates an exposure
to market risk, rather than closes it. (MAR1.6.6[3])
Citigroup's purchase of €4bn in bonds at a depressed
price level subsequent to their sale of €13bn.
Citigroup's deliberate hedge on the Eurex futures
market, for its sale in the cash bond market.
The Citigroup email specifying objectives like
'decreasing the attractiveness of the Bund market',
which the FSAsaid showed the author was not
adequately trained in good market conduct.
Citigroup's trade created a higher exposure to market
risk. This mitigates the charge of market abuse,
although it supported FSA'sthe charge of inadequate
controls.
This resonance between Citigroup's trade and these elements of misconduct helps account for the
references to market manipulation both in the regulatory and media data.
It is notable that there was a limit to what Citigroup had to 'do for the market' - its competitors
were also expected by the regulator to manage the risks of a potential market coup like Citigroup's:
"In considering the seriousness of the contravention the FSAtakes into account the losses caused to
other market participants as a result of the contravention. However, it also recognises that the
counterparties to the trades conducted by CGMLare professional market counterparties who can be
expected to understand the nature of their commitments when providing quotations on MTS" (FSA1:
15).
This sentiment is consistent with the reports that held, for example, that Citigroup "legitimately
filled orders that had been placed by willing counterparties, all of whom were grown-up financial
institutions used to dealing large numbers" (GUl).
23 FSA's(FSA3)Code of Market Conduct.
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Remedying shortcomings Figure 3·18. The category Remedying
shortcomings: properties and (dimensions)
As a mitigating factor in its sanction, the FSA
acknowledged Citigroup's "very good co-
operation with the investigation" (op cit). It
briefly noted Citigroup's behaviours that
amounted to remedying shortcomings,
summarised in Figure 3-18.
Cooperating with regulator
Apologising publicly
Emphasising values from CEO-level downwards
Frequent training in market conduct
(web-based resourcing)
(re-scheduling onnuallv}
Investing in surveillance software
Strengthening compliance department
(increasing head count)
(locating compliance staff on trading floor)
3.3.3. Preliminary propositions
The core category, or unifying theme, that captures regulators' expressed concerns is: using
corporate governance mechanisms to foresee and guard against risks posed by a transaction,
particularly market risks. This conceptual category accounts for how the FSAand CMVM summarised
their judgements, the FSA'sdetailed analysis of controls and due skill principles, and the mooted
investigations into market abuse in Germany and Italy. The other categories are being responsible at
corporate level, carrying out market-friendly transactions, and remedying shortcomings. The
relationships between these categories determine the following propositions:
P7 There is a regulatory expectation that firms will implement corporate governance mechanisms
that foresee and guard against a transaction's broader impacts. The key operational impacts to
consider are market risk, execution risk, reputational risk, and legal and regulatory risk.
PS In some cases, firms will be required to identify, by their own means, the best way to guard
against those risks.
pg Inaction, or failure to prevent transactions that disrupt the market, may draw regulatory
sanction even if the trades do not constitute market abuse; therefore, there is a proactive
responsibility to protect the market.
PlO Firms may be held accountable at corporate level for infractions of individuals even when these
infractions are not criminal offenses.
Pll Cooperating with regulators and improving compliance and risk management systems before
the end of the investigation decreasesthe risk of sanctions.
Some of these propositions extend, and others supplement, the propositions deduced from media
reports of the episodes. In the following section, we integrate both sets of conclusions to arrive at a
theoretical account of the episode.
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3.4. The Citigroup episode:Theoretical base
The controversy that followed the Dr Evil trade is a prime subject for theoretical rendering. The
episode is unusual, and appears to defy a quick explanation, for two reasons. First, whilst intense,
the controversy was not based on a clearly understood disagreement or debate. Citigroup had been
"untoward" (to use a median term), but the rules it broke were not articulated explicitly. One
banker's citation conveyed a contradiction succinctly: "Really what they did was smart. They didn't
do anything wrong, they just cornered the market. I'll tell you this though, $2Sm doesn't seem like a
lot of profit to make when you've got the whole world lining up against you" (0T3). If Citigroup had
been smart and done nothing wrong, then what justified the world lining up against them? The
ambiguous nature of the controversy was compounded by a second factor, which was the
regulator's reprimand for Citigroup's failure to ensure an orderly and efficient market. From an
economic perspective, if the bank had been smart and done nothing wrong, then market should
have remained orderly and efficient or the regulator should have intervened to change the rules.
Thus, the question emerged, 'how are firms responsible for ensuring orderly financial markets'. This
section begins to answer it.
Earlier, I conceptualised processes like executing an extraordinary operation, judging conduct, and
exercising due skill, based on coded data about the controversy and the regulatory decision, and
then developed basic theoretical propositions about how those processes related to each other.
Now, I integrate those propositions to create theory 'building blocks' that (1) account for the
episode, and (2) provide a frame to analyse other empirical episodes in the next chapters. To begin,
the table below recaps the theoretical propositions already derived.
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Figure 3-19. Recapping the theoretical propositions
Based on media data Based on regulation data
Pl. There is an emergent expectation that
traders should help to ensure market
confidence and stability.
P2. Controversy occurs even when specific
standards are not breached, provided that
there is an extraordinary financial transaction
and that observers are driven to judge an
actor's conduct.
P3. In a market-making system, explicit rules
need to be moderated by dealers in order to
ensure market confidence and stability. It is
not sufficient to observe explicit trading
rules.
P4. Stable liquidity promotes market
confidence and stability. Unstable liquidity
leads to controversy if an extraordinary
transaction is involved in creating the
instability.
PS.Large, liquid dealers are particularly
responsible for ensuring market confidence
and stability.
P6. Ensuring market confidence reduces
regulatory risk.
P7.There is a regulatory expectation that firms will implement
corporate governance mechanisms that foresee and guard
against a transaction's broader impacts. The key operational
impacts to consider are market risk, execution risk,
reputational risk, and legal and regulatory risk.
P8. In some cases,firms will required to identify, by their own
means, the best way to guard against those risks.
P9. Inaction, or failure to prevent transactions that disrupt the
market, may draw regulatory sanction even if the trades do
not constitute market abuse; therefore, there is a proactive
responsibility to protect the market.
PlO. Firmsmay be held accountable at corporate level for
infractions of individuals.
II Pll. Cooperating with regulators and improving complianceI and risk management systems before the end of the
I investigation decreases the risk of sanctions.
I
Together these propositions account, on a conceptual level, for Citigroup's Eurobond controversy. It
should not be possible to find significant data that does not feed into these propositions; that is the
grounded theory criterion of fit. However, this is not to say that there is no data contradicting the
propositions. In any theoretical account, outliers and exceptions help to assess the account's
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credibility. For example, I noted some bankers' judgements that absolved Citigroup and others that
blamed MTS and its 'artificial' market-making rules. To integrate these exceptions into the theory, I
compared them with other dimensions of the concept, and calibrated my judgement accordingly.
For example, when outlining the properties of judging conduct (Figure 3-9), I noted each of those
opposing sentiments. My contention that there is no significant data unrelated to these propositions
also means that the documents analysed do bear some information that did not "earn its way into
the theory", as grounded theorists put it (e.g. Glaser 1978, Charmaz 2006). Somedata is far removed
from what emerged as the central concepts of concern. I would highlight, for example, reports on
Russianinvestors' bids to purchase the MTSplatform, which noted the Citigroup trade incidentally.
As a matter of process, the sets of propositions above were derived separately, in part to help the
reader take stock of some of the incremental steps in the theory-building. The task now is to
integrate them to increase their parsimony.
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 270) note that a grounded theory expressed as a woven narrative serves
to demonstrate the inherent conceptual linkages systematically. Following this recommendation, the
following two sections outline the theoretical of account of this episode as a narrative. This narrative
represents the foundation, or building blocks, for the emerging theory.
3.4.1. Narrative theoretical account: Core proposition
The core proposition that accounts for the main pattern of behaviour in the media data
(controversy), and in the regulatory data (punishment), is that there is an expectation that traders
should help to ensure market confidence and stable liquidity, particularly in view of extraordinary
transactions. This is accomplished by enforcing corporate governance mechanisms that foresee and
guard against a range of potential risks. These risks include market risks, primarily, as well as
reputational risks, execution risks, and legal and regulatory risks. Corporate governance mechanisms
may need to be linked specifically to market rules, and to make a judgement on when those rules
need to be moderated (for example, if rules promote higher liquidity, this does not mean that an
extraordinary flood of liquidity would be welcome).
The main responsibility falls on the bank at a corporate level (in all but a handful of reports, market
participants, commentators and politicians did not refer to individual traders, and those traders
were absolved by the regulators). Inaction, or failure to prevent risky transactions (with the
dimensions of risk noted above), may draw regulatory sanction even if the final trade does not itself
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constitute illegal behaviour. Therefore, a bank is not only accountable for improper behaviours, but
it has a responsibility to prevent them.
The boundaries of proper and improper market conduct are not clear, but are moderated both by
implicit expectations in the market, and by porous regulatory principles. In the market, so-called
"gentlemen's agreements" may be wholly implicit, and may not even be known by all market
participants. However, failure to abide by them may generate controversy. Similarly, even if a
specific regulatory principle is not judged to have been contravened, e.g. through market abuse,
other regulatory principles may be invoked to punish the bank on similar grounds, e.g. failing to
prevent market disruption.
3.4.2. Narrative theoretical account: Contingent propositions
The preceding propositions are contingent on a transaction's properties, dominant market
conditions, the protagonist's subsequent response, and its corporate sizeand influence.
An extraordinary financial transaction (larger, faster, more surprising), is likely to generate more
controversy, and court regulatory scrutiny, if it impacts on market confidence or liquidity, or if the
protagonist's nationality or political clout are significant.
In a market-making system, explicit trading rules need to be moderated by participants. It is not
sufficient to observe trading rules because, even though market-making is designed to increase
liquidity, injecting too much liquidity may have the inverse effect of reducing the number of
participants. The principles for moderating trading rules are generally implicit and not necessarily
consensual, and therefore require good judgment.
After an incident of misconduct, and before regulatory sanction, public apologies and guidance to
employees may placate public and political criticism. In addition, implementing remedial measures,
such as increasing compliance capacity and improving how closely traders work with compliance
professionals, decreases regulatory risk.
All of the above propositions are particularly relevant for larger firms. Larger firms have more
liquidity and are frequently perceived to have a special responsibility to the market, both by market
participants, commentators and politicians whose views are reported in the news, and by the
regulator. This is also because larger firms have more resources to disrupt markets and to improve
control systems and prevent such transactions.
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3.5. Conclusion
Our conclusion is one rarely seen in the study of bond markets:" that banks are expected to take
special steps to ensure that markets function well, moderating their transactions and corporate
governance not only in pursuit of utility and transparency (which are common standards), but also in
pursuit of market confidence, stable liquidity, and corporate foresight and control. If they do not,
then the risk of controversy increases, bringing regulatory risks. Through several contingent
propositions, I have conveyed under what conditions this is likely to apply.
This argument is substantive, based on data from European government bond markets, and
tentatively generalisable within those markets. That is, if another bank attempted a similar
operation on the MTS exchange, then a similar controversy would likely ensue. The debates that
followed the trade codified a set of principles and expectations of corporate behaviour. Some of
these principles may not have existed before the trade. I found very little evidence that a specific
gentlemen's agreement discouraging such trades had existed ex ante, but did find evidence that
suggests the Citigroup traders did not know about it. However, after the controversy, the boundaries
of good conduct became clearer and precedents were established. On this basis, we can say that
Citigroup's Eurobond controversy codified the expectation of firms' responsibility for orderly
markets in the MTSsystem at least.
While this makes the episode interesting in its own right, the more exciting contribution for the
thesis is the set of sensitising concepts and frames of reference that one may use to analyse other
empirical settings. In the following chapter, I broaden the empirical scope to focus on a whole group
of actors, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs),rather than a single actor like Citigroup. As the SWFdata
yields new properties and dimensions to these concepts, the resulting propositions acquire greater
explanatory power.
24 Cf. Beunza, Hardie and MacKenzie (2006).
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"This is a further sign of how the world economy is changing.
It is not happening overnight. But it is happening gradually.
What that also means is that the rules by which markets are
run may need to evolve."
Gerard Lyons, Chief Economist, Standard Chartered Bank, on SWFs'
"They don't like us, but they want our money."
Norwegian SWFofficial'
4.1. Introduction
Variously labelled "new global power brokers" (McKinsey 2007), "giant locusts" (DTSO),and "a force
for stability" (FT149)/ sovereign wealth funds were held to more scrutiny in recent years than
almost any other kind of financial market actor. These government-funded investors have existed in
their current form since the 1950s, but for decades kept a low profile. According to data in the
Google News Archive in June 2008,4sovereign funds were mentioned in only two news articles in the
nine years between 1998 and 2006 - once in 2003 and once in 2006. Then, in 2007 alone, they
received 1,400 mentions in the same media outlets, and more again the following year. It was a
rapid, if controversial, rise to public prominence, as the funds diversified away from low-yielding
bond markets in the early 2000s and began to invest in high-profile companies and real estate in the
West. Western governments rushed to agree international policy approaches to them, and
succeeded - arguably to a greater extent than they did for investment banks in the wake of the
Credit Crunch. Codes-of-conduct outlining sovereign funds' "responsibilities", as the EU
Commissioner for Monetary Affairs called them (BBC2008), were drawn up by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US Treasury in 2008, with input from the European Union. The
purpose of these agreements with SWFswas "to help maintain a stable global financial system and
free flow of capital and investment" (IMF2: 4).
Manifest in the codes-ot-conduct is the notion that SWFshave to do more than pursue commercial
objectives and comply with regulations, in order to maintain an orderly and efficient tinancial
system. This is a very similar problematique as the Citigroup case, although in that episode the
1Citedin FT122.
2 Citedin GU25.
3 Asin the other chapters,the referencingformat hasbeensimplifiedfor documentsin the datasample.See
Part1 of the bibliography.
4Thearchivecoveredall of the newspapersin mydatasample,in addition to "hundreds"of other sources.
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controversy was a reaction to misconduct, whereas the SWF controversy is in anticipation of
misconduct. SWFsare unconventional market participants. Some hold capital with a mandate to
stabilise their domestic economy in the event of a downturn. During a global liquidity shortage, they
might therefore withdraw capital quickly from international markets, destabilising asset prices.
Often staffed by civil servants rather than professional investors, their risk management and
accounting standards are not uniform, and possibly unreliable. They could threaten market
efficiency if they moved to exert operational control over companies that they acquire, or exerted
political influence to gain an unfair advantage. And, as primarily non-Western holders of
international currency reserves, they could opt not to re-invest their capital, which would worsen
global macroeconomic imbalances. In 2007, most Western governments began to debate whether
new regulations would be required to deal with the funds.
SWFs had their advocates in the UK government and European Commission (EC), among others.
Following classical economic reasoning, advocates emphasised that sovereign funds were helping to
recycle capital into the West, through their equity and real estate investments, and thus redressing
imbalances. In addition, they were supporting Western financial firms, which showed early signs of
liquidity shortages at the start of 2007. Indeed, the funds' track-record was very positive. None of
their activities had been destabilising or untoward.
Some governments swung significantly between supporting and opposing restrictions on SWFs.The
US initially blocked an investment by Dubai Ports World on security grounds but then led the push
for a voluntary, self-regulation approach for SWFs,publishing the first code-of-conduct. Australia
initially changed its foreign investment laws to keep out SWFs,but eventually offered those funds
tax incentives to go to Australia.
What all sides agreed was that the issue was controversial. As most SWFs lacked transparency and
explicit governance models, few observers knew their governance structure or management
systems, both of which are material for the broader financial system, especially in light of the funds'
size. Controversy abated when SWFs adopted codes-of-conduct, particularly the IMF's Santiago
Principles, largely authored by SWFsthemselves. If sovereign funds have special responsibilities to
the international financial system, then these codes-of-conduct embody them.
This chapter argues that the controversy surrounding SWFs was an attempt to define what
constituted responsible market conduct for them. The concern about SWFswas very similar to the
concern about Citigroup's operation in the previous chapter: that they would threaten the efficiency
and orderly operation of markets, even if they continued to comply with regulations and maximise
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returns. I contend that this is a better explanation for the SWFcontroversy than another that was
advanced in the data; that Western governments were 'simply' pursuing classically protectionist
agendas, keeping out foreign competitors in order to protect domestic interest groups. Although this
appears partly correct, protectionism did not emerge where we would most have expected it.
Moreover, 'protecting' domestic interest groups required welcoming sovereign funds to provide
liquidity. Basedon my argument that the chief concern was to promote responsible market conduct,
I analyse the codes-of-conduct for SWFsand code them as generic processes.Comparing them with
the processes that emerged in the Citigroup episode, I advance several propositions about how
these firms are expected to contribute to orderly markets: to operate risk management systems that
anticipate the impact of investment transactions; to implement a transparent investment policy
based on commercial objectives; and to improve their shortcomings proactively, even if they are not
in breach of regulation. These propositions account for the Citigroup and SWFscontroversies and
provide a frame of reference to examine the post-Credit Crunch regulatory debate in the next
chapter.
4.1.1. Purpose and contribution of chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical explanation for the episode. The episode's
value is anchored in the analysis of Citigroup in Chapter 3. It concerns very different actors than
Citigroup, and yet, the data suggests that the core processesunderpinning responsible conduct are
similar in both cases. The SWF setting is broader, and covers markets for virtually all kinds of
securities, and involves more types of firms (SWFs, private equity funds, and others) and more
regulatory jurisdictions. This shift from a micro to a macro empirical setting increases the analytical
relevance of the research. Another benefit is that it is highly socially and historically embedded in
processes like a shift in economic power away from private firms specifically and from the West
more broadly. This increases the accuracy, or faithfulness, of the emerging theory.
The chapter's main contribution is to offer a concept of 'corporate market responsibility' (CMR),and
a set of propositions that continue to answer the question of how firms are responsible for ensuring
orderly financial markets. I argue that the central process for CMR is to establish strong
management systems and controls, and set out what the protocols are, how they are implemented,
by whom, when, and with what consequences, based on the two episodes. The propositions about
CMR in this chapter also provide a theoretical framework to assessthe post-Credit Crunch regulatory
debate, in the next chapter.
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4.1.2. Outline of chapter
This chapter begins in Section 4.2 by recounting the rise to prominence of sovereign wealth funds,
and by analysing the signals of controversy that emerged. Then, it outlines the key processes that
motivated it: (1) sovereign wealth funds expanding their investment strategies and risk exposure; (2)
governments and commentators judging SWFs' investment intent; and (3) signalling resolution:
Western governments courting SWF investment. Each of these processes is strongly associated with
a particular concern about SWFs, as the figure below illustrates. I argue that these processes amount
to a concern that SWFs would fail to ensure orderly financial markets - much like the Citigroup
controversy.
Section 4.3 conceptualises the US, EU and IMF codes-of-conduct, which ended the controversy, and
identifies good management controls as the central issue facing SWFs. Section 5.4 then compares
the emerging propositions in this episode with those from the Citigroup case and builds tentative
generalisations about CMR. Section 5.5 concludes.
Figure 4-1. The SWFsepisode as a controversy about orderly markets
and responsible market conduct: Summary of key concepts
Main patternto be
accounted for
Processes that explain
the controversy
Concerns about SWFs Resolvingthe
controversy
SWFs expanding SWFsde stabilising
investment strategy - financial markets
J
f Signallingcontroversy JudgingSWFs' SWFsusingpoliticalinvestment intent - influence
Signalling
resolution: courting _
~, SWFS__J
SWFs should
recycle wealth
Agreeingcodes-of-
conduct
Threateningmarket J
' efficiency and
orderliness
4.1.3. Sampling and analytical approach
The sampling strategy for SWFs was underpinned by the same grounded theory principles as the
Chapter 3, but took a slightly different turn operationally. The central principle was theoretical
sampling; sampling data that can uncover new properties and dimensions of the main concepts.
Technically, the core concept I am working with is the expectation that companies will help ensure
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market stability and confidence (drawn from the Citigroup episode). However, in this chapter instead
of sampling for said expectation immediately, I sampled instead for the controversy around SWFs
more broadly. The motive was to understand the broader context for SWFs because the episode
involved more actors and markets than the Citigroup case. Perhaps, there were other more
significant drivers for the SWF controversy and I did not want to obscure them.
The first step was to establish a baseline sample of reports about SWF controversy. The baseline
sample contained all references to SWFs and controversies in the same publications where I had
analysed Citigroup.i It spanned the period May 2007 to April 2008 because this period represented
the funds' rise to public prominence, as measured by volume of news reports globally (see Figure 4-2
below). During this time period, reporting grew steadily and SWFs entered international markets and
the political lexicon. Expectations about SWFs were formed and public controversies emerged. At
the end of the period, the first codes-of-conduct were written, signalling closure, and reporting
declined. The period was an appropriate launch-pad for identifying (and then re-sampling for) the
issues most central to the SWF controversy.
Figure 4-2. Historical volume of news reporting on
sovereign wealth funds, and sampling period cirded6
2007 ·08 From 2007/01 To 2008112 ~ _
---
---
---
-----,-
,
,
Jan,2007
The baseline sample consisted of 117 reports across the eight publications. I sought reports that
were directly relevant to the controversy, and searched for the terms 'sovereign funds' and
'sovereign wealth funds', with variants of the word 'controversial/controversy' or
'political/geopolitical'. The searches were conducted on each publication's website and cross-
checked using Google News Archive. The reports were fairly evenly spread across the publications,
with some emphasis in British rather than American media, as shown in Figure 4-3.
5 The Daily Telegraph (DT), The Financial Times (FT),The Guardian and Guardian Unlimited (GU), The Times
(TI), The Economist (TE), The New York Times (NYT),The Wall Street Journal (WSJ),and The Washington Post
(WP). The selection criteria for these data sources are detailed in Chapter 2.
6 Graph reproduced from Google News Archive in May 2009.
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This data set was supplemented with reports
Figure 4-3. Distribution of SWF/controversy reports in
from corporate reports that drove numerous sample, by publication
headlines. Morgan Stanley's (2007a, 2007b,
20D7c) early reports "guesstimating" (2007b: 1)
the size and future growth of the funds were
widely cited and a central frame of reference for
the debate in the media. McKinsey's (2007) report
characterised the funds as new "global power
brokers" and became another key reference in
the debate, particularly because it reported fears
that SWFs might invest politically. Standard Chartered's (2007) report was influential because it
Daily Telegraph
10%
Financial Times
25%
compared SWFs to each other and furthered the idea that, despite being state-owned, they were
"capitalist", profit-maximising investment vehicles.
The second dataset comprised regulatory and policy-documents related to SWFs, specifically the
codes of conduct. An early code-of-conduct was published by the US Treasury (USTl), based on an
agreement with the SWFs of Singapore and Abu Dhabi. This was particularly interesting because its
principles are very similar to what had been expected of Citigroup. It suggests that key lessons from
the episodes are generalisable across the two settings. Secondly, the European Commission
published "inputs" to the discussion on a global code-of-conduct for SWFs (EC2, EC3, EC4), outlining
the principles that it judged SWFs should abide by. The US and EU initiatives culminated in a global
code-of-conduct, which was drafted under the auspices of the IMF by SWFs and government
representatives (IMF2). Known as the Santiago Principles, the code set out a "user manual" for
responsible market conduct by SWFs. I analyse these codes and compare them with the Citigroup
episode in the second part of the chapter.
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4.2. Enter Sovereign Wealth Funds
"Wanted: managers to run $200bn portfolio.
Pay not commensurate with market rates.
Controversy (virtually) guaranteed."
Lex, Financial Times, 2007'
For the best part of 60 years, sovereign wealth funds were both conservative and peripheral to the
global economy. One report places their first incarnation in the Gilbert Islands, Micronesia, in 1953.
The British administration at the time "used money raised from the sale of bird poo - which was
used in fertiliser - to set up a fund that is now worth more than $500m" (GU7). Another SWF
emerged in 1956 in Kiribati. The Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund was set up to manage the
government's phosphates export revenues in support of the exchange rate and fiscal budget. The US
state of New Mexico also created an SWFthat decade, the Investment Office Trust, with revenues
from land leasing, natural resources, and tobacco. For a North American venture, its investment
objective remains surprisingly timid today ("growing the funds at a rate at least equal to Inflation'"),
but typical of most sovereign funds. Alaska's Permanent Fund Corporation, a mid-ranking SWFwith
$27 billion in assets, aims only for a 5% return after inflation, which is less than some retail savings
accounts were offering customers earlier this decade. "We're trying to turn non-renewable mineral
wealth into renewable financial wealth," said its Executive Director, "and we've been at it for quite
some time" (FTl18).
Today, sovereign wealth funds exist in primarily two forms (IFSL2008). Stabilisation funds manage
earnings from commodity exports, to protect the economy when commodity prices fall. If prices fall
and economic growth slows, the government has these funds to stimulate domestic enterprise.
Stabilisation funds also protect the country from shortages of foreign exchange reserves, since most
commodities are traded in hard currencies like the USdollar. The second type is savingsfunds, which
manage pensions and government savingsdestined for future generations. Other kinds of sovereign
investment vehicles, particularly development funds (for socio-economic projects), and state-owned
companies (like a national oil company), are distinct from SWFs (ibid), although they are also
frequently invoked in SWFdebates (e.g. IMF 2007).
7 Refersto the ChinaInvestmentCorporation(FT129).
8 Seehttp://www.sic.state.nm.us/permanent_funds.htm.
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The 1970s oil shocks created the first surge of new sovereign funds," as oil producers like Abu Dhabi,
Alaska, Canada, and Saudi Arabia - followed by minerals exporters like Botswana (diamonds) and
Chile (copper) - profited from high commodity tax revenues and began investing their cash in bond
markets, to help hedge against inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. High commodity prices also
account for most of the SWFs established in the 2000s. China's SWFs, in contrast, were funded by a
nominal1000-fold increase in the country's foreign exchange earnings, from $2 billion in 1977 to $2
trillion in 2009, owed to strong exports. China established four SWFs from the late 1990s onwards.
Some countries created SWFs to invest in international capital markets in order to earn finance for
national pensions. Ireland, for
Figure 4-4. Number of SWFs. 1953-2009
example, established its National
Pensions Reserves Fund ($31
billion) in 2001. For most of their
instruments, primarily us 10
history,
staffed
these
investment vehicles
relied on safe, fixed-income
Treasury bills, to beat inflation.
As the former head of one of
o
Singapore's two SWFs wrote in
his memoir, "Investing is a hazardous business. My cardinal objective was not to maximise returns
but to protect the value of our savings and get a fair return on capital" (FT116).
Sovereign funds' risk appetite increased in the mid-2000s, when they began diversifying their
portfolios" into investments in equities and real estate. This change was motivated by a
combination of necessity and ambition. At an individual level, many funds were exceeding their
conservative growth objectives as new export earnings accumulated quickly, driven by the
commodity price boom, and therefore had surplus capital to invest in riskier ventures. Collectively,
the doubling in the number of funds in the early 2000s meant that many were chasing the same
investments, thus depressing returns. Coupled with a roughly 33% depreciation of the US dollar in
2003-07 (which many felt would be prolonged due to the yawning US trade deficit), US Treasury
bonds had also become a less reliable option for reserves, and this drove many funds to look at
9 SeeFigure 4-4, based on data from the SWFInstitute; http://www.swfinstitute.org.
10 As in other chapters, phrases in italics refer to conceptual categories (or their properties and dimensions);
that account for the empirical data.
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alternative investments with higher returns. Another motive for setting up sovereign funds was that
countries, like Algeria, Brazil and Kazakhstan, repaid multilateral debt obligations and were no longer
bound to fiscal restraint conditions in exchange for development finance. They were therefore able
to pursue new state spending, and wanted higher yielding investments in order to fund it. Together,
these trends and the advent of SWFsheralded what some political economists have called "state
capitalism"ll- governments as investors.
With higher risk appetite came visibility. Equities (and real estate) are much more visible
investments than bonds because they give shareholders a degree of influence in the acquired
company's investment strategy. High profile equity investments helped propel SWFsto prominence.
On 23 July 2007, in one of the first such investments, Singapore's Temasek and the China
Development Bank announced that they would take stakes in Barclays Bank. In September, Dubai
acquired 20% of the US Nasdaq stock exchange, and 28% of the london Stock Exchange (lSE).
Another 20%of the LSEwas purchased by Qatar, which also took a 25%stake in the third largest UK
supermarket chain, Sainsbury's. Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, SaudiArabia and others provided sorely needed
liquidity to major American banks caught up in the subprime lending crisis _ Bear Stearns, Citigroup,
Merrill lynch, Morgan Stanley, and UBS_ in exchange for shareholdings. The irony that these iconic
global banks sought rescue from non-Western governments lay behind much of the attention
devoted to SWFsfrom late 2007 onwards.
However visible, these bids cannot fully explain the emerging controversy afflicting SWFsbecause
the controversy began earlier, in April 2007. My interpretation, based on the language and content
of many of the early news reports, is that the initial political and intellectual debates were inspired
primarily by two publications. First, Morgan Stanley published two research notes in March and May
(2007a, 2007b), which "guesstimated" (2007b: 1) that the value of SWFscould increase from $2.5
trillion that year to $12 trillion in 2015, thus exceeding the size of the world's official government
reserves (see e.g. Fll08, GU8). The bank concluded that the "longer-term implications for financial
markets are immense" (2007a: 2), but did not, or could not, specify what they would be. The
estimates in these reports became 'received wisdom', cited very frequently in media and
government reports. Also influential was the IMF's April 2007 "Global Financial Stability Report",
which said of sovereign funds, "A single institution could make sudden portfolio adjustments that
could have significant price effects on certain asset classes ... In some cases,assets may be shifted
11Seee.g. Jeffrey Garten in FT137, and Bremmer (2009).
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for political-strategic reasons" (p. 85; FTI07, FTIIO). SWFs' potential political motives became a
major source of express concern.
Before these publications, media reports that mentioned SWFshad been more technical and their
tone less inflamed. These media reports, in the first quarter of 2007, had been about new trends in
central bank reserve management, and more specifically, whether the USdollar would remain the
major world reserve currency, a well-studied question since at least the establishment of the euro in
1999. In the absence of any controversial acquisitions by SWFs in the first quarter of 2007, it is
possible that Morgan Stanley's and the IMF's reports were catalysts for the political controversy that
began in the spring of that year. In the following paragraphs, I outline the conceptual properties of
this controversy.
4.2.1. Signalling controversy
The controversy surrounding the rise to prominence of SWFs is an interesting problematique
because, a priori, there was no clear motive for it - no misconduct by SWFs, or evidence that
misconduct was imminent. The Oxford English Dictionary defines controversy as a "debate or
disagreement about a matter which arouses strongly contrasting opinions". Controversy also thrives
on uncertainty, as I argued in Chapter 3. When the debate has some features of uncertainty - for
example, whether or not a political decision will be taken - the debate/controversy intensifies.
Uncertainty about SWFs' impact helped to fuel debates about their proper role in the global
economy.
Before contextualising and explaining the controversy, I outline its signals in this section (see Figure
4-5). The first and strongest signals of controversy arose with politicians reviewing their policies
towards foreign investors. There were initial calls in Europe to establish a policy of 'defence' against
sovereign wealth funds. Germany's Angela Merkel and France's Nicolas Sarkozy were particularly
forceful in this regard. In July 2007, Merkel called SWFs"a completely new conflict situation that one
must respond to adequately" (Bloomberg 2007), and Germany set up a new agency mirroring the
US's Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)to vet foreign investment.
France's President Sarkozy stated: "We've decided not to let ourselves be sold down the river by
speculative funds, by unscrupulous attitudes which do not meet the transparency criteria one is
entitled to expect in a civilised world. It's unacceptable and we have decided not to accept it"
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(GU13).12The Dutch government expressed similar reservations, and when discussions moved to
European forums in June 2007, they were resisted by the UK and Italy. The British Chancellor,
Alastair Darling, argued that "calls for the EU to adopt a common approach to vetting corporate
acquisitions by foreign state investors" should be resisted (FTll0). Italy's international trade
minister, Emma Bonino, took a similar position,
saying in respect of the country's national airline,
Alltalia, "I don't care who buys it, it can be the
Chinese, or the Eskimos, so long as they turn it
around" (ibid). In the data, there was widespread
sentiment that the risk of a political backlash against
SWFswas significant. "And this," wrote a Bloomberg
columnist in July (2007), "is happening without
anyone having made any offers recently".
Figure 4-5. The category Signalling controversy:
properties and (dimensions)
Politicians reviewing policy
(Ee, France, Germany, Italy, UK, US,Australia)
(Protectionism, own SWFs)
Unions expressing concern
Being related to private equity
(private equity controversy)
(investment partnerships)
SWFslacking transparency
(investment strategy)
(management controls)
(risk management)
Sizeof SWFsector
(number of players, funds under management)
Symbolising wealth transfer
Improving the global economy
(providing liquidity, increasing market
confidence)
(correcting global imbalances)
(protecting emerging markets against shocks)
SWFsmanaging political risk
(making small investments)
(lobbying, PR)
(resisting code-of-conduct)
In the US, the debate was similar. In March 2006,
the US Congress had successfully persuaded Dubai
Ports World, a port operator subsidised by Dubai's
sovereign fund, to disinvest from port facilities in six
major US cities. The company had acquired control
over the ports by purchasing their previous owner,
Britain's P&O, months earlier. Some US lawmakers argued that Dubai Ports World could not be
relied on to secure US infrastructure. Senator Charles Schumer, who led the opposition, described
the Emirate of Dubai as having a "nexus with terrorism" (FT169).CFIUS,the USwatchdog emulated
by Germany, had not objected to the deal, prompting several Congressmen to "re-examine laws
governing" it, according to a Wall Street Journal report (WSJ34): "Some proposed to vastly expand
the definition of investments that could pose a threat to national security". A year later, in June
2007, the "US position on sovereign funds was clarified ". in a largely unnoticed speech [by a
Treasury official]," according to The Times:
"Identifying the potential 'impact on financial market stability, [the official) said that because so little
was known about the funds' investmentpolicies,minor commentsor rumourscould sparkvolatility.
'It is hard to dismissentirely the possibilityof unseen, imprudent risk management with broader
consequences',hesaid..." (ITIS, italicsadded).
12 SarkozyeventuallyurgedFrance'sownsovereignfund, CaissedesDepots(CDC),to "defendandpromote
the essentialeconomicinterestsof the nation" againstSWFs(GU18).
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SWFs' transparency and ability to move markets, both raised in this statement by the USTreasury,
were key properties of the controversy, which I address below. On the other side of the debate in
the US,American banks and a range of economists (WSJ25)pressed the government lito keep the
[policy] reviews narrow enough to encourage foreign investment" (WSJ34).
Elsewhere, Australia, Canadaand Japanalso began reviews of their investment policy regimes in July
2007, and by February of the next year, Australia became the first country to adopt a new policy in
direct response to SWFs. Australia argued that "Foreign governments may not operate solely in
accordance with normal commercial considerations and may instead pursue broader political or
strategic objectives" (GU31, italics added). Australia's Foreign Investment Review Board emphasised
that it would scrutinise whether "an investor's operations are independent from the relevant foreign
government" (Financial Times 2008). It examined a bid by the Aluminium Corporation of China
(Chinalco) for equity in the mining giant Rio Tinto, even though the bid was for less than 15%, the
threshold that would normally trigger a review (ibid). It was not without irony that, one year later,
Australia's Securities and Investment Commission would launch an investigation against Australia's
own SWF, the Future Fund, after it sold shares in Telstra Corp, weeks before the government
threatened to split up Telstra on competition grounds (Opalesque 2009a). The suspicion is that the
fund had received inside information from government. Overall, most governments' political reviews
ended with relatively mild encouragements for SWF transparency, particularly in relation to
investment in sensitive industries, rather than outright blocks or quotas on foreign investment. In
2009, the Australian government actually proposed tax breaks for SWFsin order to encourage their
investment in the Australian economy (Opalesque 2009b), tempering the government's earlier
scepticism.
The public debate on SWFswas partly fuelled by domestic political groups, particularly trade unions.
In the UK, the Trade Union Congress, which represents all unions, expressed concerns about the
impact of SWF investments on pensions and jobs (GU10). Unions were forceful in California, where,
in April 2008, the legislature nearly approved a trade-union-sponsored bill to bar either of its state
pension funds from investing in private equity funds that were part-owned by SWFs(DT46).
Sovereign funds' relation to the private equity industry was widely noted as a property of the
controversy. Private equity funds bypass stock markets to acquire control of privately owned
companies, restructure their management, and resell them as more profitable concerns some years
later. They grew significantly in 2005-06, courting disrepute over a lack of transparency, their large
size, and negative effect on jobs. A UKparliamentary inquiry in spring 2007 centred on the concern
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that "buy-out firms [Le. private equity funds) were profiteering by taking over iconic companies,
stripping them of value, and laying off employees" (FT124). In November, the industry agreed its
own code of conduct, stipulating more disclosure
regarding investment strategies. The code was
significantly "watered down" under pressure from
the industry, according to a Financial Times report
(FT123), and, in some cases, private equity agreed
to disclose only industry-wide, rather than
company-specific, data about their investments. The British Private Equity and Venture Capital
"1think we were certainly guilty of telling our
story badly. [We need to] get out there and say
it is not about fat cats - it is about pensioners.N
Simon Walker, head of private equity industry
association, regarding its code of conduct (FT136)
Association said that it hoped SWFswould also adopt the code (ibid), which they did not. Sovereign
funds worked closely with private equity companies, often using them to help maintain a low profile,
such as by entering a joint venture to invest under the private company's brand name (see FT116).
"Perhaps the mutual love of secrecy explains the attraction" between the sectors, said a Guardian
editorial (GU7).
Sovereign funds' lacking transparency is an ubiquitous source of concern, throughout the data, in
relation to their corporate governance more broadly. Transparency was important along several
dimensions. One was SWFs' governance structure, namely the potential political affiliations of
individuals on the board. Identifying these individuals, and their management systems more
generally, would help distinguish between being government-owned versus being government-
directed (FT112). Secondly, transparency was lacking in relation to SWFs' investment strategies.
Becausemany new deals were being concluded through private equity, the extent of SWFs' interest
in specific industries was unknown. This obscured an assessment of potential ulterior (political)
motives related to the specific investment, and created problems from a systemic perspective.
Coupled with a lack of information about risk management and control systems, it meant that SWFs
might accumulate very high exposure to sectors or asset classes, eventually posing a risk to the
system. This ability of SWFsto move markets concerned the USTreasury and IMF, as noted above. In
its April2007 report, the IMF (2007) stated:
"A singleinstitution couldmakesuddenportfolio adjustmentsthat couldhavesignificantpriceeffects
on certain asset classes.Market rumours of such adjustmentsmay lead to volatility as previous
announcementsby central bankshaveshown.Furthermore,if raw material and energypricesfall ...
countriesmay intentionallyrun downtheir fundsand internationalreserves,reversingpastflows" (op
cit: 85; FT107).
This threat was significant by virtue of the SWFsector's burgeoning size (both the rising number of
funds, and total funds under management). In the first quarter of 2007, SWFscontrolled between
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$2.5 and $3.5 trillion (Morgan Stanley 2007a, McKinsey 2007). They grew rapidly, by roughly 18% in
2007 (FT160) and 24% in the year to April 2008 (DT49). Growth was sometimes owed to shrewd
investment (for example, the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, GIC, claimed to
have achieved a 9.5% average annualised return in dollar terms since 1981; FT116),but it was also in
great part due to the commodity price boom, which earned exporters additional foreign exchange
(iFSL2008). SWFswere widely projected to quadruple by around 2015, based on reports by Morgan
Stanley (2007a, 2007b). While sovereign wealth funds were larger than the hedge fund industry
($1.9 billion) and private equity ($0.8 billion) combined, they still comprised a small share of all
institutional investor funds - including pension, mutual, and insurance funds - which controlled a
total of $75 trillion (IFSL2008). This growing size was ubiquitously associated with the political
disquiet because it raised macroeconomic and strategic uncertainties.
Key among these uncertainties was a perceived transfer of economic power away from the West. A
frequently cited report by McKinsey (2007), the management consultancy, classed SWFsalongside
hedge funds and private equity funds as lithe new power brokers" in international finance. SWFs
were deemed lithe most controversial" of the group (FT119) because of their lack of transparency
and lithe possibility that they could use their financial heft for political purposes" (FT119, citing
McKinsey). On this basis, the G7 discussed SWFs for the first time (TI15) at their October 2007
summit. The funds were also the main topic of discussion at the World Economic Forum in Davos in
January 2008, according to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ35). The "new world order" that SWFs
represented (ibid) troubled many, but it reassured others.
SWFs' potentially positive impact on the economy was the main argument counterbalancing calls for
more protectionist policies in the West. The reinvestment of their foreign exchange reserves were a
means to correct global imbalances - the growing trade deficits and declining savings in the West,
matched by opposing trends in Asia particularly. As the Wall Street Journal put it, "For those living in
the developed world, there are clear benefits ... Capital from SWFswill cushion the blow of the
current financial crisis on businesses and consumers. And continued growth in emerging countries
will soften the effects of a possible recession elsewhere" (ibid). Providing liquidity to cash-strapped
global banks was strongly associated to restoring market confidence (e.g. FT138).This rationale lay
behind the UK's bullish stance on sovereign wealth (GU25, DT33). It was also, of course, a key motive
for investment banks to lobby in favour of SWFsin the US,and a reason why Australia, which initially
adopted laws to limit SWFs,eventually proposed tax incentives for them.
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The ways in which sovereign funds managed the emerging political risks also signalled controversy.
Their central strategy was making small investments to avoid regulatory review (e.g. FT138, WSJ26,
WSJ30, WSJ34). For example, when the China Investment Corporation (Clq bought a stake in the
private equity group Blackstone in July 2007 - one of the highest profile acquisitions - it trimmed its
investment to 9.9% because 10% would have given it a seat on the company's board (WSJ34). Board
representation would bring political scrutiny (ibid). Similarly, "After Abu Dhabi's investment arm
bought a 4.9% stake in Citigroup [in September 2007] ... officials went out of their way to stress how
uninvolved they would be in Citi's affairs," said a Wall Street Journal report (WSJ26), "They would
get no board seat, or have any ongoing say in the bank's operations". These negotiations were fine-
tuned with the assistance of a well-funded lobbying campaign in the US. For example, the UAE
created a US-Emirates alliance, headed by a former aide to Hillary Clinton, to organise roundtables
and other projects to promote mutual understanding, notably with Jewish interest groups (ibid).
Singapore's Temasek, one of largest and less secretive SWFs, also launched an appeal with the
Financial Times in defence of its reputation, with Simon Israel, its executive director, saying that "our
reason to exist is purely to produce shareholder returns" (FT112). According to the FT report, Israel
"said Temasek's corporate governance is 'almost the mirror of what exists on a publicly-listed
company'" (ibid). "That may seem to be stretching the point," continued the report, "when five of its
board members are current or former members of the Singapore state apparatus" (ibid).
By March 2008, a consensus had emerged that a global code-of-conduct for sovereign wealth funds
would be drawn up, but the Kuwait Investment Authority, among other funds, initially resisted the
idea. Its managing director, Bader al-Sa'ad, argued:
"It's time to call a spade a spade. Recipient countries are placing handcuffs on SWFsin the form of
regulations termed, in the best tradition of George Orwell's 'newspeak', codes of conduct, principles
of operations or best practices.... The American economy today faces the 'mother of all crises'. This
crisis will drag Europe down and, subsequently, the rest of the world.
The cause was the creation of funds which permitted entities to borrow 30 to 40 times their capital
without any regulation. Based on public information, these funds apparently grew geometrically
without any governance or oversight" (GU39).
Drawing these parallels with large private institutional investors, al-Sa'ad suggested that SWFs were
being treated unreasonably, given that they had - now in the Guardian reporter's words - "acted
responsibly and swiftly during the financial turmoil" (ibid). Russian, Saudi and Norwegian officials
echoed the sentiment that SWFs had been, throughout their history, "responsible long-term
investors" (GU25).
Having outlined the signals of controversy, I turn now to data that contextualises and explains it.
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4.2.2. Explaining the Controversy: Potentially destabilising markets, judging SWFs'
investment intent, signalling resolution
The disquiet in sovereign funds' rise to prominence took place against three overlapping dynamics:
the funds potentially destabilising markets, the judging of SWFs' investment intent, and finally, the
signalling of resolution, or possible compromise. The first shows which investment behaviours drew
attention to the funds; the second embodies the tone and intent of the scrutiny; and the third
illustrates what brought closure to the debate. Analysing these processes together, we are led to a
broader explanation for the controversy, which centres around the judging of SWFs investment
intent - specifically their potentially political investment motives. Below, I contend that the debate
on SWFs entailed an effort to define responsible market conduct for these new, untrained market
entrants.
Potentially destabilising markets
SWFs' rapidly increasing investment drew much of the scrutiny. Specifically, the funds diversified into
equity and real estate markets, away from bonds, taking "more aggressive" risks, as many
commentators called it. This was a much more visible investment strategy than they had pursued
previously and, as statements from the US Treasury (ITiS) and IMF (2007) noted, it raised concerns
about SWFs' potential to destabilise markets.
It is difficult to identify the specific parameters of
SWFs' expansion because the funds are in many cases
untransparent. According to a report by International
Financial Services London (IFSL 2008), a thinktank,
SWFs "are usually not constrained to certain asset
classes or currency exposures as some institutional
investment managers such as pension funds may be"
(p. 6). Moreover, much of the diversification occurred
through private investment managers, including hedge
funds and private equity houses. Norway's $300 billion
Government Pension Fund is known to have increased
Figure 4-6. The category Expanding investment
strategy: properties and (dimensions)
Diversifying investments
(bonds, equities, real estate)
(higher risk appetite)
Increasing investment flows into West
(rapid acceleration)
Sizeof SWFsector
(number of players)
(funds under management)
Potentially destabilising markets
(sudden portfolio movements)
(correlation with commodity prices)
(passive/active fund management)
SWFslacking transparency
(management systems)
(risk management)
their equity exposure from 40% to 60% of their overall portfolio in 2007 (FTl07), although nothing
suggests that these proportions would be representative of other SWFs. Nevertheless, a persistent
shift away from bonds would have the effect of raising borrowing costs for the US and European
governments in particular (see DT1S), which is likely to have figured in their political reaction. The
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most visible investments fuelling SWFs' rise to prominence were direct equity purchases. In 2007-08,
virtually all of their largest equity deals were for stakes in Western financial institutions (see table
below).
In addition to diversification and SWFs' burgeoning size, already noted, SWFs' expansion was also
part of a broader trend of rapidly increasing investment flows from developing economies into
advanced ones. According to Dealogic, the value of deals that companies from developing countries
made in advanced economies rose from $14 billion in 2003 to $128 billion in the first three quarters
of 2007 (WSJ 25). That value was roughly the same as the amount of capital going in the other
direction, $130 billion (ibid). This represented the shift in economic power away from the West, as
some called it, and helps to explain alarm in Western capitals.
largest SWFacquisitions, 2007-08 (IFSl2008: 2)
Target Target country Value (Sbn)
Citigroup US 12.5
UBS Switzerland 11.5
Citigroup US 7.5
Merrill Lynch US 6.6
Merrill Lynch US 5.6
Morgan Stanley US 5.0
Laureate Education US 3.7
OMX stock exchange Sweden 3.6
Barclays UK 3.0
Budapest Airport Hungary 2.6
London Stock Exchange UK 1.6
Related Cos US 1.4
Carlyle Group US 1.4
Och-Ziff Cap Mgmt Group US 1.3
Alliance Medical UK 1.2
Together, diversification into riskier assets and rising investment values could contribute to
destabilising financial markets. Large funds might make large adjustments to their holdings (value),
trading large amounts of similar securities (range), in a short time-frame (speed), thus destabilising
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liquidity for those asset classes {IMF 2007).13 In addition, as the IMF noted (ibid), extraordinary
portfolio adjustments might be highly correlated with commodity prices. If sovereign funds'
revenues from commodities exports were to fall sharply, then they might be compelled to exit riskier
equity markets, driving down values there. (Energy and minerals companies would be doubly hurt by
falling prices and falling equity values.) Finally, even in the absence of extraordinary transactions or
commodity price shocks, the extent to which sovereign fund managers might begin trading actively,
rather than passively, could be a source of concern, according to UK Chancellor Alastair Darling
{TT14).14 In fact, the movement into equity had not yet led to more active management by SWFs
themselves. Most SWFs remained long-term passive investors, and handed their riskier capital to
private managers like hedge funds. SWFs' stated objectives included "risk diversification, avoiding
domestic equity and commodity exposure, long-term returns and investments into strategic sectors"
(FT161, IFSl2008). They therefore intended to address two of the destabilisation concerns implicitly,
just not the extraordinary portfolio adjustments issue.
Invariably, media reports associated the potential for market destabilisation to a lack of
transparency about sovereign funds' corporate governance systems, as I discussed earlier. In
particular, the metrics and processes for risk management, and the professional backgrounds of key
individuals, were unknown. As a result, the market risks associated with SWFs rise to prominence
became central to the controversy.
If these processes reflected the SWF behaviours that drew scrutiny, the tone and intent of that
scrutiny centred on SWFs' underlying investment intent.
Judging SWFs' investment intent
The rapid ascent of any new kind of financial actor on the international stage would generate
extensive coverage, but sovereign funds' state ownership fuelled the controversy. The similarly quick
rise of (opaque) private equity funds (WSJ35) two years earlier was controversial, but far less so. The
main expressed concern about SWFs was that their investments would have political, rather than
commercial. objectives. This concern was raised universally, by every influential report cited in the
press (including Morgan Stanley'S, the IMF's, and McKinsey's), as well as by the official US, EC,
German and Australian policy documents. "After ali," summarised a Guardian editorial, "commercial
13 Note similar dimensions to this kind of transaction - value, range, and speed - and those cited in Citigroup's
MTStrade. They are metrics for an 'extraordinary transaction'.
14Active trading seeks to outperform the markets, whereas passivetrading seeksto emulate market
performance.
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implications are unlikely to be paramount for totalitarian regimes" (GU17). However, I would argue
that the deeper underlying concern about SWFs, if we assume some rationality on the part of the
actors involved, was less about SWFs having political objectives than it was about using political
influence to further commercial objectives. I will develop this argument as a premise to my broader
contention that the controversy was about establishing good market conduct for SWFs.
It has always remained unclear what it would mean, in practice, to invest for political objectives. No
SWF investment was ever cited as suspicious or suggestive of non-commercial intent. As a Financial
Times editorial put it, "The main flaw in the argument [that SWFs might invest for political reasons]
is the absence of any proof to back it up" (FT138). A Wall Street Journal report added, "That leaves
even the most articulate sceptics confined to hypotheticals" (WSJ30). The sceptics advanced few
hypotheticals, according to my data. A helpful 'straw man' was presented by non-sceptic John Kay, in
an FT column:
"The City of london appears at the mercy of sovereign wealth. Its electricity is supplied by a company
controlled by the government of that ancient enemy, France. Perhaps, as one of those interminable
discussions among the ministers of Europe reaches deadlock, President Nicolas Sarkozy could order
the lights to flicker. That would remind everyone that the source of power is in Paris.
But the scenario is absurd. The switches are in london, and it is their location, not that of the share
certificates, that matters. France does derive some minor influence but this is the result of French
physical supplies through the cross-Channel interconnector, not French ownership of British
electricity companies: trade not investment. Similarly President Vladimir Putin's influence on
European energy comes from Gazprom's control of assets inside Russia, not its ownership of those
outside Russia" (FT149).
Kay's analysis is valuable because it highlights the distinction between SWFs, which make portfolio
investments, and state-owned industrials, which are involved operationally. This is important
because industrial investors can exert concrete operational pressure more readily. For example, as
both an investor and a counterparty to British energy company, Russia's Gazprom would be able to
manoeuvre politically much more quickly by altering contracts and supplies, than a purely portfolio
investor (Gomes and Balin 2007). This distinction is of course porous in both directions, but helps
bind SWFs more closely to financial markets, and might help explain why ultimately the resolution of
the controversy rested on voluntary codes-of-conduct for portfolio investors. US Senator Charles
Schumer also made this distinction in justifying his acceptance of Abu Dhabi's investment in
Citigroup, after having resisted Dubai's stake in P&O ports (see WSJ26).
Other hypothetical scenarios for political investment, advanced by Peer Steinbruck, the German
finance minister, were:
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• "if a sovereign wealth fund out of a non-democratic society took over a big media company
in Germany in order to try and influence public opinion;
• "if one tried to systematically siphon off technological know-how;
• "Or took possession of highly sensitive networks and critical infrastructure" (FT126, italics
added).
Larry Summers, the former USTreasury Secretary, highlighted others:
• "a fund took a large stake in a western airline and then insisted that airline begin direct
flights to its capital city, even if it were not profitable" (GU2S)
• "a SWFmakes an investment in a major bank of another nation [and the investment] goes
bad. 'Is there anybody in the world that can assert that, with billions of dollars on the line,
their head of state and foreign minister are not going to get involved in the negotiations?"',
he asked (WSJ30).
As one tries to make senseof these concerns, in order to get to the root of what was expected of the
funds, we can see four dimensions of investing politically, based on the range and intensity of
concerns reported throughout the data (not only in the hypotheticals above), and assuming some
rationality on the part of those that expressed them:
• Investing on commercial grounds; that is, to maximise investment returns
• Investing on political grounds; that is, to maximise political returns
• Investing occasionally on commercial grounds and occasionally on political grounds
• Investing on commercial grounds, using political tactics (politics as process, not asobjective)
The fourth dimension, using political tactics, is the one that best fits the data. Consider the
alternatives. It is safe to say that some SWFsinvest purely on commercial grounds; such as Norway,
Ireland, and Singapore's Temasek, often cited as a
'best-practice' example (see FTl55, FTl09). Indeed,
what drove SWFsto prominence in the first place was
Figure 4-7. The category Judging investment
intent: properties and (dimensions)
SWFs investing on political grounds
(purely commercial motives; purely political
motives; sometimes political motives;
commercial motives with political influence)
SWFs lacking transparency
(investment strategy)
(management controls)
(risk management)
Threatening efficiency
(degree of state-ownership; state-
effectiveness as a shareholder)
diversification in pursuit of higher investment returns,
so it is also arguable that virtually all SWFs have
invested on commercial grounds until now, and thus
the second dimension - purely political investments -
may be dismissed by assumption. Regarding investing
occasionally on purely political grounds, inference is
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difficult. There are no precedents, and in fact the data points in a different direction. Two of the
most worrisome SWFs for Western policymakers were Russian and Chinese funds," but these funds
were precisely the ones under highest scrutiny domestically to meet economic objectives. For
example, one of the high profile SWF purchases was the China Investment Corporation's stake in
private equity fund Blackstone, which subsequently lost 33% of its value. The CIC endured
"especially sharp" criticism from its government because of the loss (WSJ26) and subsequently
lowered its risk exposure and profile (WSJ26). Similarly, in 2008 Russia's National Wealth Fund was
"operating like a central bank rather than a strategic investor. The wealth is being held in liquid
assets such as government bonds because the managers suspect that Moscow might recall the funds
at any time" (OTSO). Therefore in both cases, while the funds were clearly accountable to
governments, their investment stance was far from geostrategic.
The fourth dimension of investment intent - investing on commercial grounds whilst using political
tactics - is more fitting to the controversy. This possibility would explain residual concern about the
Chinese and Russian profiles just cited, but also match other explicitly expressed concerns, such as
Larry Summers' bank scenario, above, and the following point by US Senator Evan Bayh regarding
Saudi Arabia's stake in Citigroup: "Does he [Prince Alwaleed bin Talal] have a controlling interest in
the company? Most people would ordinarily say at 4%, no. But it's hard to say he didn't exert some
significant influence" over the ouster of the bank's chief executive (WSJ26). The point Bayh makes
here is that Saudi Arabia had lost confidence in Chuck Prince's ability to lead Citigroup and had
political tools at its disposal, which private shareholders might not have had. One tool was providing
the acquired banks access to the SWF's home market. For example, Morgan Stanley saw CIC as "a
strong ally to help its own expansion plans in China" (0T29). An SWF government could exert
pressure on the bank by closing off that access to that market through economic policy - thus
making political tactics a credible threat.
Investing on political grounds, versus using politics to further commercial objectives, is an important
distinction because the latter is not new. Government delegations from every country use state
visits to help secure contracts for their domestic business groups. Indeed, favours also flow the other
way, with companies offering preferential contracts to foreign governments aligned with their own.
15 These two countries were consistently cited as primary concerns. E.g. "What worries Berlin, Paris, and
Brusselsare mega-funds under the control of Russiaand China" (OT23).
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The problem with SWFs was less about political objectives, and more whether governments could be
legitimate, or effective, shareholders."
This re-interpretation of the concern about SWFs resonates with how frequently the resistance to
SWFs was based on resistance to so-called "cross-border nationalisations" (e.g. GU31). The concern
here is that SWF posed a threat to their acquired companies' operating efficiency, rather than their
geopolitical positioning. Recall Larry Summers's aviation scenario, where an SWF with a controlling
stake influences a company to open an unprofitable route. "For decades, Mr. Summers and like-
minded US officials have travelled the world preaching the virtues of privatisation," wrote a Wall
Street Journal reporter, "50 it's jarring for them to see businesses suddenly selling sizable stakes in
themselves to government-controlled funds" (WSJ30). Many economists welcomed SWF liquidity
but maintained reservations about their impact on efflclencv." The progress that had been made to
develop liberalised and efficient markets could be overturned by the market-entry of state-owned
investors.
On this basis, I would argue that the central concern about SWFs may be summarised as: owners of
SWFs 1) using political influence to further their commercial objectives and 2) doing so at the
expense of corporate and economic efficiency. This is the most faithful rendering of judging SWFs'
investment intent, in my view. Significantly, this also made the problem reconcilable, because it
meant that the solution lay partly in corporate governance. Therefore this is also a possible
explanation as to why the chosen resolution was to adopt codes-of-conduct rather than outright
prohibitions on SWF investment in strategic industries. More evidence for this argument appeared
with the signalling of a resolution, to which I now turn.
Signalling resolution: courting SWF investment
No sooner had the controversy erupted than contours of compromise emerged. Whilst calling for
more transparency on the part of SWFs, Western politicians sought assurances of reciprocity in
investment policies; that is, assurances that SWFs' home governments would also allow Western
companies into their markets. This was particularly the British position: "free trade is just that",
wrote the Chancellor (FT110). Western governments also requested a code-of-conduct for the funds.
This signalled that a compromise was possible. It is notable, however, that no visible efforts were
made to agree new, reciprocal investment policy regimes at intergovernmental level - such as
16 SeeCata Backer (2008) on political views of the legitimacy of SWFsasshareholders.
17 According to the WSJ, "Economists say this cross-pollination is healthy, because it injects new capital into
often-mature industries and helps to knit the global economy closer together" (WSJ25).
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quotas on the amount, industry or influence that foreign investors could have in their target
companies. Instead, political efforts focused on creating codes-of-conduct for SWFs.This suggests
that it was more important (perhaps cheaper or more effective) to ensure that sovereign funds
learned good market conduct, than it was to achieve a binding governmental policy agreement.
In no uncertain terms, Western economies, struggling through a liquidity crunch, needed sovereign
wealth. And insofar as necessity begets compromise (beggars can't be choosers, as the saying goes),
this also signalled that a resolution or compromise
would emerge. "The influx of capital to bolster
balance sheets has been welcomed by regulators and
governments, which have seen the SWFs as white
knights," said an FT columnist, "But if future growth
accelerates ... the controversy may well return"
(FT161). In the US, Senator Schumer, who had
associated Dubai with terrorism in the context of the
2006 ports deal (FT169),welcomed Abu Dhabi's 4.9%
Figure 4-8. The category Signalling resolution:
properties and (dimensions)
Western governments proposing resolution
(requesting reciprocal investment policies)
(requesting code-of-conduct]
West needing SWFfunds
(liqUidity crunch, low market confidence)
(widening global imbalances)
SWFsmanaging political risk
(making small investments)
(lobbying, PR)
(engaging with code-at-conduct)
stake in Citigroup, stating, "My general inclination is
that foreign investment here [in banking] is good. We
need to be careful when national security is at stake as in a ports deal" (WSJ26). At face value,
Absence of SWFmisconduct
Schumer's distinction is questionable. Terrorist financing had been a motive for the USgovernment's
insistence on international financial reforms as part of the War on Terror. Terrorism was not
anathema to finance. Moreover, if Dubai had a "nexus with terrorism", asSchumer had alleged, then
its parent emirate, Abu Dhabi, might at least be suspect. Yet, the Abu Dhabi investment in Citigroup
was welcomed: necessity bred compromise.
The second dimension of the West's need for capital was macroeconomic, not specific to the
banking sector. SWF investment in Western economies would help to contain widening global
imbalances. Major Western countries have growing trade (current account) deficits with Asian
economies particularly, many of which in turn have surpluses. In addition, high savings rates and
growing currency reserves at consumer and country levels contributed to the imbalances. If
countries like China were to reinvest their export earnings (particularly in non-financial industries
like manufacturing) in the West, this could support economic growth and sustainability in Western
countries.
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For their part, the funds' political risk management (e.g. taking small, non-strategic stakes), noted
above, also suggested that they did not intend to ride roughshod over political sensibilities. Some
state-owned companies became more overtly commercial. Dubai Ports World, for example, offered
23%of its shares to private investors on the NasdaqDubai stock exchange in November 2007.
So long as evidence of SWF misconduct remained notable for its absence, the factors above seemed
to imply that a resolution to the controversy was imminent. Sovereign funds had been driven to
prominence in search of higher investment returns (perhaps with latent political force), and Western
economies needed their capital, so the sole remaining challenge was to ensure that SWFconduct did
not undermine financial markets. It was this challenge that the codes-of-conduct were designed to
overcome.
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4.2.3. Unifying theme: Defining responsible market conduct for orderly financial markets
Is there a single core category, a unifying theme, for the processes in the controversy? How do we
reconcile sceptical politicians reviewing investment policies with their courting of SWF investment?
The negative judging of SWFs' investment intent with the evidence that SWFswere having a positive
impact on the global economy? The signalling of controversy with the signalling of resolution? As the
perennial grounded theory question puts it: what is going on here?
Let us return to the three express concerns about SWFs,found in signalling controversy and judging
SWFs' investment intent - that SWFsmight:
• Destabilise financial markets
• Use political influence in the market
• Hoard reserves (EC3:5) and not provide liquidity to redress imbalances.
If we were to frame these concerns in the lexicon of the Citigroup chapter, we would say that they
relate to the efficient and orderly functioning of financial markets. First, the "destabilisation"
concern clearly relates to "orderliness". Second, the use of political influence reduces allocative
efficiency if, for example, an acquired airline were forced to establish an unprofitable route to its
owner-SWFs' country, as hypothesised by Larry Summers. SWFs would also threaten market
efficiency if they signalled a new wave of "cross-border nationalisations" (GU31). Finally,
"accumulating reserves for its own sake" (EC3:5) could threaten both efficiency and orderliness. It
could threaten efficiency because global liquidity would continue to tighten, increasing the risk that
markets would fragment into varying levels of liquidity and prices. This would also threaten
orderliness because tightening liquidity was increasing the risk of widespread financial sector
insolvencies, particularly in the West.
Accepting that the concerns about SWFswere concerns about their impact on financial market
efficiency and orderliness, then the controversy may be understood asan effort by governments and
other actors to define SWFs' responsibilities to help maintain efficient and orderly markets.
Controversies entail debates, by definition. The debate in this case was whether SWFs could be
relied on to act responsibly - with commercial objectivity, transparency, market discipline - or
whether they would require new laws and regulations. This controversy reached closure when a
consensus emerged, both from governments and SWFs, in support of voluntary codes-of-conduct
that would define the requisite SWF responsibilities to markets. The central category, or unifying
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theme, for this episode is therefore defining responsible market conduct for orderly financial
markets.
Before elaborating, I consider an alternative interpretation that also emerged from the data.
'Investing politically' as a red herring: the protectionism argument
Much of the data situated the SWFcontroversy within a broader trend of classical protectionism (a
good example is DT21). Instead of saying that Western governments were concerned about SWFs'
political manoeuvring, one could say that they simply wanted to restrict foreign investment - the
age-old, yet unfashionable practice of protecting domestic industries from competition. In this view,
Western governments used SWFs' government-ownership as a pretext for their protectionist
tendencies. Interviewed on the USgovernment reaction to SWFs,an American lawyer expressed this
succinctly: "It's just political - similar to the outcry against Japan back in the late 80s. Obviously
security concerns make for some differences now, but there are regulations in place in the US to
deal with that" (WSJ27). Thus, this argument would hold, the SWF controversy was not about
disciplining SWFs'market conduct and political instincts; it was about keeping them out of financial
markets where they could compete with Western financial institutions. While this resonates with
much of the data, it is an inadequate explanation for the controversy. Indeed, one could argue that
the controversy turned the classic notion of 'protectionism' on its head, because 'protecting' banks
like Citigroup meant welcoming, not restricting, SWFs.
Among the signals of controversy that support the protectionism argument is the fact that the
biggest reservations regarding SWFs came from the US and France, often highly protectionist
countries, plus Germany. By contrast the biggest welcome came from the UK, a financial liberal (see
especially DT33). In addition, some anti-SWF initiatives arose due to trade union initiatives (GU10,
DT46), suggesting that governments' resistance to SWFswere driven by traditionally protectionist
domestic political actors. On this basis, one could argue that resistance to SWFs was similar to
resistance to other powerful foreign investors - fuelled by raison d'etat or domestic interests.
However, this explanation would not account for the European Commission's reaction to SWFs,
which was, perhaps surprisingly, not protectionist. The EC is reputed for its protectionist and
interventionist instincts; low-income countries often point to its Common Agricultural Policy as an
obstacle to trade liberalisation, and the UK government is perennially fearful that new ECfinancial
regulation might affect the City of London. One could reasonably have expected the ECto adopt a
protectionist stance against large foreign financial investors like SWFs.Yet three key Commissioners
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welcomed sovereign wealth funds in emphatic terms. "Let's be brutally frank about this, sovereign
wealth funds have been positive and long-term investors," said Internal Market Commissioner
Charley McCreevv, "There is no, as far as I am aware, no instance of sovereign wealth funds acting in
any manner other than responsibly up until now" (BBC2008). He added that the EU would not
restrict any SWFs investments, but would propose "some common principles on transparency and
governance" (ibid). EUTrade Commissioner Peter Mandelson said, "We don't need new laws. What
we need is reassurance that the benign conduct of funds in the past will remain a useful and
consistent guide to the future" (FT1SS).This is very different language to that employed by German
politicians to describe SWFs("giant locusts", DTSO),or by USSenator Schumer in relation to Dubai
("nexus with terrorism", FT169).At European level, SWFswere seen neither as predatory investors
nor as national security threats, oft-used justifications for protectionism. EU Monetary Affairs
Commissioner Joaquin Almunia described SWFsas offering "useful investment", adding that they
"must acknowledge that their growing weight in global financial markets brings responsibilities"
(BBC2008, underlining added). It was on this express basis that the ECsupported the creation of a
global code-of-conduct at the IMF.
A protectionism-based account for the controversy would also not fit with CFIUS's(Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States) continued sanctioning of foreign investment into the US;
before, during, and after SWFs' rise to prominence. If protectionism accounted for most concerns
about SWFs, and given that CFIUScame under Congressional pressure to scrutinise more foreign
investments from early 2007, after the Dubai ports deal, one could have expected a more
protectionist CFIUS.Yet, in 2006, 2007, and 2008, CFIUSserved notices to review or investigate 404
proposed investments, and only two of those investments were referred to a presidential decision,
both in 2006; all others were permitted (CFIUS2009).
Proponents of the protectionism explanation could also invoke counterfactual hypotheses. For
example, Western governments may be waiting until liquidity and growth improve, and resuscitate
protectionist policies when SWF liquidity is no longer required. Or, perhaps governments' motives
were originally protectionist but they had to succumb to SWFs'higher economic advantage; that is,
politicians supported the codes-of-conduct in order to save face. Both of these possibilities are
moot. We know that the codes-of-conduct now feature in the political economy, and they have been
established as the key criteria for allowing SWFs to operate. They mitigate the threat of
protectionism because they give SWFowners a pretext to retaliate.
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Ultimately, the protectionist argument is most unfitting because the present episode turned
protectionism on its head. The shift in economic power, severe structural imbalances, and liquidity
crunch that contextualised this controversy created a new protectionist mandate. 'Protection' for
domestic industries could no longer accrue from avoiding foreign investment, as it does in the
classical sense. Protection would accrue instead from welcoming sovereign wealth funds. "What
would the average American say if Citigroup is faced with the choice of 10,000 layoffs or more
foreign investments?" asked Senator Schumer, rhetorically (WSJ34).The move to a code-of-conduct
might therefore be seen as a response to the inadequacy of classical protectionism to protect
domestic industry under new structural and historical conditions.
Defining responsible market conduct
The controversy reported in the media foreshadowed what might be in these codes. The main
processes - signalling controversy, SWFs potentially destabilising markets, judging SWFs investment
intent, and signalling resolution - all shared a common property: SWFs lacking transparency. In
addition to corporate governance standards, many of the recommendations advanced in reports
(both by quoted officials and columnists) centred on sovereign funds taking minority stakes in
companies and, in any case,not seeking operational control of their investment targets. Carrying out
long-term investments, being predictable and accountable, also featured. Competing fairly with the
private sector was raised by Peter Mandelson (FTISS)and then reiterated in the USTreasury's code-
of-conduct (USTl). Neither expanded on what this means, but a credible inference is that SWFs
should not use political influence to attain better investment conditions than their private
counterparts. Finally, a few context-specific suggestions emerged. Gerard Lyons, lead author of
Standard Chartered's influential report on SWFs, said that the funds might help to promote
democracy locally: "what one can say is that good economics is normally good politlcs, and if SWFs
can be used, for instance, to invest in economies in the Middle East,say, then this will help them to
diversify and generate jobs" (FT122). In Russia in February 2008, Herman Gref, a former finance
minister who heads Sberbank, the country's largest, called for the government to use sovereign
wealth to bailout domestic midsized banks that were experiencing liquidity difficulties (DT38).
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4.3. "Users' Manuals" for Capitalism: The codes-of-conduct
"Producing a voluntary code of conduct should simply be a
question of formalising existing investment practice. H
Peter Monde/son, then EU Trade Commissioner"
In spring 2008, one year after the sovereign wealth funds controversy emerged, Western
governments and SWFsbegan developing a global code-ot-conduct, which would be confirmed by
October. The majority of Western governments provided input to those codes, including those that
were reviewing their domestic investment laws (of which Australia and Germany implemented
reforms). Between March and April 2008, the US,EUand IMF acted more-or-Iess in concert. The US
Treasury agreed the first, trilateral code-of-conduct for SWFswith the governments of Singapore
and Abu Dhabi. This would be an input to the multilateral initiatives underway at the IMF (USTl).
The EU Council of Ministers, which represents national governments at EU level, agreed to take a
Europe-wide stance toward sovereign wealth funds and channel their input to the IMF (EC3,EC4).
The IMF hosted representatives from sovereign wealth funds and national governments for a
meeting where "Participants agreed that SWFsinvest on the basisof economic and financial risk and
return related considerations" (IMFl, underlining added). The meeting established the International
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG-SWF), comprising representatives from 25 SWF
countries, which would proceed "to agree on a common set of voluntary principles for SWFs,
drawing on the existing body of principles and practices, to help maintain the free flow of cross-
border investment and open and stable financial systems" (ibid, underlining added).
The issue of investing on political grounds, which had dominated much of the political controversy
over the preceding 12 months, had by this time become a subtler question of operational nuance.
Most official policy papers emphasised that legal safeguards already existed to protect strategically
important industries in case a proposed SWF investment were perceived to have political motives
(e.g. EC4). In addition, governments jointlv declared that SWFswere primarily commercial vehicles
(IMF op cit; USTl). The priority was instead to ensure that SWFs had operational policies and
processes which would mitigate the risks that they would (1) destabilise financial markets, (2) use
political influence to advance their investments, or (3) not recycle their currency reserves into the
global financial system to help redress macroeconomic imbalances.
18 Citedin FT155, referringto a codeof conductfor SWFs.
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To this end, the IMF's Santiago Principles established global guidelines for SWFs' establishment as
coherent institutions. A Guardian editorial referred to the imminent US and IMF codes as "users'
manuals" (GU17) to help sovereign funds' integration into the political economy. Sceptics like the
Kuwait Investment Authority (initially) and USSenator EvanBayh referred to them derisively as "best
practice" (GU30,WSJ39).
As data, the codes and inputs illustrate the high-level principles - theoretical principles - that would
underpin responsible conduct by SWFs.Eachof the IMF's Santiago Principles is supplemented with
an explanation and commentary on why it is important. The principles supplement national
legislation, and provide a basis for establishing new laws. (That is, while representing good conduct
for SWFs,they would also guide national jurisdictions in determining their individual responses to
the funds.) For example, the European Commission (EC3) stated that its "Member States have
national instruments which could be used to control and condition SWF investments or any other
investors and they can also develop new measures suitable to tackle specific needs if these arise, as
long as those measures are compatible with the Treaty [on European Union], are proportionate and
non-discriminatory, and do not contradict international obligations" (p. 7). Against this background,
the codes merit analysis not only because they resolved the controversy but also because their
nature as consensual voluntary guidelines gives them greater theoretical resonance than the
alternatives, such as context-specific national-level legislation.
Accordingly, the analysis in this section begins by outlining the key features of the US,EU, and IMF
principles for SWFs,and then identifies the commonalities between then. From this analysis, stem
four overriding principles for good market conduct by SWFs.
The next section then compares the principles for SWFswith those identified for Citigroup, discussed
in the previous chapter. That comparison, and integration, helps us to crystalise the notion of a
'corporate market responsibility' across these two substantive contexts, as we continue to explore
the central research question, 'how are firms responsible for ensuring orderly financial markets'.
4.3.1. The US-Singapore-Abu Dhabi Agreement
The US Treasury was the first institution to publish a sovereign fund code-of-conduct, through a
short press release on 21 March 2008. The express intent of the agreement was to provide a set of
"basic principles" to feed into the upcoming multilateral initiatives. The principles governing
sovereign wealth funds were as follows:
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1. "SWF investment decisions should be based solely on commercial grounds. rather than to advance,
directly or indirectly, the geopolitical goals of the controlling government. SWFs should make this
statement formally as part of their basic investment management policies.
2. "Greater information disclosure by SWFs, in areas such as purpose, investment objectives,
institutional arrangements. and financial information - particularly asset allocation. benchmarks, and
rates of return over appropriate historical periods - can help reduce uncertainty in financial markets
and build trust in recipient countries.
3. "SWFs should have in place strong governance structures, internal controls, and operational and risk
management systems.
4. "SWFsand the private sector should compete fairly.
5. "SWFs should respect host-country rules by complying with all applicable regulatory and disclosure
requirements of the countries in which they invest" (USTl, underlining added).
This code-of-conduct attends to the criticisms of SWFs cited earlier, either explicitly, such as their
lack of transparency, or implicitly - better governance structures should mitigate the negative risks
associated with SWFs' growing size, such as sudden portfolio movements.
The code is not without implications outside of SWFs; it has broader relevance for other investors.
Consider an assessment of Citigroup's Eurobond trade against these five criteria (table below), on
the premise that this code, like the international one, sought to "formalise existing investment
practice", as EU Commissioner Peter Mandelson put it (H1SS).
Figure 4-9. Testing Citigroup on criteria for SWFs
Test Result Observation
Inconclusive
While financial returns were central to Citigroup,
German investigators concluded on the basisof a
Citigroup memo some aspects of the trade were "not
investment driven" (WSJ18).
Non-disclosure of purpose and objectives was
essential to Citigroup's prepositioning in the futures
market; trust was diminished.
Poor controls were the main shortcoming cited by the
FSAin its punishment of Citigroup.
No public sector competitors were trading on the
MTS,but government stakes in MTSwere criticised.
Technically Citigroup broke no market abuse laws, but
failed to comply with FSAregulatory principles.
Basing investment decisions solely on
commercial grounds
Fail
Full information disclosure, esp.
purpose and investment objectives, to
build trust
Strong governance structures and
internal controls
Fair competition between public and
private sectors
Comply with applicable regulation of
the countries in which they invest
Fail
Fail
Inconclusive
The analysis in Figure 4-9 shows where the conduct requested for SWFs was similar to the issues
raised by Citigroup. It reveals that what lay behind much of the Citigroup controversy was that it did
not meet the basic tenets of this code-of-conduct. Although clearly motivated by financial returns,
the Citigroup trader who initially proposed the strategy noted additional 'benefits' in his memo,
,
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including: decreasing the attractiveness of the German bund market, and "turning the European
government bond market into one that more closely resembles the USgovernment bond market"
(FTS3). The German regulator "criticised the strategy outlined in [the memo] as 'not investment
driven' but instead aimed at harming Eurex's reputation", according to a Wall Street Journal report
(WSJ18, underlining added). The Financial Times criticised the bank in an editorial titled "Citi takes
on Europe", where they claimed that "When USbanks venture overseas, they often do so under the
banner of spreading American capitalism", which in that case meant transforming the European
market from a quote-driven system to a (less transparent) order-driven system. The second
criterion, transparency, was not met insofar as the purpose of ancillary trades (pre-positioning in the
futures markets) was obscured in order to extract maximum effect from the main trade.
Third, strong governance and risk management controls were inadequate - even at the world's
leading private bank - the main irregularity cited by the FSA.The criterion on fair competition
between private and public sectors does not apply neatly because Citigroup faced no government
competition. However, it is notable that those who absolved Citigroup made their arguments on the
grounds that the MTS's rules gave European governments (which have stakes in the MTS) an unfair
advantage because a minimum liquidity for their debt was guaranteed (e.g. FT7). Finally, Citigroup
complied with the letter of the law, and was not charged with criminal misconduct, but did violate
good business principles, according to the FSA.
What this tells us is that the US position on sovereign wealth funds is interesting beyond its
idiosyncratic context. Citigroup would arguably not have carried out the Dr Evil trade if it had abided
by those guidelines. It would have judged the operation purely on its investment merits, which were
modest in absolute terms (Le. independent of the short time-frame); abstained from sending un-
transparent signals in its ancillary trades; operated better governance and risk management
systems; and observed "all applicable regulatory requirements". This strengthens the argument,
already advanced, that the SWF codes-of-conduct may represent a guide to responsible market
conduct, on a broader ideational plane. It is important, however, to look at the international code,
which is both more detailed and intentionally global. Beforehand, I review the EU's input, which was
published the sameweek at the Treasury code.
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4.3.2. The European Recommendations
European Union countries converged on a common approach to sovereign funds in March 2008,
reconciling Germany and France's scepticism with the UK and Italy's cautious acceptance. Initially
the Commission (EC), a supranational body, recommended that all Member States agree a common
approach, and published "contributions" to a global code of conduct (EC3, EC4). The European
Council, which represents national governments, approved those recommendations shortly after
(European Council 2008).
In a review of its concerns, the ECnoted, first, that ''The accumulation of reserves for investment by
SWFs should not become an end in itself. SWF owners need to show that they are not holding back
appreciation in their currencies to accumulate more foreign assets for their SWFs" (EC3: 5). This was
important due to growing macroeconomic imbalances. Second, "there is unease that - whatever the
motivation - SWF investment in certain sectors could be used for ends other than for maximising
returns" (ibid). Finally, sovereign funds, due to their size and the nature of some investments, would
need to adopt systems to help maintain stable financial markets.
Like in the US, Europe's recommendations were concise, based on two overriding principles:
governance and transparency. Governance aimed for "clarity about the degree of possible political
interference in the operation of a SWF ..." (EC3: 9). Transparency, in turn, "promotes accountability.
In the case of SWFs, transparency not only serves to foster market discipline, but also reduces the
incentives for any government intervention" (ibid). The input was as follows:
"Principles of good governance include:
• "The clear allocation and separation of responsibilities in the internal governance structures of a
SWF;
• "The development and issuance of an investment policy that defines the overall objectives of
SWFinvestment;
• "The existence of operational autonomy for the entity to achieve its defined objectives;
• "Public disclosure of the general principles governing a SWF's relationship with governmental
authority;
• "The disclosure of the general principles of internal governance that provide assurances of
integrity;
• "The development and issuanceof risk-management policies.
"[ ...) Transparency practices that could be considered would include:
• "Annual disclosure of investment positions and asset allocation, in particular for investments for
which there is majority ownership;
• "Exercise of ownership rights;
• "Disclosure of the use of leverage and of the currency composition;
• "Sizeand source of an entity's resources;
• "Disclosure of the home country regulation and oversight governing the SWF" (op cit:9-10).
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This input centres on the same issues as the US Treasury code, offering more specific, if tentative,
criteria for transparency. (Notably, the sub-criteria related to disclosure of asset allocation and size
and source of resources were the ones that the private equity industry resisted in their own code-of-
conduct; FT124.) In a more qualified presentation of EU principles, Commissioner for Monetary
Affairs Joaquin Almunia (EC4) said:
"So, what is the substance of the EU's position? In essence, the EU is calling on sovereign wealth
funds to commit to good governance practices, adequate accountability and a sufficient level of
transparency. In particular, we ask for a clear division of rights and responsibilities between managers
and their sponsor governments and an effective system of checks and balances in respect of
investment decisions. It should be clear that funds are aware of their weight and of their ability to
impact on markets with large shifts in their positions" (p. 4).
The treble objective of the EU initiative was to therefore to discipline SWFs' governance, ensuring
that they are (1) aware of their potentially destabilising impact on markets, (2) independent of
political influence, and (3) not accumulating reserves for their own sake, but recycling them in the
global economy. Thus stabilising liquidity - that is, providing it to correct global imbalances, but not
so sharply that it distorts markets - was a noted responsibility to ensure orderly markets as it had
been with Citigroup.
This treble objective of the EU mirrors precisely the three concerns expressed in the broader
controversy as reported in the media (see section 2.3). It tells us that the EU policy discussion on
SWFs closely reflected the broader debate involving market actors, public intellectuals, etc.
4.3.3. The IMF's Santiago Principles (GAPP)
As the US and EC published their codes, the Fund established a Working Group with representatives
from 25 SWFs and SWF governments to elaborate what became known, in October 2008, as the
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP), or Santiago Principles (finalised at a meeting in
Chile). The IMF's discussions on SWFs had begun a few months earlier, in November 2007, where a
Roundtable of Sovereign Asset and Reserve Managers focused on the issue of transparency as an
emerging concern. The Fund then began a survey of existing practices in SWFs, in preparation for
developing a set of best practice guidelines (EC3: 6).
The Santiago Principles were, in the IMF's words, "underpinned by the following objectives for SWFs:
1. "To help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of capital and investment;
2. "Io comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the countries in which they
invest;
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3. "To investon the basisof economicandfinancialriskandreturn-relatedconsiderations;and
4. "To have in place a transparent and sound governancestructure that provides for adequate
operationalcontrols,riskmanagement,andaccountability"(IMF2:4).
A reading of the principles gives a clear sense that they aimed to provide a blueprint for establishing
and operating a sovereign wealth fund, as if these were brand new entrants into the economic
sphere. The recommendations begin with extremely basic issues. For example, Principle 1 is that an
SWF should have a clear legal status, regardless of its form. It may be a state-owned corporation
governed by company law, or a special purpose vehicle subject to ad hoc regulation, or an asset pool
with no independent legal identity at all. Principle 3 recommends simply that SWFs should
coordinate their activities with the countries' central authorities, something that one might think
was presupposed, given the concerns about political influence. Principle 22 outlines basic types of
risk that SWFs should attend to, along the categories of financial, operational, regulatory, and
reputational risks. Thus, the Santiago Principles effectively start from scratch.
My own focus in analysing this data is narrower and deeper. It is to understand how the principles
attempted to redress the controversy: that is, SWFs' potential to destabilise markets, to wield
political influence, and to hoard capital. Those principles would constitute how SWFswere expected
to contribute to orderly and efficient markets. To arrive at that point, I took three steps. First, I
coded the GAPPdocument (IMF2) and reconceptualised its recommendations as generic processes.
This 'long-list' of SWFactivities is presented Figure 4-10 on the next page. The table captures every
principle (denoted by the numbers 1 to 24), occasionally in some detail, although some nuance is
lost particularly in respect of their variants for different types of sovereign funds, like state-owned
companies versus simple asset pools. The second step was to identify which principles aimed
explicitly to assuagethe aforementioned concerns about SWFs(rather than simply establish them as
legal entities, for example). These are the processes that help to answer the question of how
sovereign wealth funds were expected to help govern markets. The third step was to return to the
GAPPdocument and re-code the properties and dimensions of each of the latter principles. This
analytical sequence is represented in the following pages.
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TEXT BOUND CLOSETO THE SPINE IN
THE ORIGINAL THESIS
re 4-10. The Santiago Principles codified as generic processes (author developing IMF A. Legal Framework, Objectives,
and Coordination with
b)
column below lists the generic processes, or conceptual categories, that appear in the code-of-conduct. The
t-hand columns denote the structure of the document, its three Sections A, S, and C, and subsections. Each
ber In the table is corresponds to a Principle. Its intersection indicates where a generic process appears in the
ment (IMF 2008b). For example, the generic process 'Giving managers an independent investment mandate'
d row below) can be found in Principle 1.1 (Section A), and in Principle 16 (Section S).
S. Institutional
Framework and
Governance Structure
4.1
4.1
1.2
1.2
and domestic demand
3
3
13
13
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C. Investment
and Risk Mgmt
Framework
21
22
22
21
21
21
22.1
24
20
In theoretical terms, the table above lists the best practices for SWFsto bring gains to the world
economy. The principles guide how funds' owners and management may define their incorporation,
their objectives or raison d'etre, and basic activities such as accounting, audit, and recruitment. I
organised these processes into more abstract, higher principles in different ways before settling on
structure, policies, and execution as the three principal categories. For example, I initially asked how
each Principle related to one of the three headline concerns about SWFs.Should destabilisation,
political influence, and re-investing capital be the main categories? I found, first, that the Principles
were fundamentally about incorporating and recognising SWFs as market entrants - a more
fundamental objective than 'simply' resolving the controversy. Second, and consequently, I had to
understand the Principles in their entirety before analysing which were most closely related to the
concerns about orderly and efficient markets. On some level, they are all related to the controversy
because they were born from it. This was the rationale for the coding summarised in the Figure
above.
For theory-building it is important to identify which combination of these generic processes are
unifying themes (core categories) that lead to robust propositions about SWFs' market
responsibility. This also implicates the processes in the other international frameworks - not only
the IMF's but also the US' and EU's. A comparison of the three will yield the most salient
expectations of SWFconduct across political jurisdictions. Accordingly, the first table below outlines
which generic processes were explicitly related to orderly and efficient markets in the text of the
Santiago Principles. Then, the second table outlines which ones were present in the other
international codes-of-conduct.
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Figure 4-11. Santiago Principles aimed specifically at maintaining orderly and
efficient markets (author developing IMF2)
Key process and subprocesses GAPP Expressed benefits
Defining and disclosing and independent corporate
governance framework
Dividing owners/governing bodies from operational
management
Giving managers an independent investment mandate
Defining a clear accountability framework for the owner,
governing body, and management
16
"Such public disclosure would support an open and
stable investment climate [and) assist in reassuring
recipient countries that SWF investments area based on6,16
1.1 9 16 economic and financial considerations and employ sound
" operational controls and risk management systems." (p.
10, 16 19)
Defining and disclosing a corporate objective, an investment strategy, and financial performance benchmarks
Defining the SWF objective (e.g. saving v stabilisation v
investment returns)
Defining and disclosing a policy on capital funding and
withdrawals
Disclosing financial information, typically asset allocation,
benchmarks, rates of return
Publicly disclosing investment strategy qualitatively (e.g.
active/passive, financial/strategic)
Define and disclose policy for exercising ownership rights
("long-term, patient investment" p. 22)
Having a recognised and trusted risk management system
Having a framework to identify, assess and manage risks
and strong risk management culture and controls
Publicly disclosing risk management framework in general
terms
Regularly reviewing implementation of the GAPP
2
4
Five principles that "aim at meeting the intent of GAPP
17 to contribute to stability of international financial
markets and build trust in recipient countries" (p. 22)
18.3
21
22
"will also help achieve the aim of preserving
international financial stability as well as maintaining a
stable, transparent and open investment environment"
(p.23)
22.2
"will help achieve the aim of maintaining a stable,
transparent, and open investment environment" (p. 24)
24
"may contribute to stability in international financial
markets and enhance trust in recipient countries" (p. 25)
Figure 4-12. Commonalities in US,EU, IMF frameworks
(adapted from usn, EC3,IMF2)
Defining and disclosing an investment policy
US Basing investment decisions solely on commercial grounds; part of formal investment policy
EU Development of an investment policy that defines the overall investment objectives
IMF Development of an investment policy that defines the overall investment objectives
Disclosing investment positions and asset allocation
us Full information disclosure, esp. purpose, investment objectives, asset allocation, benchmarks
EU Disclosure of investment positions, including asset allocation and leverage
IMF Disclosure of investment positions, asset allocation, leverage, and benchmarks
Defining and disclosing governance controls
US Strong governance structures, controls, and risk management systems
EU Separation of responsibilities in governance, disclosure of internal governance, risk management
IMF Strong governance structures, controls, separation of management responsibilities; strong risk
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These two tables show that the issues emphasised by the USand EU,and those highlighted by the
SWFsthemselves (under the aegis of the IMF), are very closely related. Namely, the key processes
for helping to maintain orderly and efficient markets entail defining and disclosing independent
governance structures, an investment policy, investment positions, and risk management systems.
The codes do not stipulate how definition and disclosure should occur. They focus on content. In the
following paragraphs, I conceptualise each one, basedon the how the codes describe them.
Having independent governance structures
Much of the GAPP's emphasis is on incorporating and institutionalising SWF, with the aim of
ensuring that they operate according to economic incentives. The first principle is that SWFsshould
have a defined legal form, and the code outlines three possible dimensions of this. One is a state-
owned corporation (such as Singapore's Temasek or the China Investment Corporation), subject to
common company law. Another is also an independent legal entity, governed by special purpose
laws (e.g. the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and most other Gulf SWFs).The third is an asset pool
with no independent legal entity, which is owned by the government or central bank directly (e.g.
Botswana, Norway) (IMF2: 11). Although none of
Figure 4-13. The category Having independent
governance structures: properties and (dimensions)these forms necessarily presuppose a better or
worse performance, they do condition other
requirements like the hierarchical structure and
accountability framework, which I discuss below.
The Santiago Principles emphasise the importance
of separating the fund management function from
governance of the fund and from its owners (see
GAPPs 1.1, 6-9, 16). The governing bodies -
effectively a board of directors - may be a
government institution like a ministry, or
independently appointed. Regardless, it is
important for fund managers to "have the authority
to make individual investment decisions, as well as
to make operational decisions related to staffing
and financial management (subject to strategic
direction and accountability to the owner or the governing body(ies))" (op cit: 17). The necessary
Defining the fund's owners and beneficiaries in
a legal entity
(state-owned corporation)
(special-purpose vehicle)
(asset pool without separate entity)
Giving fund managers an independent mandate
(ensuring managers are motivated only by
investment returns)
(establishing a separate governing body)
(providing extensive powers to senior staff)
(giving management responsibility to a
statutory agency like central bank)
(contracting external service providers)
Defining the SWF's objective
(savings v stabilisation v investment returns)
Defining accountability framework for owner,
governors, and fund management
(owner being accountable to legislature;
governors accountable to owner; management
accountable to governors)
accountability frameworks also depend on the funds' overall legal form. For example, if a fund is
established as an independent legal entity, then "the governing body(ies) is accountable to the
1SS
owner, and management is accountable to the governing body(ies) for the SWF's operations,
including its investment performance" (ibid). In funds without a separate legal identity, managers
are accountable to the owner, and the owner is accountable to the legislature or the public, for the
SWF'sobjectives (ibid).
Establishing a policy objective is another core property of the funds' incorporation and governance.
The policy objective clarifies the ultimate goal that each governance structure should aim towards.
For example, stabilisation funds (e.g. Russia, Chile, Mexico) aim "to insulate the budget and the
economy against price swings" (op cit: 12). Savingsfunds (e.g. Libya and Kuwait) "aim to convert
non-renewable assets into a more diversified portfolio", particularly for pension purposes (ibid).
Investment corporations (e.g. Korea, CIC)aim for returns on capital. Whatever the primary objective,
it conditions consequent investment policies; for example, savings funds have longer time-horizons
than stabilisation funds, and the latter will almost always look for assets that are negatively
correlated with national income (ibid).
Having and disclosing an investment policy
Having an investment policy was perhaps the most
important management protocol required for SWFs
from the point of view of abating the controversy.
Market participants, regulators, and politicians wanted
to know what SWFs intended to do, and how, and the
investment policy would reveal it. The concept of an
investment policy is very closely related to each of the
three concerns about SWFs. First, it would provide
benchmarks about what kind of assets the SWFswould
invest in, and establish the level of risk tolerance, thus
going some way to illuminating dimensions of the
funds' potential to destabilise markets. Second, an
investment policy would set some boundaries for
SWFs' ability to exercise political influence, such as
under what conditions they would take up seats on the
boards of acquired companies and how they would
deploy their voting rights as shareholders. Moreover, if
the SWFsdid have political objectives, such as social or
Figure 4-14. The category Having an investment
policy: properties and (dimensions)
Matching SWF investment objectives
Establishing a benchmark portfolio
(performance targets and time-frames)
(permissible asset classes)
(concentration risk cf asset classes,
liquidity, sectors, etc)
(correlation with source of SWF'sfunding)
Establishing risk tolerance
(size of manageable declines in portfolio)
(acceptable size of performance
uncertainty)
(acceptable use of derivatives, leverage)
Using external investment managers
(skills required, costs, monitoring)
Exercising equity ownership rights
(board representation)
(voti ng rights)
Disclosing the policy qualitatively
(active/passive)
(financial/strategic)
(benchmark portfolio)
(non-financial considerations)
Monitoring performance and reviewing
policv periodicallv
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environmental mandates, the policy would clarify what those were. Finally, the existence of an
investment policy would promote investment, thus mitigating the concern that SWFsmight simply
hoard capital in reserve and contribute to the problem of widening global macroeconomic
imbalances and falling liquidity in the West.
Central to the investment policy would be a benchmark portfolio, which is "a reference portfolio or
an index [that] serves as a basis for comparison of the performance of the actual portfolio" (IMF2:
20n). It is the fund's aspirational asset allocation strategy, specifying time-frames for investments in
different asset classes, and how correlated the investments would be with the SWFs' funding.19
Another core property of the investment policy would be to establish the fund's risk tolerance,
including the extent of recourse to derivative products and leverage (borrowed capital). The GAPP
also stipulated that the investment policy should be disclosed, at least in qualitative terms.
Disclosing investment position
Public knowledge of where SWF capital has been allocated would increase knowledge of which
markets increasingly relied on sovereign liquidity. Thesewere, on one hand, healthier markets given
that global liquidity was tightening in 2007-08. On the other hand they were also more vulnerable to
a sudden shift in SWF domestic priorities or risk
aversion. Given the emphasis put on establishing an
Figure 4-15. The category Disclosing investment
position: properties and (dimensions)
investment policy, the disclosure requirements were Disclosing investment position
(Asset allocation)
(Benchmarks)
(Rates of return over investment horizon)
simple by comparison. Both the EU and the IMF
employed cautious language, aware that disclosure was
a sensitive subject. In the West private financial companies must disclose this information as a
matter of course, but imposing the requirement on other governments would be difficult. Santiago
Principle 17, the only one on this specific issue, reads, "The financial information referred in this
principle would normally be asset allocation, benchmarks where relevant, and rates of return over
appropriate historical periods" (IMF2: 20). "Disclosure of these items," it continues, "will help to give
guidance on risk appetite" (ibid).
19Theadviceisthat fundsshouldinvestin assetswhosevaluehasa negativecorrelationwith their sourceof
funding.
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Operating risk management systems
The imporntance of highlighting risk management in
the principles owed itself primarily to SWFsrelative
inexperience, rather than their links to government,
or their size. Risk-basedgovernance is a prime issue
for any new market entrant because of how
interdependent market actors are in modern
financial markets. The issue also features highly in
the Financial Services Authority's Principles for
Business, where Principle 3 is "Management and
control: A firm must take reasonable case to
organise and control its affairs responsibly and
effectively, with adequate risk management
systems" (FSA2009a).
Three Santiago Principles are devoted to "Risk
Management and Performance Measurement",
covering the establishment of a risk management
Figure 4-16. The category Operating risk
management systems: properties and (dimensions)
Establishing framework
(identifying, assessing,managing risks)
(financial, operational, regulatory,
reputational)
(c/ear lines of responsibility)
Riskmonitoring and management
(control and incentive mechanisms)
(codes of conduct)
(reliable reporting)
(business continuity planning)
(tracking regulatory changes)
(independent audit)
Conducting stress-tests
(model-risk measurement)
(economic and financial shocks)
Training staff in professional and ethical
standards
(establish code of conduct)
(conflict of interest, integrity)
(offering legal indemnity)
(extending this to external contractors)
DisclOSinggeneral framework
framework (GAPP22, 22.1, 22.2), accurate and reliable reporting of risk information to the SWF
owners (GAPP23), and reviewing implementation of the GAPPitself (GAPP24). Other principles also
provide valuable inputs to risk management, however. GAPP12 stipulates that operational systems
and controls "should be internally audited on a regular basis" (op cit: 18). GAPP13 states that all
persons involved with the SWFshould follow "professional and ethical standards", based on clear
policies and training. The positive impact that training in ethical conduct could have on risk
management had also been highlighted in the FSA'spunishment of Citigroup, and in Citigroup's own
pre-emptory response to the controversy. The remaining properties of operating risk management
systems are set out in Figure 4-16. It is evident from the level of granularity of these Principles that
these controls are central to good market conduct by SWFs.
4.3.4. Preliminary conclusions
I began analysing these codes-of-conduct on the premise that they embodied the types of
behaviours that were expected of SWFsto help ensure well-functioning markets. My grounds for
this premise were based on the deduction that (1) the SWFcontroversy was an attempt to define
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good market conduct for SWFsand (2) the codes-of-conduct resolved the controversy. Hence, (3)
the codes-of-conduct defined good market conduct. I made two discoveries that were material to
the episode's broader relevance. To what extent do the Principles for SWFsapply more broadly? The
first thing to note is that the GAPPsought to recognise SWFsare market entrants, and legitimise by
setting out effectively a 'how to' manual for operating one. Secondly, in my analysis of the US
Treasury code-of-conduct, I found that Citigroup's mistake was largely to fail to abide by those
principles. As a result, these principles have a broader market significance. In this episode the four
essential features of good market conduct were given by:
• Having and disclosing independent governance structures
• Having and disclosing an investment policy
• Disclosing investment positions
• Operating risk management systems
To understand the broader implications of these responsibilities, I compare them with those invoked
for Citigroup in the next section.
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4.4. Defining 'corporate market responsibility': Integrating the episode into theory
The Citigroup and SWF episodes both suggest that market actors have special responsibilities
towards markets; that is, responsibilities beyond maximising profits and complying with the law.
Citigroup was punished for failing to meet these responsibilities, and SWFswere led, under a threat
of regulatory sanction, to codify responsibilities of their own. In the Citigroup episode, the existence
of special responsibilities was evident becauseCitigroup was punished despite not breaking the law.
In the SWFsepisode, we found that even though legal safeguards existed to prevent SWFsinvesting
in strategic industries for political purposes, markets needed additional protection from the
potential that SWFs would inadvertently destabilise them. Beyond compliance and investment
returns, sovereign funds had to be responsible market actors. Given this similarity in the conceptual
trajectory of the two episodes, we can begin to integrate and establish relationships between the
concepts that emerged in each. Each episode has its own set of interrelated concepts that explain
the controversies and their resolution. Together, they continue to answer our original research
question: how are firms responsible for helping to ensure orderly and efficient financial markets?
In the following paragraphs my analysis establishes the concept of 'corporate market responsibility'
in the form of a proposition affirming its existence, and describes CMR's role as a core category that
explains the main patterns of behaviour in these episodes. Then, the various manifestation of CMR
are extended, in three related propositions.
4.4.1. Defining CMR:The core proposition
We can begin with some generalities, or what grounded theorists call "coding families" (Glaser 1978:
72-8), meta-codes. At a general level, the recommendations invoked for Citigroup and SWFs
organise into a coding family that I would entitle entity, protocols, and actions. Let:
• Entity standfor corporatestructure:howa firm dividesinto hierarchiesandmandates
• Protocols standfor rules:managementsystemsandcontrolssuchasrisktolerance
• Actions standfor financialtransactionsandenablingactivities
In general terms, the responsibilities invoked for Citigroup focused on actions; and protocols that
would support those actions. Those for sovereign funds focused on corporate structure; and
protocols that reinforce that corporate structure (see Figure 4-17 below). Citigroup's punishment
held that the bank's trade disrupted the market unduly, its managers failed to exercise due skill, and
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ultimately its systems and controls had been weak. Although the bank was faulted at corporate
level, rather than at the level of individual traders, the emphasis was not its corporate structure; it
was on its activities and protocols. The inverse appears to have held for sovereign funds. The
recommendations that brought closure to the SWF controversy focused on SWFs' overall
incorporation and structure (i.e. division of labour, objectives, policies) rather than the funds'
practical activities. To address market risks arising from transactions, the focus is on ensuring that
SWFs are clearly incorporated and structured, and have protocols to support that structure.
Specifically, a range of fully disclosed protocols should ensure that fund managers maintain an
independent mandate from the fund's owner. For balance, I note that the Citigroup sanction also
addressed entity and the SWF principles also addressed actions." But the one issue that cuts equally
across both controversies is how effective management systems and controls are. For Citigroup,
they relate to better trading, and for SWFs, to better corporate structure.
Figure 4-17. Management controls as a central feature of
market responsibility in the two episodes
On these grounds, 'corporate market responsibility' is based, first and foremost, on management
controls, rather than, for example, being a certain kind of corporation or engaging in certain kinds of
activities. For the purpose of theorising firms' responsibilities towards financial markets, the
centrality of management systems and controls is not deductively surprising: if an entity has a
responsibility that pre-determines its activities, then that responsibility would be expressed as a
protocol. We must now establish what the requisite protocols are, why they matter, who is
responsible, when, and with what consequences. Let us present the core category of CMR first, and
then the propositions that follow.
20 For example, the FSApointed out that Citigroup strengthening its compliance department pre-emptively had
mitigated further sanction; SWFs signed the GAPP 20 on competing fairly, i.e. not seeking inside information.
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We deduce from the regulatory and reputational controversy that emerged in both episodes that a
corporate market responsibility exists. 'Corporate market responsibility' refers to an expectation by
regulators and other political. economic and social actors that companies will help to maintain
orderly and efficient markets by helping to ensure market confidence and stability through certain
management protocols. In the case of Citigroup, market confidence means actors trusting that the
market's rules and its implicit norms will be observed. In the caseof SWFs,trust, which is referenced
in several of the Santiago Principles (see Figure 4-11), meant that SWFswould be good commercial
partners. 'Confidence' and 'trust' were largely conceptually synonymous in the data, as they are in
many languages. Market stability in both cases is based on the protagonists providing liquidity
reliably - as a trusted market participant in Citigroup's case, and as an investor (not merely a holder
of capital reserves), in SWFs' case. The episodes dictate that certain protocols should be observed,
and that they mitigate regulatory and reputational risk.
162
Figure 4-18. Core CMR proposition
Theoretical Proposition Annotation see Fig:
What Companies have a responsibility to help maintain orderly and efficient markets.
How Specifically CMR entails:
Ensuring market confidence and stability by establishing a set of
protocols (as follows)
Risk management protocols were central recommendations in
Operating a sound risk management system that anticipates the both episodes. This was importantforCitigroup to anticipate 3-13,4-16
impact of investment transactions the impact of transactions, and important for SWFs to reassure
host countries that they would not be a destabilising force.
Operating a transparent investment policy based on commercial Central for SWFs, significant for Citigroup. The German
objectives. regulator criticised Citi's strategy for not being entirely
"investment-driven" (WSJ18). as did the FT (see below).
This holds because standards are fluid and may not be well-
established; secondly, because proactive mitigation increases
trust and reduces regulatory and reputationol risk.
Improving CMR shortcomings proactively
Why This is important because:
3-9,4-14
3-18,4-8
Compliance with only minimum standards may not suffice to
maintain efficient and orderly markets. The boundaries of
acceptable market conduct are moderated by porous and
implicit principles and agreements that change quickly and may
not be known by every actor. In the event of market instability,
Compliance with minimum standards (i.e. the 'letter of the law')
was given in both episodes, but did not prevent controversy. In
the Citigroup episode, the market-making rules had to be
moderated by sound judgement. (Although intended to
increase liquidity, too much liquidity would also be 3-9,4-5,4-7
problematic.} In the SWFs episodes, acceptable market conduct
compliance with only minimum standards increases regulatory was frequently redefined; for example, when Schumer
and reputational risks. condemned Dubai World's investment and accepted Abu
Dhabi's.
Who Responsibility falls primarily to:
Large, liquid market participants.
Senior management is held accountable externally, and junior
management internally; junior staff have most implementation The occasional differences are noted in the tables below.
Media and regulatory data frequently singled out the particular 3-7,4-5
responsibility of large firms.
3-17,3-15,4-
13,4-16
When
resoonsibllitv.
This matters mast when:
Making or assessing extraordinary transactions
Large,/ast, unprecedented transactions are more likely to
impact market confidence and liquidity, thus courting
regulatory scrunity. Citigroup's trade and SWFs' high-profile
pnlJitv nrnll;f;;itinnc; vrere p){nmnlp~
The geographic dimension of new markets was key in both
episodes, where the controversy emphasised the investors'
national origins. However, entry into new financial product
mark ere i( n/~n dnnifirnnt
In a marker-making system, the potential to contribute to too
little or too much liquidity is more acute.
Citigroup's trade was 0 reaction to high amounts of existing
liquidity, and it ultlmoteiy led to liquidity tightening. SWFs
brought welcome liquidity. The goal is liquidity stabilisation.
Entering new markets
Being a market-maker
Liquidity is rapidly rising or falling at market- or economy-level
Conse-
quences
Establishing independent governance structures with clear
mandates
Restricting certain kinds of investments
Impact on entity.
Impact on actions.
Collaboration increased market confidence and curbed
regulatory risk in both episodes.
Collaborating with regulators and political bodies
3-6,3-7,4-5,4-
6
3-9,4-6
3-10
3-6,3-10,4-
5,4-6
3-14,4-13
3-13,3-7,4-
14
3-18,4-8
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The table above sets out the core proposition of CMR, and how CMR is manifest. The left-hand
column sets out the theoretical propositions that emerge from the data. These are answers to the
research question, and building blocks of the emerging theory. The 'Annotations' note how the
proposition fits differently with each of the episodes, or notes theoretical implications, or
clarifications. The right-hand references are to Figureswhere the related conceptual categories are
more fully described. For example, Figure 3-6 is signalling controversy in the Citigroup example, and
it notes that the MTS market operator reigned in liquidity as a response to Citigroup's trade. Thus
the references enable further clarification and substantiation of each theoretical proposition.
4.4.2. Propositions on risk management, investment policy, & improvement
The core CMR proposition points to three sets of management systems and controls - risk
management, investment policies, and proactive improvement - that represent CMR in practice.
These protocols help to discipline the corporation as an entity, as well as its actions. The protocols
differ from the core proposition in what they are, but not in why they matter or when they should
be used. Theoretically, there may be differences as to why different protocols matter, and when, but
the data does not present this level of granularity. All of the protocols matter because they
contribute to market confidence and stability. They are particularly important when making or
assessingextraordinary transactions, entering new markets, being a market-maker, or when liquidity
is unstable (rapidly rising or falling) at market- or economy-level. There are small variations related
to who is responsible for each protocol, and what its consequences are, as I outline below.
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Figure 4-19. CMR proposition on Risk Management
Theoretical proposition Annotation see Fig:
What
A company has a responsibility to operate a sound risk management system that anticipates the impact of
investment transactions.
How Specifically it should:
Establish a risk management framework (incl risks and lines of
responsibility) and the impact on market risk, may be underestimated.
Both episodes noted that same risks, including reputational risk
3-13,4-16
Using well-structured analysis and monitoring risk exposure
Implement risk monitoring systems (rules, incentives, reporting,
were highlighted specifically by the FSA,and ather systems
... )
Anticipate the impact of its activities on the market
Escalate strategies to senior management
Conduct stress-tests
Train staff in professional and ethical conduct (incl market
conduct)
Disclose this framework for external monitoring
Who Responsibility falls to:
Lower management is responsible for implementation and
escalation of key decisions to senior management. Senior
management is held accountable by external parties.
Conse-
quences
This may lead to:
The firm may need to abstain from certain profitable
transactions that exceed risk tolerance or whose impact cannot
were noted extensively in the GAPP.
This ex ante analysis was central for Citigroup. For SWFs, it
related only to reputation risk, but figured also in the
investment oolicv (see below)
Reliable information and decision reporting is emphasised in
both cases
For SWFs,this is in the GAPP.For Citi, the FSAlimited its
punishment, saying (like others) that Citi's competitors should
have oreoared for the scenario in advance.
Both cases emphasised broad stakeholder groups, and
Citigroup's also noted attendance levels.
Disclosure figures highly in the SWFGAPP. It is part of
conventional audits of private companies.
Both cases emphasise that accountability and reporting
requirements (e.g. to independent risk functions) should be
clearly delineated. Individual Citigroup traders were not held
accountable bv the FSA.
3-13,4-16
3-14,4-
16,4-14
3-13,3-14
3-15a,4-
16
3-13,4-16
4-16
3-15,4-13
3-6,3-15,4-
6
The second protocol, below, is to operate an investment policy based on commercial objectives.
Here, comparing the two episodes was particularly useful for helping to clarify the boundaries of
being 'investment-driven'. In Section 4.2.2, I argued that the underlying concern about SWFsis that,
whilst investment-driven, they could use political influence to help achieve their aims. In the
Citigroup case, controversy had emerged partly from a Citigroup memo revealing that the bank had
intended, in its own words, to "turn the European government bond market into one that more
closely resembles the US" market and "decrease the attractiveness of the [German] Bund" (FTS3).
Consequently, BaFin, the German regulator, accused Citigroup of not being "investment-driven".
Similarly, a Financial Times editorial claimed the bank was operating "under the banner of spreading
American capitalism" (FT61). Both episodes showed that being "investment-driven" is important,
and yet ambiguous. Comparing the two, I would define it as: seeking returns on invested assets. The
fact that Citigroup's ultimate motive for transforming the European bond market was commercial
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did not make it ok. The important issue is whether it was generating returns on the assets it was
transacting, or looking primarily to impact on the market architecture.
Figure 4-20. CMR proposition on Investment Policy
Theoretical proposition Annotation see Fig:
What A company has a responsibility to operate a transparent investment policy based on commercial objectives.
How Specifically, the policy should ...
Be driven by financial returns on invested assets
Central far SWFs,significant for Citigroup. The German
regulator and FTcriticised Citigroup for looking to re-shape the 3-9,4-7,4-13
European bond market into US-stylemarket.
Be based on a well-accepted level of risk tolerance, and clear
parameters for transactions (acceptable uncertainty levels,
including external uncertainty)
Both episodes show strong conceptual cross-over between
investment strategy and consequent risk requirements.
3-15,4-14
Explicit for SWFs.Citigroup suggests that if a planned trade is
Have a benchmark against which the strategy can be evaluated. unprecedented - has no possible benchmarks - then other CMR 3-13,4-16
responsibilities are more acute.
trading positions/exposure
Establish systems to monitor asset allocation/concentration and Ensuring that the investment policy is compled with. 3-15,4-14
Begenerally disclosed and regularly audited and reviewed
Disclosure may be solicited after perceived wrong-doing
particularly.
3-9,4-14,4-
15
Who Responsibility falls primarily to:
The policy is implemented by operational management and
defined by the owner or governing body(ies).
In private companies, the owner's responsibility may fall to
shareholders.
3-15,4-13
Conse-
quences
Thismay lead to:
Adjusting corporate hierarchy and mandates Impact on entity. 3-15,4-13
Establishing new systems of accountability, transaction analysis
and information escalation
3-14,3-15,4-
13
Disclosing investment positlons in times of audit or scrunity
Disclosing investment position was central for SWFsas a matter
or course. For Citigroup it was more situational- other banks
needed to understand Citigroup's position and intent during
3-7,3-9,4-15
The third proposition, below, relates to the importance of proactive, continuous improvement in
respect of CMR. In both episodes, protagonists were held accountable for proactive action to
implement CMR. For Citigroup, the FSA mitigated its punishment on the grounds that, since the
trade, Citigroup had begun to implement more robust CMR-relevant systems proactively (outlined in
Figure 4-21 below). Indeed, "inaction" is vis-a-vis regulatory principles is a proscribed behaviour
under UK financial regulation (UKP1). For SWFs, taking action to draft and adopt a code-of-conduct-
proactively attempting to correct their shortcomings - is what resolved the controversy.
166
Figure 4-21. CMR proposition on Proactive Improvement
I
Theoretical proposition Annotation see Fig:
What
A company has a responsibility to correct its shortcomings proactively, even if they are not in breach of regulation or their
perceived cost is limited to the company.
How Specifically, it should:
Cooperate with regulatory and political authorities, including to TheSWFs cooperating on a code-of-conduct, and Citigroup with
3-18,4-8understand and codify its responsibilities, as well as to
investigate past transactions
Emphasise its values from the level of owner, or governing
body(ies) or CEO,downwards
Re-train its staff in professional and ethical standards
Invest in surveillance and information-reporting quality
Strengthen its compliance department and systems
Who Responsibility falls primarily to:
When
Senior management should express and cascade value
messages, and are held accountable externally. Junior
management implements the various processes, and must
report and escalate known shortcomings.
This is particularly important when, in addition to other CMR
conditions:
The company is perceived to pose or have posed a risk to
orderly and efficient markets.
Conse-
This may lead to:
quences
New management structures, systems, and expenditure
regulators, were cited as increasing market confidence and
curbing regulatory risk.
In private companies, the owner's responsibility may fall to
shareholders.
3-18,4-13
As noted under 'Risk'.
3-18,4-5,4-
16
3.13,4-16
3-18,4-13,4-
14
Citigraup moved compliance staff to trading floor.
Regulatory and media data did nat highlight the role of specific
individuals, but tended to hold the entity accountable at
corporate level. Senior staff have a more active role in
Improvement processes than ather CMRs.
3-15,4-13
For Citiqroup, these initiatives mitigated the FSApunishment.
For SWFs, drafting and signing the GAPPwas the first thing 3-18,4-8
they were expected to do.
Thisshows that CMR has central governance implications, and
cannot be effective at the margin.
In the end, my analysis of the two episodes suggests that having sound management systems and
controls - that aim, among other things, to help ensure market confidence and liquidity - may be
more important than merely abstaining from wrong-doing (like SWFs) or being a well-structured
corporate entity (like Citigroup). These management protocols are the (at this stage tentative)
answers to the question of how firms are responsible for helping to ensure orderly and efficient
markets.
4.5. Conclusion
In 2009, two years after SWFs' rise to prominence, the idea that they posed a threat to the global
economy had become sufficiently outdated to seem almost quaint. In November 2009, the IMF, a
driver for global financialliberalisation and privatisation for best part of 50 years, encouraged Angola
to establish a SWF in order to manage its foreign reserves on international markets (IMF 2009).
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Western governments actively court SWFsas buyers for their sovereign debt, and as investors in
slowly growing industries. SWFshave become mainstream. My analysis in this chapter suggests that
SWFs became accepted at the same time as they learned how to be responsible actors, adopting
management protocols that safeguarded orderly markets. While they did so, the public perception
of SWFsmatured. Western policy-makers acknowledged that SWF investment had become one of
the few means available to them to protect domestic industries from insolvency within a 'free
market' paradigm - that is,without fiscal intervention.
Early on in the analysis, I recognised similarities between the SWF and Citigroup episodes:
controversy in the absence of clear-cut wrongdoing; concern for the financial system despite legal
compliance; and increasing regulatory risks for the firms. Notwithstanding these general similarities,
I had not expected to find so much resonance between the two episodes within the very detailed
prescriptions for SWFs.The reason for the Citigroup controversy was effectively that Citigroup failed
the US Treasury test for 'responsible' SWFs. Systematically coding the SWF codes of conduct as
generic processes, and comparing these conceptual properties with the earlier episode's, I built
propositions that explain and frame both controversies. Figures 4-18 to 4-21 detail those CMR
propositions, noting their roots in each empirical setting and their occasional variations. These are
the key contributions of this chapter, to provide a conceptual account of the SWFcontroversy, and
to provide a set of propositions that explain and frame both controversies.
During this research, I noticed that a new public debate had emerged about firms' contributions to
the financial system. As the global financial crisis that began in late 2007 gathered pace in 2008,
large banks and bank-like institutions were blamed, among others, for an "age of irresponsibility"
that resonated with the proposition of corporate market responsibility. Poor risk management that
provided the wrong incentives; bad investment policies that spawned misleading product
innovations; and a lack of proactive improvement in compliance practices, were all emphasised in
the debate among regulators, policy-makers, and other market stakeholders, following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers investment bank in September 2008. Again, firms' responsibilities for orderly
markets were invoked. This became the subject of the following chapter.
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My daughter called me up from school and said, "Daddy,
what's a financial crisis?" And without trying to be funny,
Isaid, "it's something that happens every five to seven
years". And she says, HSO why is everyone so surprised?"
50 we weren't - we shouldn't be surprised.
Jamie Dimon, Chairman of JPMorgan, testifying to the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 13 January 2010
The biggest mistake we made, somehow in mortgage
underwriting, we just missed that home prices don't go up
forever.
Dimon, same testimony'
5.1. Introduction
The financial crisis that began in 2007, often described as the most significant since the Great
Depression, has brought to the forefront of public debate a number of ideas that contribute to this
thesis. In this chapter, I explore what the debate contributes to our understanding of firms'
responsibilities for orderly financial markets. The regulatory fallout from the Credit Crunch is a
contemporaneous problematique, complicated by many overlapping themes. Its breadth was first
conveyed by Britain's then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in a speech at the UN General Assembly in
September 2008, when he described the run-up to the crisis as an "age of irresponsibility":
"The current era has been one of global prosperity. It has also been an era of global turbulence, and
while there has been irresponsibility, we must now say clearly that the age of irresponsibility must be
ended. We must now build that new global financial order, founding it on transparency, not opacity;
rewarding success, not excess; and responsibility, not impunity. That order must be global, not
national" (Brown 2008).
Months later, Barack Obama lent his weight to the concept, making "a new era of responsibility" the
central theme of his presidential inauguration and the title of his first budget. Obama (2009) wrote:
"Wall Street threw caution to the wind, chased profits with blind optimism and little regard for
serious risks-and with even less regard for the public good. Lenders made loans without concern for
whether borrowers could repay them. Inadequately informed of the risks and overwhelmed by fine
print, many borrowers took on debt they could not really afford. And those in authority turned a blind
eye to this risk-taking; they forgot that markets work best when there is transparency and
accountability and when the rules of the road are both fair and vigorously enforced. For years, a lack
of transparency created a situation in which serious economic dangers were visible to all too few. This
irresponsibility precipitated the interlocking housing and financial crises that triggered this recession.
The time has come to usher in a new era - a new era of responsibility ..." (p. 1, underlining added).
1FCIC(2010) video, minutes 02:34:00 and 01:53:00.
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Both leaders extended the blame for the crisis to a wide constellation of actors. Bankers had acted
with excessive risk tolerance, improper incentives structures, and inadequate knowledge of their
products. Regulators had been insufficiently sophisticated or intrusive, even occasionally negligent
of their mandate. Borrowers were frequently over-optimistic to borrow against expensive homes,
especially when many had misrepresented their income in mortgage applications. More broadly,
there was "a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people ... to understand the risks to
the system on the whole", according to a letter from the British Academy (2009: 2-3) to the Queen.
The crisis began in a specialised part of the banking system in 2007, and quickly spread to the real
economy in countries worldwide. Initially, banks experienced large losses from defaults on subprime
mortgages' that they held on their trading books (FSA6: 93).3 Many of these mortgages had been
packaged and sold throughout the banking system as re-structured, derivative products that became
exceedingly difficult to value. "[U]ncertainty over the scale of the losses created a crisis of
confidence which produced severe liquidity strains across the entire system," wrote the FSA in 2009
(ibid), "As a result, a wide range of banking institutions now suffer from an impaired ability to extend
credit to the real economy, and have been recapitalised with large injections of taxpayer money".
The Credit Crunch put many companies and individuals in bankruptcy. "Trillions of dollars in wealth
have been destroyed," wrote the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC11: 1), adding that the
crisis "challenged the faith of many in our system of capital formation and allocation - a system for
creating wealth that has proved over the long term to be the greatest the world has seen".
Banks and regulators now find themselves in a substantial and wide-ranging review of how to govern
financial markets. In the US, UK and at European levels, financial ministries, legislative committees,
and regulatory institutions have published white papers to analyse what led to the crisis and
propose new approaches for financial regulation. There is broad agreement that regulation should
be more "robust", although both among researchers and practitioners there is significant
disagreement about what it should look like.4 The UK's Financial Services Authority wrote that the
future requires "a combination of better regulation and market response to the crisis" (2009b: 10,
underlining added). Research on this market response has taken a backseat relative to regulatory
2 'Subprime' refers to the relatively low creditworthiness of the house-buyers who took out mortgage loans,
relative to the size and cost of the loans.
3 As in previous chapters, stylised referencing is applied to data documents, which are listed in Part 1 of the
bibliography.
4 Researchon better post-crisis regulation is already extensive (e.g. Daviesand Green 2008, FSA2009d,
Goodhart 2009) and likely to grow rapidly for years. In the US,the Congressional Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC)is due to report in December 2010, setting the stage for further USpolicy debate.
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reform, although some references to it have emerged. For example, Commissioner Byron Giorgiou of
the US Congressional Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, stated at a hearing:
"I'm a strong believer in the strength of the market system. And although regulation of the financial
services industry is proper and necessary, despite their best efforts, governments and regulators
often lack the resources and expertise to monitor adequately activities that create undue systemic
risk. So it is important for us to focus on creating market mechanisms that reduce the likelihood that
risk-taking practices will get out of hand and threaten the stability of the entire financial system" (FCIC
2010: minute 02:02:00).
Jamie Dimon, head of JP Morgan, also stated at that hearing that, because regulatory oversight may
be too slow to adapt to financial innovation, "perhaps some of this oversight is the [bank] managers'
responsibility, not the regulators?' (ibid).
Managers' responsibility for oversight is of course a central theme in this thesis. In the last chapter, I
established four propositions on the subject, which emerged from the Citigroup and sovereign
wealth funds episodes (Figure 5-1).
Figure 5-1. CMRworking propositions
Title Financial companies are expected to... see Figure:
Core
proposition
Help maintain orderly and efficient markets by ensuring market confidence
and stability through certain management protocols. Failure to observe this
'corporate market responsibility' increases regulatory risks.
4-18
Risk
Management
Operate a sound risk management system that anticipates the impact of
investment tra nsactions.
4-19
Investment
Policy
Operate a transparent investment policy based on commercial objectives. 4-20
Proactive
Improvement
Correct their shortcomings proactively, even if they are not in breach of
regulation or the perceived cost of the shortcomings is limited to the
company.
4-21
In this chapter, I develop these propositions further, on the assumption that the current regulatory
debate already has something to teach us.
The debate marks a departure from decades-worth of conventional wisdom about how and when
financial markets self-correct (UST3: 2, FSA6: ch. 1). Now, the question of how firms must help to
ensure orderly markets is discussed much more broadly in society. The ongoing debate includes a
major re-alignment of responsibilities for regulation (including new regulatory institutions and
172
mandates). In many cases, as I discuss throughout the chapter, regulators plan to intensify
supervision while also calling for companies to comply with the spirit of the law, to share a common
objective with regulators, in tacit recognition that prescriptive rules cannot always deliver adequate
solutions in such a fast-paced and complex environment. Regulatory reviews and proposals are
grounded in indictments over 'irresponsible' banking practices, such as poor risk assessments,
inadequate compensation structures, and predatory lending. These data provide granular insight
into discretionary decisions that financial institutions make daily, with implications for financial
stability. At this level of granularity, the fact that the debate has not yet concluded is a strength. It
gives a platform to minority views that may not ultimately be codified in regulation, but are shaping
new expectations about corporate behaviour.
The debate presents ideas that contribute to the propositions outlined in earlier chapters. First, the
notion that companies have a responsibility to adopt risk management systems that anticipate the
impact on their market is pervasive. Much of what caused the crisis was a failure of risk
management. Companies failed to assess and diversify the risk of certain credit products
appropriately. Now the proposed reforms to risk management practices are based primarily on
reducing risks to the financial system on the whole, rather than to individual companies (FSA6:ch.
2). Specific properties of risk management that the Citigroup and SWFepisodes highlighted, such as
stress-testing or ethical conduct, are again emphasised in this episode.
A second area of resonance is investment policy, where the previous episodes suggested that
business practices should be part of an auditable, legitimate policy, benchmarked against broader
corporate objectives. The Credit Crunch debate highlights specific business practices, such as short-
selling (betting that the price of shareswill fall), which regulators have partly prohibited because of
the possibility that the bets become abusive or self-fulfilling, destabilising markets. More generally,
the benefits of financial innovation are questioned based on their impact on the wider system. "Not
all innovation is equally useful", said the FSA'sChairman, Lord Turner, in a speech (2oo9b: 15), "If by
some terrible accident the world lost the knowledge required to manufacture one of our major
drugs or vaccines, human welfare would be seriously harmed. If the instructions for creating a
[derivative like the] COO-squared have now been mislaid, we will I think get along quite well
without". In the highly discretionary area of business innovation, new limits and considerations
based on market stability have emerged.
Third, the proposition that firms have to correct their shortcomings proactively - even if they are not
in breach of regulation and their perceived cost is limited to the company - is further substantiated.
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This may be surprising because this episode is largely about tightening regulation and compliance.
One might infer that the space for proactive improvement would be narrowed. On the contrary, the
data suggests that even highly numerate and ostensibly 'precise' areas of new regulation, like
accounting, require sound, responsible judgement in order to work. Regulators are actively
encouraging companies to implement technical regulation responsibly. Indeed there may even be a
positive relationship between the specificity of regulation and the amount of discretionary
judgement that it requires. This is because the more specific the regulation, the more important it is
to determine how to apply it to idiosyncratic products and processes.
The data also suggests that CMR is underpinned by a special role that banks have in the wider
economy. All of the regulatory authorities and the heads of certain banks, like Goldman Sachs's
Lloyd Blankfein, affirm that financial market stability is not only an objective in its own right, but a
strategy for wider economic development. As Blankfein put it, investment banks are doing "God's
work" (Sunday Times 2009).
5.1.1. Purpose and contribution of chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to conceptualise what the response to the biggest financial crisis for
generations says about companies' responsibilities for regulating financial market stability. The
episode conveys expectations of economically responsible corporate behaviour among more actors
and across more markets. In such a broader context, it increases the credibility, resonance, and
usefulness of the emerging CMR theory. Insofar as the financial crisis may herald a new regulatory
era, the episode also helps the theory of CMRincorporate uncertainty about the future.
To this end, the chapter contributes a stylised conceptual account of the regulatory and public
indictments of corporate conduct in the run-up to the Credit Crunch. It analyses what practices are
legal and by some rationale worthwhile, but ultimately damaging to the market. It adds variation
and density to the CMRpropositions by illuminating new properties of responsible risk management,
investment policies, and improvement. In particular, it develops two conceptual categories -
responsible compliance and humanising technical activity which serve as unifying themes for the
regulatory debate. Because this episode occurs in a new setting, this chapter demonstrates how
expectations, responsibilities, and behaviours vary under different conditions. To what extent did
market conduct in this episode differ conceptually? How did conditions differ? What were the
effects? By drawing these boundaries through and between the episodes, I establish a basis then to
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integrate all the propositions on corporate market responsibility - from the Citigroup, sovereign
funds, and the Credit Crunch episodes - in the next chapter.
Finally, this chapter demonstrates that the CMR propositions have contemporaneous significance.
The emergence of CMR concepts at the centre of the current regulatory debate, particularly the
'discovery' of systemic risk as a pivotal issue of regulatory concern, suggeststhat CMRhas historical
significance. This sets the stage for a better understanding of the diffusion of private authority in
financial governance. While CMR reinforces that trend, it also represents a reassertion of societal
authority over market governance. For example, CMRmay represent a conditionality framework for
financial market de-regulation, and thus illustrate limits for the diffusion of authority. These issues
are taken up for discussion in the next chapter.
5.1.2. Chapter outline
The chapter begins with a factual baseline about the economic and financial trends that led to the
crisis. This narrative in Section 5.2 explains the most contentious financial practices and products
and contextualises their emergence. Then it examines how the regulatory data conveys 'systemically
responsible' risk management, investment policies and proactive improvement. Section 5.3 analyses
the traction that this debate had among other market participants, observers and regulators, based
on news reports in the financial press, and outlines several concepts that press reports contributed.
Section 5.4 integrates the regulator and media analysesand Section 5.5 concludes.
5.1.3. Sampling and analytical approach
The analysis continues to draw on regulatory and media data to convey expectations of market
conduct. In this episode, however, the epistemological significance of regulatory data is different.
Previously, regulation served to resolve the controversies, to codify a set of expectations that would
become accepted practice. In the Citigroup episode, market participants cited in news reports were
explicitly waiting for the regulators' reaction in order to assessCitigroup's transaction. In the SWFs
case, several politicians cited referred to the public controversy as an input to the codes-of-conduct
that would emerge. In both cases, regulation signalled the end of extensive news reporting. Here,
the regulatory data does not resolve the controversy, it prolongs it and helps to set broader
stakeholder expectations. As a result, I inverted the sampling sequence, beginning with regulatory
papers and moving on sampling news reports subsequently to understand the extent to which
regulatory ideas found wider traction. This sequence also had the value of reinforcing the direct
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relevance of news data. This relevance would otherwise be very difficult to achieve because in the
vast and 'noisy' (Taleb 2004) depository of new reports on the financial crisis, many reports are only
tangentially related to CMR issues. Starting with regulatory reports reinforces my focus on the core
theme and disciplines the use of media data, whose value is to convey broader social reaction to the
regulatory fallout.
The sampling strategy entailed several criteria. Data is made up of white papers and similar
publications that propose a new approach to financial regulation or review the existing approach.
These papers analyse which banking practices may have undermined the system, and give an
indication of where new regulatory thinking is headed. Their authors were finance ministries,
legislatures, central banks, and financial regulators." As in previous chapters, I narrowed the sample
to UK, US and EU data. Because the data also contained significant references to work done at the
Bank for International Settlement's Financial Stability Board, particularly its input to the G8
governments, their white paper was also included.
The temporal limit for sampling was September 2008 to September 2009. The episode begins in
September 2008 because it was then that the fall-out from the Credit Crunch began, after Lehman
Brothers investment bank collapsed. This was the largest catalyst for regulatory intervention in the
financial system and the point at which point the crisis fully matured, and therefore the time to
begin capturing the public stakeholder response to it.6 The one-year time-limit was chosen because
it includes a very robust set of regulatory reviews from all the relevant stakeholders; equals the
sampling period for each of the two episodes in the preceding chapters; and, not unimportantly, fit
the practical constraints of this doctorate. As I have acknowledged, the debate is still ongoing and
relevant new data emerges weekly. I proceed on the assumption that there is plenty to learn from
what has already been written and the claims that I make for the resulting theoretical propositions
acknowledge the ongoing nature of the episode. On a few occasions, based on the principle of
purposeful sampling (Charmaz 2006), I sampled documents whose publications exceeded the time-
limit, because the other data suggested that they would significantly influence the terms of the
debate.
5 The UK regulator is the Financial ServicesAuthority. The UShasseveral regulators with overlapping
mandates, but the Securities and ExchangeCommission (SEC)is the primary oversight institution for securities
trading and describes its mandate almost identically to the FSA:"The mission of the U.S.Securities and
ExchangeCommission is to protect investors, maintain fair. orderly. and efficient markets. and facilitate capital
formation" (SEC2009, underlining added).
6 The USTreasury called September 2008 "the most devastating month in modern financial history"; see
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/faq.html.
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These various sampling criteria narrowed the universe of regulatory publications into a specific data
sample. The criteria are summarised in Figure 5-2 below. Some US institutions did not publish
holistic reviews like their British counterparts. Instead the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and Federal Reserve presented their analyses in a series of testimonies to Congressional panels. The
SEC had 33 testimonies, 17 of which were selected for the sample on the grounds that they
concerned pre-crisis banking practices, new financial markets regulatory reform, or systemic risk.
Figure 5-2. Regulation data collection scheme
l.Financia~regulator, certral bank. finance miristry,legislaba"eAuIJIorsIIip - - -- -- ---_____/
• wtite Papers, Dig:ussion Papers, ConsUtations, Independent Reviews, Financial
lOCatiDl'lof Stability Reports. Financial SVstem Reports, Press Releases, Testimonies, Plans
l _rdI
Temrof
document
• Dig:ussion, review, or proposal
• Banking practices precedng the crisis, regulatory reform, systemic risk
s~
I'IIbIic:ation
date
• 15eptEmber 2008 ID31 Sepb!mber 2009
The dataset that resulted from these criteria is listed in Figure 5-3 below.
177
Figure 5-3. Regulation data sample
UK
Treasury Reforming Financial Markets 08July 2009 UKTl
Walker Review 01 October 2009 UKT2
Bank of England Financial Stability Report: Safeguarding stability 01 December 2009 BOE1
Financial Stability Report: Global Instability and Policy Response OlJune 2009 BOE2
Financial Stability Report: Building a more resilient financial syste 01June 2009 BOE3
Financial Stabi Iity Report 01 October 2008 BOE4
Role of Macroprudential Policy - Discussion Paper 21 November 2009 BOES
UKParliament House of Commons Treasury Committee: Banking Crisis: Dealing v 24July 2009 UKP2
House of Commons Treasury Committee: Banking Crisis: Reformin 24July 2009 UKP3
House of Commons Treasury Committee: Banking Crisis: Regulatic 31July 2009 UKP4
House of Lords: Future of EUFinancial Regulation 20August 2009 UKPS
FSA Turner Review: A regulatory response to the financial crisis 15March 2009 FSA6
Chancellor's response to Turner Review 27 March 2009 FSA7
US
Treasury Financial Stability Plan 01 March 2009 UST2
Financial Regulatory Reform: A new foundation 17June 2009 UST3
Systemic risk legislation 22July 2009 UST4
Legislative text on OTCderivatives 11August 2009 USTS
Federal Reserve Cole Submission to the House (Risk mgmt in banks) 18March 2009 FED1
Bernanke Testimony to the House (Regulatory restructuring) 24July2009 FED2
Bernanke Testimony to the House (Regulatory reform) 01 October 2009 FED3
USCongress Senate: Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 15March 2009 UScl
Senate: DODD:HOW DOWE PROTECTMAIN STREETFROMWALLS- 23July 2009 USC2
House: Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairnes! 30July 2009 USC3
Senate: HEARINGON STRENGTHENINGBANKREGULATIONS 04 August 2009
SEC Testimony Concerning Turmoil in U.S.Credit Markets: Recent 23September 2008 SECl
Lessons from the Credit Crisis for the Future of Regulation 23October 2008 SEC2
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Fi'"!ancialServices and Ge 11 March 2009 SEC3
Testimony Concerning Mark-to-Market Accounting: Practices and I 12March 2009 SEC4
Testimony Concerning Lessons Learned in Risk Management Over 18March 2009 SECS
Testimony Concerning Securities Law Enforcement in the Current 20March 2009 SEC6
Testimony Concerning Enhancing Investor Protection and Regulati 26 March 2009 SEC7
Testimony Concerning Strengthening the SEC'sVital Enforcement 07 May 2009 SEC8
Testimony Concerning the Oversight and Regulation of Executive 11June 2009 SEC9
Testimony Concerning Regulation of Over- The-Counter Derivative 22June 2009 SEC12
Testimony Concerning SECOversight: Current State and Agenda 14July 2009 SEC13
Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private lSJuly 2009 SEC14
Testimony: "Regulatory Perspectives on the Obama Administratio 22July 2009 SEC15
Testimony Concerning Regulation of Systemic Risk 23July 2009 SEC16
Testimony Concerning "Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Pl 29July 2009 SEC17
Written Testimony Concerning SECOversight of Credit Rating Age 05 August 2009 SEC18
Testimony Concerning "Recent Innovations in Securitization" 24September 2009 SEC19
EU
EC Report of the de Larosiere Group 25 February 2009 ECS
Communication on 'Driving European Recovery' 01 March 2009 EC6
BIS
BIS/FSB Financial Stabil ity Board response to Turner Review (Mario Draghi 27 March 2009 BIS1
Improving Financial Regulation: Report to the G20Leaders 25September 2009 BIS2
178
After coding these documents and pinpointing how they analysed the concepts of CMR, I sought to
understand the wider resonance of the regulatory debate. This had two stages. First I checked my
coding log to identify which regulatory sources had provided the densest data - the most conceptual
properties and dimensions. These publications could be said to be the most closely related to CMR
because they contributed the most conceptual properties.' Then, I searched in the selected
newspapers for all reports regarding those regulatory publications, within two weeks from their
publication. The objective was to identify how the wider debate treated their ideas. The assumption
behind this objective is that the financial media influences market expectations and behaviour over
time (as discussed in Chapter 2, Section
2.4.2.1). Thus, media documents would help
me understand which issues of CMR had
Figure 5-4. Distribution of news reports, by publication.
Wash Post Economist
The sample comprised 208 news reports
regarding 11 regulatory publications, in the
eight selected newspapers. The largest shares
of data appeared in the Financial Times and
Wall Street Journal, with British papers slightly
more dominant (see Figure 5-4).
The Times
9%
become more salient throughout the sampling
period.
Analytical approach
As in previous chapters, it is useful to clarify the analytical approach because grounded theory
methodology evolves at more advanced stages of research. At this point I have tentative
propositions, and several working concepts. I now use selective, or focused, coding (Strauss and
Corbin 1998: ch. 10; Charmaz 2006: ch. 3), to find new manifestations of these concepts. In
grounded theory parlance, this means coding around the core concepts, aiming for "theoretical
completeness - accounting for as much variation in a pattern of behaviour with as few concepts as
possible thereby maximising parsimony and scope" (Glaser 1978: 95-6). I set out to recognise
themes that previously emerged - both trends and contradictions - and then analyse how they
differ from earlier episodes. For example, in this episode a concept or proposition may have entirely
new properties than previous episodes. The role of remuneration and accounting for risk
management are two examples.
7 They were UKT2, BOE2, UKP3, FSA6, USB, USC3, SEC2, SECS, SEC16, ECS, and BIS2.
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A particular analytical discipline was required for this chapter. The Credit Crunch brought a much
broader controversy than the earlier episodes. Therefore it was important to ensure that coding
focused on the right issues and that any new concepts "earned their way" into the theory, as
grounded theorists put it (Glaser 1978; Charmaz 2006). In particular I focused on understanding
banking practices that were directly related to orderly markets, or systemic risk. This meant
downgrading data that referred only to institutional restructuring at regulatory organisations, for
example, if this did not have direct implications for corporate practice.
Finally, a major theme in the regulatory debate fell outside the remit of my research, despite it
relating both to systemic risk and corporate behaviour: capital adequacy reserves. It is a major issue
of regulatory review that banks must hold much more (liquid) capital in reserve, and reforms are
moving in that direction, under the umbrella Basel 2 process. The Bank for International
Settlements, the lead institution in this process, identifies the key issuesas follows (BIS2:4-5):
• Increasing minimum capital requirements
• Establishing countercyclical capital buffers, requiring more reserves during good times, and
fewer during bad
• The quality of the Tier 1 capital base, predominantly common shares and retained earnings
• Definition of various capital forms
• Appropriate leverage (debt) ratios
• Whether so-called "contingent capital" may be used asa 'shock-absorber' during crises
These highly technical discussions inhabit primarily quantitative finance studies rather than the
political economy or sociological disciplines. My ability to interpret and analyse these issuescritically
is very limited. Accordingly, I leave liquidity standards to finance experts, but provide some input on
responsible accounting practices as a higher-order management ethic.
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5.2. Responding to the 'age of Irresponsibility'
We need to encourage a tone and culture ... that mere
compliance with the law, narrowly viewed, is not the highest
goal to which we aspire, but the base from which we start.
US Securities and Exchange Commissions
For financial companies, many of which have returned to pre-crisis levels of profitability, the
enduring fallout from the Credit Crunch is a slow and persistent regulatory re-think. Each of the four
regulatory stakeholders in the US and UK - regulators, legislatures, finance ministries, and central
banks - and the European Commission, has called for some form of regulatory tightening. The major
investment banks have also offered to help fund an expansion of regulators' supervisory capacity,
perhaps in the hope that this will ward off tough new rules." Although the debate covers a wide
range of specific and technical fields - reform of institutional mandates and institutions; capital
adequacy standards; and business practices such as risk management - the myriad reviews,
proposals, and theoretical ideas put forth to date all appear underpinned by the 'discovery' of
systemic risk as a pivotal regulatory concern ..
Before the crisis, regulators operated on the implicit assumption that regulating individual
institutions' capital and systems mitigated generalised, multi-market risks. The interdependency of
financial institutions did not figure highly in regulatory agendas. For the FSA, this is the main reason
why regulators did not suitably address the issues that led to the crisis. "The reality of excessive risk
can sometimes only be spotted at systemic level," it wrote (FSA6: 80). Pre-crisis definitions of
systemic risk looked at the problem from individual institutions' point of view. Systemic failures were
thought of as idiosyncratic concerns - losses to specific companies - and therefore the approach to
systemic risk was vigilance at company level. By and large, regulators only addressed financiers'
impact on market stability in isolated episodes such as the Citigroup and SWF episodes, or else
criminal cases of market manipulation.
8 SEC6:14.
9 The former head of Morgan Stanley, John Mack, told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, "Well, I've said
this and I think some of my colleagues have said this, that I think we need a regulator with bigger resources
and a bigger budget to focus on that [financial complexity] and attract [experienced] people". See
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings; video for 13 January 2010. Jamie Dimon concurred in a press conference later
that day.
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Systemic risk has become not only what the system does to companies, but also what companies do
to the system. Now, "the future of banking regulation and supervision needs to be rooted" in a
systemic approach, wrote the British regulator (FSA6: 52; also BOES). A systemic risk is one that
threatens the effective operation of the financial system as a whole (BOES), or a core part of the
system (FSA6), for example, when a failure by one institution leads to large losses for other
institutions (IMF 2010).10 As SECChairman Mary Shapiro wrote, "Throughout this crisis we have seen
how traditional processes evolved into questionable business practices, that, when combined with
leverage and global markets, created extensive systemic risk" (SECll: 3). These corrosive activities
are attributable to banks and similar institutions. The SEC and the UK Treasury write about the
financial sector generally, with the latter's Walker Review of corporate governance employing the
acronym BOFls - banks or other financial institutions (UKT2). The FSA differentiates "institutions
performing bank or bank-like functions" from those "performing non-bank financial activities, such
as life insurance" (FSA6: 52). I follow the same conventions.
In this section I analyse how the corrosive practices that Shapiro referred to are now perceived, their
potential regulation, and the implications for firms' responsibilities to the financial system.
The propositions about CMR developed earlier - on risk management, investment policy, and
proactive improvement - structure the following analysis, and serve as section headings. I find that
despite the intent to tighten regulation and the technical content of many of the key issues,
regulators persistently raise importance of corporate employees exercising sound (subjective)
judgement, and taking a share of responsibility for systemic risk maintenance. Accounting requires
interpretation; independent committees need functional independence; systemic risk calls for
shared responsibility. A distinction emerges between literal compliance and responsible compliance.
10 The SEC also defines systemic risk as "the longer-term risk that our system will unintentionally favour large
systemically important institutions over smaller, more number competitors, reducing the system's ability to
innovate and adapt to change" (SEC14: 1).
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5.2.1. Background: Pre-crisis economic and financial trends
"When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've
got to get up and dance. We're still dancing."
Chuck Prince, then-CEOof Citigroup, 9 July 2007, two
months before Citigroup's liquidity crisis
For the purpose of contextualising the debate, the following paragraphs set out a factual baseline
about the economic and financial trends that led to the crisis. The FSA's(200gb) summary of these
trends is regarded as consensual (e.g. FSB2, ECS), and does not seek to assess the relative
significance of the different factors in causing the crisis, merely to provide a narrative description."
As an economic explanation, the FSA account helps us to understand the crisis on its own
epistemological terms.
The economic story begins at the turn of the 2000s, with global macroeconomic imbalances:
yawning trade deficits in the US,UKand other large import-driven Western economies, matched by
trade surpluses in China, oil-exporting countries and other export-driven Asian countries. These
imbalances, driven in large part by high savings in China and low savings in the US, meant that
foreign exchange reserves were accumulating very quickly in surplus countries' central banks. These
reserves were invested mostly in very low-risk government bonds, rather than in equity, property or
other assets (FSA200gb: 2).
High demand for bonds led interest rates to fall to historic lows, with two major consequences. First,
low interest rates fuelled the rapid growth of new borrowing in US and UK property/mortgage
markets particularly. The credit standards of borrowers fell significantly, not least because the
accompanying property price bubble "made those lower credit standards appear costless" (ibid).
(I.e. it was thought that even if borrowers defaulted, their inflated properties would cover the cost
of default.) Second, low interest rates fuelled "a ferocious search for yield" (investment returns); "a
desire among any investor who wishes to invest in bond-like instruments to gain asmuch as possible
spread above the [lowest-risk interest rate], to offset at least partially [that] declining rate" (ibid).
This made "any products which appear to add 10, 20 or 30 basis points [hundredths of a percent] to
that yield without adding too much risk look very attractive" (ibid).
11TheUKTreasury'sWalkerReviewof corporategovernanceadoptsasimilarstylisedapproach(UKT2:6).
Literatureattributing the crisisto specificissuesisalreadyextensive;seereviewsin Economist 2009a,Financial
Times 2009a,and The Times 2009a.
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With this hunger for assets with higher yields, innovation in financial services became critical,
particularly securitisation of credit assets, which led to new products. Banks and bank-like
intermediators began "slicing and dicing" assets with different risk profiles and yields. They re-
structured the various slices to create new assets whose value derived from the underlying risk
exposure - assets known as structured credit derivatives. The underlying belief in banks was that
derivatives could '''create value' by offering investors combinations of risk and return which are
more attractive than those available from direct purchase of the underlying credit exposures" (op
cit: 3). This led to an "alphabet soup" of credit products whose risks were defined by highly complex
mathematical calculations that were not understood in many casesby the investors who bought the
securities, nor even by senior management in the originating banks. The business model described
here is referred to as the "originate and distribute" model for banks' credit business (ibid). However,
it transpired that many risky securities were not distributed throughout the system but were held by
the originating banks or their special purpose vehicles (shadow banks), resulting in a growing
concentration of risk.
As a result of securitisation, the difference between yields of securities with very different risk
profiles began to fall "to clearly inadequate levels" (ibid). In other words, even high-risk assets were
offering the same low returns over time as lower risk assets; 'credit spreads' became narrower. One
effect of falling credit spreads was to encourage even more securitisation of riskier (Le. potentially
higher yielding) assets and more complex derivatives whose underlying risk was difficult to account
for. In addition, banks began to leverage investments (Le. use borrowed capital) in historically high
proportions. The median leverage ratio in UK banks was over 30-to-l in 2007; that is, for every 30
units of capital they invested, banks borrowed 29 units. Deutsche Bank and UBShad leverage ratios
of roughly 4S-to-l in 2007, rising to roughly 6S-to-1 and 100-to-1, respectively, in 2008.
Across a range of instruments, credit risk appeared to be falling, "fuelling in turn higher apparent
profits and higher bonuses, and as a result reinforcing management and traders' certainty that they
must be doing the right thing" (ibid). This continued "Until", writes Turner, "we reached the point
where people began to fear that the music was about to stop - but where others felt ... that they
had to keep dancing until the band stopped" (ibid). That moment came in autumn 2007.
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Figure 5-5. Trends leading to the financial crisis
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This trajectory from macroeconomic imbalances to over-leveraging has a consensual description.
Some, like Goldman Sachs's CEO Lloyd Blankfein (FCIC 2010), emphasise that a number of
government policies encouraged higher home ownership and, by implication, were to blame for
falling credit standards at banks, but the core processes described above are not in dispute.
5.2.2. Risk management
It is difficult to find a greater example of
wishful thinking combined with hubris.
The British Academy, on pre-crisis risk management"
In many respects, the lead-up to the Credit Crunch is a story about risk management. Credit
securitisation, derivative products, the use of leverage, and the retention of certain capital assets on
the balance sheet, all relied on understanding the risks in the underlying assets. According to the
FSA, there was a "misplaced reliance on sophisticated maths" (FSA6: 16). Complex mathematical
formulas were assumed to be reliable and 'soft' subjective judgement was often considered
unsystematic. This faith in hard maths and atomistic economic doctrine (whereby the system was
assumed to be the sum of its corporate parts) eventually proved unreliable because markets failed.
Reviewing data post-crisis regulatory debate, one finds frequent references to the importance of
soft judgement in normally hard risk management. One might say that there was an abrogation of
traditional management responsibility, because discretionary decision-making was transferred to
'automated' mathematical models. The data does not simply call for more subjective judgement
over mathematical calculus, however. Rather it argues that a subjective ethic, or judgement
principles, should run through even technical risk management processes - such as deciding which
accounting rules to apply in particular situations, or which scenarios to stress-test against. What
12 British Academy (2009: 2)
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makes these principles relevant for CMR is the fact that they arise in discussions of how better to
ensure orderly financial markets.
Below, I review how this debate contributes to our understanding of responsible risk management,
in the areas of corporate governance, fair accounting, remuneration, and stress-testing, all of which
were highly prominent in the data. This analysis then extends to the role of innovation and
compliance.
5.2.1.1. Corporate governance
The impact of corporate governance on risk management was as significant a priority in the wake of
the Credit Crunch, as it had been in the other episodes. The UK Treasury published a review of
corporate governance standards (the Walker Review, UKT2) whose tone is similar to the other
sources. The notion that specific prescriptions cannot wholly replace good discretionary judgment is
pervasive. The Walker Review stated that,
"Good corporate governance overall depends critically on the abilities and experience of individuals
and the effectiveness of their collaboration in the enterprise. Despite the need for hard rules in some
areas, this will not be assured by overly specific prescriptions that generate box-ticking conformity. So
while some of [our) recommendations are relatively prescriptive ... most set parameters within which
there is need for judgement and appropriate flexibility" (UKT2:7).
The extent to which boards show good judgement and flexibility also determines potential changes
in regulation: "the ability of the regulator to stand back and leave space for significant new initiative
and enterprise will necessarily depend on a positive supervisory assessment as to the quality and
capability of a board, in discharging its essential obligation in relation to risk" (UKT2: 92). A greater
onus is placed on firms with higher systemic significance (UKT2: 91). Throughout, the data suggests
that the balance of regulatory risk rests on the extent to which firms and regulators pursue shared
objectives.
There is considerable overlap between discussion of risk governance in this episode and in others.
This is to say, several issues are given the same prominence and level of granularity. One case is the
need to establish a risk management framework that specifies risks to be monitored and lines of
responsibility and is disclosed and externally monitored. This episode also emphasises assessing
market-relevant risks (leverage, liquidity, interest rate and currency, etc) rather than several
company-specific risks (IT, business continuity, and reputation risk), on the grounds that the former
are the '''fundamental' prudential risks of the institution" (UKT2: 95). New dimensions also emerge
in this episode. Although previous episodes emphasised escalating risk strategies to senior
management, regulators in the post-crisis debate specify boards being directly accountable for risk
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decisions. In particular, creating a risk committee, setting overall risk appetite, having a chief risk
officer with enterprise-wide remit, and non-executive directors challenging 'groupthink' (UKT2: 90-
105) are boards' responsibilities. Therefore, the key process that was escalating lower-level
strategies, evolves into integrating high-level objectives with lower-level strategies, in this episode.
Another new dimension that emerges is about the future. One of the propositions already
established in earlier chapters is that a good risk management system should anticipate the
(systemic) impact of investment transactions. A similar, forward-looking, hypothetical dimension
emerges here. Several financial institutions had adopted a view of risk management as audit. That is,
risk management involved assessingthe risks posed by current (or past) investment decisions. In the
UK, an explicit focus on future risks emerged (e.g.
Figure 5-6. New properties and (dimensions) of
Operating a sound risk management systemFSA6:22, 44; FSA2008b). The British government's
review of corporate governance (UKT2) made
several recommendations on establishing a board
risk committee that would be separate from an
audit committee. A "key priority" would be "to give
clear, explicit and dedicated focus to current and
future-looking aspects of risk exposure" (p. 95).
Taking a forward-looking view of risk entails
changes to a wide range of activities, including
accounting and stress-testing, which I address below. In addition, it reinforces the need for
Aligning high-level objectives with mid-level
strategies
Promoting board's accountability
Creating a risk committee
Setting strategic risk appetite
Appointing enterprise-wide CRG
Appointing independent NEDs
(groupthink, forward-looking)
Establishing 'fitness' standards for directors
(honesty, competence)
Taking a forward-looking view
discretionary judgement and challenging 'groupthink'. In this context, risk management expands to
capture uncertainty. with financial institutions compelled to identify also which risks are unknown
(see FSA6:44).
In the US regulatory debate, corporate governance was addressed in depth by fewer institutions.
The Obama administration's white paper on financial reform (USn) and the Federal Reserve data
(FEDl-3) had a strong focus on governance at regulatory institutions but not in corporations. The
issue was taken on more extensively by the Senate and the SEC.The Senate's Restoring American
Financial Stability Act 2010 emphasised corporate governance requirements for firms involved in
dealing derivatives. According to the bill, each firm should:
"establish governance arrangements that are transparent in order to fulfil public interest
requirementsandto supportthe objectivesof ownersandparticipants[00')
establish and enforce appropriate fitness standards for directors, members of any disciplinary
committee,andmembersof the organization[00')
187
establish and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest in the decision-making process of the
organization and establish a process for resolving such conflicts of interest [...]
ensure that the composition of the governing board or committee includes market participants"
(USC3:571-2, emphases added).
These succinct recommendations rely on corporate discretion to tend to the "public interest" and
more specifically to other "market participants". This is notable both because it takes place in an
American legislative environment, where regulation is based on prescriptive rules, but also because
it applies to firms where mismanagement of risk was extensive. In that environment, the extent of
this reliance on corporate responsibility for financial stability is notable.
The SECaddressed corporate governance in the context of accounting rules, to which I now turn."
5.2.1.2. Fair accounting
Accounting methods featured prominently in the assessment of bad practices that led to the crisis
and prolonged it. Accounting is a highly specialised discipline whose natural habitat is the study of
finance rather than political economy or sociology, and one to which the latter can offer only limited
insight. However, accounting is also an inexact process that requires frequent qualitative judgement
(see Power 2004). To this end the SEC, itself a rules-based regulator, has published extensive
guidance "about how accounting standards should be applied in particular situations" (SEC7: 4), "to
assist those responsible for making fair value measurement judgements" (SEC3: 5). The balance of
benefits and risks associated with 'fair' accounting is a delicate one. Insofar as accounting requires
qualitative human judgement, because straightforward rules are not always available, and insofar as
the purpose of accounting is to provide transparency to markets, then it stands to reason that
finance companies have a responsibility to strive to account Jairly'.
In this vein, the SECadvances several corporate governance protocols to support it. "Given [mark-to-
market's] critical contribution to the integrity of valuation and books and records," it states,
"[independent management] supervisors must engage fully in understanding the price verification
controls at financial institutions, ensure that it is well resourced, has independent authority to push
back on the business line valuations, and is in ready communication with and has the active support
and investment of firm senior management" (SECS: 5). In short, good accounting, however
numerate, requires the discipline of sound, responsible corporate governance.
13 Although the substance of CMR is management protocols, rather than corporate structure or actions (see
Chapter 4, Section 4.4), note that regulators in this episode emphasised corporate structure in some depth,
such as rules for electing directors to various governing bodies in firms (USC3:895-900), accountability of non-
executive directors (UKT2: part 2, UKP3:10), and reporting lines to and from the Board particularly (ECS,UKT2,
USC3,SECS,SEC9).
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Accounting and risk management practices generally have relied heavily on credit ratings for capital
products, and the agencies that provide those ratings have come under scrutiny because they
underestimated the risk of many credit derivatives that subsequently failed." What I will address
here are the risk management rules in financial institutions for the use of credit ratings. As the FSA
put it, "The use of ratings-based investment and cash management rules by individual companies
[ ... J is entirely rational at the idiosyncratic level and Figure 5-7. The category Doing accounting fairly,
properties and (dimensions)it is very difficult to imagine how many institutions
could operate without such decision rules" (FSA6:
79). In principle, credit ratings systemise how
institutions assess credit risk, and ratings were
Understanding value verification controls
Having support of senior management
(resources, independent authority)
Limiting credit ratings to where they apply
(authority to push-back on transactions)
Monitoring risk over time (mark-to-market)largely accurate before the advent of complex
derivatives (FSA6: 43). The challenge is to ensure
that internal (idiosyncratic) rules on the use of ratings do not increase procyclicality in the system
undulv." To this end, once again discretionary judgement is paramount. Companies should limit
reliance on credit ratings only for securities where a consistent rating is possible (FSA6: 8). Moreover,
in line with the SEC's recommendation above, companies' risk analysts should operate
independently from "commercial revenue maximising objectives" (FSA6: 78), and push back on
trading decisions based on credit ratings that may not be consistent. In addition, the BIS has agreed
good-practice due diligence principles to reduce asset managers' reliance on credit ratings (BI52: 3).
Most of the issues arising from credit ratings in this episode relate to the agencies themselves,
however, and their supervision by regulatory authorities (FSA6: 78-9, UST3: 45-5, 87-8; 5EC7), who
should themselves rely less on ratings (UST3: 45).
5.2.1.3. Remuneration and risk-taking
High levels of remuneration in the financial industry, particularly the awarding of performance-
related bonuses, courted intense regulatory and political scrutiny because they could encourage
excessive risk-taking. The FSA argued that while other factors like approaches to accounting were
more important for risk management, "There is a strong prima facie case that inappropriate
incentive structures played a role in encouraging behaviour which contributed to the financial crisis"
14 There is a debate about how to regulate credit ratings agencies in their own right, but I focus here on how
banks and other financial institutions use ratings in their risk management.
15 Procyclicality in credits ratings occurs when, for example, a ratings downgrade for a certain institution then
inhibits that institution from raising further capital, thus making default more likely. Thus the rating itself
precipitates the default. The liquidity strain that AIG faced after a threatened downgrade in September 2008 is
an example.
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(FSA6:80). "[Past] remuneration policies ... resulted in large payments in reward for activities which
seemed profit making at the time but subsequently proved harmful to the institution, and in some
cases to the entire system," it said (ibid). Regulators had not previously addressed this issue and
firms had focused on the impact of remuneration on inter-firm competitiveness (attracting talent)
but not on balance sheet risk (ibid). like in Britain, the USregulator emphasised the importance of
reforming executive compensation for safeguarding campanies' long-term interest. As a result of the
systemic failure, the SEC began considering Ita broad package" of new compensation-related
guidance and regulation (SEC9:4). In Britain reform proposals arrived more quickly.
The FSAemphasised six principles for aligning remuneration with risk management practices. The
first principle is that the alignment should happen. This became a formal rule for "systemically
important companies", a designation that, as in the
Citigroup and SWF episodes, emphasises the
special responsibilities of large institutions. More
specifically, the second principle holds that
Figure 5-8. The category Alignming remuneration
with riskmanagement, properties and (dimensions)
remuneration committees should provide
Assessing its Impact on risk exposure
Aligning it with compliance record
Aligning It with risk profile of trades
Making deferred payments
(stock options, dates of maturity)
limitina auaranteed bonuses
independent judgements on the impact of company
remuneration policies for the company's risk
exposure. Thirdly, "remuneration should reflect an individual's record of compliance with risk
management procedures", not only their financial performance (FSA6:80). Fourth, the profit metrics
used to determine compensation should reflect the risk profile of the transactions (ibid). The
majority of performance-related bonuses should be paid in a deferred form and, finally, this
deferment should be linked to the transactions' financial performance (ibid). As is typical with the
FSA,this regulation took the form of principles that companies are expected to use to guide their
risk and corporate governance policies. In addition to these principles, the Financial Stability Board
(Bank for International Settlements) also called for limiting guaranteed bonuses (FSB2:9).
5.2.1.4. Stress-testing and moral hazard
In risk management, a firm's stress-tests assesswhether the firm has enough capital to withstand a
hypothetical crisis scenario. For example, a stress-test could measure how the company would fare
in a deep economic recession, or following defaults by a cross-section of borrowers, or in the midst
of a systemic failure. Stress-tests can also be used to design responses to operational issues,such as
IT failure.
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Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein told the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC 2010) that
moving stress-tests up the risk management agenda was one of the most important lessons that the
bank had learned from the crisis. Stress-testing was not as extensive before the crisis, and when it
happened it was often based on mild or wrong assumptions (EC5: 8). Instead, risk managers
confided in techniques that measured the future value-at-risk (VAR) of their risk exposures. In VAR
modelling, according to the FSA, lithe underlying methodological assumption was straightforward:
the idea that analysis of past price movement patterns could deliver statistically robust inferences
relating to the probability of price movements in future" (FSA6: 44). Accordingly, banks thought that
they had a good assessment of the likely risks they faced. However, the assumption that events in
financial markets have a similar distribution of frequency/severity as other phenomena is not
supported by evidence (see Taleb 2004, 2007). In financial markets, high-severity events may be
more frequent than VAR calculations indicate. In addition, they appear to be characterised by
randomness (Taleb 2004); that is, more unexpected, as well as more frequent. On this and other
bases," stress-testing 'what-if scenarios emerged as a fundamental risk management activity.
I have found suggestions of negligence or moral hazard in banks' choices of which scenarios were
modelled. In the opening quotation of this chapter, JP Morgan's Jamie Dimon states that crises are
"unsurprisingly" cyclical and that the one scenario JP Morgan did not consider was falling house
prices. Here is that second quotation in full:
"The [risk management) process is very rigorous, if you look at risk we have a separate pricing group,
internal audit, external audit, reviews by the DCC and the Fed, and if you had a chance to look at
those things you'd be pretty impressed by the diligence behind that process.
"As a company we always did some stress testing because history tells you that things go bad in the
market and you have to be prepared. And looking back ... the biggest mistakes we made, somehow in
mortgage underwriting, we just missed that home prices don't go up forever .... We stressed [tested)
almost everything else, but we didn't say 'home prices going down 40%'" (FCIC2010: 01:53:00).
Brian Moynihan, head of Bank of America, which bought Merrill Lynch to save it from bankruptcy,
stated something very similar:
lilt you ask what we thought we missed I think it would be similar to what Mr. Dimon said, which is ...
we didn't do the kind of testing you actually do on a trading book, saying, what if housing goes down
40% and test what your thought would be, and how best you protect your firm, and I think that's the
best lesson we've learned" (FCIC2010: 01:56:00).
Both banks ostensibly missed the falling house prices scenario, even though, among others, the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), which oversees international banking policy coordination,
warned in its 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 Annual Reports that a downturn in housing prices
16 SeeFSA6:44-45, 58-59; SEC1;SECS.
191
was a significant risk for the financial sector (see Chapter VII of each report). Yet the banks only
stress-tested "almost everything else". One possible explanation is that they failed to exercise due
skill, care and diligence, in contravention of the FSA'sPrinciple 2. Another is that they perceived an
implicit guarantee that the state would capitalise major banks in caseof crisis, to prevent a systemic
meltdown. In the latter interpretation, banks felt that they were 'too big to be allowed to fail'. A
stress-test would have revealed significant vulnerabilities; the lack of a stress-test would create
'plausible deniability' and enabled senior managers testify, as they did, that they were unaware of
these vulnerabilities. We could characterise either a lack of due skill or this moral hazard as
irresponsible, especially given the various warnings and the magnitude of risk.
Regulatory proposals have now recommended almost uniformly that some stress-test scenarios
should be provided by regulators (e.g. FSA6,UST2,SEC1,BOE1).This represents an increase in the
regulatory risks faced by financial institutions. These tests will take into account the existing systemic
position as well as how individual institutions might react in crisis scenarios. Regulators have also
extended responsibility for best-practice stress-testing to companies (perhaps in the hope of
deflecting criticism to companies if/when another crisis occurs). For example, the FSA now
recommends a "reverse stress-testing" approach whereby firms explicitly identify the areas where
they are most vulnerable and design scenarios that
Figure 5-9. The category Improving stress-testing,
properties and (dimensions)show how negative impacts would play out (FSA
200Sb: Ch. 3; also UKT2: 97). Among some of the
issues discussed are the expectations that banks
and other financial institutions promote
imaginative thinking when designing scenarios
(BOE2); contemplate complete systemic meltdown
(SEC1);contemplate shocksnot only to the firm but
to other firms of which it is a group (FSA200Sb);
assume no government bailouts (SECl);
incorporate short, sharp shock scenarios (SECl); improve disclosure (BOE2); and inform firms' risk-
Identifying vulnerabilities first and testing them,
ie. 'reverse stress-testing'
Promoting imaginative thinking for new scenarios
(NEDs,internal departments)
Contemplating systemic breakdown
(length, intensity of shocks)
Contemplating shocks to peers
Assuming no government bailouts
Improving disclosure
Linking tests with risk appetite
(trigger points, reporting channels)
appetite (BOE2, UKT2), particularly "pre-identification of trigger-points for review and revision of
[business] strategy" (FSA200Sb: 25). In the latter respect, stress-tests become an input for broader
investment policy.
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5.2.3. Investment policy: Choosing business activities
Howa firm's choice of business activities might impact on systemic risk also emerged as a corporate
responsibility issue in the previous episodes. Then, we saw the expectation that companies would
operate an investment policy with transparent commercial objectives and risk tolerance. Citigroup
was criticised for seeking to undermine the quote-driven Eurobond market and transform it into a
US-style order-driven market, where there is less transparency, through their bond trading. The
German regulator BaFin regarded that objective as "not investment driven" (WSJ18). A central public
concern about SWFs was that they might have investment objectives or strategies that were not
purely commercial. Best-practice for the choice and pursuit of business activities was coded as
operating a transparent investment policy that was driven by returns on invested assets, had an
acceptable risk tolerance, had benchmarks against which to evaluate transactions, systems to
monitor asset allocation/exposure, and was disclosed and auditable (Figure 4-20).
This proposition evolves in the post-credit-crunch debate. The manner in which certain business
practices and innovation were pursued was seen to have implications for broader market stability,
and consequently led to higher regulatory scrutiny. The expectation emerged that a firm's impact on
the wider system should influence it in choosing business activities. Short-selling, and innovation
more generally, are two such activities.
5.2.1.5. Short-selling
"There are practices that are contrary to fair and orderly markets; abusive short selling, for example,
would fall in that category," wrote the SEC(SEC7: 3). Short-selling means betting that an asset's price
will fall. To short-sell company shares, for example, traders borrow the shares from shareholders,
sell them on the open market, wait, re-buy them at a lower price (assuming the bet is successful),
and return them to the original owners with a small premium. The difference between the sell price
and the buy price, minus the premium paid to the original shareholder, is profit. In economic theory,
there is merit to this practice because it enables markets to discipline asset prices quickly, gives the
market liquidity, and provides a hedging tool for risk management. However, wrote IOSC017 in a
statement to the G-20:
"short-selling may be problematic in the midst of a crisis of confidence. For example, in a context of a
credit crisis where some entities face liquidity challenges, but are otherwise solvent, a decrease in
17 The International Organisation of Securities Commissions is an association of financial regulators from
around the world, who together supervise over 90%of global securities trading. It works closely with the Bank
for International Settlements, which is in effect an association of central bankers and was mandated by the G-
20 to coordinate international research into crisis response.
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their share price induced by short-selling may lead to further credit tightening for these entities,
possibly resulting in bankruptcy. In addition, there are circumstances in which short-selling can be
used as a tool to mislead the market. For example, short selling can be used in a downward
manipulation whereby a manipulator sells the shares of a company short and then spreads lies about
a company's negative prospects. This harms issuers and investors as well as the integrity of the
market" (IOSCO2008: 2; italics added).
In addition, aggressive short-selling by a group of funds can become a self-fulfilling bet without
misleading rumours being spread. The practice became contentious during the crisis because bank
equities came under extreme pressure from speculators.
Regulatory and political scrutiny focused on "naked" short-selling, where traders do not borrow the
securities they are shorting, but instead look to acquire them after they have undertaken the sale.
(Many trades are only settled at the end of the trading day, giving sellers some time to buy the
traded security.) If the seller is unable to acquire the security, the transaction fails. It was therefore
possible to sell certain shares non-stop, provided that one could demonstrate subsequent attempts
to acquire the shares. These attempts would ostensibly prove that the motive was not market
mantpulatlon", but in many cases the damage was already done, from a regulatory perspective,
because the price of the asset would have fallen as other traders observed a higher supply of those
assets on the market.
There is a clear trade-off between responsible businessand regulatory risk when it comes to short-
selling. Regulators restricted the most threatening form of short-selling on the grounds that it
threatened market stability, and there are grounds to suggest that conventional short-selling would
also be restricted if it had a bad effect on market stability, particularly if it were driving down the
value of bank shares. Short-selling was an established practice before the crisis, rather than a new
discovery. In 2008, when Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns went bankrupt, extensive short-selling
of bank shares became seen as abusive and EUand USregulators temporarily suspended it. In 2009
most regulators internationally restricted naked shorting permanently by tightening requirements
related to end-of-day transaction settlements, and Increasing pre-trade borrowing requirements
(IOSCO2008, SEC7).The SECconsidered proposals to reinstate the uptick rule, which stipulated that
the price of a conventional short-sale had to be higher than the last traded price of the security. The
FSAwas given powers to suspend short-selling unilaterally and independently of any changes to the
EU's market abuse directive (UKT1: 66). The German government banned certain forms of naked
shorting outright in 2010. The trajectory here has been progressively tighter regulator driven by the
threat that short-selling can pose to orderly financial markets, notwithstanding its benefits.
18 SeeChapter 3, Section 3.3.2 on market manipulation and other forms of market abuse.
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This gives us grounds to hypothesise that conventional shorting could be more tightly regulated or
banned if it disrupted markets further. The practical implication is that if financial firms witnessed a
'run' on the shares of another company (especially a bank), then they would be implicitly expected
to consider suspending shorting that asset. Due to momentum effects, that suspension could mean
foregoing profits whilst its competitors pursued the business opportunity, so this would be a very
difficult decision for any company.
This is where transparent and auditable investment policies apply. Such a policy relates to the choice
of investment activities and the way in which they are pursued. A policy that stipulated the risk
tolerance and clear parameters for transactions (per my original definition of a responsible
investment policy; Figure 4-20) could delineate a firm's attitude toward short-selling clearly. As a
generalised practice, these policies could resolve the coordination problem where individual firms
are reluctant to suspend short-selling because their competitors are continuing to profit from that
opportunity. Thus investment policies that defined clear parameters for short-selling could both
reassure regulators that this potentially healthy practice would stop in situations where it became
detrimental to the system, and resolve coordination failure in the industry to help provide (market
stability as) a public good. The latter is, after all, a purpose of many industry-led voluntary standards
(Haufler 2000).
5.2.1.6. Innovation
One of the major strengths of a market economy is its capacity to incentivise innovation, which leads
to economic growth and development opportunities. The market mechanism is generally assumed
to promote good innovation and demote bad, with the state occasionally stepping in when the
market fails. The key metric for distinguishing good and bad innovation is typically consumer
demand. However, the post-crisis debate has brought a new dimension to the "two sides to
innovation" (SEC14: 3). FSAChairman Adair Turner summarised the debate thus:
"Now of course, if you are an extreme Chicago school economic liberal [you will argue that) if the
industry grew dramatically in the decade to 2007 that must be because it was performing value added
services: if complex product innovations were able to sustain themselves economically, they must
have been socially useful innovations. But after what has happened, I think we know that that is not
the case. I think we know that imperfections and irrationality in financial markets which are not
fixable just by disclosure, but are inherent, mean that financial innovation which delivers no
fundamental economic benefit, can for a time flourish and earn for the individuals and institutions
which innovated, very large returns.
"Not all innovation is equally useful. [...) And in the years running up to 2007. too much of the
developed world's intellectual talent was devoted to ever more complex financial innovations. whose
maximum possible benefit in terms of allocative efficiency was at best marginal. and which in their
complexity and opacity created large financial stability risks" (FSA200gb: 14-5, underlining added).
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Whereas Turner emphasised the societal utility of financial innovation here, his SEC counterpart
Mary Shapiro made the point at a commercial level: "At their worst, the self-interests of financial
engineers seeking short-term profit can lead to ever more complex and costly products designed less
to serve investors' needs than to generate fees" (SEC14: 3). The UK Treasury emphasised the SEC's
argument: "Innovation seems to have led to the development of large ranges of subtly different
products rather than to increasing market focus on the types of products which consumers might
reasonably be expected to want" (UKT1: 158). Firms' ability to create new mortgage products for
subprime consumers and opaque structured credit derivatives was a major cause of the crisis (UKT1:
Ch. 3). The negative aspects of innovation in this episode are not new. Citigroup's extraordinary
transaction was controversial in part because it was so innovative, a property that featured in
proposition regarding when CMR was most important (Table 4-18).
Pre-crisis innovations were closely associated with what the public debate termed 'irresponsible
lending'. The SEC's then-Chairman Christopher Cox was bullish on this point:
"It is abundantly clear [...) that if honest lending practices had been followed, much of this crisis quite
simply would not have occurred. [...) This is typified by the notorious no down payment loans and 'no-
doc' loans in which borrowers not only didn't have to disclose income or assets, but even
employment wasn't verified.
"Securitisation of these bad loans was advertised as a way to diversify and thus reduce the risk. But in
reality it spread the problem to the broader markets" (SEC1:2-3, underlining added).
Cox stated that derivatives "fuelled" the crisis, but poor lending practices "created" it (ibid). The
issue here is not only risk management, therefore, but rather how new products are developed and
marketed. Many of these loan products were judged to be "unfair", "abusive", or "deceptive" (UST3:
58). One of the most contentious was so-called exploding mortgages, which had no or very low
interest rates for the first years that subsequently 'exploded'. In order to lock in profits, some
lenders prohibited borrowers from repaying any principal on their debt in the early years or imposed
extremely high early repayment fees.
The problem with these consumer-facing products is the same as the inter-bank problem raised by
Shapiro; that they do not serve consumer or investors' interests so much as generate income. This
brings to mind Citigroup's apology for its transaction, where the head of global capital markets said,
"We must exercise sound judgement, know our markets and our clients well and act in their best
interests" (FT28). Knowing clients well and acting in their interests applies to assessing their
creditworthiness and selling them appropriate products. Knowing markets and acting in their interest
applies to ensuring that risk is not misunderstood and spread opaquely throughout the system.
Exercising sound judgement is a general principle that is essential to promote systemic stability
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because there is a limit to how much responsibility regulators can take for regulating innovation,
given that innovation is a driver of corporate
Figure 5-10. New properties and (dimensions) of
Operating a sound investment policygrowth and profitability. In fact, the problems of
innovation have led to deeper regulation of
derivatives, particularly the $58 trillion credit
default swap market which, according to the SECis
"completely lacking in transparency and
completely unregulated" (SEC1:2; see 8IS2). The
enduring need for corporate responsibility, and its similarity to the Citigroup episode, are also clear
Choosing business activltles
Establishing clear parameters for short-selling
(risk appetite, foregone profits)
Innovating for customers'/investors' true needs
(product differentiation, true demand)
(consumer know/edge, freedom)
from this analysis. Whatever regulation is enacted, it is unlikely to succeed without sound
judgement.
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5.2.4. Proactive improvement: Literal v. responsible compliance
The ethos of disciplined innovation is thus closely associated with the expectation that financial
firms improve their shortcomings proactively. In the Citigroup and SWFsepisodes, this expectation
of proactive improvement was evident even though no specific regulation had been contravened
and when the perceived costs of the shortcomings were limited to the company. In the Citigroup
case, the FSAdecreased its fine becauseCitigroup had, between the trade and the FSAinvestigation,
taken steps to communicate its corporate values to staff, re-trained staff in ethical standards,
invested in information-reporting quality, and strengthened its compliance department. SWFs, for
their part, were encouraged to create a code-of-conduct proactively and stick to it rather than face
new regulation. After the Credit Crunch, several dimensions of proactive improvement emerged in
relation to risk management and compliance itself.
A regulator-driven imperative to strive continuously to improve is as surprising, from an economic
perspective, as the principle that businesses should "demonstrate due skill", the FSA's second
principle which I discussed in Chapter 3. One would infer from economic theory that companies who
do not strive to improve - or demonstrate due skill - will succumb to greater competition. However,
what emerges from a regulatory perspective is that companies who do not improve proactively put
the entire system at risk, not only themselves. The Walker Review on Corporate Governance (UKT2:
92) made this point by writing, "A BOFI[bank or other financial institution] board that failed to draw
on the experience embedded in [best-practice risk management] techniques to ensure that
appropriate management and control processes are in place would be in breach of its
responsibilities". More is at stake in corporate governance than the firm. The system relies on good
practice.
In this vein, proactive improvement should involve good judgement in complying with new
regulation. Throughout the thesis I have referred to CMR being a requirement above and beyond
compliance, by definition. This is because the Citigroup and SWFepisodes showed an expectation of
CMR behaviour despite strict compliance having been observed. While that data helped me to
define specific activities that comprise CMR, and in which situations they applied, the data did not
specify how much the overall requirement of CMRvaried with the overall specificity of regulation.
We could have hypothesised that CMR requirements are constant however specific regulation is; or
that that there is zero-sum trade-off between regulation and CMR. (There is a frequent assumption
of zero-sum trade-offs between formal regulation and self-regulation, of which CMR is a form.) Data
in this episode suggested that the requirements of CMRvary with the specificity of regulation, but
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do not amount to a zero-sum trade-off. In some cases,CMR may even rise with the specificity of
regulation (although the data does not indicate when this would be most likely). The key point is that
however specific and prescriptive new regulation is, it requires discretionary, and responsible,
interpretation.
The more surprising data source to communicate this was the Securities and ExchangeCommission,
which is a rules-based, 'hard compliance' regulator. It concluded one of its testimonies on "Securities
Law Enforcement" with the statement:
" ...we need to encouragea tone and culture, especiallyamongthose who maketheir livingsfrom
other people's investments,that merecompliancewith the law, narrowlyviewed, is not the highest
goal to whichwe aspire,but the basefrom whichwe start.Thesecuritiesindustryaswhole needsto
embrace this compliance culture, and in eachfirm, the tone must be set at the top. We shouldall
work toward a systemwherethosewhowork in it are responsiblestewardsof the assetsentrustedto
them" (SEC6: 14-5).
The USregulator pointed to the importance of sound discretionary judgement in implementing new
rules. "In order for markets to function properly", it stated, management must ensure they are
providing shareholders with "adequate information about their companies" and allowing them to
"exercise effectively their rights to elect directors" (SEC9:1-2, formatting added). Disclosure and
voting rights are strict regulatory requirements, but the added expectation is that senior
management will tailor implementation to the company's particular situation and the good
functioning of the market. For example, disclosed
information must be "straightforward, Figure 5-11. The category Responsible compliance,properties and (dimensions)
understandable, and meaningful" (ibid). UK
authorities, which tend to favour principles-
based regulation, emphasised the point: "Despite
the need for hard rules in some areas, this [good
corporate governance] will not be assured by
overly-specific prescription that generates box
ticking conformity. So while some of [our] recommendations ... are relatively prescriptive, for
Pursuing shared objectives with the regulator
Pursuing best-practice techniques
Enabling a compliance culture
Setting tone at board level
Providing genuine adequate information
Demonstrating sound judgement
(literal compliance, responsible compliance)
example on the [role of the chief risk officer], most set parameters within which there is need for
judgement and appropriate flexibility" (Urn: 7). These statements are especially meaningful in the
context of high pressure to tighten regulation under which they were written. If there were a
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context in which we would expect a hard regulatory approach looking to 'leave nothing to chance',
this would be one."
This analysis adds a new property to proactive improvement category - demonstrating sound
judgment complying with regulation. It is tempting to label two dimensions of this property as
minimum compliance, which seeksthe lowest-cost compliance solution, and responsible compliance,
which seeks to meet the goal of the regulation, within the parameters set by the latter. This would
suggest that responsible compliance is nearly always more costly than minimum compliance,
because it requires an additional judgment. That might sometimes be the case in the US,where the
emphasis is on following specific rules (see, however, Ayers and Braithwaite 1992: 120-123). In
European corporate governance (including some risk management and business policy rules), the
minimum/responsible compliance dichotomy is less applicable because the general principle is
"comply or explain" (UKT2: 38, EC2006). If companies choose not to comply with a corporate
governance guideline they can explain why, both to their shareholders and the regulator. The FSA
has said it will be dedicating more time to assessinglarge banks' submissions on these points. As a
result of "comply or explain", responsible compliance may be lesscostly than minimum compliance,
if we define the latter as looking to follow the letter of the law. Therefore, the two dimensions of
sound judgment in compliance could be termed literal compliance versus responsible compliance.
This dichotomy integrates well with several existing theories, which I discuss in the next chapter.
19 Indeed,then-SECChairmanChristopherCoxstatedIntestimonythat "We havelearnedthat self-regulation
doesnot work" (SEC2:5).
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5.2.5. Additional issues: Systemically important companies
Throughout this analysis, the primary actors in the CMR debate have
been broadly defined, with a similar stylised approach as the UK
government, which refers to "banks and other financial institutions
(BOFI)" in its corporate governance review (UKT2). Many of the pre-
crisis failures originated in "quasi-banks", as the FSA put it, or the
"shadow banking system", in the US government's language. These
institutions were sometimes special purpose vehicles where banks
deposited their risk; other times they were mortgage brokers who
effectively acted as lenders (WP35); some marketing companies had
such long-standing contracts with banks that they were effectively
an extension of their bank clients; hedge funds were involved in
short-selling. The key differentiator in the regulatory debate, for
which companies merited special attention, became their "systemic
importance".
Under US legislative proposals, the degree to which a company is
systemically important depends on its size, degree of
interconnectedness, and degree of leverage (debt) (UST4). Tier 1
financial holding companies (FHCs), as they are called, are set to be
supervised specifically by the Federal Reserve, in the US, and face
higher regulatory rules and standards. The US Treasury wrote,
"These standards will be set with a focus on the risks that these
firms could pose to the financial system as a whole, not just the risks
to each institution" (ibid). The Financial Times (2009b) reported that
it had obtained a confidential list of the 30 most systemically
Figure 5-12. List of SIS-designated
systemically important companies
(FT 200gb)
us
Bank of America Merrill
Citigroup
Goldman Sachs
JPMorgan Chase
Morgan Stanley
Canada
Royal Bank of Canada
UK
Barclays
HSBC
Royal Bank of Scotland
Standard Chartered
Switzerland
Credit Suisse
UBS
France
BNP Pari bas
Societe Generale
Spain
BBVA
Santander
Japan
Mitsubishi UFJ
Mizuho
Nomura
Sumitomo Mitsui
Italy
Banca Intesa
UniCredit
Germany
Deutsche Bank
Netherlands
ING
Insurance groups
Aegon
Allianz
Aviva
Axa
Swiss Re
Zurich
important companies, as designated by the BIS, reproduced in Figure 5-12. They are mostly banks.
The BIS takes the view that "regulation needs to focus on the economic substance of financial
activities, rather than the legal form assumed by institutions. We have learned that the activities of
large, highly leveraged institutions of all kinds have significant systemic impacts and potentially pose
critical systemic risks" (BIS1). The US and UK agree. American definitions of Tier 1 FHC's will include
banks, broker-dealers, investment companies, investment advisors, insurers, commodities pools,
and others (KPMG 2009: 4). In the UK, Adair Turner, head of the FSA, referred to the "'duck factor' -
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if something looks and sounds like a duck, it will be treated as if it is one" (FT172).This is a lesson I
take forward to the next chapter, on theorising corporate market responsibility: that generic
principles of CMR may be tentatively generalisable among a wider set of financial actors, insofar as
they are grounded in maintaining systemic stability and in the experiences of large, interconnected
financial institutions.
5.2.6. Preliminary conclusions
In review, this data illustrates two balances that are needed for regulating systemic risk. One is the
balance of hard analysis and soft judgment. Hard risk mathematics required soft corporate
governance standards. Dry accounting techniques required good discretionary judgement. Economic
scenario stress-testing required imagination and broad participation. Competitive innovation
required a systemic perspective. Compliance was lessmeaningful without shared objectives. In this
vein, finance appears to acquire an endogenous socio-political dimension. We can anticipate some
theoretical implications. Non-economic, or non-maximising, behaviour does not appear to be
restricted to the non-market domain, nor even to inter-firm negotiations within the market domain.
Regulating systemic risk requires non-economic behaviour within companies. As part of the daily
grind of lending and trading, a wide range of management systems needed to be subjectively
tailored to mitigate potentially corrosive impacts on the wider system.
The second balance is of responsibilities, between regulators and companies. Regulators
acknowledged that systemic risk cannot be identified idiosyncratically from within companies;
hence, much of the debate was about how to restructure regulatory authorities, particularly in the
US. However, financial stability would not be achieved without firm-level reforms to risk
management and trading, as regulators could not be expected to provide all of the requisite
mechanisms prescriptively. Further, it emerged that a literal reading of regulation would not suffice
to meet the regulators' objectives. This was evident even at the SEC,which describes itself as a "law
enforcement agency" (e.g. SEC6).Orderly markets required shared responsibilities, implemented via
improved management protocols.
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5.3. Resonance: The wider debate in the press
"We don't know much about financial
regulation, but we know what we don't like."
The people have spoken [...]
Andrew Hill, Financial times"
"Financial news may have great human interest potential to the extent that it deals with the making
or breaking of fortunes," wrote Shiller (2002: 85). Much in line with this idea, the press reports of
the regulatory debate disproportionately emphasised the issue of remuneration. This subject
received far more emphasis in the news than other topics, despite regulators having discussed it less
than accounting or lending standards, for example. The media's emphasis brought its own pressure
to bear on banks, independently of regulators'. Some banks took steps to improve risk-based
remuneration proactively. In 2009 Goldman Sachs paid a higher share of bonuses in stocks and
deferred payments, "in a bid to quell public anger", according to the Financial Times (2009c). The
issue became important also for shareholders. According to the Wall Street Journal, Goldman Sachs
set up a number of meetings with major shareholders in December 2009 to explain the rationale
behind their high executive compensation (WSJS6). Excessiveremuneration has become an explicit
and widespread "red flag" that investment companies seek out in due diligence investigations of
potential investment targets, because it may signal reputational or investment risks. This example
helps to illustrate why it is useful, epistemologically, to analyse the news. Taking as a given that
news reports influence market actors' expectations and actions, even distorted media emphasis
acquires ontological significance. In this case, media emphasis became synonymous with "public
anger", which made remuneration reform a larger regulatory risk than it was solely on the basis of
regulatory documents.
In this section, I review how news reporting introduced new nuances to the conceptual categories
developed on the basis of regulatory documents. One example of new conceptual properties is the
relationship between ethics and technical analysis. Regulators had emphasised that new structured
credit derivative products had been "socially useless" or not in clients' interests. News reports
questioned the ethical standards of senior staff at banks and credit ratings agencies, and their
potential impact on the wider system. If we accept the logic that news reports can elevate a
relatively secondary issue to a prime regulatory risk for companies, then we are likely to find
20 Citedin FT17S.
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humanising technical activity, as I would call it, an increasingly relevant component of corporate
market responsibility. The new analytical layer from media data is set out in the following
paragraphs, where I detail news reports' contributions to our propositions on risk management,
investment policy, and proactive improvement.
5.3.1. Riskmanagement, investment policy, and improvement
News reports about the regulatory documents did not go into detail on the whole scope of risk
management issues, but focused on the more accessible components of remuneration, corporate
governance, and stress-testing.
5.2.1.7. Remuneration and risk-taking
"How many boats hove I bought? It's
not a good time to answer that. "
Michael Sherwood, Goldman Sachs, in 2009"
A central controversy regarding remuneration in the banking system was the perception that
governments were underwriting bonuses at banks. Many banks had relied on direct government
investment, particularly Citigroup, Lloyds, and RoyalBankof Scotland (RBS),in order to remain going
concerns. All had benefitted from very cheap, sometimes free, credit from central banks under the
monetary policy known asquantitative easing.The "public" therefore perceived these fortunes to be
funded by governments while at the same time unemployment and bankruptcies were rising steeply
in other economic sectors. According to a New York Times report, "public fury over bonuses has
spilled into the regulatory effort" (NYT27).The Conservative shadow chancellor in the UKsaid, lilt is
totally unacceptable for bank bonuses to be paid on the back of taxpayer guarantees" (TISO). Public
perceptions were so emphatic that it was even reported that the head of RBS,Stephen Hester, had
been criticised for his remuneration by his mother (Financial Times 2010). Barclays and several
government-backed banks followed Goldman Sachs's lead in reforming their compensation
structures, at least temporarily.
Against this background, the debate in news reports (whose interlocutors were reporters, editorial
writers, market participants, policy-makers, and others who are invited to comment in the press)
focused on how adequately to govern remuneration. One of the most frequent measures cited was
disclosure (FT192, FT200,DT70, DT72, GU5S).More specifically, some argued that disclosure would
only be useful if it were comprehensive: naming and shaming. The FT'sLex column supported strong
21 Citedin The Sunday Times (2009).
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disclosure. "To enable shareholders to monitor risk taking," it stated, "investors need to identify
which employees, and therefore which product lines and business units, are generating abnormal
rewards ... [The] argument that there is no evidence that naming and shaming would improve risk
governance is weak" (FT192).
Alongside disclosure, deferring payments and using share options in place of cash bonuses emerged
as the two consensual management protocols. According to regulatory proposals, financial
executives should only be awarded bonuses for their trades once those investments have matured
and their risk has been adequately assessed. In a similar bid to promote a more long-term
investment approach, the use of share options as compensation is intended to encourage traders
and lenders to act their company's interest. A third protocol - which had not been evident in
regulatory papers but emerged in reporting - was to moderate retirement packages. Some of the
closest media scrutiny was placed on chief executives who retired with very large 'golden
parachutes'. In the UK, the referential case- "widely seen as the clearest single example of banking
hubris and excess" (Daily Telegraph 2009) - was that of former RBSCEOFred Goodwin, who retired
with an annual pension of £555,000, after having led RBSto a $24 billion loss, the largest in UK
history (ibid). After intense public debate and even vandal attacks on his home in Scotland, Goodwin
agreed to reduce the pension to £342,500, effectively returning £4.7 million to the bank.
These three protocols for improving remuneration,
which I note in Figure 5-13, were uncontroversial
in comparison to other regulatory proposals. Some
failed proposals had been intrusive and legalistic,
rather than principles-driven. One of the most
stringent and most feared (WSJ92)was a cap on
bonuses as a percentage of salary. France and
Germany had supported this option, while the USand UKopposed it (DT79).
Figure 5-13. New sub-properties and (dimensions)
of Aligning remuneration with risk management
Disclosing remuneration packages
(detailed information 'naming and shaming')
(individuals)
(business lines)
Moderating retirement packages
Renouncing bonuses if required
At a summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009, the G20 endorsed the more discretionary
recommendations, stating that "[regulatory] supervisors should have the responsibility to review
firms' compensation policies and structures with institutional and systemic risk in mind and, if
necessary to offset additional risks, apply corrective measures" (G20 2009). This statement
foreshadows some of the theoretical conclusions that I draw in the next chapter about the
enforcement of CMR. G20 governments promoted a discretionary regime for governing
remuneration, while simultaneously reserving the right to enforce it. The statement captures
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succinctly the push for 'regulating self-regulation', anchored in a concern over systemic risk. Both
sides, firms and regulators, responded. At the end of 2009 and start of 2010, Barclays, Lloyds, RBS,
and Goldman Sachs CEOs renounced their latest bonuses." On the regulatory side, the SEC
"stretched the law" to "confiscate" bonuses and other compensation from CEOs and CFOs in US
companies, according to a former SECassistant director (WSJ84).
One month before the G20 summit, the US House of Representatives passed a bill on executive
compensation that empowered regulators to scrutinise executive compensation schemes, and gave
shareholders the right to vote on those schemes. (The votes would be nonbinding.) Higher
shareholder activism had already been endorsed by the SECin several testimonies (e.g. SEC9), and it
emerged as a significant topic in the media data.
5.2.1.8. Shareholder responsibility
Much of the media's reporting of the regulatory documents was faithful to regulators' emphases on
transparency, impartial risk committees, and disciplined non-executive directorships; yet two
additional subjects received new attention. One was being a responsible shareholder. In a column
titled "Watchdogs that must be taught to bark in the boardroom", the Guardian's City editor argued
that "institutional investors also have a case to answer" for their role in permitting the crisis to occur
(GUSS). Additionally, she argued, shareholders "should invest responsibly, carefully monitoring the
businesses in which they own stakes" (ibid). The
UK's City Minister, Lord Myners, was cited saying,
"Institutional shareholders need to ask
Figure 5-14. The category Being a responsible
shareholder, property and sub-properties
themselves: were they appropriately engaged in
asking questions about the risk appetite of our
banks? Were they asking sufficient questions
about competency of directors and appropriately
engaged in examining and approving compensation cultures?"(ibid}.
Investigating directors' fitness
Investigating compensation culture
Monitoring businesses over time
Managing conflicts of interest
Escalating activities as required
The UK's government's Walker Review of corporate governance - which had remarked that
"Shareholders who do not exercise [thorough] governance oversight are effectively free-riding on
the governance efforts of those that do" (UKT2: 71; Ch 5) - spawned a new code of conduct: the
22 Curiously, the FT had reported after the G20 summit that the recommendations "mirrored existing best
practice among leading financial groups", citing one executive saying, dubiously, "It iswhat everybody already
does, although it is good to have it written down in black and white" (FT210).
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Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors published by the Institutional Shareholders
Committee (ISC).23Its seven principles included:
• Disclosing a policy on how their "stewardship responsibilities" would be discharged;
• "Managing conflicts of interest in relation to stewardship";
• Monitoring "investee" companies;
• Establishing guidelines on how to escalate activities;
• Disclosing a policy on how activities will be "escalated" (shareholder activism) (ISe2009: 2-5).
Thus the ISCcode encouraged shareholders to establish their own codes. Myners found it superficial
and stated that it did not resolve what he called the problem of "ownerless corporations" (FT198).
The head of Tomorrow's Company, an NGO, encouraged a more radical approach; to distinguish
between fund managers and asset owners (fund managers' clients), and encourage the latter to
exert more pressure. Other NGOs, like Governance for Owners, and service providers, like
RiskMetrics, proposed a range of options for resolving the stewardship gap, ranging from league
tables to pools of funds to support activism among shareholders (ibid). like regulators' proposals,
these called for providing adequate information to shareholders while the latter effectively exercise
their voting rights - conceptual properties of proactive improvement.
As Myners put it, "Responsible ownership means industry as a whole playing its part to drive up
standards so that governance becomes the norm and responsibility of all, not limited to governance
geeks" (FT198). The well-known concept of 'shareholder rights' thus acquired a complement in
'shareholder responsibilities'.
5.2.1.9. Ethics of competence
The second institutional issue given relatively higher prominence in the media was ethics. Regulatory
papers from the SEC, FSA, and their Treasury counterparts, had characterised many lending practices
as dishonest (see also GU49). Several commentators in the media expanded the charge of
mischievousness throughout the system. Gretchen Morgenson, author of the New York Times'
influential Market Watch column, wrote,
23 The Ise describes itself as a "forum which allows the UK's institutional shareholding community to exchange
views and, on occasion, coordinate their activities in support of the interests of UK investors"; it is backed by
the influential Investment Managers' Association and Association of British Insurer, among others;
www.institutionalshareholderscommittee.org.uk.
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"Companies, even those in cyclical businesses, routinely told investors that the reason they so
regularly beat their earnings forecasts was honest hard work - and not cookie-jar accounting. They
were believed. [...]
Wall Street dealmakers were fawned over like all-knowing superstars, their comings and goings
celebrated. No one doubted them.
Banks engaging in anything-goes lending practices assured shareholders that safety and soundness
was their mantra. They, too, got a pass.
Directors who didn't begin to understand the operational complexities of the companies they were
charged with overseeing told stockholders that they were vigilant fiduciaries. Investors suspended
their disbelief. [...]
My hypocrisy meter konked out last week." (NYT21).
This excerpt is representative of a broader sample insofar as it frames ethics both in terms of
honesty but also competence. Being competent is not something that the market will necessarily
resolve by replacing incompetent people with better specimens." Rather, actively acknowledging
incompetence is partly one's own ethical prerogative. Indeed the close association between honesty
and competence lay embedded in the FSA's"Fit and Proper test [sic] for Approved Persons", which
individuals have to pass in order to obtain certain jobs in the financial industry or to acquire large
companies. The two assessment categories in the test are "Honesty, integrity and reputation" and
"Competence and capability". Explaining one decision to fail an individual, the FSAcited indications
of a banker's incompetence, which asa result "prejudiced the interest of consumers" (FSA200ge: 2).
The ethics of competence is also associated with the issue of performance-related remuneration,
because doing one's job well, without outsized bonuses, is common practice outside of the financial
industry. Publicising an idea they call "identity economics", George Akerloff and Rachel Kranton
argued that,
"the public, in America and elsewhere, are so angry about the bonuses on Wall Street[ because] Most
of us just get up in the morning and do our jobs [...] We take pride in jobs well done and we celebrate
people such as [American Airlines pilot) Sully Sullenberger who, after ditching his plane in the Hudson
River, checked the cabin twice for remaining passengers before being the last to evacuate. As he
explained: 'I was just doing my job.' [...] Why then, we ask, do traders and bankers need outsize
bonuses and performance pay to get them to do their jobs? [...)
"In identity economics, performance pay demonstrates bad faith. It tells employees they are not
trusted to do the right thing. Rather, incentives have to be right. [...]
"The incentive should not be to manipulate the system, but to live up to responsibilities: to pilot the
plane; to storm the beach; to run to the fire. In the financial world. it is called fiduciary duty,"
(Financial Times 2010c, underlining added).
24 This is analogous to the argument that the market will not necessarily remove 'bad' innovations.
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Ros Haniffa, an accounting professor, extended this argument from individuals' performance to the
level of business strategy:
"We need to get the corporate elite in financial services to understand that protecting their
professional integrity and maintaining high ethical standards will sometimes require taking less profit
and bonus. The overall impact on the economy and society has to playa part in how the elite run
these businesses.
"What we have to do now is tackle the fundamental issue. There needs to be a major mind shift by
those involved in the banking industry - from excessive greed to justifiable profit. And business
schools have a significant part to play in educating the next generation of business leaders on ethical
ways of conducting business" (FT199).
To code these arguments on a more abstract level, Akerloff, Kranton, and Haniffa call for conducting
business with some non-financial objectives. At the individual executive's level, this entails doing
one's job well without being greedy, and at the strategic level, it entails justifying corporate profits.
Across both dimensions, there is also the
conceptual property humanising technical
activity. The regulatory documents highlighted
the importance of soft judgement in 'hard' risk
management, such as understanding how to
apply accounting standards in particular
situations (SEC7: 4). Using almost identical
language, Haniffa called on ethical grounds for "training in how to apply codes of conduct in
Figure SolS. The category Ethical competence,
properties and (dimensions)
Acknowledging fitness for role
(honesty, competence)
Conducting business with some non-financial
objectives
Performing well, without greed
Justifying corporate profits
everyday [accounting] situations" (FT199). In the context of education, she continued, "Students
must be exposed to alternative business models and thinking, not just trained to resolve complicated
financial problems through mathematical modelling. These tend to be detached from the real world
and consideration of human elements" (FT199). Ethics is thus closely associated with introducing a
human, qualitative dimension to typically formalist methodologies of risk management (see also
NYT21and WSJ67).
5.2.1.10. Humanising technical activity
Technology got ahead of our ability
to use it in responsible ways.
Andrew Lo, Finance Professor at MIT25
To what extent did risk managers delegate their responsibilities to non-human processes?Which is
to ask, did they neglect their responsibilities? Parties to the regulatory debate frequently invoked
25 Cited in NYT24.
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what the FSAtermed a "misplaced reliance on sophisticated maths" (FSA6:16). Press reports also
pursued this theme. In these reports, the issuewas not only technical content (such as the relative
usefulness of value-at-risk modelling versus stress-testing), but also human judgement. At senior
level, managers were criticised for failing to understand their risk models, while at lesssenior levels,
for "confusing the model with the world" (NYT24): "The quantitative models typically have their
origins in academia and often the physical sciences. In academia, the focus is on problems that can
be solved, proved and published - not messy, intractable challenges. In science, the models derive
from particle flows in a liquid or a gas, which conform to the neat, crisp laws of physics. Not so in
financial modelling," wrote a New York Times reporter (ibid). "The price of an asset, like a house or a
stock, reflects not only your beliefs about the future, but you're also betting on other people's
beliefs," said an economist at the Federal Reserve, "It's these hierarchies of beliefs - these
behavioral factors - that are so hard to model" (ibid). Leslie Rahl, head of Capital Market Risk
Advisors, stated that "Complexity, transparency, liquidity and leverage have all played a huge role in
this crisis. And these are things that are not generally modelled as a quantifiable risk" (ibid). The
problem was that many institutions held as a guiding principle that anything could be modelled.
When an executive at the credit ratings agency Standard & Poor's voiced reluctance to rate a
particular product, his colleague was reported to have replied by email, "We rate every deal. It could
be structured by cows and we would rate it"
(NYT21). Figure S-16. The category Humanising technical
activity, properties and (dimensions)
Mistakes were also made in the other direction.
Economists at the Federal Reserve assessed
Training in alternative business/thought models
Understandi", models' limitations
(reverse stress-testing the models)
(triggers, thresholds)several models used by Wall Street analysts that
"correctly predicted that a drop in real estate
prices of 10 or 20 percent would imperil the market for subprime mortgage-backed securities. But
the analysts themselves assigned a very low probability to that happening" (NYT24). I have noted
that there is evidence that banks wilfully neglected (the BIS's) warnings about housing market
vulnerabilities.
In this difficult interaction between risk methodologies and business prerogatives, the lesson is
therefore not that models should be used lessand human intuition trusted more. Rather, it is that in
order to use models responsibly, risk managers must actively seek to understand their
methodological weaknesses. We can develop this principle by recalling some of the
recommendations for stress-testing. Stress-testing is the practice of assessing how well a firm's
finances (or operations) could withstand a shock. Some of the recommendations included selecting
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and modelling scenarios specifically on the grounds that they would be the most hurtful for the
company. An analogous technique might be extended for using risk models more responsibly. Under
what conditions will the models fail to estimate risk correctly? Is it possible to stress-test risk models
themselves?
We know that models tend to fail in extreme (stress) scenarios. As Alan Greenspan argued, in an
article titled, "We will never have a perfect model of risk":
"Themostcredibleexplanationof why state-of-the-artstatisticalmodelscanperformsopoorly is that
[ ..• J thesemodelsdo not fully capturewhat I believehasbeen,to date, only a peripheraladdendum
to business-cycleand financialmodelling- the innatehumanresponsesthat result in swingsbetween
euphoria and fear that repeat themselvesgeneration after generation with little evidence of a
learningcurve" (Greenspan2008).
Greenspan adds that common practice is "to introduce notions of 'animal spirits', as John Maynard
Keynes put it, through 'add factors'. That is, we arbitrarily change the outcome of our model's
equations" (ibid). The "arbitrary" criteria for these changes bring to mind the notion of "random
sampling", the fundamental belief, in rationalist methodologies, that one should not presuppose the
outcome of the tests. Yet, based on the data above, I infer that another requirement is to seek to
identify the extreme situations in which the model is likely to fail. Similar to the process of reverse
stress-testing, this would allow risk modellers to identify triggers and thresholds, and thus to raise
alarm.
5.3.2. Preliminary conclusions
The press data helped to identify how the issues raised by the regulatory debate became part of
wider expectations beyond official regulatory circles. This was a technical contribution insofar as it
comprised new properties of the CMR management protocols. Clearly, aligning remuneration with
risk management was a higher priority for the public debate - where it dominated reporting - than
within for the regulatory debate specifically. Questions about the competence and honesty of some
of the people receiving outsized remuneration coincided with a wider discussion about ethical
competence, and touched both on issuesof strategic orientation (justifying profits), and of technical
activity, which became detached from the interests of banks' clients and banks themselves. New
sets of actors were called to responsibility, namely shareholders, who were said to have been too
passive in not investigating risk management and investment policies in companies. Insofar as news
media influence expectations and activities in the marketplace, and insofar as the fallout from the
Credit Crunch is set to dominate economic policy for several years, then these concepts are likely
increasingly to playa part in shaping expectations of corporate conduct.
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5.4. Theoreticalintegration
Before setting out what this episode tells us about CMR, it is important to understand the various
relationships between these concepts themselves. Theory is, as Straussand Corbin (1998: 15) put it,
"a set of well-developed concepts related through statements of relationship, which together
constitute an integrated framework that can be used to explain or predict phenomena". By
identifying, comparing, and conceptualising these relationships, a grounded theorist aims to discover
a unifying theme that explains the episode. In the following paragraphs, I argue that the central
categories in this episode are responsible compliance and humanising technical activity.
This episode was different from the Citigroup and SWFscases.The latter were more sequential. It
was possible to discern specific signals of controversy (the problem), its resolution, and the generic
processes like judging conduct that explained the trajectory. This episode, by contrast, takes place in
a cycle of debate that has had no clear resolution. All of the concepts display significant inter-
relationships, whatever point in the sampling period they emerged in. The reason for this may be the
high number and variety of actors involved in the Credit Crunch controversy. Whereas the earlier
controversies focused on a single actor and then a single set of actors, this one called a much wider
range of financial firms into account. Below, in Figure 5-17, I have set out some of the key
relationships between the concepts, asa tool for identifying the central themes.
Each relationship is defined by each concept's properties that were identified in the data. (For
example, the matrix notes that a relationship between responsible compliance and choosing
business activities is establishing and disclosing parameters for short-selling. This is because
establishing parameters for short-selling is related to both concepts in the data itself, rather than
because it was simply logically deduced.) This table helps us to identify which categories comprise a
unifying theme for the episode. The table uses the language of grounded theory methodology: the
label 'proposition' refers to the CMR propositions shown in Figure 5-1 at the start of this chapter.
The label 'category' refers to concepts in the data. 'Properties' are characteristics of each category.
Several paths are available in order to find such a theme. The simplest would be to assesswhich
categories are related to the most other categories. However, in the present episode, all of the
concepts are interrelated. Instead, a second option would be to identify which concept has the same
relationship with every other; where the same conceptual property explains all of the relationships.
This option's strength is to provide a high degree of certainty that the concept matters; a high
degree of fit with data. However, it is also possible that the concept would matter in a relatively
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peripheral way; that is, have little resonance. One example of this is being a responsible shareholder,
which is related to several other categories through providing (receiving) high quality information.
While high quality of information is certainly a fundamental issue, shareholders' responsibilities
were not central to the problematique. A third and preferable alternative is to identify which
concepts show both strong relationships (defined by references of relationship in the data), and a
variety of relationships. This process demonstrates that the final unifying concepts are theoretically
dense - packing lots of references in the data and lots of conceptual properties - and account for
variation in the behaviour being studied - namely, CMR.
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The two categories that fulfil these criteria are responsible compliance and humanising technical
activity. They both featured in many codes in each dataset. The regulatory data, as I noted in Section
5.2.6, pointed to two core balances that should be struck - between hard knowledge and soft
judgement (humanising technical activity) and between regulators' and corporations' responsibilities
for systemic regulation (towards responsible compliance). In the media data, the strong emphasis on
improving remuneration was related to responsible compliance via full disclosure, which was not
specifically mandated in rules. The media data also placed strong emphasis on how technical
knowledge became detached from corporate governance and ethical competence. Humanising
technical activity, by holding boards to account, improving judgement in assessing credit ratings, and
improving ethical performance, were notable management protocols. The strong emphasis in both
datasets is one reason for highlighting these two categories.
Another reason is that responsible compliance and humanising technical activity are related to each
of the other concepts in a variety of ways. As the matrix shows, each relationship between these
core categories and the others is given by a different set of conceptual properties. We can say in the
language of grounded theory methodology that, together, these categories "account for most of the
variation in a pattern of behaviour" being analysed (Glaser 1978: 93). Effectively these categories
render what the post-crisis debate is about. This is not the same as saying that the categories are the
'most important' alongside the others, but rather that they help to explain the other concepts. On
this basis, Figures 5-18 and 5-19, below, recap what they are.
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Figure 5-18. Unifying theme I: Responsible compliance
Conceptual category Explanation
What Responsible compliance
Specifically, this entails
Pursuing shared objectives with the regulator; implementing
technical regulation responsibly
Enabling a compliance culture; setting the tone at the top
Why This is important because:
Providing high quality information
Who
When
Conse-
quences
Regulators cannot safeguard systemic risk on a solely
prescriptive basis
Responsibility falls primarily to:
Functionally, throughout the organisation; regulatory
accountabilitv at Board level
Thismatters most when:
At all times
This may lead to:
New management structures, systems, and expenditure
This often entails 'exceeding' minimum requirements, although
it may be less costly. It is the opposite of 'literal compliance',
which pursues only letter of the law, rather than its spirit
Thisshares many properties with riskmanagement; including
appointing independent risk teams, and setting risk appetite
Disclosure is not sufficient unless it enables market and state
supervisors to do their lob well
Regulatory attempts to do 50 would conflict with encouraging
corporate innovation as an enqine of qrowth
The Board should appoint several of the required management
structures and set the tone
Under 'comply or explain' systems, responsible compliance may
be less costly than literal comoliance
Similarly to ather categories that are part of Praactive
1m rovement
Figure 5-19. Unifying theme II: Humanising technical activity
Conceptual category Explanation
What Humanising technical activity
Specifically, this entails
Establishing models' (and ratings') limitations and proper usage
Ethical competence
Why This is important because:
Who
When
Conse-
quences
Technical methods were insufficient to mitigate risks
Prerequisite for accountability
Responsibility falls primarily to:
Accounting and risk functions; regulatory accountability at
Board level
Thismatters most when:
Markets are highly liquid; or in structured and derivative
product trades
Thismay lead to:
The firm may need to abstain from certain profitable
transactions that exceed risk tolerance or whose (internal or
external) impact cannot be reliably assessed.
Toprevent abdicating of managerial judgement and
accountability infavour of formalist methods, which may fail.
Stress-testing the models is a possible mechanism for this
{Plftrnnnlntpt/ fmm rh» rpnlllntnrll nnrn I
Acknowledging one's 'fitness' for technical roles;justifying
activities in non-financial terms
Poor understanding of risk in structured products - both on
supply and demand sides - raised systemic risk
Perceived lack of accountability and ethical positioning at
Board level fuelled public controversy
Adequate communication between technical and strategic
levels is key
Particulalry in retail credit markets
Similarly ta other RiskManagement categories
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5.5. Conclusion
For many influential actors, the financial crisis re-defined their perception of financial capitalism and
incited questions about markets' fundamental behaviour. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve in 1987-2006, a staunch advocate of liberalisation, was among those who acknowledged
significant mistakes. Testifying to the Congressional Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, he stated:
"Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders'
equity, myself especially, are in a state of shock and disbelief. [...)1 made a mistake in presuming that
the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks and others, were such [that) they were best
capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms [...)
"I've found a flaw [...] in the model that I perceived as the critical functioning structure that defines
how the world works" (US Congress2008: 35-7).
In the private sector, some well-known financiers made similar arguments. Among them, George
Soros said in 2009:
"AII we are doing right now with this talk of public-private partnerships and new regulation is
tinkering. It assumes that the system is basically OK.The idea that the markets are self-correcting has
been proven false. The efficient markets hypothesis has been broken ... the market, rather than
reflecting the underlying reality [of companies], is always distorting it. There is mispricing and it
affects the fundamentals [of companies)." (WSJ66).
Within this broad public discussion about markets, this chapter pursued a much narrower
problematique. Taking systemic market instability as the starting point, I asked, what can we learn
from these controversies, about how companies are expected to contribute to an inherently
imperfect system? I looked primarily to the regulatory debate for answers because it anticipates a
policy response but also seeks to motivate a "market response" (FSA 2009b: 10), a change in
corporate conduct.
The analysis identified responsible compliance and humanising technical activity as central
challenges - both epistemological and practical- for corporate conduct. The concepts are frames of
reference for investigating financial market controversies, and structuring new questions. If 'the
regulators and the people have spoken', then one unanswered question is, 'how have firms
responded?' This chapter's first contribution is to enhance our understanding of this
contemporaneous debate in financial governance, and to inspire new questions for investigation.
The second contribution is more technical. The various, unique conceptual properties of risk
management, investment policy, and proactive improvement in this chapter are components of a
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broader emerging theory of CMR. The next chapter integrates the three empirical episodes, and
presents a substantive set of theoretical propositions about corporate market responsibility more
broadly. The fact that those propositions contain data from the current regulatory debate serves to
increase the credibility, relevance, and usefulness of the emerging theory.
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Experience in controversies such as these brings out the
impossibility of learning anything from facts until they ore
examined and interpreted by reason; and teaches that the
most reckless and treacherous of 01/ theorists is he who
professes to let facts and figures speak for themselves.
Alfred Marshall, mentor to 1.M. Keynes
6.1. Introduction
The controversies involving Citigroup, sovereign funds, and others during the Credit Crunch, suggest
that regulators and other economic and societal actors hold financial firms responsible for helping to
reduce systemic risk. They also suggest that this requires corporate activities other than compliance
and profit-maximisation, which are firms' traditional economic responsibilities. Instead, actors are
compelled to adopt certain management protocols related to risk management, investment policy,
and proactive improvement. The protocols are voluntary, but enforced. In the absence of
responsible conduct, firms faced higher regulatory risks, because CMR conduct was perceived to
decrease systemic risk. This thesis was devoted to answering the research question, 'how are firms
responsible for helping to ensure orderly financial markets?' The answer is presented in this chapter,
in a substantive theory of corporate market responsibility.
To arrive at this point, where theoretical propositions may be advanced, three episodes were
analysed. What these episodes had in common is that the firms in question had pursued legal,
profit-maximising behaviour but lacked internal management systems to prevent them from
destabilising markets. The episodes varied in that each had a broader scope than the previous. In
Citigroup's Eurobond controversy, the setting was European government bond markets, and a single
bank was punished for the management failures that led to their large bond trade. In the sovereign
wealth funds (SWF)episode, the setting included bond markets, but also equities, commodities, real
estate, and others. The post-Credit Crunch regulatory debate had a broader range of actors,
including all large banks and so-called quasi-banks in the financial system. Thus from a bounded,
micro-level case, through to a fully systemic level episode, the analysis led to a substantive theory
about financial market governance.
CMR embodies many of the characteristics described in the literature on decentralised governance
(e.g. Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999), particularly the paradigm that
levi-Faur (2005) called "regulatory capitalism". The state assumesa supervisory role and businesses
develop "internal controls and mechanisms of self-regulation in the shadow of the state" (levi-Faur
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2005: 15). I will argue that as a technique, CMR is a form of "meta-regulation" (e.g. Parker 2002);
that is, regulators compel firms to improve management systems voluntarily in order to meet the
regulators' broader market objectives (Black 2006). Thus positioned within existing theoretical
frameworks, CMR may contribute to several current debates in political economy and economic
sociology. I argue that CMR enhances Underhill and Zhang's (2008) framework for legitimacy in
financial governance, both as a normative ethic (CMR as theory) and as an observation (CMR as
data). In economic sociology, I argue that the CMR episodes demonstrate new variations of markets'
embedded ness in social norms and networks (e.g. Granovetter 1985), and the performativity of
economic models (e.g. MacKenzie 2006). Addressing behaviours that are problematic in both
disciplines, CMR is argued to be an integrative concept that enables better multidisciplinary theory-
building.
6.1.1. Purpose and contribution of chapter
The main purpose of this chapter is to present a substantive theory of CMR; my theoretical findings.
Each preceding chapter contributed a conceptual rendering of an empirical episode, and here I
integrate those conclusions in a set of propositions that are tentatively generalisable to new
situations. I outline what CMR is as a practice (a set of management protocols) and as a principle of
market governance (its relationship with regulatory risk and systemic risk). I examine the
implications for existing theories in political economy and economic sociology, both of which are
disciplines where financial market governance is an important topic.
The purpose of this analysis of literature is to demonstrate that CMR is an integrative concept that
addresses issues that are analysed in a range of disciplines. The purpose is not to 'square' CMR with
extant concepts, to verify or falsify existing ideas, or to resolve a theoretical debate. Rather, the
chapter seeks to show that CMR theory can advance existing knowledge in several domains. By
showing how CMR comprises different forms of self-regulation (Chiu 2009); how it increases
accountability in financial governance (cf. Underhill and Zhang 2008); and how it delegitimizes
regulatory arbitrage (cf. Greenspan 1998); among other issues; this chapter demonstrates that CMR
is a frame of reference for pursuing ideas in several related theories and drawing connections
between them.
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6.1.2. Chapter outline
The chapter is organised into three parts. The first part, 'What is CMR?', presents the theoretical
propositions on CMR, consolidating the findings from the three empirical chapters. Then, the CMR
propositions are assessedagainst the quality criteria of grounded theory methodology. The second
part of the chapter integrates CMR propositions with existing theoretical knowledge in the fields of
political economy and economic sociology. This section draws on political economy and economic
sociology to position CMR within the academic debate, and extend contributions to these
disciplines. The third and final part of the chapter, 'Where may CMRgo?', discussesfuture directions
for research.
6.2. What is corporate market responsibility?
Corporate market responsibility (CMR), as a concept, refers to an expectation by regulators and
other political, economic and social actors that companies will help to regulate systemic risk through
certain management protocols. CMR, as a corporate practice, refers to these management
protocols.
6.2.1. Theoretical Propositions
My analysis of CMR leads to three sets of propositions. The first is a single proposition affirming the
existence of CMRand its protocols (Figure 6-1 below).
The second set of propositions focuses on firms' conduct. It advances propositions about each of the
CMR protocols (Figures 6-2, 6-3, 6-4). They are the direct answer to how firms are responsible for
regulating systemic risk. They refer primarily to management systems and controls (protocols);
rather than corporate structures (entity) or financial trades (actions). Although the latter two
elements do feature, the dominant themes in the data across the three episodes are the
management systems' related to RiskManagement, Investment Policy, and Proactive Improvement.
Each has several practical processes associated with it. These processes show what regulators and
other societal actors expect firms to do in practice. The reader will find annotations about how the
processes varied in each episode, to help discipline generalisation. The right-hand columns point to
1 I developthis distinction betweenentity, actions,andprotocols- andsubstantiatemy focuson protocols- in
Chapter4, Section4.4.1.
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specific Figures throughout the thesis where data on each process is detailed, to help establish an
audit trail for the analysis.
The third set of propositions look outside the firm, to CMR as a mechanism of systemic regulation
(Figure 6-5). These propositions explain the relationship between firms' behaviour, wider
expectations, and market impact. Specifically, they relate CMR protocols to regulatory risk faced by
firms, and to systemic risk. These are referred to as meta-propositions because they are more
abstract and cover the episodes in their entirety, rather than specific company activities. Whereas
the CMR protocols firms' responsibilities (the research question), these meta-propositions convey
the entire research problem; that is, why the research question matters. In particular, they establish
a positive relationship between CMRand regulatory risk.
Together, the follow propositions comprise my theoretical findings about CMR, and constitute a
substantive theory of corporate market responsibility.
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Figure 6-1. Core CMR proposition
Data in
Core CMR Proposition Annotation Figure:
What
How
Companies are expected to help regulate systemic risk in financial markets.
Ensuring market confidence and stability by establishing a
set of orotocols. as follows:
Specifically this corporate market responsibility (CMR) entails:
Riskmanagement protocols were central recommendations in all
Operating a sound risk management system that episodes. Thiswas important for Citigraup to anticipate the impact of 3-13,4-16,5-
anticipates the systemic impact of investment transactions transactions;for SWFs to reassure host countries that they would not 6,5-7,5-8,5-9
be a destabilising force; and post-Credit Crunch to ensure board-level
Operating transparent investment policies
Improving CMR shortcomings proactively
Why This is important because:
Compliance with only minimum standards may not suffice
to maintain efficient and orderly markets. In the event of
market instability, compliance with only minimum
standards increases regulatory and reputational risks.
Who Responsibility falls primarily to:
When
Conse-
quences
Large, liquid market participants.
Significant for Citigroup, whose strategy to change market structure
was not "investment-driven ", according to regulators (WSJ18j.
Central for SWFs, to discourage political investments. Significant post-
Credit Crunch to discipline short-selling and innovative products.
All the episodes showed that standards may be fluid and not
consensually understood; proactive improvement was shown to
reduce regulatory risk with Citigroup and SWFs; post-Credit Crunch,
"responsible compliance" called for pursuing joint objectives with
All the episodes showed compliance with minimum standards did not
prevent controversy. Citigroup and SWFs showed that the boundaries
of acceptable market conduct may shift quickly and be poorly
understood. The post-Credit Crunch debate showed that regulators
feel unable to mitigate systemic risk without discretionary help from
firms; hence their call for 'responsible compliance' and 'ethical
competence'.
Media and regulatory data frequently singled out the particular
resoonsibilitv of larae. "svstemicotiv imoortant" firms.
Senior management is held accountable externally, and
junior management internally; junior and senior staff share The occasional differences are noted in the tables below.
irnnlams ntatlon rpc:nnnc:ihilitv.
This matters most when:
Liquidity is rapidly rising or falling
Making or assessing extraordinary transactions
Entering or creating new markets
Being a market-maker
Citigroup's trade injected a high amount of liquidity, and when
confidence dried up a liquidity shortage followed. The Credit Crunch
also saw exceptionally high liquidity followed by a crisis of confidence,
and a crunch. SWFs rise to prominence was driven by high liquidity,
and one of the concerns is that they would subsequently hoard it. The
Large, jast, unprecedented transactions are more likely to impact
market confidence and liquidity, thus courting regulatory scrunity.
Citigroup's trade and SWFs' high-profile equity acquisitions were
examples. Post-Credit Crunch, very high leverage, enabling large
The geographic dimension of new markets was key for Citigroup and
SWFswhere the controversy emphasised the investors' national
origins. Entry into new financial product markets was also very
significant for Citigroup and post-Credit Crunch, where innovations
.. ,orD "D"' rnnf-D",tin"r'
In a market-making system, the potential to contribute to toa little or 3-10
too much liauiditv is more acute.
Restricting certain kinds of investments
Establishing independent governance structures with clear Impact on entity.
mandates
Collaborating with regulators and political bodies
Impact on actions.
Collaboration increased market confidence and curbed regulatory risk
in the Citigroup and SWF episodes; post-Credit Crunch this evolved
3-9,4-14,5-10
3-18,4-8,5-
11,5-15
3-9,4-5,4-7,5-
11,5-15
3-7,4-5,5-12
3-17,3-15,4-
13,4-16,5-6,5-
R
3-6,3-10,4-5,4-
6,5-5
3-6,3-7,4-5,4-
6,5-5
3-9,4-6,5-10
3-14,4-13,5-6
3-13,3-7,4-
14.5-10
3-18,4-8,5-11
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Figure 6-2. CMR proposition on RiskManagement
Risk Management Proposition Annotation Data in
Figure:
What
How
Financial companies have a responsibility to operate a sound risk management system that anticipates the
systemic impact of investment transactions.
Establish a risk management framework (inel risks and lines of All episodes noted that some risks, particularly systemic risk, may be
responsibility) underestimated.
The Citigroup and SWFs cases emphasised escalating strategies
upwards, whereas the Credit Crunch emphasised setting the tone
Specifically this should:
Align high-level objectives with mid-level strategy
Anticipate the impact of its activities on systemic risk
Implement risk monitoring systems (rules, incentives,
reporting, ... )
Conduct stress-tests
Align remuneration with risk management
Humanise technical activity (finding models' limitations,
understanding role of subjective judgement, ...)
Do accounting fairly (understanding value-verification,
limiting credit ratings to where they are appropriate, ... )
Improve ethical competence (training staff, acknowledging
fitness, having non-financial objectives, ... )
Disclose this framework for external monitoring
Who Responsibility falls to:
Conse-
quences
Lower management is responsible for implementation and
escalation of key decisions to senior management. Senior
management is held accountable for setting the tone.
This may lead to:
The firm may need to abstain from certain profitable
transactions or payment structures that exceed risk tolerance
or whose impact cannot be reliably assessed.
3-13,4-16,5-6
3-13,3-14,5-6
downwardsfrom the top
All cited this os a key failing of Citigroup. For SWFs and post-Crunch, 3-14,4-16,4-
this issue related primarily to Investment Policy (see next proposition) 14,5-10
Using well-structured analysis and monitoring risk exposure were
highlighted specifically by the FSA,and other systems were noted
extensively in the SWF GAPP. Post-Credit Crunch, key issues were
remuneration and stress-testing, below.
Far SWFs, this is in the GAPP. For Citi, the FSAlimited its punishment,
saying (like others) that Citi's competitors should hove prepared for
the scenario in advance. Post-Crunch, poor stress-testing was a key
concern, particularly in relation to moral hazard.
3-13,4-16,5-
13,5-7
3-150,4-16,5-9
This was particularly emphasised post-Credit Crunch. 5-13
This was particularly emphasised post-Credit Crunch. 5-16
This was particularly emphasised post-Credit Crunch. 5-7
All cases emphasised that a wide range groups must be 'fit and
proper', and the Credit Crunch episode also emphasised the ethics of 3-13,4-16,5-15
acknowledging one's (lack of) fitness for the role.
Disclosure figures highly in the SWF GAPP and the post-Crunch
debate in the context of responsible compliance and being a 4-16,5-11,5-14
responsible shareholder (see propositions below).
All cases emphasise that accountability and reporting requirements
(e.g.ta independent risk functions) should be clearly delineated.
Individual Citigroup traders were not held accountable by the FSA.
3-15,4-13,5-13
3-6,3-15,4-6,5-
10
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Figure 6-3. CMR proposition on Investment Policy
I I
· .. ~uin
nvestment Po ICY Proposition Annotation .Figure:
How Specifically, the policy should ...
Financial companies have a responsibility to operate transparent investment policies.What
Be based on a well-accepted level of risktolerance, and
clear parameters for transactions (acceptable uncertainty All episodes emphasise underpinning investment strategy with risk
levels, including external uncertainty, particularly in the assessment.
context of short-selling)
Be driven by financial returns on invested assets
Have a benchmark against which the strategy can be
evaluated.
Establish systems to monitor asset
allocation/concentration and trading positions/exposure
Promote being a responsible shareholder (both towards
company investments and its own investors)
3-15,4·14,5·10
Central for SWFs who might be acting on political grounds. Also
significant far Citigraup (the German regulator and FT criticised
Citigroup for looking to re-shape the European bond market into US-
style market). Post-Credit Crunch, this is directly linked to, and
discourages, 'naked'shart-selling.
Explicit for SWFs. Citigraup suggests that if a planned trade is
unprecedented - has no possible benchmarks - then other CMR
responsibilities are more acute. Post-Crunch, related to auditors' and 3-13,4·16,5-10
3-9,4-7,4-13,5-
10
investors' ability to appraise innovative products and strategies.
Ensuring that the investment policy is complied with.
3-15,4·14,5-6,5-
11
This was emphasised post-Credit Crunch. 5-14
Who Responsibility falls primarily to:
Be generally disclosed and regularly audited and reviewed Disclosure may be solicited after perceived wrong-doing particularly. 3-9,4-14,4-15
The policy is implemented by operational management
and defined by the owner or governing body(ies), with
special responsibilities falling to shareholders.
Conse-
quences
This may lead to:
Adjusting corporate hierarchy and mandates
Establishing new systems of accountability, transaction
analvsis and information escalation
Disclosing investment positions in times of audit or
scrutiny
In private companies, the owner's responsibility may fall to
shareholders.
3-15,4-13,5-14
Impact on entity. 3-15,4-13,5-6
3-14,3-15_4-13,
5-6
Disclosing investment position was central far SWFs as a matter or
course. Far Citigroup it was more situationot- other banks needed to
understand Citigroup 's position and intent during the trading itself
3-7,3-9,4-15,5-
11
These specific propositions about management protocols vary in some respects from the central
proposition that CMR exists; namely in how CMR is implemented, who is responsible, and with what
consequences. However, they do not differ from the core proposition as to why and when they
matter.
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Figure 6-4. CMR proposition on Proactive Improvement
Proactive Improvement Proposition Annotation ~ata inFigure:
What
Financial companies should pursue responsible compliance, correcting their shortcomings proactively
even if they are not in literal breach of regulation.
Specifically, they should:How
Cooperate with regulatory and political authorities,
including to understand and codify its responsibilities, as
well as to investigate past transactions
The SWFs cooperating on a code-of-conduct, and Citigroup with
regulators, were cited as increasing market confidence and curbing
regulatory risk.
3-18,4-8,5-11
Promote responsible compliance (pursuing shared
objectives with regulators, pursuing best-practice, ... )
Emphasise its values from the level of owner, or governing All episodes emphasised this. The owner's responsibility may also fall
bodvfiesl or CEO. downwards to shareholders.
This was particularly emphasised post-Credit Crunch. 5-11
3-18,4-13,5-11
Invest in surveillance and information-reporting quality
Post-Credit Crunch, this related to accounting fairly, and stress-
testino.
Citigroup moved compliance staff to trading floor.
3·18,4-5,4-16,5·
15
3-13,4-16,5· 7,5-
9
3-18,4-13,4·
14,5-11
Promote ethical competence As noted under 'Risk'.
Strengthen its compliance department and systems
Who Responsibility falls primarily to:
Senior management should express and cascade value Regulatory and media data did not highlight the role of specific
messages, and are held accountable externally. Junior individuals, but tended to hold the entity accountable at corporate 3·15,4-13,5·6,5-
management implements the various processes, and must level. Senior staff have a more active role in Improvement processes 11
report and escalate known shortcomings. than other CMRs.
This is particularly important when, in addition to other
CMRconditions:When
For Citigroup, these initiatives mitigated the FSApunishment. For
The company is perceived to pose or have posed a risk to SWFs, drafting and signing the GAPPwas the first thing they were
orderly and efficient markets. expected to do. Post-Crunch, this became a continuous requirement,
as part of pursuing shared objectives with regulators.
3-18,4-8,5-11
Conse-
quences
This may lead to:
Re-defining corporate strategy, management structures, This shows that CMRhas central governance implications, and
systems. and expenditure cannot be effective only at the margin.
These CMR protocols matter for market governance because of their relationship with regulatory
risk and systemic risk. This tripartite conceptual relationship shows the CMR theory's broader
relevance in market governance. By clarifying how these concepts are related to each other, I
establish meta-propositions that account not only for how the specific episodes developed (which
the propositions above already do), but also for why they matter more broadly. The meta-
propositions below are more abstract, and represent a tentative step towards generalisation, which I
then discuss. I begin by showing how systemic risk and regulatory risk were manifest in the episodes.
Systemic risk refers to threats to the functioning of financial markets as a whole (Kaufman 1996,
1999; BOE2), or a core part of the system (FSA6), either as a result of a single institution's
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transactions or due to collective action (Marshall 1998). Dow's (2000) review of theories of systemic
risk promotes lithe idea that systemic risk, being a matter of public policy, should refer to casesof
risks being imposed on the financial system where some element of externality exists. In other
words, financial regulators have a legitimate interest in intervening when somebody takes a risk that
then causes further risk for others in the financial system" (p. 2; also IMF 2010). The financial
regulators themselves refer to reducing systemic risk as part of maintaining "fair, orderly, and
efficient markets", which both the SEC(2009) and the FSA(2006) share.
Systemic risk was the trigger for controversy in each of the three episodes. First, Citigroup's
Eurobond transaction destabilised the level of liquidity in Eurozone bond markets, led its
competitors to suffer extensive losses,and eventually forced a suspension of trading in the market.
This is a systemic effect insofar as it happens within a bounded system across several the European
bond markets. In the SWFscase,controversy emerged due to a concern that SWFsmight destabilise
global financial markets due to their size, use of political influence, or hoarding of international
reserves. Then, the credit crunch episode looked at the regulatory debate that followed the financial
crisis, which focused on systemic risk as a central challenge in financial regulation (e.g. FSA1:ch. 2).
The connection between systemic risk and the third variable, regulatory risk, was an intrinsic part of
each episode - indeed one reason why the episodes were chosen. Regulatory risk refers to the
potential for new legal and regulatory changes to impact on business operations, inducing losses
directly (e.g. through fines) or indirectly (e.g. prohibiting certain business activities) (EIU 2005; and
see Black 2006). In all of the episodes, the increase in systemic risk that triggered a controversy, and
the ensuing controversy itself, increased regulatory risk. In the Citigroup episode, many market and
societal actors showed mixed feelings regarding the bank's transaction and explicitly awaited the
regulator's judgement, reflecting an increase in regulatory rlsk.' The regulator interpreted its
principles-based regulation in order to decide on the correct punishment. It also cited Citigroup's
proactive attempts to improve its risk management systems as a reason why the regulatory
punishment diminished, illustrating the non-rigid (risky) nature of the regulatory response. A similar
dynamic emerged in the SWFepisode. Government authorities in the USand Europe threatened to
implement new regulations targeting SWFs,as a result of the funds increasing systemic risk. SWFs
then agreed a code of conduct designed to mitigate systemic risk and by extension regulatory risk.
The credit crunch episode captured the post-crisis regulatory debate. The existence of this debate
2 Thereputation pressureonCitigroupmayalsobe regardedasa form of regulation(BraithwaiteandDrahos
2000).
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was an increase in regulatory risk. This risk had come about because of the higher systemic risk
during the crisis.
With this analysis, it is possible to generate more abstract meta-propositions about the three core
variables. They are presented in Figure 6-5 below.
Figure 6-5. Propositions about CMR, regulatory risk, and
systemic risk
Meta-proposition Annotation
Less CMR conduct leads to higher regulatory risk
In all three episodes, the lack of CMRwas cited by regulators as a
justification to threaten new regulatory interventions.
More CMR conduct leads to lower regulatory risk
The Citigroup and SWF episodes showed that proactively implementing
some CMRprotocols could decrease the regulatory punishment, or threat.
The reason for this relationship is that higher CMR is perceived to help
lower systemic risk.
In all the episodes, and across both public debates and regulatory
decisions, the perception among market and non-market stakeholders is
that this relationship holds. This was at the core of the post-Credit Crunch
regulatory debate, which framed the causes of the crisis as the "age of
irresponsibility".
Less CMR conduct leads to higher systemic risk
Higher systemic risk leads to higher regulatory risk
All three episodes showed higher systemic risk leading to higher regulatory
risk.
This figure summarises the relationships between CMR, regulatory risk, systemic risk. These meta-
propositions abstract from specific micro-level processes and show CMR in the broader context of
market governance. They explain the episodes in their entirety. They show why CMR matters and
how it emerges. CMR conduct matters for regulators and other actors because it is perceived to help
reduce systemic risk. Therefore, regulators increase the threat of new rules or punishments when
CMR conduct is absent. CMR conduct matters for firms because in its absence they face higher
regulatory risks, and may also face higher systemic risks. Firms can reduce regulatory risk by
pursuing CMR conduct. Put differently, financial firms may reduce regulatory risk by striving to
reduce systemic risk.
These meta-propositions help explain why the research problem emerged. Regulators perceive that
certain discretionary corporate behaviours impact on their ability to meet their key objective of
regulating systemic risk. As a result, they attempt to compel firms to adopt new behaviours. In sum,
these meta-propositions comprise the raison-d'etre for the thesis. I return to them in the discussion
of market governance literature, in Section 6.3.
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The following are the parts of the CMRrelationships that I have not established:
• Whether more CMRconduct leads to lower systemic risk
This relates to the effectiveness of CMRas systemic risk regulation. If we assume that the actors
cited in the data asking for CMR are rational, then this relationship should hold. However, the
episodes focused on the absenceof CMRconduct.
• Whether higher regulatory risk leads to more CMRconduct
This relates to the effectiveness of regulatory pressure in promoting CMR. If regulatory pressure
does not bring about CMR, but regulators invoke CMR nonetheless, then we may anticipate
future controversies, with a lack of CMRleading to further regulatory punishments.
In the final section of this chapter, I present several outstanding issues as directions for future
research. These two CMR relationships would require new empirical contexts where CMRbehaviour
can be fully observed.
6.2.2. Generalisability
Taken together, the propositions about CMRconstitute a substantive grounded theory of corporate
market responsibility. A substantive theory is a conceptual rendering of specific events and
environments, not yet extended beyond a few similar empirical contexts (Charmaz 2006, Glaser
1978, Strauss 1987, Strauss and Corbin 1998). While tentatively generalisable among certain groups
and places, it is still specific to the environments from which it emerged. A substantive theory may
become more generalisable as researchers analyse further variations of the core concept in more
empirical settings. Eventually, this may lead to formal theory, which pursues the general implications
of the core concept (Glaser 1978: ch. 9; 2007).
The choice of research methods is an important determinant of the level of generalisability in a
theory. Any theory, writes Charmaz (2006: 143), "bears the imprint of its authors interests and
ideas". However, she continues, researchers may generate theory that is "sufficiently abstract to
cover a range of situations" (op cit: 145) by adopting methods like Straussand Corbin's (1998), which
tend towards objectivism. This is what I did. Adopting these methods (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.), I
identified my methodological approach as postpositivist grounded theory (Charmaz and Bryant
2007: 52), which makes "limited, tentative generalisations, not universal statements" (ibid).
How generalisable are my findings, then? The theoretical propositions should make sense to other
researchers as potential explanations for new emerging phenomena. For example, at the end of this
chapter, I note that the recent debate about hedge funds and 'dark pools' of capital might be
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understood as an attempt to define a 'corporate market responsibility' for the market actors
involved. If I have done my job well, then the propositions should help researchers and practitioners
better understand, learn from, adapt to, and shape some emerging situations in financial market
governance. In other words, the substantive theory should be tentatively generalisable across
empirical contexts. Moreover, it should have some predictive power within the contexts that I
studied. It should improve the understanding of these episodes such that another analyst with a
similar theoretical background and following the same procedures would arrive at similar
conclusions: "The same problems and issues should arise regardless of whether they are
conceptualised and integrated a little differently", asStraussand Corbin (1998: 266-7) write.
However, each of the episodes (and each new future episode) is historically and culturally
embedded, somewhat idiosyncratic, and never fully apprehendable. This limits the generalisability of
my findings. I have argued that this acknowledgment (which many theoreticians do not make) is
fundamental for building self-aware social science. Specifically, I would delineate the boundaries of
generalisability for this thesis as follows, based on the characteristics of CMRalready outlined. The
propositions apply especially in relation to:
• Large financial institutions (entities)
• When making extraordinary transactions (actions)
• Western regulatory jurisdictions (location)
• In situations of unstable liquidity, or where liquidity is threatened (conditions)
• The present era, rather than historically (time-period)
Combining insights from micro- and macro-level episodes bears implications for what kind of theory
CMR is. CMR theory claims that firms have, at the micro level, a responsibility for system-wide
governance. It links the particular to the general, by outlining corporate practices that serve a
systemic purpose. Yet the micro and macro levels are not always commensurable. Economic
theories, for example, often present distinct constructs to explain micro and macro levels of
economic activity. Only a few concepts (like utility-maximising behaviour) are invoked at both levels.
In this thesis, the argument intends primarily to show how micro-level phenomena (corporate
practices, regulatory pressure) have macro-level effects (systemic risk). That is, CMR refers to how
individual actors impact on the systemic commons.
As such, CMR is a middle-range theory. It does not present an overarching explanatory framework
for the commons, nor does it focus strictly on agent-level problems. Its focus is on the
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(dis)connection between the two levels. It could be seen as a response to the problem of systemic
financial governance of the modern era, insofar as too much attention was placed on corporate risk
management, under the mistaken assumption that systemic risk management was a natural by-
product of agent-level activity. CMR awakens us to the connection between the two levels of risk
and calls for self-aware systemic risk management at corporate level.
The theory makes some causal claims about the relationship between the core variables - CMR,
regulatory risk, and systemic risk - presented in Figure 6-5, above. In this respect, CMRmakes some
tentative normative claims for public policy. CMR protocols comprise mechanisms through which
systemic risk can be managed at a corporate level. That said, it has not been an objective of this
thesis, contrary to much governance literature, to present an agenda for a new regulatory
framework. Such an endeavour would have required a deeper investigation of how CMR is socially
constructed and the practical limitations of its implementation. In addition, CMRtheory is in part an
explanation, or illustration, of (already) observable trends in financial governance and therefore is
not a wholly new agenda. The value in the thesis is that many of these expectations have been
implicit. CMR theory is therefore also a heuristic that practitioners may use to anticipate
expectations and reactions under situations of unstable liquidity. In this way, CMR theory comprises
terms of reference for a new regulatory framework that could better regulate systemic risk.
By and large, CMR theory is limited to the financial sector, and I do not make claims as to its
generalisability beyond the sector. Finance is a unique industry. It draws capital from the real
economy and creates its own parallel markets and derivative capital. It can enhance productivity and
growth throughout the entire economy. The repercussions of its failures extend to all other
industries. The term 'systemic risk' is apt, not only because it refers to failures throughout the
financial system, but also throughout the wider economy. A few other industries have similar
effects, and may also have special responsibilities. One such industry is energy. Largesections of the
economy rely on stable, affordable energy in order to function. As a result, one might pursue the
argument that energy companies have an economic responsibility beyond their own shareholders.
The difference between this argument and the CMR theory presented here is that this argument
would examine energy companies' responsibility to the entire economy, whereas this CMR theory
only pursued financial firms' responsibility to their own markets.
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6.2.3. Assessing the theory's quality
Grounded theory methodology presents a clear set of criteria for evaluating the quality of the
research findings. The methodology has transitioned from positivistic roots (Glaser and Strauss 1967,
Glaser 1978), to include postpositivist (Strauss 1987, Strauss and Corbin 1987, Charmaz and Bryant
2007), and constructivist (Charmaz 2006) variants. I contrasted the criteria of the more extreme
positivist and constructivist strands, and showed how they overlap, in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.3.3.). I
now assessmy research processand findings in light of these quality criteria.
6.2.3.1. Fit and credibility
• A grounded theory should fit the data (Glaser 1978: 4). There should be sufficient data to
merit the claims (Charmaz2006: 182-3).
During the research and analysis process, I built detailed code logs that showed, for each news
article or regulatory paper, which codes had appeared and which other codes they related to.
The logs are not complete conceptual summaries of the data, because when conceptual
categories became theoretically saturated (the data stopped conveying variation), they were no
longer coded. Although the method calls for sampling to cease at the point of theoretical
saturation, I established minimum sampling periods for each episode, and on those grounds, I
would argue that the data is sufficient to merit the claims.
• Data is not selected to fit an extant theory; most categories are generated directly from
data; categories are re-fit to new data; there is emergent fit between data and pre-existing
categories (Glaser: op cit).
The selection of data emerged directly from my first empirical observation; a news report about
the Citigroup episode. I chose regulatory and media documents as my data specifically in line
with the research problem (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2). During the analysis process, I was
careful not to introduce concepts that had not yet emerged. For example, I only began to
conceptualise the relevant aspect of orderly markets as systemic risk in Chapter 5, because this
concept emerged in the Credit Crunch data. Other categories evolved as more data emerged.
For example, escalating strategies to senior management (upwards), became aligning high-level
objectives with mid-level strategy (both upwards and downwards), during analysis of the post-
Credit Crunch debate.
• Achieving intimate familiarity with the topic (Charmaz:op cit).
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In the empirical analysis, I place some of the most vivid data in citations to illustrate the more
idiosyncratic perceptions. I also sought to convey intimate familiarity by limiting how much I
generalised my theoretical findings.
6.2.3.2. Relevance and resonance
• Theory allows core problems and processes to emerge; theorist does not have to spend time
to convince others of the relevance of his work (Glaser: op cit).
The contemporaneous nature of the SWF and Credit Crunch controversies, particularly, is
sufficiently strong to immediately convey the relevance of this thesis. In addition, throughout
the research, I have allowed empirical and theoretical problems to emerge that I had not
anticipated. One example was my discussion of alternative explanations for the SWF
controversy. The data showed a number of commentators attributing the controversy to
classical protectionism on the part of Western governments, rather than attributing it, as I do, to
a concern over their market conduct. I disputed their argument based on data showing that
protectionism did not emerge where we might have expected it (the EU and the US's CFIUS), and
that 'protecting' Western banks now meant welcoming SWFs, not prohibiting them.
• Categories portray the fullness of the studied experience; reveal unstable 'taken-for-
granted' meanings; analysis offers insights to people in the analysed environment (Charmaz:
op cit).
It would be difficult review the data on these episodes and find conceptual categories that are
both significant and not represented in my propositions. An exception to this would be the
debate on capital adequacy requirements, which I have not analysed. I judged in Chapter 5 that
the technical, financial nature of this debate was outside my ability to analyse it critically,
although my analysis on humanising technical activity and ethical competence would merit
consideration in that debate. My analysis shed new light on some taken-for-granted meanings.
One example was my argument on protectionism; that in the context of SWFs, it had come to
mean welcoming foreign investors rather than blocking them. Another is my argument later in
this chapter that the putative gentlemen's agreement that many commentators suggest should
have discouraged Citigroup from their transaction probably did not exist, but rather was as a
post hoc construction.
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6.2.3.3. Workability, modifiability, and usefulness
• Categories allow for ready, quick modification to help explain surprising or new variations in
an ever changing world, as new data emerges; can be extended to new substantive contexts;
maintain tractability and hence relevance (Glaser: op cit).
One of the most important heuristics I employed, both to help meet this criterion and to help
organise my thoughts, was to code the data as generic processes,almost always in gerund form
(verbs ending in -ing). Identifying generic processes is extremely helpful for trying to understand
relationships between concepts. Another advantage is that, as processes, these codes give
researchers a better idea of what is meant by them and how they may be extended to new
contexts. For example, the code aligning remuneration with risk management is more helpful
than the code 'remuneration relationship with risk management'. The categories are also
modifiable because I have expressed their properties and dimensions. The category banks being
unsettled has as one of its properties panicking, with dimensions such as hedging and
withdrawing from the market. In new settings, these categories and properties can be readily
modified.
• Interpretations that people can use practically; generic processes; analysis sparks further
research in other areas; contributions to knowledge and making a better world (Charmaz: op
cit).
Coding generic processes also enables people to use these findings practically. In the CMR
propositions, corporate managers may identify specific practices to implement. By outlining the
relationships between CMRand regulatory risk and systemic risk, and particularly the aspects of
those relationships that I have not established, I have also indicated areas for future research.
Moreover, I believe that CMRcan contribute to a better world by improving accountability and
legitimacy in financial governance, as I argue in Section 6.3.3 below.
6.2.3.4. Originality
• Categories are fresh and offer new insights; new conceptual rendering of the data;
challenge, extend, or refine current ideas (Charmaz:op cit).
The core category in the thesis, corporate market responsibility, is a new conceptual dynamic in
market governance. As I integrate CMRwith existing theories in the following sections, CMRmay
be regarded as a form of meta-regulation (Parker 2002), similar to Ayres and Braithwaite's
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{1992} 'enforced self-regulation' concept. I will also argue that CMR offers new insights into
legitimacy in financial governance, and I show that my analysis of Citigroup and SWFsoffers
insights for economic sociology from a new perspective. It is the first time, to my knowledge,
that these episodes have been analysed using grounded theory methodology. Therefore, each of
the preceding chapters arguably offers an entirely original conceptual rendering of the data.
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6.3. Integration with other theories
CMR raises questions of, and lends weight to, a number of theories in contemporary market
governance. A central problem in this governance is the decentralised and complex nature of
networks where state and market actors assume overlapping roles. In this section, I position CMR
within this literature and argue that CMR advances several discussions in political economy and
economic sociology.
To order the complexity of decentralised governance, I draw on Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn,
Rojas-Suarez,and Weisbrod's (1998) relational paradigm of regulation, which posits that financial
regulation reflects interdependency between regulators and the regulated, an argument also
underpinned by Underhill's (2000) notion of a "state-market condominium". I position CMR within
this field by arguing that it is a form of meta-regulation, often described as the "regulation of self-
regulation" (Parker 2007, Black 2006, Black and Baldwin 2006, Gray and Hamilton 2006), and shares
some characteristics with similar models such as enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite
(1992) and ethical self-regulation (Chiu 2009). My aim in this analysis is to use extant theory to
further define and refine the CMR concept. Even though CMR grew from empirical data, it is very
compatible with existing theoretical ideas.This adds to CMR's relevance because it speaksdirectly to
current debates in financial governance, and it increases CMR credibility because extant theory
confirms that similar processeshave been observed elsewhere. Moreover, the argument that CMR is
an example of meta-regulation illustrates this extant model in a new substantive context.
After positioning CMR as meta-regulation I begin a more critical discussion, exploring CMR's
implications for current arguments in political economy and economic sociology. In political
economy, I focus on accountability in financial governance. This is intrinsically relevant becauseCMR
is a way in which regulators and other actors hold firms accountable for their impact on the financial
system. I argue that CMR lends weight to Underhill and Zhang's (2008) argument that financial
governance is detached from traditional democratic mechanisms and in some respects lacks
legitimacy. However, my analysis also suggests that CMR is a means to improve accountability and
legitimacy in governance. It is therefore an answer to some of the problems that Underhill and
Zhang raise, and it justifies taking a more optimistic perspective than theirs.
To explore the implications for economic sociology, I break CMRdown into its constituent empirical
episodes. The CMR episodes lend weight to two central concepts in economic sociology:
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embedded nessand performativity. First, they present evidence that markets are embedded in social
networks and values, rather than atomised rational action, which is the traditional argument of
economic theory. For example, the Citigroup case showed that governance in bond markets relied
on implicit meanings about what constitutes acceptable market conduct. The episodes also present
evidence that actors in financial markets perform economic theory - that economic models drive
financial behaviour and do not merely describe it (MacKenzie 2006). For example, sovereign wealth
funds had to be 'trained' in economic behaviour, even though they were already pursuing financial
returns. CMR also shows new dimensions of embeddedness and performativity. I argue that the
putative gentlemen's agreement that Citigroup was widely said to have violated most likely did not
exist, but was a post hoc construction designed to help perform economic theory. The SWFepisode
also extends the concept of performativity into what I call performativity-plus: the funds were not
only 'trained' in economic theory (disembedding them from their traditional decision-making
structures), but also in how to apply it responsibly (re-embedding them into a CMRethic).
A connection between embeddedness, performativity, and legitimacy is outlined based on the Credit
Crunch episode. I argue that CMR expectations served to de-legitimise regulatory arbitrage; the
practice whereby firms look for lower regulatory requirements in new jurisdictions, or by innovating
new products. CMR de-legitimises atomised economic behaviour by setting the expectation that
firms will help regulators achieve a stable financial system, which is in the public interest.
With these analyses, I demonstrate that CMR is an integrative concept that helps us to understand
key patterns of interaction that are problematic for theories of political economy and economic
sociology. The structure of this theoretical integration that I have just described is illustrated in
Figure 6-6 below.
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As the figure shows, I begin by setting
Figure 6-6. Structure of theoretical integration
·Ontology of decentralised governance
-The state-market condominium
·CMR asmeta-regulation
·CMR asan ethic for legitimacy and
accountability in financial governance
.CMR as evidence of embeddedness and
performativity
.CMR asde-legitimising regulatory arbitrage
a theoretical context that shows why financial market
governance is problematic in theory. Then I establish the concept of CMR as a form of meta-
regulation. Third, I proceed to draw implications for current theoretical discussions.
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6.3.1. Theoretical Context: Decentralised market governance
In recent political economy, market governance is often characterised as decentralised, or 'messy'
(e.g. Black 2002; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Chiu 2009; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Haufler
2000; Higgot, Underhill and Bieler 2000; Matthews 1997; Rosenau 2002; Underhill 2000; Vogel
1996). Several criss-crossing vectors of decentralised governance are apparent. State authority,
often regarded as a starting point for governance, has.become more diffuse, if not necessarily
reduced. A transnational space has emerged, where the issues requiring governance and the
mechanisms of governance cut across and transcends state borders (Scholte 2000). Civic coalitions
with single-issue or public-interest agendas increasingly influence political ideas, regulatory
standards, and business behaviour (Matthews 1997). Regulatory institutions mandated by the state
to create rules for corporate behaviour are increasingly independent from the political arms of
government, whose primary function has often become to supervise, rather than guide, industry
regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). Private regulatory institutions now exercise many similar functions as
state regulators, often obscuring the traditional accountability mechanisms of governments
(Underhill and Zhang 2008). Not only do industries self-regulate (under the influence of state and
civic organisations) but they are seen to have legitimate authority to do so (Cutler, Haufler, and
Porter 1999: 334).
One of the most important domains of decentralised governance is regulation; that is, governance
through prescriptions and enforcement (Levi-Faur 2005: 13). The complexities of governance
generally are replicated in the regulatory domain specifically, along several dimensions including, but
not exclusively:
• Who creates regulation: regulatory institutions exist in public forms (e.g. the SEC),state-
mandated private forms (e.g. the FSA),formal private organisations (e.g. the British Banking
Association), informal conventions (e.g. industry codes-of-conduct), and market mechanisms
(e.g. credit ratings);
• Where regulatory design and supervision take place: there are subnational, national,
intergovernmental, transnational, and global levels ;
• How specific the regulation is: rules (specific prescriptions), principles (unspecific
prescriptions), norms (implicit prescriptions), and standards (thresholds of compliancel:"
• How voluntary or compulsory these measures are; How effectively non-compliance can be
monitored and punished: i.e. accountability.
3 See especially Braithwaite (2002).
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Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn, Rojas-Suarez, and Weisbrod (1998) order this "messy world"
(Rosenau 2002) into a relational paradigm that distinguishes between regulators and the regulated
but acknowledges their interdependency and overlap. Underhill (2000) goes further and argues that
states and markets function as a "condominium". Whilst recognising the state-market dichotomy as
a useful heuristic, Underhill rejects the frequent thesis in political economy that firms and regulators
think differently and pull in opposite directions:
"The preferences of market agents and other constituencies of market society are integrated into
the institutions of the state through policy and regulatory processes at domestic and
international levels of analysis, depending on their individual organizational capacities/coherence,
and of course power. The incentives and constraints of state policy and regulation are in turn
part of the landscape of firm decision-making, conferring advantages on some and costs on
others just as some are more capable of affecting the policy outcome than others" (Underhill
2000: 821).
This state-market condominium implies that decentralised regulatory governance does not derive
from a dichotomy of preferences of state and market actors, but rather from a "complex alignment
of principles, mechanisms and actors" (Drahos and Braithwaite 2001: 123) which Levy-Faur (2005:
14) frames as "regulatory capitalism": "Regulation is both a constitutive element of capitalism (as
the framework that enables markets) and the tool that moderates and socialises it (the regulation of
risk)". In this view of the political economy, "the state retains responsibility for steering [economic
development and rule-making], while business increasingly takes over the functions of service
provision and technological innovation" (op cit: 15). The implications of this division of labour extend
well beyond regulation, to include, for example, privatisation of social utilities, which were within
the remit of government particularly between the 1940s and the 1980s. In regulatory terms, argues
Levy-Faur, "This new division of labour goes hand in hand with the restructuring of the state
(through delegation and the creation of regulatory agencies) and the restructuring of business (and
other societal organisations) through the creation of internal controls and mechanisms of self-
regulation in the shadow of the state" (ibid, underlining added). (This process is intrinsic to CMR.)
Thus, regulatory capitalism heralds an increase in privatised service provision, an increase in the
number of regulatory agencies, and an increase in industry self-regulation. The key point is that we
see responsibility for market governance diffused among several overlapping actors, as in my own
analysis of CMR.
In Drahos and Braithwaite's influential work, they call for a better understanding "of when a
particular web [of regulatory actors, mechanisms, and principles] tightens or unravels" (2001: 123-
4). Global regulatory capitalism "cannot be understood in terms of the agency of single actors using
single mechanisms," they write, "Theories that concentrate on a single actor, such as realist
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international relations theory, or a single mechanism, such as rationality, end up giving a poor
account of the patterns of regulatory globalisation, [...which, rather,] depends on a complex
alignment of principles, mechanisms and actors" (ibid). In particular, Drahos and Braithwaite's
studies "reveal regulatory globalisation to be a contest of principles" (ibid). This contest of principles
is evident in the emergence of CMRalong several dimensions. Nominally, CMR is a set of principles
for corporate conduct that will challenge established management structures in some corporations.
It is also arguably an ethic that increases accountability in governance by contesting existing, taken-
for-granted standards of conduct and levelling the playing-field for some smaller actors, as I will
argue in detail. One CMR's strongest contributions to the contest of principles may be how it de-
legitimises regulatory arbitrage, a widely accepted principle for action. This is also covered later in
this chapter.
The topology of this conceptual world - decentralised governance; regulatory capitalism
underpinned by a state-market condominium; contests of principles - helps us position CMR theory
within a broader analytical tradition. CMR sheds new light on existing ideas and indicates new
directions for research; my objective in the following pages. I will not attempt a systematic
alignment of CMR and regulatory capitalism because that would be to force CMR into an extant
framework unnecessarily. Some features of both theories will remain outside the following analysis,
and may even contradict it. Instead, my contribution is to advance the theoretical discussion along
three dimensions:
• Establishing CMR as a form of meta-regulation: CMR may be understood as an empirical
example of this regulatory model.
• Exploring implications of CMR I: Legitimacy: CMR is a governance ethic that may enhance
legitimacy in terms of input, output, and accountability (cf. Underhill and Zhang2008).
• Exploring implications of CMR II: Embeddedness, performativity, and regulatory arbitrage:
The Citigroup episode shows CMR as a driving force for the state-market condominium to
operate as a business model for governments and firms. The SWFepisode shows CMR as a
tool for the state-market condominium to sustain markets by 'performing' market theory.
The credit crunch episode shows CMR as a response to a principle-agent problem because
shared norms and objectives are demanded. The profit motive is deemed insufficient
grounds to eschew regulatory objectives.
These first two arguments draw on political economy, with input from theories of law (e.g. Black
2002, Braithwaite 2002). The rationale for extending CMR in this way is that these arguments
contextualise CMR more firmly within an existing tradition. So doing, it is hoped that CMR will
become a more useful concept for political economists. The other arguments are exploratory, and
draw on economic sociology. My rationale for this is to help de-silo our understanding of market
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governance and to highlight this discipline which I believe to be very fertile, and worthy of political
economists' attention. Financial markets have received relatively little, but increasing, attention in
sociology (see Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005). To my knowledge, sovereign wealth funds have not
featured in any sociological studies; which is interesting, given the way in which these funds cohabit
the social and economic environments.
I also take these extant theories to be a form of data (Wallis 2009) insofar as they represent the
views of other theorists. If some theories are highly consistent with CMR, they arguably lend weight
to the idea that CMR exists. For example, the fact that several theorists have shown "meta-
regulation" to exist helps me argue that my theory, which was born from empirical observations
rather than an extant theoretical framework, is, at a minimum, not peculiar.
6.3.2. Theoretical Framework: CMRas 'meta-regulation'
A key feature of decentralised governance and regulatory capitalism has been the search for better
instruments of regulation (Levy-Faur 2005: 21). Regulation is a form of governance that takes place
through rules, principles, and enforcement (op cit: 13). A defining feature of decentralised
governance is self-regulation by firms and industry association. Chiu's (2009: 27) comprehensive
review of models of financial regulation groups three models as examples of "shared governance",
where, "although leadership is provided by regulation, the regulated may be co-opted to provide
governance within discretionary parameters". The shared governance models are meta-regulation,
enforced self-regulation, and ethical self-regulation. All three stand out for their consistency with
key features of CMR, none more so than meta-regulation. In this section, I argue that CMR is a
substantive example of meta-regulation.
Examining these three models serves two purposes. One is to refine CMR.The comparison between
CMR and extant theory introduces CMRto the literature on recognisable and commensurable terms.
In addition, showing CMR's proximity to the generic model of meta-regulation builds credibility for
the concept, because it helps to 'verify' my theory-building. CMRdeparted from data analysis rather
than pre-conceived hypotheses, but it arrived at a very similar place as other theoretical
frameworks. In this respect, extant theory assumesthe role of data, verifying the plausibility of CMR.
The second purpose of this analysis is to show a new substantive variation of these generic models.
Because CMR is grounded in empirical data, it adds new empirical evidence and variations to these
models. To my knowledge, these models have not been discussed in relation to the Citigroup or SWF
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episodes. Inevitably other researchers will be analysing their relevance for the Credit Crunch, as the
timing is propitious.
6.3.2.1. Meta-regulation
The first of these models, "meta-regulation", is a regulatory technique that advances parameters for
firms' internal management systems, usually in order to help regulators meet their objectives (Black
2006: 3). It is often referred to as the "regulation of self-regulation", hence the "meta" in the name.
It does not refer to the way in which private actors create regulation (self-regulation) but rather how
regulators influence discretionary management systems in firms. Recent studies have looked at its
role in financial regulation (Black 2006, Black and Baldwin 2006, Chiu 2007, Gray and Hamilton
2006), risk management (Braithwaite 2003, Power 2004), corporate social responsibility (Parker
2007), and as a form of decentralised governance (Grabosky 1995, Parker 2002). In this model, lithe
quality of firms' internal controls are the paramount focus of attention" (Black 2006: 3), usually with
the aim of managing "risks that the regulatory agency will not achieve its objectives ... and more
specifically the extent to which, and ways in which, those firms will comply with regulatory
requirements"." Chiu's (2009: 29) discussion of meta-regulation shows various fundamental
similarities with CMR.
"This approach may be manifest in the emphasis placed on corporate governance, risk management,
ethical business management and even corporate social responsibility - encouraging corporations to
improve and self-reflect from the inside. The meta-regulation of risk management in financial
institutions is in particular, a key feature of financial regulation in the EU and the UK. The lEU's)
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive provides for broad principles of organisational soundness,
the establishment of a compliance function, risk management systems, internal audit, and the
responsibility of senior management for compliance generally. These cannot be excessively
prescribed as regulators are not in a position to micro-manage firms, and hence, these represent a
meta-regulatory approach where regulators expect certain internal measures to be in place in firms,
and the regulators' role is to monitor the performance of such measures. Some commentators have
lauded this approach as being reflexive and cost-effective, and likely to entail more permanent
solutions that would be viewed asconvincing for firms ....
[Under meta-regulation, firms') "capacity to self-regulate may be enhanced by value orientation,
management commitment, the acquisition of skills and knowledge and the design of internal
processes and systems. The 'self-regulation' of each microcosm should then be accountable to
regulators and stakeholders in order to achieve not just 'compliance' but responsibility towards the
democratic polity" (Chiu 2009: 29-30).
The emphasis on internal systems, rather than corporate structure or specific types of trades, is
entirely consistent with the CMR protocols. This is especially true of the emphasis on corporate
4 Black 2006 and Chiu 2009 associate meta-regulation closely with the risk-based regulation approach of the
FSAand the EU- where regulation is designed to mitigate risks to the regulators' objectives. Black argues that
meta-regulation goes hand-in-hand with this approach; is fuelled by it, and in turns fuels it (p. 3).
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governance, risk management, and ethical businessmanagement. Also in this vein, Black (2006: 22)
writes that part of the purpose of meta-regulation is "to determine how much those at the top of
the organisation, essentially the board, know about how the risks identified by the regulators are
being managed... The aim is then to ensure that the firm's own system of regulation is enhanced to
enable the regulator to spend fewer resources monitoring it in future". Throughout the CMR
episodes, the notions of escalating trades to senior management, integrating high-level objectives
with mid-level strategy, and having the board setting the tone of responsible compliance from the
top were integral to the recommendations. Meta-regulation's aim of "enhancing the capacity to self-
regulate through value-orientation" (Chiu op cit) was also notable in the Credit Crunch episode's
contributions to the CMR concept; namely, pursuing responsible compliance, humanising technical
activity, and ethical competence.
Meta-regulation's move from strict compliance and towards "responsibility towards the democratic
polity" (ibid) is also apparent in the CMR protocols. Firstly, the protocols emerge not only from
regulators, but also from other political, economic and social actors, whose reactions and
prescriptions in each of the controversies were captured in media data. Second,exceeding minimum
compliance is a fundamental feature of the CMRproblematique.
A principles-based approach in meta-regulation, in contrast with "excessively prescriptive" rules
(ibid), is another consistency between the models. Finally, the particular application of meta-
regulation in financial industries (ibid; also Black2006, Braithwaite 2003) is of course consistent with
the substantive context of the CMRpropositions.
Against this background, CMRmay be regarded as a substantive example of meta-regulation. CMR is
a form of meta-regulation designed to ensure an orderly financial system. One difference is that
CMR protocols are drawn both from regulatory statements and from broader stakeholders, whereas
meta-regulations typically depart directly from regulators and regulated flrms." This may enable
CMR to overcome some limitations of the generic model. The generic model "may be seen as an
excesslvelv microcosmic approach to regulation. It offers no particular insight as to the collective
effects of firm self-regulation and issuesof social risk or communitarian concerns, or systemic risk,"
writes Chiu (op cit: 32). By contrast, CMR is underpinned by a focus on mitigating systemic risk,
which is in the public interest, as I will argue in more detail.
5 See,however,Hutter (2005) on the role of variousgovernmentinstitutionsin the applicationof risk-based
regulation.
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Meta-regulation has also been criticised for leaving regulators open to "technocracy capture" (see
also Porter 2004 on "technical authority"), where regulators "find it difficult to judge the
performance of the firm's systems and designs," writes Chiu (ibid), "In this respect, shared
governance such as meta-regulation that allows and entails reliance on the internal expertise of
firms may create a presumed legitimacy". CMR is also vulnerable to this claim. Further, as Black
(2006: 2) notes, technocracy capture often means that the "most important problems" remain
"obscured from public scrutiny until a 'scandal' occurs". On this note, however, CMR's emphasis on
systemic stability (outcomes), combined with its explicit threat of regulatory punishment, should
provide a disincentive for firms to hide problems behind technology. This is because if the "scandal"
that reveals the corporate misconduct is a systemic crisis, the regulatory response is likely to be
acute. Put differently, if CMR propositions were only about specific protocols (management
systems), then technocracy capture would be significant vulnerability. Becausethe protocols are also
linked both to systemic risk and regulatory risk, CMR shows a disincentive for firms to obscure
problems.
A more significant problem with meta-regulation and CMR lies in its instrumental value for
regulators. Black (op cit: 22) writes, "Whilst it may have a new label, reliance on a firm's internal
management controls to implement regulatory norms and objectives is inevitable ... Meta-regulation
arguably simply aims to turn weakness into strength by turning this inevitability into a regulatory
technique". Consequently, this may not solve the regulatory problem, but rather move "the onus for
its resolution to the firms whilst not necessarily helping them to develop the capacity to resolve it"
(ibid). Here we are moving into a more normative space, about the effectiveness of CMRto resolve
systemic risk, which we can only be assessedempirically. However, if meta-regulatory frameworks
like CMR are hollow envelope-pushing, then we may be able to anticipate higher systemic risk and
increased conflict between firms and regulators, because neither set of actors is adequately
prepared to manage the system. This concern would be acute because meta-regulation "is growing
rapidly in vogue, and has been hailed as one of the hallmarks of the 'new regulatory state',"
according to Black (ibid).
6.3.2.2. Enforced self-regulation and ethical self-regulation
Meta-regulation is classed by Chiu (2009) as a model of "shared governance" in financial regulation
alongside two others: enforced self-regulation and ethical self-regulation. Like meta-regulation,
these improve our understanding of CMR.They do so particularly in the area of enforcement.
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Enforced self-regulation is a technique proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) whereby
regulators set objectives, firms write their own rules, and regulators subsequently monitor them,
and punish non-compliance." This is similar to meta-regulation insofar as regulators take the lead in
setting objectives and firms subsequently have discretionary space for agreeing rules. In addition,
enforced self-regulation promotes the independence of the compliance department in firms (Ayres
and Braithwaite op cit: 115-6), as does CMR in several key processes. However, the regulations in
this model do not necessarily focus on internal systemsand controls, which is the emphasis of meta-
regulation. They may cover any aspect of management, incorporation, or trading.
In the enforced self-regulation model, firms articulate specific rules for themselves, sometimes in Ita
lengthy process of writing and re-drafting" regulations (op cit: 111). It is only in a minority of cases
that Ayres and Braithwaite "envision instances in which regulators should develop different sets of
defaults that the regulated firms can choose between as an additional alternative to developing
idiosyncratic self-regulation" (op cit: 109). By contrast, CMR has specific principles as defaults,
derived from outside the firm. This is a key difference: CMR is less about firms self-regulating, and
more about external stakeholders influencing discretionary firm behaviour. Put differently, enforced
self-regulation emphasises compliance with written rules, whereas CMR (and meta-regulation more
generally) emphasises meeting regulatory objectives and does not explicitly call for firms to write
their own rulebook.
Notwithstanding these differences, Ayres and Braithwaite advocate enforced self-regulation on
some of the same grounds that I describe CMR. In particular, enforced self-regulation may spur
companies to adopt higher standards than regulator-led regulation would. "Regulations mandating a
certain hazard-reducing technology, while forcing less responsible companies to upgrade to this
standard, can also cause industry leaders to adopt this fix when, left to their own devices, they
would have installed a technology superior in both hazard reduction and economy," write Ayres and
Braithwaite (op cit: 110). Indeed, they continue, "internal corporate rules ted to cover a much wider
range of industrial hazards and corporate abuses than do governmental regulations" (op cit: 112;
also Goodhart et al 1998). In this way, Ayres and Braithwate argue that the model offers incentives
for what the CMR protocols term responsible compliance; that is, pursuing shared objectives with
regulators, rather than only minimum literal compliance (seeChapter 5, Section 5.2.4).
6 AyresandBraithwaitepresentenforcedself-regulationasa form of responsiveregulationmorebroadly.See
alsoBlackandBaldwin(2006).
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In order to overcome the problem of literal compliance, CMR invokes ethical prerogatives rather
than rules written by firms. CMR shares this characteristic with ethical self-regulation, the third
model. Chiu (2009: 32) summarises the model thus: "In a narrow sense ethics may relate to the
prevention of fraud or other anti-social and detrimental behaviour that may inflict organisational
and social costs. Seen in that, light ethical self-regulation would include risk management, social
responsibility in the sense of prevention or mitigation of externalities, and corporate governance.
Ethics may also relate to 'proactively' adding to social good ... ". The content of an ethics-based
regulatory programme summarised here by Chiu is similar to the content of CMR: risk management,
much of which is related to corporate governance, and proactive improvement in performance that
leads a more orderly financial system, attending to externalities such as the impact on a firm's
clients and competitors (e.g. NYT1,FT28).One of CMR's properties related to ethics was responsible
compliance, noted above. The other was ethical competence; particularly conducting business with
some non-financial objectives and acknowledging one's fitness for one's role. Outsized remuneration
in the lead-up to the Credit Crunch was both a risk management issueand an ethical one because it
implied that bankers needed a bigger reward for their work than other equally socially valuable
people (Financial Times 2010c). Elaborating some of the parallels between ethical self-regulation and
meta-regulation, Parker (2007) writes of "legally accountable corporate social responsibility", and
Shamir (2008) of "responsibilisation" for moral conduct. Where specific rules were unfeasible in the
CMRepisodes, ethics were invoked as a supplementary enforcement mechanism.
While much of the literature on these regulatory frameworks assesses their relative merits in
achieving regulatory objectives (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Chiu 2009, Goodhart et al1998), I have,
at most, assessedtheir merits in explaining the CMR episodes. More precisely, the analysis shows
CMR's convergence and divergence with these other frameworks of shared governance. CMR
arguably constitutes a substantive example of meta-regulation, displaying some of the same
enforcement drive of the enforced self-regulation and ethical self-regulation models. These existing
frameworks help to confirm the plausibility of my findings and introduce them to a broader
theoretical discussion, where CMR contributes empirical evidence. Having thus positioned CMR
within a broader framework, I now explore some ways in which CMRenhances our understanding of
key problems in political economy and economic sociology.
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6.3.3. Political Economy: CMRasaccountability in financial governance
In the first of two discussions on the theoretical implications of CMR, I address the question of
legitimacy in financial governance, which is intrinsic to the paradigm of decentralised governance.
Such legitimacy has been severely criticised (Black 2008: 137). I focus my analysis on a specific
framework of (il)legitimacy advanced by Underhill and Zhang (2008), who argue that the increasing
transfer of regulatory authority to private actors has "aligned financial governance with the
preferences of powerful market players, transforming the notion of the public interest in the
international financial domain" (p. 536). This has meant that "private market interests increaslnglv
define supervisory standards" (p. 541). Together these trends have decreased (democratic)
legitimacy in financial governance regimes, an argument that Underhill and Zhang illustrate with two
case studies on banking and securities regulation under the auspices of the Basel Committee and the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). This is an interesting argument to
engage with because it is concerned with the interaction between private authority over financial
regulation and the public good. Similarly, CMR is concerned with self-regulation in pursuit of stability
of the system as a whole. In addition, Underhill and Zhang's model is divided into three phases that
map onto CMR, systemic risk, and regulatory risk in a way that enhances our understanding of both
frameworks.
CMR builds on Underhill and Zhang's premise that regulatory authority is being diffused to powerful
private interests, who are closely aligned with regulatory institutions. Yet I would argue that CMR is,
normatively and descriptively, an ethic of accountability that could lead to higher legitimacy in
private financial governance. The theory of CMR provides a normative underpinning for more
legitimate governance. The observation of CMR suggests that regulators' willingness to pay the cost
of financial instability on behalf of their friends in the private sector may have limits. The threat of
regulatory risk embedded in CMR may owe itself to regulators often taking the blame when private
authority does not act towards the public good.' Because there is an express threat of higher
regulation when CMR is not observed, CMR may represent a conditionality framework for
devolution of authority, which would mean that the transfer of regulatory power to private
7 I do not assume that bankers-turned-regulators are willing accept the damaging consequences (for their
professional standing, for example) of bad behaviour by banks. The close relationship between regulators and
banks need not preclude resentment and competition between them. In illustration, Hector Sants, chief
executive of the 'light-touch' FSA,himself a former banker, said in March 2009, "There is a view that people
are not frightened of the FSA.I can assure you that is a view that I am determined to correct. People should be
very frightened of the FSA"(BBC2009).
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authorities need not be considered an unconditional structural process. The following discussion
positions CMR as a partial response to the problem of legitimacy as Underhill and Zhang present it.
6.3.3.1. Three-phase framework of legitimacy
Underhill and Zhang's (2008) framework for legitimacy in global governance distinguishes between
input, output, and accountability dimensions of legitimacy. Legitimacy is important on both
normative and instrumental grounds because it induces compliance through "an internal sense of
obligation rather than by the fear of retribution or self-interested calculation, both of which are
more costly and tend to have only ephemeral effects" (p. 573). The three dimensions of legitimacy
are distinguishable thus:
"The input side refers to the decision-making process and the extent to which the interest of the
broader community are included. The output side concerns results: the capacity of rule-makers to
produce outcomes which resolve problems and achieve collective goals in line with accepted and
shared preferences or norms of the community. [... The accountability phase] concerns the
democratic accountability of global policy processes and outcomes to the broad range of
constituencies that are affected by the output phase, beyond the rather narrow, often technical,
policy communities which currently participate in decision making" (pp. 538-9).
Underhill and Zhang present evidence to suggest that, in practice, the financial policy-making
process and its outcomes are detached from democratic institutions, and captured by powerful
financial interests. In the following paragraphs I show how CMR integrates with this framework.
The meta-propositions about CMR - that regulators and other societal actors expect firms to help
reduce systemic risk and in return will face lower regulatory risk - maps on to each of the three
phases of legitimacy, input, output, and accountability (see Figure 6-7).
Figure 6-7. CMRenhancing legitimacy (developing Underhill and Zhang 2008)
Phasesof
legitimacy
Input Output Accountability
[ + CMR ) )[ - Systemic ) >[ - Regulation Jrisk risk
- CMR
+ Systemic + Regulatory
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KeyCMR
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First, at the input phase, specific CMR propositions provide parameters for discussion (input-
content) that facilitate broader constituency participation (input-process). These inputs are geared
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to provide orderly financial markets, which is an output in the public interest. Non-observance of
these management principles increases regulatory risk, which is an accountability mechanism.
Several legitimacy gaps that Underhill and Zhang point out are not represented here, such as the
accountability of regulators to national authorities. However, my claim is that CMR represents an
evolution of the legitimacy framework in the substantive environment of systemic risk management.
This claim exists on normative and descriptive planes. Normatively, CMR is an idea around which
constituencies can coalesce. Descriptively, CMR is empirical evidence of some conditionality in the
regulatory diffusion process, and therefore an improvement in legitimacy. The following paragraphs
illustrate this argument.
6.3.3.2.lnput: CMR propositions as 'content' legitimacy
Underhill and Zhang (2008) argue in favour of a policy-making process that "facilitates the inclusion
of new and wider constituencies as participants in the input phase" (p. 539). They argue that
decisions made without "a democratic process with input from those who bear the costs of
decisions" (p. 539) leads to outcomes that are either not in the public interest or perceived not to
be, and are therefore illegitimate.
Whereas Underhill and Zhang devote more attention to the process side of input legitimacy, my
analysis emphasises the content side. The process side relates to how input is received - which
constituencies participate, the equitability of costs of participation, the mechanisms to ensure
constituency views count (e.g. voting rights), etc. The content side relates to what inputs are
received - items on the agenda, their assumptions, and the parameters for final decisions. This
input-content is separate from the output, which relates to final decisions and their outcome. Input-
content merits specific attention. Parameters for what measures will be discussed in a policy-making
context need to be appropriate for each constituency in order for their representation to be
meaningful. Very technical and complex discussions tend to favour powerful interest groups.
Underhill and Zhang make this point but in reference to the output of Basel II negotiations:
"Complexity raises the relative compliance costs more for smaller and less sophisticated banks,
erecting barriers to entry and hindering competition" (p. 546). The same is true on the input side:
complexity increases the cost of participating, and in addition, it decreases participating groups'
ability to represent their constituencies faithfully. For inputs to have legitimacy, some baseline
parameters for the discussion must be set out. Such a set of parameters can help marginalised
constituencies to focus their resources on developing the capabilities required to discuss the most
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material problems, rather than chaseever-expanding agendas (both in scope and complexity), which
intrinsically favour well-resourced groups."
CMR provides such a set of baseline parameters because, to begin with, it is geared to something in
the public interest: systemic stability. Therefore CMRas a starting point provides some discipline to
ensure that the agenda for discussion attends to public interest. That agenda includes the principles
of CMR, namely risk management protocols that specifically look to anticipate the impact of
transactions on a broader stakeholder group; discipline the choice and pursuit of business
opportunities; and promote proactive improvement, which is part of good implementation of the
rules on the output side. Thus, the management protocols for financial companies constitute an
agenda for discussion. CMR's intrinsic principles-based nature also de-limits the agenda to a
manageable scope. The propagation of self-regulatory regimes is often argued to favour the
powerful interests that design them. That may be true, but having a degree of flexibility in regulation
also decreases costs for poorly represented constituencies like low-income country governments
precisely because it permits them to enter and steer the discussion to the issues they regard as
priorities. CMR protocols are sufficiently vague - principles rather than rules - thus allowing
interpretation by individual parties based on their particular conditions and a shared objective of
systemic stability. This flexibility is a stepping stone for closer integration of ideas on the input side,
and therefore greater legltlrnacv." Over time, as Underhill and Zhang put it, legitimate input "should
help a sense of community to emerge as outcomes correspond better to an accepted set of norms
around particular issues" (op cit: 539).
CMR principles are Western by design, and it is not intuitive to present them as facilitators for non-
Western participation in policy-making. However, one must note that institutions that depart too far
from the underlying distribution of structural power cease to be taken seriously by those who
possess it (Strange 1997b). In this case, there is more to be gained from adopting an agenda that is
anchored in systemic stability and contains voluntary elements - like CMR - than one that more
directly serves the interests and capabilities of particular groups. Secondly, CMR is grounded
specifically in reactions to the potentially destabilising influence of very large and powerful financial
actors, who typically set the rules of the game. These reactions were not only regulators' but also
from a broader stakeholder group that included Citigroup's small competitors, which the bank had
intended to "kill off'; trade unions that feared SWFs' potential asset-stripping instincts; and
8 Onthis point, seealsoAyresandBraithwaite(1992: 122).
9 Onthis point, VojtaandUzan(2003: 284) arguethat encouragingemergingmarketprivatesectorinstitutions
to developbestpracticestandardsfor riskmanagementwould improvefinancialgovernance.
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consumers who fell prey to predatory lending before the credit crunch. Being grounded in reactions
to controversies in governance, CMR is, I contend, an apt starting point for improving the terms of
debate.
The interpretation of CMR I have just presented is normative. It is an ethic that can be used to
increase legitimacy on the input side of policy-making. Underhill and Zhang note concerns that lithe
enhanced rule-setting power of private interests may have severely undermined the authority of
public actors to formulate financial and regulatory policies in line with the public interest, a situation
approaching policy capture" (op cit: 553). As one solution, they propose enhancing constituency
representation on technical committees at international institutions like the Basel Committee for
banking regulation or 10SCOfor securities supervision, whilst noting that such projects would likely
meet with "fierce opposition" from entrenched interests (ibid). I would note that successful
cooperation is frequently achieved when interests coalescearound a common ethic (Braithwaite and
Drahos 2000), of which CMRis an example.
6.3.3.3. Output: Systemic stability as a public interest
Underhill and Zhang define the output side of legitimacy as "outcomes which resolve problems and
achieve collective goals in line with accepted and shared preferences or norms of the community"
(op cit: 538). Here they focus on content, not only process, as do I. They present evidence to suggest
that, lilt is often difficult clearly to define the public interest, as distinct from the particularistic
claims of private market actors in relation to the financial system" (op cit: 541). The emergence of
CMR, especially the discovery of systemic risk as a pivotal regulatory concern, may be seen as an
improvement. CMR aims for systemic stability. This is a public good insofar as its enjoyment by one
party does not prevent its enjoyment by another (non-rivalry), and it is difficult to exclude parties
from it (non-excludability), except through illegal market abuse. Market stability is also a more
equitable outcome for marginalised groups than market instability. Large and powerful actors
('shapers') can use instability to promote more favourable market structures and outcomes,
whereas less influential actors ('adapters') must take the future as given (Courtney, Kirkland, and
Viguerie 2001: 10). Further, systemic stability attends to externalities in the real economy. While
there is nothing inherently illegitimate about instability arising from the failure of an incompetent
company, questions arise when this instability has extensive negative repercussions in the real
economy purely as a result of highly interconnected financial markets. Then, questions arise as to
whether financial activity is too detached from the real economy and therefore illegitimate. On
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these grounds, the emergence of CMR as an ethic of regulation represents a focus on outcomes in
financial governance that are more closely aligned with the public interest.
This argument has its limits. CMR is embedded in the paradigm of market-based regulation, and a
market economy. The relative distribution of costs and benefits has been increasingly inequitable
throughout the modern history of market economies (Scholte 2000). This inequitable distribution is
one of the negative (illegitimate) outcomes of many private regulatory regimes (Underhill and Zhang
2008: 542). Indeed, like many such regimes, CMR arguably presents policies that "reinforce the
market orientation of economic governance, thus aiming to enhance both growth and stability" (op
cit: 540). More specifically, CMR reinforces the trend whereby authorities adopt "market-oriented
approaches to regulation, supervision and corporate risk management, [and] where private firms are
responsible for risk management through complex mathematical models implemented under the
approval of supervisory agencies" (op cit: 541).
However, CMR does steer this trend in a more equitable and self-aware direction. Its overriding
focus on systemic risk promotes the market commons by limiting the socialisation of private, self-
interested risks. An orderly market commons becomes a self-aware objective in itself, rather than an
assumed by-product of 'normal' business activity where powerful interests predominate. This is
most evident in the CMR proposition of continuous improvement. Even in areas like accounting,
where powerful companies exercise technical authority (Porter 2004), companies are called to
interpret regulation in terms of its ultimate objective, rather than its literal requirements (see Power
2004). The CMR proposition on investment policy, where large firms are expected to forego
potentially profitable opportunities and products in order to safeguard the system, also reflects a
public purpose.
6.3.3.4. Accountability: CMRas regulatory conditionality
Completing the circle of illegitimate policy-making processesand outcomes is the demonstrable lack
of accountability of private and quasi-private actors, who dominate financial governance, argue
Underhill and Zhang. "This concerns the (democratic) accountability of global policy processes and
outcomes to the broad range of constituencies that are affected by the output phase, beyond the
rather narrow, often technical, policy communities which currently participate in decision-making,"
they write (op cit: 539). The existing mechanisms of accountability are limited to "such means as
disseminating information affecting the reputation of individual and corporate actors, through
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protest, and through the activity of civil society NGOs" (tbld)." Some new measures of accountability
have been proposed, such as possible compensation for groups that are disadvantaged by outcomes
(ibid). Lack of accountability means that the input and output dimensions of governance are less
amenable to change and therefore increasingly illegitimate.
The two current trends that fuel this problem are financial firms' "close and relatively exclusive
relationships with regulatory agencies" and international regulatory regimes' "frequent recourse to
self-regulation" (op cit: 541). Underhill and Zhang write that the "relative disarmament of public
authorities means that private market interests increasingly define supervisory standards" (ibid).
One of their case studies illustrates how powerful private interests defined the changes to Basel I
capital adequacy accord that turned it into a more market-oriented Basel II. This process showed
how the capital adequacy policy domain was "far more likely to take into account the articulated
preferences of private sector interlocutors in developed countries than the interests of developing
country supervisors and their corresponding financial sectors" (op cit: 546). The pivotal moment in
this process was a report that reviewed Basel I; a report which appears to have a great deal of
resonance with some CMR issues:
"The report ... observed that management controls should playa central role in the supervision of
financial systems and that 'core' financial institutions should take the initiative to develop a new
system along with 'international groupings of supervisors'. In essence, financial globalisation had
rendered the supervisory process increasingly difficult and placed it beyond the reach of national
supervisors. The conclusions of the report implied that regulatory agencies should rely more on the
private institutions that they supervised and that these institutions themselves would accept the
responsibility to improve the structure of, and the discipline imposed by, they internal control
functions and risk management mechanisms" (op cit: 545, underlining added).
The resonance with CMR is strong, insofar as CMR focuses on management controls, core
institutions, and their acceptance of responsibility. Thus CMR is further evidence of the general
dynamics described here. However, the CMR narrative has a subtle difference that is consequential.
The CMR narrative is not one where regulators surrender regulatory powers to corporations who
"accept that responsibility", but one where regulators and other public stakeholders compel
corporations to take responsibility. This is underpinned by the trade-off with regulatory risk that is
explicit in CMR. Firms that do not observe CMR face higher regulatory risks." Underhill and Zhang
noted in an earlier work (2003b) that "Private sector burden sharing and responsibility issues have
been notable for their absence in the policy debate" (p. 380). The regulatory risks in CMR call firms
10 Underhill and Zhang reference Keohane (2006: 79-80).
11The data suggeststhat firms may face higher regulatory risks individually or collectively, depending on the
circumstances. Citigroup faced individual sanction, but the SWF and post-Credit Crunch episodes showed
collective pressure applied to firms.
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to account for how their management protocols impact on the wider system. CMR episodes also
showed accountability to broader stakeholder groups, such as business counterparties and trade
unions. The Citigroup episode saw the bank's competitors attempt a broad boycott, including in
presentations to the Citigroup's clients. Further, the Citigroup, SWFs,and (part of) the Credit Crunch
response invoked principles-based regulation, whose motivation is also to give regulators more
flexibility in interpreting misconduct (Lomnicka 2001). In complex environments principles can bring
more interpretive certainty for regulators than rules (Braithwaite 2002: 54). Thus, CMR seeks to
increase the accountability of management protocols that often define market governance,
flattening the inverse relationship between self-regulation and accountability.
In situations where regulatory risk is a red herring, CMR compensates with a normative ethic. It is
true that close relationship between private actors and regulators may sometimes preclude a strong
regulatory response to misconduct. I do not believe this is automatically the case because the
dominant epistemic elite argues in favour of competition and may compete among themselves for
professional plaudits. But in any caseCMR is embedded in a narrative of normative responsibility. As
such it empowers stakeholders to build coalitions driven by ideals of leadership that endeavour to
bring private authority to account.
6.3.3.5. CMR as accountability: normative and descriptive underpinnings
Underhill and Zhang (2008) conclude their argument in "search of normative underpinnings for
global financial order" (p. 552) and I contend that the theory of CMR is a partial response to that
search, in the domain of financial systemic risk. Normatively, CMR provides an ethic for participants
in governance regimes to delimit the content of policy discussion (inputs) and to coalescearound the
mutual goal of systemic stability (output), which is relatively equitable vis-a-vis the status quo.
Intrinsically, the call for firms to take responsibility for better outcomes provides an outcome-based
rationale for bringing private authority to account. Descriptively, the observation of CMR in practice
suggests that the legitimacy framework for financial governance is evolving. Within the trend of
diffusion of authority to the private sector, CMR episodes demonstrate a willingness of regulators
and other public stakeholders to make systemic stability an objective in itself (output), and to
compel firms to adapt their management systems to work towards that common goal, under threat
of regulation. As such, CMRis evidence both that the diffusion of regulatory authority continues, and
that some normative conditionality has emerged. Ultimately, however, accountability mechanisms
are not neutral but embody their own interpretive and discursive logic (Black 2008: 158). As a result,
CMR's effectiveness as an ethic of accountability will depend on specific contexts. In the Citigroup
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and SWF contexts, it arguably worked because the firms adapted to the expectations. The jury
remains out on banks' longer-term response to the Credit Crunch.
I argued in Section 6.3.3.3. that, in the context of these episodes, systemic stability is in the public
interests, whereas systemic instability is not. This is a narrow interpretation of the public interest
because it does not attend to the distribution of welfare in the system. My claim rests on the
assumption that more equitable welfare can be achieved under stable financial conditions than
under unstable conditions because, in the latter, powerful "shapers" fare better than powerless
"adapters" (see Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie 2001). A Marxian worldview would ascribe greater
benefits to creative destruction than I have herein. Nevertheless, as I argued in Section 6.3.3.4., CMR
entails some mechanisms of accountability. We saw informal mechanisms of accountability being
replaced by formal mechanisms when they were perceived to be insufficient. Keohane (2006)
identifies informal accountability mechanisms that include peer networks of influence and efforts to
impose costs on others. Citigroup saw its competitors attempt to create a boycott among its clients.
SWFswere urged by private equity funds to adopt the same codes of conduct that the private equity
industry had designed for itself. Whilst tangible, these efforts were deemed insufficient and replaced
by formal accountability mechanisms, specifically regulatory enforcement. This mix of informal and
formal accountability mechanisms is of course intrinsic to a reflexive regulatory model, like meta-
regulation or enforced self-regulation.
Underhill (2000: 823) writes that a key question for political economy is "how long is the current
form of state-market condominium sustainable in the face of the increasing volatility of global
financial markets?" One topic for investigation is therefore the feasibility of CMR.Three challenges
to CMR as a form of governance, and therefore to its enduring ontological significance, were
explained earlier: the asymmetry between the focused profit-motive versus a diffused systemic
motive; the possibility that senior management will scapegoat junior executives for technical failure;
and the potential for finger-pointing among companies and the limitations that poses for an
effective and efficient regulatory response. I presented a limited counter-argument that I will now
broaden to include sociological factors. In the following paragraphs, I show the extent to which
markets are embedded in social networks and norms, and the power of new theories (of
governance, for example) to influence, or "perform", market activities. My argument is that the
propagation of meta-regulation generally and CMRspecifically need not face the challenges above.
The socio-political embedded ness of markets and the role of social values mitigated narrow self-
interest in the episodes I have presented. Persistent scapegoating would likely be untenable because
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of reputational effects within companies and the "social capital" of effective managers (Parker
2007). Moreover, the propagation of CMRtheory could itself be performative.
6.3.4. Economic Sociology: Embeddedness, performativity, and regulatory arbitrage
CMR, as an integrative concept, enables us to see the interaction of both sociological and political
economy processes in financial governance. This section pursues a different analytical direction from
the preceding focus on legitimacy. Here I break down CMR into the three empirical episodes and
analyse them in light of two concepts from economic sociology, embedded ness (Granovetter 1985,
Smelser and Swedberg 2005) and performativity (Calion 1998, MacKenzia, Muniesa, and Siu 2007). I
proceed to argue, first, that the CMR episodes lend empirical weight to these concepts. This is an
important contribution becauseeconomic sociology hasonly recently, since the 1980sand especially
in the 2000s (Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005: 8), begun to focus on financial markets. Research in the
sociology of financial markets is conversant with political economy, often drawing on the work of
political economists like Robert Shiller, Susan Strange, Barry Eichengreen, and SaskiaSassen,who
herself has written on embeddedness (Sassen2005). However, compared with political economy
and economics, the sociology of financial markets remains an "incipient discipline" (Knorr Cetina and
Preda: op cit). The same could be said of economic sociology more broadly (Swedberg 2004: 2).
Empirical evidence that supports two central concepts in the discipline is a worthwhile contribution.
In this section, I present the CMR episodes as evidence of those concepts, and I argue that the
Citigroup and SWFepisodes reveal new variations of embeddednessand performativity.
Drawing on this analysis, the empirical emergence of CMR is argued to demonstrate the introduction
of regulatory norms into market conduct. The argument then goes one step further, to posit that
these norms may de-legitimise some rational economic practices, like regulatory arbitrage. This part
of the argument refers to the Credit Crunch episode. Thus, I show that CMR is an integrative concept
that helps researchers to bridge issuesof concern in both political economy and economic sociology,
helping further de-silo these two research traditions. Figure6-8 below summarises this analysis.
258
Figure 6-8. CMR integration with economic sociology
Concepts: Embeddedness (market conduct is embedded in social norms and networks) & Performativity (economic models shape
conduct, do not merely describe it)
Episode Arguments Contribution
Episode is evidence of market embeddedness; shows
the "state-market condominium" as a business model.
Citigroup
Embeddedness can be a post hoc construction, that
becomes performative.
SWFs
Episode is evidence of performativity; SWFs perceived
to be 'wrongly' embedded, and their 're-educated' in
profit maximisation.
Episode illustrates 'performativity-plus', the
performance not only of economic conduct, but
responsible economic conduct.
Credit Crunch
Episode shows the embedding of new socia-economic
norms (in CMR), de-legitimising the practice of
regulatory arbitrage.
Adds empirical substantiation to extant concepts
and shows new variation of embeddedness post
hoc. Illustrates the "state-market condominium"
as a business model
Adds empirical substantiation to extant concept
and show new variation of performativity; early
sociological analysis of SWFs in the global
economy
Synthesising sociological and political economy
understandings of regulatory arbitrage
6.3.4.1. The concepts of embeddedness and performativity
Economic sociology helps us explain and conceptualise the Citigroup and SWF episodes which, in
turn, lend weight to some core propositions in this discipline. Economic sociology studies the effect
of social norms, behaviours, and culture on economic transactions. In contrast with economics,
where the analytic starting point is typically the individual, in economic sociology the starting points
are typically groups, institutions and society (Smelser and Swedberg 2005: 4). The two disciplines
also diverge when it comes to the scope of rationality in economic action:
"The economist traditionally identifies rational action with the efficient use of scarce resources. The
sociologist's view is, once again, broader. Weber referred to the conventional maximisation of utility,
under conditions of scarcity as formal rationality. In addition, however, he identified substantive
rationality, which refers to allocation within the guidelines of other principles, such as communal
loyalties or sacred values. A further difference lies in the fact that economists regard rationality as an
assumption, whereas most sociologists regard it as a variable" (ibid; see also Teubner 1983).
Two of the most important concepts in modern economic sociology are embedded ness and
performativity (Smelser and Swedberg 2005). Embeddedness refers to how economic activity is
conditioned by social relations and structures. Granovetter (1985) became the main reference for
this concept, arguing both against over-economised renderings of economic behaviour and over-
socialised ones (see also Nee and Ingram 1998). Both rely on what Granovetter calls social
atomisation. Among sociologists, "oversocialised conceptions of how society influences individual
behaviour are rather mechanical: once we know the individual's social class or labour market sector,
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everything else in behaviour is automatic, since they are so well socialised" (op cit: 486). Economists,
on the other had, "invariably abstract away from the history of relations and their position with
respect to other relations - what might be called the historical and structural embedded ness of
relations. The interpersonal ties described in their arguments are extremely stylised, average,
'typical' - devoid of specific content, history, or structural location" (ibid).
Granovetter "insists" that "while social relations may indeed often be a necessarycondition for trust
and trustworthy behaviour, they are not sufficient to guarantee these and may even provide
occasion and means for malfeasance and conflict on a larger scale than in their absence" (op cit:
491). Uzzi (1997) hasgone on to argue that companies may be over-embedded (strong social ties) or
under-embedded (arm's length market transactions), and that firms are likely to be most successful
when they balance these two (Smelser and Swedberg 2005: 15). I will argue that Citigroup traders
under-estimated the degree of embedded ness in the market. Traders explicitly assumed that other
banks would replicate the illicit trade ("copycat trades", FTS3)because formally the trade was a
'rational' allocation of resources. However, its competitors felt the bank had violated their trust.
The second concept I address is performativity, which refers to how ideas, like economic theory, or
CMR,do not only capture an independent reality, but transform frames of reference for actors in the
studied environment, who may then 'perform' that theory. Strictly, a performative statement,
according to Austin's (1962) widely cited How To Do Things with Words, is one that causesthe reality
that it describes: for example, "1hereby sentence you to prison", or"l marry you" (Callan 2007: 317).
Since Calion's (1998) The Laws of the Markets, sociologists have increasingly focused on the thesis
that "economics can influence the behaviour of real economic agents, which it claims to analyse
objectively and from a distance" (cf. Calion 2007: 313). Studies of performativity show how
economic theory has been applied practically to construct new markets (Garcia-Parpet 2007,
MacKenzie and Millo 2003), design financial trading strategies, particularly derivatives (MacKenzie
2003, 2007, tepinav 2007), and national development strategies in low income countries (Mitchell
2007). The way in which "representative" economic statistics affect decislon-rnaking, and do not
merely describe it, further illustrates the theme (Didier 2007).
To understand the conceptual ties between embeddedness and performativity, we can look to a
heated debate on the implications of performativity (e.g. Holm 2007). The debate began with
Miller's (2002) argument that economic theory and abstract market models are used to defend
capitalism from other forms of exchange. He accusesCalion of "treating the economic model of the
market as though it were core to actual economies rather than a projection of economists" (Miller
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2002: 219). Miller writes that "what lies within the frame [of economic theory] is not the market
system as an actual practice, but on the contrary a ritualised expression of the ideology of the
market" (op cit: 224). Here lie conceptual ties between performativity and embedded ness. Where
Callan holds that actors may be socialised to perform a market, embedded in social norms, Miller
argues that the market does not exist as such and its manifestation is a "performance" - he calls this
market "virtualism". Millers position is therefore highly relativistic and he sees no evidence of
'rational' performed economic action. On the contrary, his studies showed that economic "decisions
were constantly embroiled in larger cultural concerns and indeed I felt that the more successful
companies were those trying to become still more entangled in the 'street culture' of consumers"
(2002: 229). The question arises of whether economic theory's performativity leads to actual
performance or simply the illusion of rational economic activity.
The CMR episodes provide several illustrations of the concepts of embeddedness and
performativity. The Citigroup episode suggests that Calion's performation of economic theory, and
Millers "ritualised expression of the ideology of the market", are not mutually exclusive. A plausible
interpretation of the Citigroup controversy is Citigroup traders were unaware of the market norms.
As I will argue, the gentlemen's agreement that Citigroup was said to have violated very likely did not
exist but was a post hoc rationalisation that transformed an expected standard of conduct, into an
explicit principte." This interpretation brings something to both sides of the Callan-Miller debate. On
one hand, Citigroup appeared to operate as an atomised, self-interested 'market' actor, and
believed that other market participants did the same (seeMiller 1999). From Citigroup's perspective,
the market existed, independently of whether it was being performed as a result of economic
theory. This could fall into Callan's framework. Citigroup's traders were, however, mistaken in their
view, because other stakeholders, including its competitors, held that atomised self-interested
behaviour had its limits. As they saw it, the market brought gains to participants but should not
supersede the dominant socia-political norms in the exchange mechanism. Several stakeholders said
they would defect from the system if Citigroup behaved in the same way again (DT3). The liquid,
transparent, 'pure' MTS market was constructed to safeguard a mode of exchange that was not
native to the participants. In a nod to Millers view, a rival exchange called the MTS'soutput "virtual
liquidity". This interpretation, which I set out below, shows that the two sides of the controversy -
Citigroup and the others - could be seen to correspond, respectively, to Callan and Millers view of
embeddedness and performativity.
12 Braithwaite(2002: 50-52) definesastandardaa thresholdof what isdesired,andaprincipleasa planfor
action.
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6.3.4.2. Citigroup: Discovering embedded ness through controversy
The Citigroup episode was deeply socially embedded, along several dimensions. The controversy
itself was a social intermediation of public judgement over Citigroup's conduct. Commentators did
not see the market as an amoral space, but one moderated by emotions such as anger, concern, and
jealousy, which the data frequently linked to the ensuing risk appetite on the market. Citigroup's
competitors lodged protests, appealing to non-market institutions to intervene. They had been taken
by surprise because Citigroup was reputed to be risk averse in the market (DB). Ten senior
managers planned their response at one of the most social networking environments there are:
dinner. Their retaliation included reaching out to their client networks to attempt to hurt Citigroup's
reputation, which by some measures they succeeded in doing (TI6). In two instances, Citigroup
apologised for the trade. One such "public statement of contrition" (FT28)was widely characterised
as a "humiliating" (OT7) attempt to placate regulators (FT28, TI6, NYT1).One competitor called it
"birch beating in public but [also] a high-risk strategy". A tactical apology could fire back if it was
"seen as manipulative" by regulators (FT28).These signals of controversy all involved transmitting
influence through social channels, including various networks that were in turn expected to punish
Citigroup and thus restore confidence to the market.
A second dimension of embedded ness was the political construction of the MTS platform itself.13
The market-making rules of the exchange, which required dealers to quote publicly the prices at
which they would buy and sell securities, had been set up to ensure that smaller Eurozone
governments would have sufficient liquidity for their debt, given that the Euro had eliminated
currency risk and the market might uniformly prefer safer bonds. This was a politically constructed
market structure (see Fligstein 1996) that employed a "sociotechnical device" (et Calion 2005: 319) in
the form of its market-making rules to create, as a rival exchange put it, "virtual liquidity" (TI4). The
liquidity was said to be "virtual" because it did not arise from innate, ad hoc utility-maximising
behaviour, but rather because it was politically mandated. These rules made the market so liquid
and transparent, that it decreased arbitrage opportunities for banks. In order to secure banks'
participation, governments tacitlv agreed (FT8) to reward those market participants with more
lucrative opportunities in primary markets, Le. bond issuance. Thus, participating in a market that
helped smaller governments finance their fiscal policies gave banks a networking opportunity for
new business. This market had major socio-political underpinnings; I would say it that expresses the
state-market condominium as a businessmodel: Eurozone governments received a discount on their
13 See also Beunza, Hardie, and MacKenzie (2006).
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borrowing, and banks received alternative lucrative business - both state and market actors
profited.
The reason behind the controversy may have been that Citigroup underestimated the extent to
which the MTSmarket was embedded; indeed, how much the market relied on its embedded nessto
function properly. This is where embeddedness played its most significant role. Although Citigroup
was often said to have broken a "gentlemen's agreement", which would itself be evidence of social
norms and networks at play, it appears at least as likely that such an agreement did not exist ex
ante, but emerged as a post hoc rationalisation that enabled commentators to justify the oddity of a
competitive, by-the-book transaction having so angered them. This argument, which I now expand,
would also characterise the putative gentlement's agreement asa performative device.
To begin with, Citigroup appeared unaware that such a gentlemen's agreement had existed. In a
leaked internal memo, Citigroup traders planned the operation with explicit references to "killing off
smaller dealers" and undermining the Eurex market, where Germany, a powerful client, had
extensive interests (FTS3).The memo did not in any way foresee controversy. On the contrary, the
traders expected other banks to engage in "copycat trades", which would help undermine the
market, as Citigroup intended (ibid). Citigroup therefore saw the MTS as atomised entities trading
self-interestedly and perhaps rationally, rather than conditioned by norms. If a gentlemen's
agreement indeed existed, then traders at the world's (then-)Iargest bank did not know about them,
or they thought it was fragile.
So had an agreement existed? As I noted in Chapter 3, there is no persuasive evidence for it. Despite
numerous reports citing an agreement as the main reason for the controversy, only one article in a
sample of 168 reports actually ventured a guess at what it had been. That report said that a
gentlemen's agreement had "barred firms from swamping the market with a barrage of sell orders"
(TIl). It is a rather precise description of Citigroup's transaction. Yet, no individuals were quoted
describing the agreement, and even whilst several politicians and regulators invoked the need for
"fairness" in markets, none mentioned unwritten rules. It is entirely possible that there were
standards of conduct - that is, thresholds of "fair" and "unfair" conduct - without there being any
principles - that is, prescriptions for action (see Braithwaite 2002). I believe this was the case.
The inconsistency between, on one hand, claims that a gentlemen's agreement was central to the
controversy and, on the other hand, a near total inability to articulate what the agreement had
been, has at least two possible explanations. The first is that the agreement was made at a high level
of the organisation and Citigroup traders did not know about it. Granovetter (1990) and Moran
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(2005) would call this structural embeddedness; that is, the embedded ness was determined by a
hierarchical configuration in the company. In support of this argument, Citigroup's upper
management distanced themselves from the traders' actions, calling them "knuckle-headed" and
said they had not met the bank's standards (NYT1). However, their apology did not invoke market
rules, norms, or a gentlemen's agreement, but focused more generically on acting in the interests of
their markets (plural) and their clients (ibid). Therefore, the possibility that an agreement existed
and the traders were unaware of it is tenuous.
An alternative interpretation for the hollowness of the gentlemen's agreement is that it did not
exist, but instead emerged as a post hoc rationalisation that helped stakeholders interpret what had
gone wrong. When rational action failed to serve the common interest, the gentlemen's agreement
construct formally assumed behavioural norms required in the market. Put differently, if generalised
morality did not exist, someone had to invent it. Suppose that, as economic sociologists argue,
economic theory is performative; or, in MacKenzie's words (2006), economic theory is an engine of
economy, not only a camera. Actors draw on economic theory to shape their decisions under
uncertainty, which is to say that they are socialised by it. From this perspective, a broken
gentlemen's agreement was a much more straightforward issue for a performer of economic theory
to rationalise than a controversy arising from a legal and profitable operation. For those who learned
morality from economic theory, the emergent gentlemen's agreement became a heuristic to make
opposition to Citigroup's transaction epistemologically coherent. It helped stakeholders to articulate
the deeper underlying explanation for the controversy - that traders were expected to help
maintain orderly markets. This corporate responsibility was intrinsically obvious (a standard), but
never stated (as a principle). It was only implicit that traders had to use their judgment to moderate
the market rules, not to inject too much liquidity into the system. Interpreting the gentlemen's
agreement as a post hoc rationalisation helps explain why the condemnations of Citigroup often
appeared so mixed. Saidone trader: "They didn't do anything wrong, they just cornered the market.
I'll tell you this though, $25 million doesn't seem like a lot of profit when the whole world it lining up
against you" (DT3) (see Section 3.2.2). Why was the world lining up against Citigroup if they had
done nothing wrong?
It is possible that several stakeholders underwent an epistemological journey, departing from a
position of atomised economic thinking and discovering themselves within a socia-economic
network with norms that they had not previously articulated. They codified the notion of a
"gentlemen's agreement" to articulate the requisite norm. In my reading, Citigroup's operation was
a controversial discovery of embedded ness.
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To clarify how the gentlemen's agreement construct was a performative instrument, we can divide it
into ex ante and ex post dimensions. The ex post performativity is the affirmation that a gentlemen's
agreement existed. From the moment it was public, it captured the existing outrage and set out
norms for future behaviour on the MTS, so it immediately came into effect. The ex ante dimension
is the reason why the affirmation was required. It was necessary to codify Citigroup's infraction as a
violation of a gentlemen's agreement because atomised conventional wisdom could not explain the
controversy. Conventional wisdom was economic theory, which justified Citigroup's self-interested
behaviour. Had actors not been constrained by their performance of economic theory, the
codification of a post hoc gentlemen's agreement would not have been necessary. Citigroup's
infraction would have been a clear infraction, and the controversy moot.
6.3.4.3. SWFs:Performing economic theory, responsibly
The sovereign wealth funds controversy may also be characterised as an exercise in pertormatlon."
The SWFepisode shows a new type of actor being integrated into global financial markets by means
of "user manuals" based on economic theory. The manuals simultaneously described how funds
should behave and created that new reality, having been adopted voluntarily as codes-of-conduct.
One basis for this forced performation was SWFs' perceived embeddedness: the funds were not
trusted to perform economic theory becausethey were instruments of the state. This was despite all
available evidence suggesting that their increasing risk appetite was in line with global trends and
without untoward intent. Underlining this distrust, a Guardian editorial stated, "After all, commercial
implications are unlikely to be paramount for totalitarian regimes" (GU17). The assumption is that
SWFsmight have traditional or socio-political motives for their investment choices. Accordingly, the
challenge was to train the funds to adopt idealised economic behaviour, particularly to invest solely
on commercial grounds (rather than socially embedded grounds), providing transparency to other
market actors, etc. These investors had to support markets, not undermine them.
While this alone constitutes evidence of the performative use of economic theory, the handling of
SWFswent further. One might call it 'performativity-plus' - funds had to perform economic theory
but, in addition, to perform it responsibly. The generic concern about sovereign funds was that the
funds threatened systemic stablntv." In response, sovereign funds were compelled, first, to dis-
embed themselves from traditional or social investment norms, and to subsume those to economic
14 Performationisperformativityexpressedasanactionrather than aquality.
15 SeeChapter4, Section4.2.3. Specifically,SWFsmightdestabiliseliquidity, usepolitical influenceto further
their investments,or hoardcapital reservesthus not recyclingtheir earningsinto the globaleconomy.
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utility. The process of dis-embedding was performance of economic theory, through principles such
as rational, risk-based utility-maximisation. But this dis-embedded ness from idiosyncratic social
norms was an insufficient, perhaps even implausible, way to reduce systemic risk. (After all, the
funds were already investing on commercial grounds before the controversy, according to available
evidence.) To make up for this implausible dis-embeddedness, the funds were also compelled to re-
embed themselves in a responsible market ethic, whereby their conduct would be shaped by
systemic objectives, not simply atomised economic rationale. This new embeddedness within a
responsible ethic was achieved by means of a performative code-of-conduct, which both described
and created a new reality for (responsible) sovereign wealth funds. I would call this disembedding
and re-embedding, 'performativity-plus'.
To accept this argument, we must hold the code-of-conduct as an actor-neutral manual of good
conduct. That is, the code should be a generic economic performance manual, not only for funds,
but for other actors. In support of this proposition, I showed in Figure 4-9 that the reprimand for
Citigroup's transaction was based on the same principles as that for sovereign funds. Peter
Mandelson's statement that a code-of-conduct for SWFswould "merely be a question of formalising
existing investment practice" also framed this exercise as performation.
Thus far, I have showed that the Citigroup and SWFcontroversies provide evidence and variations of
embeddedness and performativity. CMR protocols and objectives are not necessarily 'social',
however, because they aim to sustain financial markets through economic processes like financial
risk management. However, they are also not necessarily economic, because they call for a shared
purpose with regulators, other market participants, and imply a use of ethics. This dimension of CMR
protocols arguably de-legitimises some rational economic activities, like regulatory arbitrage, as I
now argue.
6.3.4.4. Credit Crunch: De-legitimising regulatory arbitrage
Regulatory arbitrage is often seen as legitimate from the point of view of rational action. Among
economists, the way to avoid it is to realign incentives such that firms are not inclined to engage in it
(Goodhart et al 1998). Yet, the social processeswitnessed in the Credit Crunch episode - particularly
the call for responsible compliance and its property of pursuing shared objectives with regulators -
served in part to de-legitimise that practice.
There are at least three kinds of regulatory arbitrage often seen as legitimate. One is to re-locate
operations to jurisdictions where regulatory requirements are relatively lower. In the credit crunch
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media data, fears were often expressed that higher regulatory risk in the UK would drive financial
firms to other jurisdictions such as Switzerland or Ireland (e.g. DT73, GU42).16 A second kind of
arbitrage is to exploit the differential between official requirements and the current position.
Greenspan (1998: 16S) gives an example from the banking sector, whereby "a group of loans attracts
an internal capital charge that is very low compared with the Basle 8% [regulatory] standard, [and]
the bank has a strong incentive to undertake regulatory capital arbitrage to structure the risk
position in a manner that allows it to be reclassified into a lower regulatory risk category." In this
example, if the bank has exceeded regulatory requirements, "preventing the bank from earning
[what it regards as] an acceptable rate of return on its capital" (op cit: 166), then it is likely to try to
reduce its excess compliance towards the minimum (see also Ayres and Braithwaite: 1992: 112-3). A
third type of regulatory arbitrage is to use regulatory requirements as a pivot around which to create
innovative new products and transactions (Minton, Sanders and Strahan 2004). This type of
arbitrage explicitly seeks to exploit loopholes in regulation and is the type most frequently used to
explain regulators' inability to keep up with the sophistication ofthe financial industry.
From the perspective of a rational, self-interested actor, these practices are legitimate (Goodhart et
al 1998). Jurisdictional arbitrage is openly discussed by corporations; regulatory capital arbitrage is
defended as efficiency and profit-maximisation (Greenspan 1998); and regulatory arbitrage through
innovation is characterised as a problem for regulators to deal with, a natural consequence of self-
interested corporate behaviour - John Mack, Chairman of Morgan Stanley, made this argument to
the FCIC (2010). An implicit dichotomy here is that regulators are responsible for safeguarding the
financial system, and corporations are responsible for maximising shareholder value.
The emergence of CMR as a regulatory expectation challenges this dichotomy. Firms also become
responsible for ensuring market confidence and stability. The post-Credit Crunch regulatory debate,
in particular, held that firms should comply responsibly, pursuing shored objectives with regulators.
The SEC's affirmation that "mere compliance with the law, narrowly viewed, is not the highest goal
to which we aspire, but the base from which we start" (SEC6: 14), was an explicit challenge to the
legitimacy of regulatory arbitrage.
16 These fears always struck me as ill-founded. Few countries were in an economic or regulatory position
desirable for large institutions to relocate to. In Ireland, for example, macroeconomic conditions deteriorated
sharply during the financial crisis, and the government's escalating public debt increased the risk of tax hikes.
Switzerland posed heightened regulatory risks. According to Philipp Hildebrand (2009), a governor of the Swiss
National Bank, speaking at 'The Future of Financial Regulation' conference at Oxford University on 6 March
2009, one of the major investment banks had explicitly threatened Swissauthorities with re-location, in
protest at new regulations. This occurred one week before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, after which the
threat was rescinded because relocation options closed down.
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In the rational, self-interested world, regulators' response to these practices seems to lie in
realigning incentives. Goodhart et al (1998: xviii) argue that, "While there must always remain a role
for external regulation, there can be no alternative to placing greater reliance on internal risk
management". Accordingly, they propose "a reinterpretation of financial regulation as a contract
which is designed so as to make it in institutions' own self-interest to maintain a 'socially desirable'
(low) level of risk. [...J The main responsibility for risk control has to be shifted back towards internal
management and away from external regulators" (op cit: xviii-xix). This emphasis on internal risk
management is consistent with CMR.
However, the focus on incentives as the basic tool for changing risk management the poses a
significant principal-agent problem. The regulators face three information gaps: what the quality is
of banks' internal risk management processes (unless they undertake an intrusive audit); the
thoroughness of banks' compliance with rules; and "residual risks", independently of the other two
(op cit: 46). The principal-agent problem in turn leads to two potential market failures: adverse
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection would occur when high-risk bank managers look to
comply with the lowest possible regulatory requirements. Moral hazard would occur when
circumstances "materialise that incite bankers to take on larger risks than the maximum ones
compatible with regulations - even though it was optimal ex ante to accept the rules" (op cit: 47;
also the example given by Greenspan). This is a time-inconsistent issue: ''The ex ante incentives to
commit [to regulatory standards] can be different from the ex post incentives to adhere, once
something unexpected happens" (ibid).
The implementation of CMR in the three empirical episodes included both punitive incentives and
ethical principles that helped to mitigate this problem. Punitive disincentives are evident in the
strong connection between CMR and regulatory risk. In all three episodes, regulators raised the
possibility of establishing tighter rules and higher penalties if irresponsible conduct persisted. In
addition, some CMR protocols, notably in the area of risk management, are designed to increase
greater accountability. They are similar to some of the incentive structures recommended by
Goodhart et al (1998) in their publication for the Bankof England. For example:
• "Ensurethat appropriate sanctionsare appliedto internal managementwhich allows failure of
control to occur.[Accountability]
• "Require large institutions to establish an internal audit system.[Systemically important
institutions]
• "Require the internal audit committee of such financial institutions to signify that it has
consideredthe implicationsof the risk preferencesof key personneland their pay structures.
[Escalating strategies; aligning remuneration with risk]
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• "Decidewhat marketmovementsare soextremeasto merit governmentsupport to withstand
them. Requirebanksto hold sufficient capital to meet shocksup to this limit in stresstests of
proprietarymodels[Stress-testing)" (opcit: 59-60,italicisedphrasesadded).
This emphasis on improving accountability mechanisms relative to risk management is notably
similar to CMR. These recommendations were made in 1998 to allow firms to regulate themselves
better and thus help reduce systemic risk, traditionally the regulators' responsibility (op cit: 44-5,
52). Alongside them, the authors recommended internal systems based on practices like value-at-
risk modelling and extensive structuring of credit derivatives (op cit: ch. 5) which, with the benefit of
hindsight, became very problematic.
By 2008, the idea of pure self-interest was questioned. Many credit derivatives were criticised as
socially useless (FSA2009b: 15) or as contrary to the interests of investors to whom they were sold
(SEC14: 3). The legality and self-interested nature of these instruments was not sufficient to
legitimise them. The key regulatory issue was not only whether the right regulatory incentives had
been in place. Companies' decision-making was also assessedon an ethical plane.
The expectation of CMR held that firms should pursue an ethic of common purpose, such as
anticipating the impact of investment transactions on the market and its participants, and choosing
business activities in a way that met customers' and investors' genuine needs. Curiously, in the
incentives-based, self-interested world, 'moral hazard' is rarely discussed as a moral issue." Rather,
it is usually taken as given that if an economic incentive exists, morality is subsumed to it. When
regulators called for responsible compliance in the wake of the credit crunch, they were intruding on
the ethic of pure self-interest, and calling for firms to interpret and implement regulation the way
that it had been intended. This process was closely related to being ethically competent and
humanising technical activity. That is, rather than using technical authority to arbitrage regulatory
requirements, it meant deploying those talents specifically to hard-to-read situations to ensure that
the regulatory objectives - particularly systemic stability - were observed. Thus CMR as a meta-
regulation introduced an ethical conditioning to the incentives-based world, and de-legitimised
regulatory arbitrage. Financial incentives and self-interest would no longer suffice as a justification
for arbitraging regulation - whether by seeking the minimum possible compliance or by innovating
around it - if well-functioning markets were threatened.
17 E.g. seePauly(1968:531):"the problemof 'moral hazard'in insurancehas,in fact, little to dowith morality,
but canbeanalysedwith orthodoxeconomictools"; cf. DembeandBoden(2000).
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This de-legitimisation of regulatory arbitrage synthesises concepts from interests-based political
economy and values-based soctologv." On one hand, the regulatory expectation of CMR behaviour
acknowledges intrinsically that markets operate based on financial incentives. On the other hand, it
conditions these incentives by invoking values-based concepts like responsible compliance, ethical
competence, and humanising technical activity. The idea appears to (re-)embed mechanistic, self-
interested economic activity in shared objectives between regulators and regulated institutions. Is
this plausible, or a fundamental contradiction? If incentives-based action, including regulatory
arbitrage, is inevitable, and at the same time remains incompatible with systemic stability and
expectations held of firms, then that might point to an enduring crisis in Western financial
governance.
6.3.5. Summary
The analysis in this section sought to integrate the substantive theory of CMRwith current academic
debates in political economy and economic sociology. This happened in four parts: theoretical
context, CMR's positioning, integration with political economy, and integration with economic
sociology. First, the context of decentralised governance in financial markets was explained.
Decentralisation diffuses authority and rule-making among both public and private actors, who often
operate as a condominium (Underhill 2000), a network entangled in a "complex alignment of
principles, mechanisms and actors" (Drahos and Braithwaite 2001: 123). Levy-Faur (2005) frames
this paradigm as "regulatory capitalism". In it, the state assumes a supervisory and "steering"
function and encourages businesses to restructure "through the creation of internal controls and
mechanisms of self-regulation in the shadow of the state" (op cit: 15). The regulatory technique that
promotes this focus on firms' internal controls, the regulation of self-regulation, is meta-regulation.
The second part of the theoretical integration positioned CMR as an example of meta-regulation. In
this model, the emphasis on reforming internal controls; the regulators' encouragement of self-
regulation by firms in order to meet regulators' objectives; and the push towards corporate
accountability to a wider "democratic polity" (Chiu 2009: 28) were some of the factors that align
CMR with meta-regulation. Thus CMRmay be better understood through existing literature as part
of a wider trend of meta-regulation that "has been hailed as one of the hallmarks of the 'new
regulatory state'" (Black2006: 22).
18 I note that ethicalvariantsof politicaleconomyand interest-basedsociologyalsoexist;seeBraithwaiteand
Drahos(2000) andSwedberg(2004).
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The third and fourth parts of the theoretical integration sought to advance current debates in
political economy and economic sociology. In the political economy space, CMR was argued to
enhance Underhill and Zhang's (2008) framework of legitimacy in financial governance. The CMR
protocols comprise valuable inputs for financial governance that is aimed at an orderly financial
system, which is an output in the public interest. The covariance of CMR and regulatory risk was
presented as evidence of accountability in the substantive episodes that were covered. In the space
of economic sociology, each of the CMRepisodes contributed empirical evidence to the concepts of
embedded nessand performativity, and showed new variations of the concepts in action. Sodoing, it
was argued that CMR helped to explain key patterns of interaction that are problematic in both
political economy and economic sociology.
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6.4. Directionsfor future research
The presentation of CMR in Section 6.2 explained what CMR is, how it is implemented, by whom,
when, and with what consequences. Yet the data provides only part of the answer as to why CMR
emerges. Published explanations for the rise of shared governance are extensive, both in political
economy (e.g. Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999) and in sociology of law (e.g. Teubner 1983). My own
grounded theory provided limited explanations. In each episode, CMRemerged because regulators
and other actors explicitly perceived that CMR would reduce systemic risk. Still, the question is
worth pursuing further and empirically.
Each episode presented some context-specific reasons for the emergence of CMR. In the Citigroup
case, it was argued that the regulatory reaction to Citigroup was partly due to the interest that
governments had in the MTS exchange, which enabled them to sell debt more cheaply, and which
Citigroup had threatened. In the SWFscase, the controversy was partly due to protectionist instincts
in Western governments that intended to prevent foreign acquisitions of domestic interests. In the
Credit Crunch episode, the eventual prominence of remuneration on the regulatory agenda was
partly driven, in my view, by the media's intense reporting on the subject, due to civic interest in the
matter. These context-specific reasons for the emergence of CMR make it difficult to pursue the
question of why it (CMR)all happened. However, grounded theory methodology does antlcipate the
quest for more abstract explanations, as researchers pursue a substantive theory like CMR across
empirical settings, leading to formal theory (Glaser 2007). I suggest several empirical settings for
that endeavour below.
The question of why CMR emerged (why only after regulatory interventions, and in whose
interests?) is also worthwhile pursuing because it tells us about the feasibility of CMRasa regulatory
programme. In each episode, firms adapted to the expected CMR conduct. The three empirical
episodes showed that a significant cross-section of market actors recognised the need for CMR in
order to assure systemic stability. However, each case required regulatory intervention before CMR
was adopted. There may be an issueof policy capture by specific corporate or regulatory interests. A
comparison may be drawn with the prisoner's dilemma in game theory, where the Pareto
equilibrium is suboptimal. CMR implementation may rely on an external coordinating agent (such as
a regulator), and this thesis therefore has a messagefor regulation and public policy on the need for
enforcement. Exploring why CMR emerged and how it was constructed would help us understand
whether it is consistently achievable and therefore how effective it could be. To do this, researchers
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would be well served to find cases that emphasise the observation of CMR rather than (as I have
done) its absence.
In addition to 'why', two unanswered questions were raised by the data, noted in Section 6.2.1:
• Whether higher CMR leads to lower systemic risk
• Whether higher regulatory risk leads to higher CMR
Regulators' expectation of CMR is predicated on the assumption that CMR behaviour will help to
reduce systemic risk. As a result they attempt to compel CMR behaviour. Yet both of these effects
may fail to hold. CMR behaviour may not mitigate systemic risk, and regulatory risk many not
compel adoption of CMR protocols. As a result, an enduring expectation that firms adopt the
protocols and ensure orderly markets could be persistently frustrated, leading to further financial
controversies and regulatory conflicts. For this reason, both questions are worth pursuing.
Both rely, of course, on observing CMR in practice. Are senior managers at financial firms cognisant
of CMR expectations? Under what conditions do they implement which CMR protocols? What are
the opportunities and constraints? In addition to contributing to our understanding of the
effectiveness of regulatory frameworks, and the legitimacy of private regulatory authority, an
analysis of who controls institutions and for what purpose is an increasingly fertile field of economic
sociology (Stearns and Mizruchi 2005; Teubner 1994). The data frequently referred to a number of
financial actors and settings where CMR appears to be increasingly relevant, and where these
questions may be pursued. Theoretically, the CMRpropositions apply to large, liquid, and innovative,
banks, funds, and similar institutions. Private equity funds were singled out in the SWFcontroversy
because they were perceived to be untransparent and potentially destabilising. The industry agreed
a code-of-conduct (British Venture Capital Association 2007) in response to criticism, but the code
was significantly "watered down" (FT123) relative to expectations, signalling a potential space for
meta-regulatory intervention. Similarly, hedge funds faced calls from the German, French and UK
governments to improve codes-of-conduct in the industry, particularly to increase transparency, and
rejected them (Financial Times 2007b). During the Credit Crunch, the funds saw increased regulatory
scrutiny (see SEC12),including a stringent ban on short-selling, which the industry resisted (Borges
2008). Given the systemic importance of these funds, and the persistent calls for closer oversight,
they are a fertile subject for researching CMR.
New financial markets and practices could also expand the explanatory power of CMR.One of these
settings, known as 'dark pools', are private markets where funds exchange financial securities away
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from public scrutiny. Actors who participate in these markets have faced face higher regulatory
scrutiny from the SEC,for example, who announced that they would "take a serious look at what
regulatory actions may be warranted to respond to the potential investor protection and market
integrity concerns that dark pools may raise" (SEC14).Dark pools and other settings often see "high-
frequency trading", also known as "flash trading", a relatively new practice where very large trades
are conducted through computerised algorithms. Flash trading is reminiscent of Citigroup's
transaction, insofar as it involves trading of very high values, very quickly, across multiple platforms.
Flash trading is also under increased regulatory scrutiny in the US and UK due to its potentially
destabilising effect (NYT33, NYT34). I believe that the propositions of CMR may help researchers
frame and explain these emerging controversies.
These are contemporaneous trends, and they may obscure a wider generalisability for CMR theory.
CMR may have emerged much earlier than the last decade, which has been my focus. As I
mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5), several of the conditions underpinning CMR - very large
financial transactions, interconnected financial markets - are increasingly apparent and the
temptation is to claim that CMR is increasingly relevant historically. Nevertheless, CMRexpectations
may have deeper roots than I have uncovered. For example, banks and discount houses explicitly
assumed a responsibility to stabilise financial markets, in their own interests, under the Gold
Standard in the late is" and early zo" century." In this vein, fruitful new research on CMR theory
might research more time-periods, not only new contemporaneous actors and transactions.
19 I am grateful to Geoffrey Underhill for this insight.
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6.5. Conclusion
This chapter presented a substantive theory of corporate market responsibility, which is a
conceptual account of, and a partial explanation for, the three empirical episodes of the thesis. CMR,
as a concept, was defined as an expectation by regulators and other political, economic and social
actors that companies will help to regulate systemic risk through certain internal management
protocols. CMR, as a corporate practice, refers to these management protocols. Accordingly, three
sets of propositions were presented, which together comprise the theory of CMR. The first set
contains a single proposition that CMR exists. The second set contains three propositions about the
CMRmanagement protocols: risk management, investment policy, and proactive improvement. The
third set contains meta-propositions, which hold that more (less) CMR leads to more (less)
regulatory risk, and that the absence of CMRprobably increases systemic risk.
This grounded theory is empirically credible because the concepts in it emerged directly from data
analysis, and gathered new properties and dimensions as new data was collected. It is theoretically
credible because - despite departing from data rather than extant propositions - CMR is very similar
to the model of meta-regulation (Parker 2002, Chiu 2009, Black 2006), and resonates with enforced
self-regulation and ethical self-regulation (Chiu 2009). It is relevant because it addressed
contemporaneous problematiques in the political economy, including the reaction to the Credit
Crunch, often described as the biggest financial crisis in generations, and because it offers new
insights about unstable taken-far-granted meanings (Charmaz 2006: 183), such as the construction
of 'gentlemen's agreements' in bond markets. The theory is also useful because the CMR protocols
are presented as modifiable generic processes that other analysts may pursue, and because they
may contribute to a more stable financial system, or one where firms are more accountable for their
impact on it. Finally, CMR is original, the fourth criterion of grounded theory, because it extends and
refines ideas in political economy and economic sociology. The following concluding chapter
addresses some of the theory's limitations.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion - Contributions to knowledge
Building a grounded theory, like CMR, entails a conceptual journey. Analysis travels from sensitising
concepts through data, into an integrative, explanatory concept that usually (ideally) differs from
researchers' early ideas. Such a journey was evident in this thesis. Chapter 1 presented concepts and
literature that framed the research question, whereas Chapter 6 presented concepts and literature
that framed the answer. The questions that motivated this research originally related to how firms
might address market failure, particularly when governments lack the capacity to do so and when
CSR theory does not provide answers because some failures are market-bounded. Over the course
of the research, data revealed that the problematique was the pressure brought to bear on firms to
engage in endogenous market governance; their responsibility to shape internal controls in order to
reduce systemic risk. Being a regulation of discretionary conduct (Grabosky 1995, Parker 2002), this
'corporate market responsibility' was interpreted as a form of financial meta-regulation.
The theory of CMR could develop in a number of directions. To varying degrees, I have shown CMR
to relate to patterns of behaviour that are analysed in political economy, economic sociology, law,
management/ and welfare economics. Such is the nature of an integrative concept. This nature is
both a strength and a weakness. An integrative concept helps to discover explanations and meanings
that disciplinary boundaries might obscure. On the other hand, integrative concepts lack a clear
'brand'. It is difficult to answer the question, which discipline does this study belong to?, even
though it is easy to answer another, what is this a study of? In this case, the answer is market
governance. In this chapter, I outline some of the thesis's other contributions and limitations,
beginning with limitations.
Grounded theories are sometimes criticised for being inductive because they develop through
empirical analysis (cf. Glaser and Holton 2004). As a result, one might ask whether CMR theory is
only as good as the next response to a crisis. Generically, this charge of inductivism misunderstands
the technical processes of axial coding, deduction, and theoretical sampling in grounded theory.
These processes deliberately look for variations in concepts to 'falsify' researchers' original
interpretations (Strauss 1987: 12). More specifically, this CMR theory derived from systematic
comparison of environments of varying scope and depth - ranging from a single actor in a well-
1 Including strategy (e.g. Baron 2001), CSR(e.g. Dubbink 2004), and corporate governance (e.g. Power 2005).
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defined market, through a set of well-defined actors across various markets, to a full Western
financial crisis. This progressively broader scope was a search for green, grey, and black swans - to
extend Popper's (1978) terminology - within similar substantive contexts. Importantly, the literature
on decentralised financial regulation suggests that CMR is consistent with established models, such
as meta-regulation, enforced self-regulation, and ethical self-regulation. Therefore one could also
invert the CMR argument, if necessary, to frame the empirical observation of CMR as substantive
evidence of those models.
A possible limitation is that by pursuing documentary evidence rather than interviews or
questionnaires, the sampling strategy may have reduced the persuasiveness of the findings among
those who consider such direct testimonies essential. In explaining my decision, I argued in Chapter
2 that idiosyncratic testimonies would be unnecessary and unhelpful. They were unnecessary
because I sought to understand broad-based expectations of market conduct, rather than
idiosyncratic ones, and the documentary data contained extensive citations from individual actors
that provided them. Some of my more important findings - the sociological discussion of the
Eurobond gentlemen's agreement and the explanation of how SWFs'investment intent was judged -
arose from individuals' quotations in media. Pursuing idiosyncratic testimonies outside the specific
controversies would be unhelpful because, among a number of cognitive challenges, actors would
have incentives to downplay concepts that implied taking on additional operating costs and
opportunity costs, or characterised their own past conduct as irresponsible (Section 2.4.2.3). They
would introduce idiosyncratic skew that I had worked to reduce by developing selection criteria for
news sources. In recognition that individuals' perspectives are valuable, I pursued them through the
social medium of news reporting rather than through individual testimonies.
This strengthened my findings, in my view. A broad-based, baseline perspective for CMR is valuable
because it provides a firmer conceptual perspective for future research. With this substantive
version of CMR, one may pursue research within specific institutions, as suggested in Chapter 6,
incorporating idiosyncratic views. If respondents find CMR implausible, then this may signal future
conflicts with regulators. Such arguments would be harder to pursue if the concept of CMR were
already 'diluted' with idiosyncratic skew from individual interviews or questionnaires.
A more persuasive limitation of the thesis is that it does not attend to how CMR is socially
constructed. News reports and regulatory documents were assessed 'as they are'. The politics of
media companies and regulatory institutions were not analysed. Media hype and skew present
challenges to understanding what is 'really' happening 'out there' (seeChapter 2, Section 2.4.2.1). In
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addition, meta-regulation may be a way for regulators to shift the onus of regulatory problems to
corporations (Black 2006: 22)/ which would make CMR effectively a red herring. However, I
proceeded on the basis that news reports and regulatory documents establish precedents that
become 'real'. For example, if the media overemphasised the idea of a gentlemen's agreement on
the MTS market, the agreement nevertheless became a principle of conduct. While protectionism
may have been a 'hidden' motive (in addition to CMRexpectations) for asking SWFsto pursue CMR
protocols, the protocols now exist and SWFsmay use them in future bargains. Post-Credit Crunch,
while the media overemphasised the issue of remuneration (relative to regulators), it also helped to
move that issue up the agenda and influenced market responses. Regulatory and policy documents
are references for corporate behaviour, whatever the motivations behind them. It may be that
corporations choose to debate and oppose expectations like CMR, but CMR comprises terms of
reference for that debate and therefore helps us understand it.
Among those who view research as a vehicle for advocacy (seeGuba and Lincoln 2005), CMRmay be
seen as unrealistic; as something that firms would not adopt. However, the objective in this thesis,
contrary to much governance literature, has not been to develop a realistic regulatory programme,
but to investigate a 'real' regulatory problem. CMR accounts for empirically observed phenomena.
Certainly the data suggest that regulators and others consider CMR conduct to be desirable, and
enforce it, but the thesis itself has been agnostic as to whether CMRsuccessfully reduces systemic
risk.' A better question for advocates might be, under what conditions would firms adopt CMR?This
is a worthy empirical pursuit, and this thesis should provide useful constructs and a frame of
reference for it.
As a substantive theory, CMR's explanatory power is de-limited by several factors given by the
empirical episodes. CMR is particularly relevant in relation to large financial institutions (entities),
extraordinary transactions (actions), Western regulatory jurisdictions (location), in the present era
rather than historically (time-period), and under conditions of unstable liquidity or where liquidity is
threatened. The Citigroup and Credit Crunch episodes saw ample liquidity followed by liquidity
crunches (in Citigroup's case, as banks suspended participation on the MTS), and the SWF episode
was partly driven by concerns that SWFswould hoard liquidity (see Section 4.2.3). As such the key
feature of systemic risk that CMR is relevant to is the level of market liquidity. The thesis has not
explored how CMR would apply under different systemic risk conditions (see Goodhart et al 1998:
2 See,however,Hutter (2005).
3 Theempiricalevidencefocusedon the lackof CMR conductrather than its observance.
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chs 1, 7; Mishkin 2000), and it focuses on crisis prevention rather than crisis management (see
Eichengreen 1999).
The contributions of this thesis can be presented along methodological, empirical, and theoretical
lines. One measure of originality is the deployment of a methodology that is unusual for a certain
discipline (Guetzkow et al 2004). Grounded theory methodology is rare in the study of markets and
business management. Although it has been recommended as a method for building economic
theory (Finch 2002, Lee 2005), it remains a niche practice. This is unfortunate because grounded
theory facilitates the investigation of original concepts that may not easily fit in to existing
theoretical frameworks, particularly when the concepts are multidisciplinary. The thesis shows how
to implement a middle-ground position between positivist and constructivist methods, which
researchers of businessand markets are likely to find helpful, particularly in respect of governance.
Another methodological contribution is a code logging technique (explained in Chapter 2, Section
2.3.2, and illustrated in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.2) that enables systematic logging while developing
conceptual categories and relationships. It is particularly helpful when the data set contains
hundreds of documents and requires extensive logging. This technique is preferable to software
programmes like Nvivo when the documents cannot be easily transcribed to such a programme.
The thesis also contributes new conceptual understandings of empirical phenomena. This is another
dimension of originality (Guetzkow et al 2004). Eachempirical chapter presents data on the relevant
episode and develops a conceptual account and explanation for the episode. Much like case study
analysis would aim to provide "thick descriptions" of phenomena (Geertz 1973), these conceptual
renderings are "thick" theoretical explanations, where each concept is grounded in detailed data.
Researchersseeking to understand these episodes, which present significant controversies, will find
extensive empirical grounds in this thesis. The data on the public reactions (news reports) of these
controversies have not previously been collected or analysed, to my knowledge.
On a theoretical plane, the data and resulting theoretical propositions serve to advance existing
theoretical frameworks, like meta-regulation. Theoretical writing about meta-regulation is not
extensive (as compared with "enforced self-regulation", for instance) but the practice of meta-
regulation is "in vogue" (see Black 2006: 22). Guetzkow and colleagues (2004) single out a "new
approach to a trendy topic" as a form of originality. CMR is a new form of meta-regulation in several
ways. Chiu (2009: 32) argues that the generic framework of meta-regulation "offers no particular
insight as to ... systemic risk", but the CMR form of meta-regulation is specifically designed to
address this risk. CMR also shows how enforced self-regulation and ethical self-regulation may
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coexist as methods of enforcement. It combines incentives-based enforcement (Goodhart et al
1998), ethical enforcement (Shamir 2008), and legal accountability even in the absence of rules-
violations (Parker 2007).
CMR's dimension of accountability is a partial response to the problems raised by Underhill and
Zhang (2008). They argue that financial governance lacks legitimacy because it is increasingly aligned
with powerful private interests, who increasingly define supervisory standards (op cit: 536, 541).
CMR also suggests that private interests have increasing discretion in defining the scope of their
compliance decisions. However, CMR carries an objective that is in the public interest (an orderly
financial system), and an accountability mechanism (regulatory pressure), and therefore illustrates
limits to the transfer of influence to private interests. In addition to these empirical observations of
CMR, CMR as a theory is a normative ethic around which different constituencies may coalesce, in
order to provide inputs and outcomes that are perceived as more legitimate, and thus become less
costly and more effective (cf. op cit: 573).
Another theoretical contribution of CMR is to enhance two central concepts in the "incipient" (Knorr
Cetina and Preda 2005: 8) and interesting field of sociology of financial markets. The CMR episodes
seemed to show market actors constructing social norms 'post hoc' in order to help them perform
market theory. This analysis speaks to the heated debate (Holm 2007) between Calion (1998) and
Miller (2002) as to whether economic actors actually create and perform rational markets, or
whether rational markets are virtual interpretations. The Citigroup episode showed that both forms
of performativity can occur within the same market institution: Citigroup was ostensibly following a
rational, atomised strategy on the MTS exchange, while others claimed that implicit standards of
conduct had been in force. The SWFdebate illustrated an extension of performativity: encouraging
the funds to perform economic theory through "users' manuals" (GU17), but in addition, to perform
it responsibly. In this vein, the thesis contributes one of the first sociological analyses of sovereign
wealth funds. Finally, the Credit Crunch episode showed an interplay between regulatory incentives
and ethics de-legitimizing the practice of regulatory arbitrage.
As a doctoral thesis the work illustrates my own epistemological journey. I began by exploring the
research problem through CSR,economics, and political economy. Yet data analysis compelled me to
search further afield, to other areas of political economy, economic sociology, and law. In part, this
journey is testament to grounded theory methodology, which encourages researchers to keep an
open mind in deriving theoretical explanations. It is also a source of personal satisfaction that, in this
pursuit, I discovered extensive resonance between my empirical findings and extant concepts
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outside my initial theoretical 'silos'. The thesis built my ability to explore future research questions
within a wider range of market governance disciplines than I had anticipated. The Credit Crunch was
not only a financial crisis but, for this thesis, an empirical one. It is also a source of personal
satisfaction that I framed and handled that problem.
Ultimately the contribution is CMR theory itself, a frame of reference to help researchers
understand and anticipate governance problems in emerging domains of financial activity, and
across several disciplines. The theory has its strengths, and researchers may identify new areas of
theoretical relevance. CMR also appears increasingly relevant for actors like private equity funds,
markets like dark pools, and practices like high-frequency trading. For practitioners in these
domains, CMRmatters because it conveys standards and provides principles of market conduct that
that drive reactions from other actors, in markets and wider society. As I have noted, all three
episodes in the thesis occurred under conditions of ample liquidity followed by significant credit
shortages, or the threat of them. Currently, Western financial markets appear to be recovering
slowly from the Credit Crunch. Investment banks have recovered pre-crisis levels of profitability. If JP
Morgan's Jamie Dimon was right when he said that financial crises occur every seven years, then
now may be a propitious time to attend to corporate market responsibility.
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